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ABSTRACT 
 
     The  Polish-Soviet  War  of  1919-1921  was  a  direct  consequence  of  the  ideological 
objectives  pursued  by  the  belligerents.  Ideology  shaped  the  political  agenda  and  the 
diametrically opposed war aims of both states, and was implemented through the foreign 
policy, diplomatic negotiation and military engagements pursued. This proved to be the 
principal obstacle to  the  establishment of cordial relations. As  western democracy and 
Russian Marxism battled it out, war was inevitable. 
     Externally,  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  provided  the  necessary  conditions  for  the 
resumption of traditional Russian-Polish hostilities, whilst the Allied States consistently 
demonstrated  their  absolute  inability  to  directly  influence  either  the  development,  or 
outcome, of the conflict.  
      Redressing the balance of historiography, this thesis includes a greater examination of 
the conflict from the perspective of the Soviet regime. This firmly controlled the Russian 
decision-making process. By charting the war, it becomes clear that both states deliberately 
pursued  a  dual  offensive:  traditional  diplomatic  negotiation  and  military  campaign  as 
conditions  dictated.  However,  in  addition,  Soviet  Russia  developed  a  unique  and 
innovative,  revolutionary,  agit-prop,  diplomatic  medium.  This  enabled  adept  Soviet 
diplomats to  win the majority of diplomatic battles  during the conflict,  although often 
negotiating from a militarily weak position.  
     Nevertheless, the regime ultimately failed in its objective: to ignite socialist revolution 
in western Europe. The mistaken Soviet decision in July 1920 to cross the ethnographic 
border to forcefully sovietise Poland, in opposition to Marxist doctrine, irreversibly altered 
the complexion of the war and proved its pivotal turning point. This culminated politically 
with  the  short-lived  establishment  of  the  Provisional  Revolutionary  Committee  in 
Białystok,  and  militarily,  with  the  decisive  defeat  of  the  Red  Army  at  the  Battle  of 
Warsaw. It is now certain that the Red Army offensive into Poland in July 1920 aimed not 
only at the sovietisation of Poland, but at spreading the socialist revolution to Western 
Europe and overthrowing the Versailles settlement.  
      The European revolutionary upsurge had largely extinguished during the previous year 
and in August 1920, Communist ideology ultimately failed to inspire the vast majority of 
the Polish population. Thus, by utilising the Soviet military to secure its war aims, Lenin 
and the Politburo inadvertently signed the death-warrant of socialist revolution in Poland 
at the beginning of the twentieth century.   3 
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Note on Orthography 
 
Polish names are given in Polish (Julian Marchlewski, Feliks DzierŜyński).  Russian names 
have been transliterated from Cyrillic into English using the Library of Congress System. 
Where accepted English versions of both place and peoples’ names are well established, 
these are used (Warsaw, Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky). For places which have been allocated a 
variety of names in the period 1919-1921 (e.g. Lwów, Lvov, Lviv, Lemberg; Kraków, 
Cracow;  Wilno,  Vilna,  Vilnius)
1,  the  name  most  widely  used  in  1919-1921  has  been 
adopted, with the exception of quotations where they appear exactly as in the original.   
 
Note on Dates 
  
Until 31 January 1918, Russia followed the Julian calendar, which ran 13 days behind the 
Gregorian  calendar,  used  in  Western  Europe.  The  Soviet  Government  adopted  the 
Gregorian calendar on 31 January 1918. The following day was dated 14 February.  Dates 
concerning domestic Russian events are given in the Julian calendar until 31 January 1918 
and in the Gregorian after that date. Dates relating to international events, including the 
Great War, are given in the Gregorian calendar. 
                                                
1 For further details see, Appendix B: Variant Place-names   9 
Introduction 
 
1. Introduction 
 
      The Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921 was a direct consequence of the Soviet and Polish 
leaders’  ideological  objectives.  Soviet  Russia,  guided  by  Marxist  ideology,  sought  to 
export socialist revolution to the western world, whilst rival federalist and annexationist 
agendas fought to become the dominant philosophy in Poland. Both states attempted to 
implement these ideologies through the political, diplomatic and military policies adopted 
during the conflict.  
 
      In examining the development of Polish-Soviet relations during these crucial years, this 
thesis pays particular attention to the respective diplomatic and foreign policies pursued as 
these directly reflected the ideological and political objectives of both states. In this way, it 
will address the principal obstacles to the establishment of cordial relations between the 
neighbouring states, from the outset of the conflict in February 1919 to its conclusion at the 
Treaty of Riga in March 1921.  
 
      Previous accounts of the war have been written primarily, from the Polish perspective. 
To date, the most notable works in English on the Polish-Soviet War were written by 
Norman Davies, Piotr Wandycz and Adam Zamoyski. White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish-
Soviet War, 1919-20 by Davies, was one of the first historical works to highlight the war 
and the possibility of further research into the topic, but is primarily an examination of the 
military  conflict.
1  Likewise,  Zamoyski’s  The  Battle  for  the  Marchlands,  provides  an 
important military evaluation.
2 Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921 is an excellent account 
by Wandycz, but it is two-dimensional, focusing largely on relations between Russia and 
Poland,  and  readily  admits  that  it  provides  no  detailed  analysis  of  the  international 
situation.
3 Moreover, these sources were first written thirty to forty years ago and although 
all three authors read Russian, they were unable to visit and utilise the sources stored in the 
then Soviet archives. Consequently, an examination of their bibliographies demonstrates a 
heavy reliance on Polish and Western sources. 
                                                
1 N. Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20, (London, reprinted 2003, 1st edition 
1972). 
2 A. Zamoyski, The Battle for the Marchlands, (New York, 1981). 
3 P. Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921, (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).   10 
    Before 1990, detailed study of the history of Polish-Soviet relations was forbidden under 
the Communist  authorities  in both Russia and Poland, and careful analysis of existing 
Soviet historical accounts is required. For instance, Trotsky claimed that in the Soviet 
sponsored  documentary  collection,  Krasnaia  Kniga,  “...we  reported all  documents,  not 
concealing any at all”.
4 This was untrue: the collection of diplomatic documents is, in fact, 
highly selective. Indeed, Soviet documentary collections often failed to mention the Red 
Army defeat at the Battle of Warsaw and resultant Polish victory at all.
5 Moreover, the 
communist  regime  concealed  all  information  which  would  have  implicated  Lenin 
personally  in  subversive  activities,  including  his  support  for  the  Polish  Provisional 
Revolutionary  Committee  (Polrevkom)  and  his  demands  for  a  Soviet  offensive  into 
ethnographic  Poland  in  July  1920.
6  Istoriia  Pol’shi  is  one  example  of  extreme  Soviet 
historical bias in its treatment of the Polish-Soviet War.
7 Since the collapse of communism, 
much new material has been published in Poland.
8 In sharp contrast, the history of the 
Polish-Soviet  War  has  largely  remained  a  blank  spot  in  Russian  historiography.  Even 
today, many Russian historians appear keen to avoid raising inevitable difficult questions 
about the first defeat experienced by the Red Army at the hands of a foreign adversary.
9    
 
       This work seeks to redress the balance of historiography, aided by the opening of the 
Russian archives following the collapse of the Soviet Union. A research trip to Moscow, 
conducted primarily in the rich archives of the Rossiiskii gosudarstvennii arkhiv sotsial’no-
politicheskoi  istorii  (RGASPI)  (Russian  State  Archive  of  Social  and  Political  History), 
allowed access to collections previously unused by western researchers.
10 The thesis also 
draws upon little used collections at the extensive archives of the Instytut Polski i Muzeum 
im. Gen. Sikorskiego (Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum); Archiwum Instytutyu Józefa 
                                                
4  I.I.  Kostiushko  (ed.),  Pol’sko-Sovetskaia  Voina  1919-1920:  ranee  ne  opublikovannye  dokumenty  i 
materialy, vol. 1, (Moscow, 1994), doc. 116, p. 189; Krasnaia Kniga: sbornik diplomaticheskikh dokumentov 
o russko-pol’skikh otnosheniiakh, 1918-1920, (Moscow, 1920)   
5 See, for example, V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 31, (Moscow, 1966), p. 14.  
6 When correspondence was especially sensitive, Lenin insisted that no copies be made and the original 
destroyed, R. Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin: from the Secret Archive, (New Haven, 1996), p. 4.   
7 Istoriia Pol’shi, (Moscow, 1958) 
8 These include: M. Drozdowski (ed.), Międzynarodowe Aspekty Wojny Polsko-Bolszewickiej, 1919-1920: 
antologia tekstów historycznych, (Warsaw, 1996); U. Olech, Wojna Polsko-Sowiecka 1919-1921: Materiały 
do  bibliografii,  (Warsaw,  1990);  J.  Slusarczyk,  Polska  a  Panstwo  Radzieckie:  Kalendarium  1918-1939, 
(Warsaw, 1996); S. Bieleń, Polska-Rosja Czas Przewartościowań, (Warsaw: Centrum Badań Wschodnich 
Uniwersutetu Warszawskiego, 1995); A. Koryn (ed.), Wojna Polsko-Sowiecka 1920 roku: przebieg walki tło 
międzynarodowe, (Warsaw, 1991); J. Szczepański, Społeczeństwo Polski w Walce z Najazdem Bolszewickim 
1920 rok, (Warsaw, 2000). 
9 See, E. Kridl Valkenier, “Glasnost’ and filling in the ‘Blank Spots’ in the History of Polish-Soviet relations, 
1987-1990,” in Polish Review, vol. 36, (1991), pp. 247-267; P. Wandycz, “Historiography of the Countries of 
Eastern Europe: Poland,” in The American Historical Review, vol. 97, no. 4, (1992), pp. 1011-1025.  
10 Some difficulties in using Russian archives do remain. Access to the personal files of Feliks DzierŜyński at 
RGASPI was denied to the author.   11 
Piłsudskiego  (the  Piłsudski  Institute),  and  The  National  Archives  in  London,  and  the 
National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh. 
 
      Research was also conducted using numerous primary source materials held at: the 
Lenin Library, Moscow; Glasgow University Library; the Mitchell Library, Glasgow; the 
National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh; Stirling University Library; the British Library, 
London;  the  Centre  for  Russian  and  East  European  Studies  Library,  University  of 
Birmingham, and Manchester Public Library. A large number of documentary collections, 
including recent publications not available to previous historians of the conflict, have also 
been consulted.
11 Newspapers reflecting the involvement of the major players in the war 
have been analysed, including those from Russia, Poland, Britain and France, and this 
international aspect is further reflected in the examination of a large number of memoir 
sources and original works by participants.  
 
      These  factors  have  enabled  the  present  reexamination  of  the  Polish-Soviet  War, 
including a greater examination of the conflict from the perspective of the Soviet regime 
than it has previously received. Its motivations, objectives, victories and defeats in the 
political, foreign policy and diplomatic battles with Poland and the wider international 
community, are assessed. This is essential if a balanced examination of the war is to be 
reached. In order, however, to research events surrounding the Polish-Soviet War as fully 
as  possible,  the  present  work  also  seeks  to  address  the  Polish  dimension,  utilising 
previously untapped resources in Polish and British archival collections, to shed light on 
Poland’s political and diplomatic history at the time of the war, 1919-1921. 
 
      Chapter 1 examines the historical context of the war as this was to prove crucial for its 
outbreak, development and eventual settlement. Firstly, externally, the role of the Great 
War and the resultant  Paris Peace Conference  provided the  necessary  conditions for a 
resumption of the centuries’ old Polish-Russian hostilities from 1919 to 1921. Until now, 
the  role  of  the  Paris  peace-makers  on  the  development  of  Polish-Soviet  relations  has 
largely been overlooked. Secondly, internally, ideological motivation directed the action of 
both states throughout the conflict, yet the ideology of Soviet Russia, in particular, has 
received  little  attention  from  historians  of  the  war.  As  this  is  fundamental  to  our 
understanding of the conflict, this thesis seeks to redress the balance. This chapter is based 
primarily on the archival collections of the Polish Institute, the Piłsudski Institute, The 
                                                
11 Including most notably, I. I. Kostiushko.   12 
National Archives and the National Archives  of Scotland, supplemented  by previously 
underused documentary collections and eye-witness accounts. 
  
      Diplomatic  negotiation  and  foreign  policy  initiatives  were  a  continuous  feature  of 
Polish-Soviet relations during the war and were, in conjunction with military directives, 
employed to implement the respective state ideologies. Chapter 2, firstly, addresses the 
interdependent diplomatic-foreign policy relationship in both Soviet Russia and Poland, 
highlighting their ideological objectives. The Soviet decision-making process is examined, 
for the first time in the context of the war, to provide insights into the direction pursued by 
the  regime  in  its  Polish  policy,  whilst  previously  unused  archival  documents  clearly 
demonstrate Polish strategy in the war with Russia. The chapter then assesses the practical 
implementation of their ideologies during the first year of the war, through the diplomacy, 
foreign  policy  and  military  objectives  pursued.  This,  primarily,  draws  on  little-used 
archival sources, memoir accounts and recently published documentary collections. 
 
      Chapter 3 charts the development of the war from January to July 1920, with particular 
reference to the diplomatic field which directly responded to changes and shifts in Soviet 
policy.  It  answers  the  questions:  why  did  the  war,  and  the  diplomacy  surrounding  it, 
progress as  it  did? In addition, it assesses  ongoing Allied  involvement in the conflict, 
building  upon their positions adopted at the Paris Peace  Conference. Both  Poland and 
Russia continued to pursue dual policies: diplomatic negotiation and military campaign, 
but for the first four months of the year, it was the former which took centre stage. As the 
year  progressed,  Poland  became  an  increasing  concern  for  Russia  and  so  the  chapter 
examines  the  three-pronged  Soviet  offensive  launched:  traditional  and  revolutionary 
diplomacy, agitational-propaganda and military engagement, evaluating the ability of the 
regime  to  successfully  win  the  majority  of  diplomatic  battles,  despite  fighting  from  a 
militarily weak position.  
 
      By  April,  a  military  solution  was  sought  by  Piłsudski,  driven  by  his  ideological 
programme, transforming the war in scale and intensity, before the following three months 
witnessed a concerted Soviet counter-offensive which threatened the heart of the Polish 
state. The decision in July to cross the ethnographic border to forcefully sovietise Poland, 
taken in opposition to Marxist doctrine, irreversibly altered the complexion of the war. 
This  culminated  politically,  with  the  establishment  of  a  Provisional  Revolutionary 
Committee in Bialystok and militarily, with the decisive Battle of Warsaw the following   13 
month. For this chapter, the source material is drawn primarily from the collections at The 
National Archives, and previously unpublished documentary collections. 
 
      One of the most significant events of the Polish-Soviet War was the establishment, at 
the height of the conflict, of the Polish Provisional Revolutionary Committee (Polrevkom) 
in Białystok, in July 1920, yet its origins, objectives and activities have been little studied 
by  historians.  Chapter  4  will,  for  the  first  time,  provide  a  detailed  evaluation  of  the 
Polrevkom, for its importance cannot be underestimated. If the Polish-Soviet War formed 
part  of  the  Soviet  regime’s  earliest  venture  to  export  revolution  by  military  force 
westwards, the Polrevkom was its first attempt to establish a Soviet Socialist Republic in 
ethnographic Poland. This was the culmination of the practical implementation of Soviet 
ideology in Polish territory and consequently, had lasting implications for the evolution of 
relations between Russia and Poland.  
 
      In  particular, the relationship of  the  Polrevkom with  the  Russian Communist Party 
(RKP(b)) will be examined, to determine the extent to which the latter provided a blueprint 
for  its  work.  New  light  is  shed  on  its  aims,  its  immediate  tasks,  most  notably  in  the 
pressing  economic  fields  of  industry  and  agriculture,  and  its  heavy  involvement  in 
disseminating Marxist ideology through the expansion of the Soviet propaganda offensive, 
to both the Polish and Entente populations. The chapter will conclude by assessing the 
reception accorded to the Committee’s ideological programme by the Polish inhabitants, 
which proved crucial to its fate, before evaluating its lasting consequences for the two 
states. Its failings proved to be those of the entire Soviet foreign policy and diplomatic 
agenda  during  the  conflict,  and  as  such  deserve  greater  examination  than  previously 
received. This chapter is primarily based on sources held in Rossiiskii gosudarstvennii 
arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii. 
 
      Chapter 5 provides a reassessment the decisive months of July and August 1920 for the 
outcome of the Polish-Soviet War, by drawing on previously unused archival resources at 
The  National  Archives  and  Polish  Institute,  and  recently  published  Russian  archival 
collections. Both states stepped up their diplomatic offensives and propaganda drives as 
the military situation intensified and they continued to play to an international audience. 
Entente intransigence, first witnessed at the Paris Peace Conference, reached its zenith 
during these two months, and this chapter will examine the ineffectual responses of the 
Allies to appeals from both Poland and Russia for assistance and demonstrate just how out 
of touch they had become from the reality of the situation.      14 
 
      This period proved absolutely critical. It witnessed the climax of Polish diplomatic-
military  advances,  and Soviet  Russia’s  three-pronged  ideological attack, first  begun  in 
early  1919:  diplomatic  manoeuvring;  agit-prop  offensive  and  military  engagement. 
Ideologically, these months were absolutely vital for the Soviet regime: by temporarily 
overlooking Marxist doctrine, it inadvertently signalled a turning point in its ideological 
development.  This  would  have  lasting  repercussions  for  the  future  of  the  Russian 
Revolution.  Consequently,  the  chapter  will  conclude  by  asking  if  Soviet  Russia  was 
misguided, idealistic and too optimistic in the policies pursued, or was there a possibility 
that international revolution could have broken out during the conflict? The answers to 
these questions shed light on developments within both Soviet Russia and Poland at the 
cessation of hostilities. 
 
      Finally, chapter  6 considers  the  last  diplomatic acts of  the Polish-Soviet War. The 
negotiations which began at Minsk in August 1920 were finally concluded with the signing 
of The Treaty of Riga in March 1921. This chapter will examine how the Soviet regime, 
yet again, tactically manoeuvred to gain the upper hand at the negotiating tables, despite 
being  militarily  defeated.  New  information  about  the  peace  talks  has  been  gathered 
primarily  from  the  archival  collections,  held  at  the  Polish  Institute  and  The  National 
Archives, allowing a reassessment of the diplomats’ achievements in the months leading 
up to the treaty signing. Documentary collections and memoir accounts provide additional 
information about the events. What were the objectives of both delegations and to what 
extent did this reflect their initial ideological aims at the outset of the war? How successful 
was  the  treaty  for  the  contracting  parties?  Was  the  ideological  programme  of  either 
belligerent implemented? How was the peace settlement received in Russia, Poland and 
internationally? And did it successfully resolve the age-old Polish-Russian conflict? These 
questions will be considered, before the conclusion to the thesis draws together its various 
integral themes. 
 
2. What was the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1921? 
 
      An evaluation of the Polish-Soviet War by its participants or by historians fails to 
provide a consensus as to its definition and nature. What type of war was it? The conflict, 
quite simply, represented a different war to the different sides and participants involved. 
For the leadership of the Russian Communist Party (RKP(b)), the contest was initially 
viewed as  both a continuation, and an extension,  of the Russian Civil  War, by which   15 
domestic and foreign opponents had threatened to overthrow the Soviet regime, since its 
formation in October 1917. In contrast, for the large majority of Poles, the confrontation, 
from the outbreak of military engagements in February 1919, was regarded as a national 
war  against  a  foreign  adversary.  Finally,  for  others,  including  many  Western 
contemporaries and historians, the Polish-Soviet War represented not simply a clash of 
socialist  versus  nationalist  ideologies,  but  embodied  a  continuation  of  centuries-long 
hostilities between two neighbouring states, which was to have lasting implications for 
Europe and the wider world at the beginning of the twentieth century.
12 
 
2.1 Soviet/Russian Interpretation 
 
      The Marxist ideology of Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky and the RKP(b) conditioned the 
Soviet leadership to regard the Polish-Soviet conflict as a “class” war, to be fought against 
the bourgeois ruling classes of “White-Guard Poland”.
13 On 6 March 1920, Lenin informed 
the Moscow Soviet of Workers’ and Red Army Deputies that the conflict was a class war, 
instigated by the Polish landowners, capitalists and imperialists, “...because they feel their 
end  approaching”.
14  Over  the  next  year,  this  was  to  become  a  recurrent  theme  in  the 
writings and speeches of RKP(b) members. For instance, on 5 May 1920, in a speech to 
Red Army soldiers departing for the Polish Front, Lenin confirmed that the regime was 
fighting,  “Polish  magnates,  landowners,  and  capitalists”,  not  the  working  class,  and 
warned,  “Remember,  Comrades,  we  have  no  quarrel  with  the  Polish  peasants  and 
workers”.
15 
 
      However, despite the promotion of this viewpoint, the Communist Party leaders were 
persistently opposed by individuals, even within their own party, who regarded the war as 
having a nationalist component. For example, Evgenii Preobrazhenskii felt compelled to 
write about the national-class debate to Lenin, no later than 5 May 1920, and demand that 
action be taken against colleagues who strayed from the class interpretation. He stated, “I 
propose to cease the unseemly ‘patriotism’. Radek, in a speech, referred to the ‘National 
                                                
12 See, Chapter 1.  
13 Soviet contemporaries and historians advocated this interpretation. For example, Soviet Western Front 
Commander, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who directed the Soviet advance towards Warsaw in July-August 1920, 
spoke  of  Poland’s  entry  into  the  already  existing  civil  war,  M.N.  Tukhachevsky, “Pokhod za  Vislu"  in 
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war’. Today in Agitrosta, Bergman published an indecent article concerning love of the 
homeland by the true Russian people”.
16 So concerned was Lenin about the presentation of 
the war that he immediately responded, 
I  propose  the  directive:  all  articles  about  Poland,  the  Polish  war,  to  be 
looked through by responsible editors as their personal responsibility. Do 
not exaggerate, do not fall into chauvinism, always to single out PANS and 
capitalists from the workers and peasants of Poland.
17 
 
In this policy, the Soviet leader was fully supported by Leon Trotsky who, as Commissar 
for War, knew only too well the importance of presenting a united class programme to the 
workers and peasants of Russia and Poland, whom he required to enlist as Red Army 
recruits. Consequently, Trotsky ordered the closing down of the Soviet General Staff’s 
periodical Voennoe Delo after it had published an article about the Poles which had used 
language, 
 ...riddled  through  and  through  with  a  spirit  of  crude  chauvinism.  It  is 
enough  to  mention  that  the  article  speaks  of  the  ‘innate  jesuitry  of  the 
Polacks’, which is contrasted with the honest and straightforward spirit of 
the Great-Russian race. There is no need to explain how greatly this sort of 
crude  and  false  generalisation  contradicts  the  spirit  of  fraternity  which 
inspires  the  attitude  of  the  Russian  working  class  towards  the  working 
masses of Poland.
18 
 
 
      The Polish-Soviet War was not, however, identified by the Soviet regime simply as a 
continuation of the class war against domestic opponents in the Russian Civil War.  With 
the explicit objective of spreading socialist revolution across national borders, westwards 
to the advanced capitalist countries, the Russian communists aimed to turn the Russian 
Civil War into an international war between the classes. As a result, the inevitable danger 
facing Soviet Russia from the class opponents of the worldwide proletariat was a constant 
refrain of the Soviet leaders in 1919-1921. Not only was the new opponent facing Soviet 
Russia in 1919 a recently reestablished foreign state, but the Russian communists also 
firmly believed that Poland was a puppet manipulated from behind the scenes by Britain 
and France.
19   
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17  Ibid,  pp.  88-89;  V.I.  Lenin,  PSS,  vol.  51,  doc.  338,  p.  193.  PAN  was  the  Soviet  term  for  a  Polish 
landowner. 
18 L.D. Trotsky, The Military Writings and Speeches of Leon Trotsky: how the revolution armed, (trans. Brian 
Pearce), vol. 3, (London, 1981), p. 209. However, as the war progressed, Trotsky increasingly appreciated 
the important role which nationalism could play in securing support for the Communist regime. 
19 Traditionally, Soviet historians stressed this interpretation of the war. For instance, B. Ponomaryov et al, 
argued that, “...the imperialists were pushing Poland into an adventure”, B. Ponomaryov, A. Gromyko & V. 
Khvostov (eds.), History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1945, (Moscow, 1969), p. 128.    17 
      This succeeded in giving the war an international dimension and transformed the civil 
war from a domestic affair into a conflict with much wider implications. According to 
Lenin,  “...it  is  not  only  the  Russian  or  Polish  question  that  is  being  decided,  but  the 
question  of  their  [the  imperialists’]  own  survival”.
20  Following  the  failure  of  Allied 
intervention during the civil war to bring about the downfall of the Soviet regime, Lenin 
believed that the Polish-Soviet War, “...marked a new attempt by the Allies to destroy the 
Soviet Republic… this time with the help of Poland”.
21 In a speech to the Joint Session of 
the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet of Workers’, Peasants’ 
and  Red  Army  Deputies,  trade  unions  and  factory  committees,  on  5  May  1920,  he 
reiterated,  
...this war is a link in a long chain of events revealing the international 
bourgeoisie’s frantic resistance to the victorious proletariat, a frantic attempt 
by the international bourgeoisie to crush Soviet Russia, to overthrow the 
first Soviet State at all costs and by all means.
22 
  
 
      Even after the defeat of the Red Army at the Battle of Warsaw in August 1920, Lenin 
remained unshaken in his belief that the war had been fought not only against their near-
neighbour, but had also been waged against the British and French. Accordingly, on 2 
October  1920,  ten  days  before  the  peace  preliminaries  which  ended  the  conflict  were 
signed, Lenin informed workers in the leather industry that, 
...the chief thing pushing the Poles into war with us was, of course, the 
power  of  international  capital….  It  was  a  new  attempt  by  the  Allies  to 
destroy the Soviet Republic.... The Versailles treaty has turned Poland into a 
buffer  state,  which  is  to  fence  Germany  off  from  contact  with  Soviet 
communism,  and  is  regarded  by  the  Entente  as  a  weapon  against  the 
Bolsheviks.
23 
 
 
      However, despite the Soviet leaders’ best efforts to direct opinion on the nature of the 
conflict,  as  the  war  progressed,  a  diverse  range  of  individuals  began  to  regard  it  in 
increasingly  nationalistic  terms.
24  These  included  such  unlikely  bedfellows  as  the 
Chairman  of  the  Third  Communist  International  (Comintern),  Grigorii  Evseevich 
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Zinoviev; prominent Polish Communists such as Karol Radek and Pavel Lapiński; former 
Russian Tsarist officers, including Aleksei Alekseevich Brusilov; and foreign statesmen, 
such as the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George.
25 Indeed, disagreements over the 
complexion of the war were to have serious implications for RKP(b) ideology as its leaders 
were forced to acknowledge the potential support which could be gained by playing the 
national card. 
 
      As Marxists, the Russian and Polish communists had no respect for patriotic sentiment 
and  were  fervently  anti-nationalist.  However,  Piłsudski’s  offensive  towards  Ukraine  in 
April 1920, and resultant occupation of Kiev on 6-7 May, had a dramatic impact on the 
Russian  population.  Previously,  the  war  had  been  fought  on  territory  far  from  ethnic 
Russian  lands,  but  with  the  deep  advance  of  the  Polish  Army  eastwards  towards  the 
Russian border, Russians of all political persuasions were stirred to action.  According to 
one British observer, 
...partly despair and disillusionment in their hope of peace, and partly the 
traditional enmity which has grown up between the Russians and the Poles, 
were responsible for a sudden ebullience of Russian national feeling in what 
was regarded as a war against unprovoked aggression.
26 
 
This Russian national component of the war was also recognised by foreign statesmen. On 
29 February 1920, for instance, the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, F.A. Beneš, 
observed that, “...the Bolshevik Government was now taking a national line... and a war 
against Poland would undoubtedly be popular in Russia”.
27 Speaking of the Poles’ April 
offensive into Ukraine, Lloyd George remarked, 
...the action of the Poles had consolidated Russian nationalism.... Russians 
of all classes were joining hands to defend Russian territory. They might 
fight between themselves concerning the way in which Russia should be 
governed,  but  were  united  in  opposition  to  foreign  aggression  with  the 
object of annexing Russian territory.
28 
 
 
      Many Russians, including former Whites who had fought against the Bolsheviks in the 
Russian Civil War, opposed the reestablishment of Polish independence, and regarded the 
war as a traditional conflict between two opposing states.
29 As a result, numerous former 
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tsarist officers joined the ranks of the Red Army, including most famously, A.A. Brusilov, 
who  wrote  on  1  May  1920,  that  the,  “...first  measure  [of  the  Soviet  regime]  must  be 
agitation  of  national  patriotism,  without  which  an  army  cannot  be  strong  and 
battleworthy”.
30 
 
      Unable to suppress this Russian nationalist outpouring, the Bolshevik leaders decided 
to harness it to their war effort and for the first time invoked the defence of the Russian 
nation. Lenin, himself, was forced to acknowledge the impact of this national movement, 
when he informed a conference of workers and Red Army men in Moscow, on 13 May 
1920, that, “Even former Tsarist generals consider that Poland’s claims are unjust and are 
helping us”.
31 This temporary ideological shift from actively pursuing internationalism to 
promoting the rising tide of Russian nationalism can be clearly observed in an appeal 
issued by Trotsky fifteen days later, which read, “Volunteers are needed... Russian officers, 
who have understood that the Red Army is saving the Freedom and Independence of the 
Russian nation! The Western Front calls you all!”
32 In the same vein, Radek wrote in July 
1920, “We preach that this is a war… not primarily to defend the Soviet Government and 
communism, but to defend the independence of Russia”.
33 Ironically, Zinoviev, Chairman 
of  the Comintern,  the  organisation  established  by  the  RKP(b)  to  direct  the  worldwide 
socialist revolution, also advocated the utilisation of Russian patriotic sentiment for the 
Soviet cause in July 1920. In an address to Russian nationalists, he stated, 
The  war  is  becoming  national.  Not  only  the  advanced  sections  of  the 
peasant population but even the wealthy peasants are hostile to the advance 
of the Polish landowners...  we Communists must be at the head of this 
nationalist movement, which will gain the support of the entire population 
and which daily grows stronger.
34  
 
This remarkable statement graphically demonstrates just how far the Soviet leadership was 
willing to bend its ideological beliefs during the war, in the very short-term, to achieve the 
vital long-term goal of securing the world’s first socialist state. 
 
2.2 Polish Interpretation 
 
      For  the  majority  of  Poles,  the  war  with  Soviet  Russia  in  1919-1921  was 
overwhelmingly perceived as a national, not a class, conflict. A long history of traditional 
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hostilities between the two neighbouring states, Polish identification of Soviet objectives as 
a continuation of Tsarist imperialism, and an upsurge in patriotic sentiment after the Red 
Army  crossed  Poland’s  eastern  ethnographic  frontier  in  July  1920,  promoted  this 
interpretation. Consequently, as noted by a Western diplomat residing in Warsaw during 
the war, 
...there  would  not  appear  to  be  any  newly-created  bond  of  sympathy 
between the working classes in the two countries strong enough to do away 
with the contempt and hatred which 99 per cent of the Polish race feels for 
all Muscovites.
35 
 
      Although exhausted by four years fighting in the Great War, much of which had been 
waged in Eastern Europe on Polish territory, when hostilities broke out between Poland 
and Soviet Russia in early 1919, the vast majority of Poles rallied to defend the newly 
established Polish state. For centuries, antagonism and disaffection had scarred Polish-
Russian relations, culminating in the eighteenth century partitions of the Polish nation by 
Russia,  Prussia  and  Austria.
36  This  resulted  in  a  strengthened  and  steadfast  Polish 
patriotism, the primary objective of which was the reestablishment and defence of the 
Polish state. As Aleksandra Piłsudska recollected in her memoirs, throughout the Polish 
lands there was an, “…atmosphere of secret rebellion... the flames of resistance... were 
always there because never for a moment in our daily lives were we allowed to forget the 
Russian yoke”.
37 
 
      This Russian repression was a reality for many Poles, whether their eastern neighbour 
was  the  Tsarist  Empire  or  a  Soviet-led  regime.
38  Vladimir  Lenin  was  regarded  as  the 
successor  of  Tsar  Nikolai  II,  albeit  in  a  different  political  form,  and  his  objective  of 
subjugating and occupying the Polish lands was viewed as a continuation of the Russian 
imperialist tradition. As noted by the Polish diplomat, Roman Debicki, during the war 
many  Poles  felt  that,  although,  “Revolutionary  Russia  had  recognised  Poland’s 
independence in principle... it was soon evident that the old Czarist imperialism had merely 
been transformed into a new one, with revolutionary slogans”.
39 Piłsudska concurred, and 
argued  that,  “Whatever  government  Russia  has,  becomes  an  imperialist  government 
because she herself is essentially imperialistic. She has only exchanged the imperialism of 
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the Czars for the Red imperialism of the Soviets”.
40 Even Julian Marchlewski, a leading 
Polish  communist  and  one  of  Lenin’s  closest  advisers  during  the  war,  was  forced  to 
concede that due to the tradition of conflict which existed between the two countries, many 
Poles inevitably continued to regard all Russians, regardless of their political persuasion, 
with deep-seated hatred.
41 
 
      Polish  suspicion  of  Soviet  intentions  heightened  considerably  when  the  Red  Army 
crossed the ethnographic Polish border in July 1920. This was of decisive importance in 
encouraging the majority of Poles to view the conflict as a war for the defence of their 
homeland.
42  The  Polish  newspaper,  Kurjer  Poranny,  on  22  August  1920,  succinctly 
reported the impact of the offensive, when it stated, 
The  Bolshevik  Muscovites  have  entered  into a  compromise  with  Tsarist 
methods, and so, by overstepping Poland’s frontiers they have overstepped 
the culminating point of their strength and their success. The Bolshevik 
Muscovites have betrayed the idea of Communism.
43  
 
Indeed, the inability of the RKP(b) to win Polish support for the Red Army advance was 
central to their failure to spread socialist revolution to Poland.
44 The Polish Socialist Party 
(PPS), for instance, rejecting outright the notion that the conflict was a class war, actively 
presented the hostilities as a national war, fought against a foreign adversary. On 15 July 
1920, a party manifesto denounced the Russian advance as being driven by Russian racial 
hatred, whilst on 5 August, it spoke of, 
….the Imperialism of the Soviets… the Red Army is not only a safeguard of 
the Russian revolution, but is also destined to ruin the independence of the 
neighbouring  nations....  Who  would  dare  reproach  Polish  socialists  for 
wishing to save the independence of their country? The revolutionary mask 
of the invader cannot possibly prevent them from doing their duty towards 
Poland.
45 
 
 
 
 
                                                
40 A. Piłsudska, p. 308. 
41  J.  Marchlewski,  Pol’sha  pod  inozemnym  igom,  (Moscow,  1920),  p.  24;  M.N.  Chernykh,  Iulian 
Markhlevskii o Sovetsko-Pol’skikh otnosheniiakh v 1918-1921 gg., (Moscow, 1990), p. 28. 
42 Even the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), which had previously called for an end to hostilities, advocated the 
staunch defence of the Polish nation after July 1920. The only Polish political party which unequivocally 
supported Lenin’s view of the war as a class conflict was the Communist Workers’ Party of Poland (KPRP).  
43 Kurjer Poranny, 22 August 1920. 
44 For a detailed examination of the Soviet attempt to encourage and implement this revolution see, Chapter 
4: The Polish Provisional Revolutionary Committee.  
45 Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 9, pp. 30-31, (hereafter Polish Institute); Polish 
Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 24, pp. 177-178.    22 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
      The Polish-Soviet War was, therefore, interpreted by its participants in very different 
ways. The understanding of the conflict by the sides involved was largely dependent upon 
their  nationality,  political  affiliations  and  ideological  beliefs.  Two  predominant  and 
opposing schools of thought developed: an international, class-based interpretation and a 
national diagnosis. Absolute consensus on the nature of the war failed, however, to be 
reached  in  either  Poland  or  Soviet  Russia,  and  dissenting  voices  from  the  dominant 
interpretation continued to be raised throughout the conflict. 
 
3. When did the Polish–Soviet War begin? 
 
      This ambiguity continues when examining the onset of the Polish-Soviet War. The 
failure of either the Polish Government or the Soviet regime to issue a formal declaration 
of war against their neighbouring state in 1919 or 1920 makes it extremely difficult to 
accurately date the outbreak of the war. This unplanned conflict developed and escalated as 
both sides were able to field increasingly larger armies with the progression of time and as 
the  hostilities  became  of  greater  importance  to  the  safety  of  the  two  regimes.
46 
Traditionally,  Poles  have  dated  the  conflict  from  November  1918,  January  1919  or 
February 1919, whilst Soviet and Russian accounts of the war cite April 1920 as the date 
for the commencement of hostilities. The reasons for these divergent interpretations are 
numerous and varied. The terms of the German Armistice in November 1918, which ended 
the Great War, and the subsequent withdrawal from the Ober-Ost by German troops, were 
of crucial importance for Polish-Soviet relations.
47 Action taken by the local populations in 
the borderlands lying between Poland and Russia was also decisive in promoting military 
action between the two states in 1919, as was the simultaneous advance, supported by their 
respective governments, of both the Soviet and Polish armies. 
 
3.1 Polish Interpretation 
 
      The Armistice between Germany and the Allied Powers, signed on 11 November 1918, 
succeeded in ending four years of fighting in the Great War. It failed, however, to bring 
peace to Eastern Europe. Fear that Bolshevism would find fertile soil for growth in the 
volatile, unstable regions of Eastern Europe, led the Allied statesmen to insert Article 12 
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into the Armistice, requiring that the German Army remain in these territories until further 
orders were issued.
48 This proved to be impossible, however, after news of a revolution in 
Germany reached the army and the soldiers began to surrender their positions. As one of 
the three Regents in German-occupied Poland, Prince Zdislas Lubomirski, recounted, 
...on the morning of November 11 everything was quiet at Warsaw and the 
Germans were patrolling the streets as usual. About one o’clock news came 
of the revolution, which had broken out in Berlin. The garrison at once 
proceeded to disarm its officers and to form soldiers’ committees. The Poles 
on their side disarmed the Germans.
49 
 
On 14 November, the newly appointed Polish Head-of-State, Józef Piłsudski, agreed to the 
German Army’s evacuation of Polish territory and the Ober-Ost.
50 As the German forces 
had  gained  control  of  much  of  Eastern  Europe  by  November  1918,  including  Poland, 
Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic States, their withdrawal from the region resulted in a 
complete redrawing of the map of Eastern Europe. The resultant political and military 
vacuum in the borderlands between Poland and Russia (the kresy) led to the first clashes 
between the Polish Army and the Red Army as each side quickly attempted to advance and 
fill the gap created.
51 
 
      As a result, many Poles date the Polish-Soviet War from November 1918, including 
Piłsudski, who believed that, “The beginning of the war of Poland against the Soviets was 
in 1918 the very year when Poland had... begun to live an independent life”.
52 In contrast, 
the Polish Legation in London dated it from the onset of the Soviet advance, reporting that, 
“The war between Poland and Soviet Russia was thrust upon Poland in January 1919”, 
whilst a British Foreign Office Memorandum on Polish Foreign Relations recorded, 
The conflict in Polish-Russian relations practically dates from the signature 
of the armistice with Germany on 11 November 1918. The evacuation of 
the  German  forces…  began  in  December  1918,  and  was  continued 
throughout the following January and February (1919).
53 
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      There was, nevertheless, little divergence of opinion in Poland as to the cause of the 
outbreak of war with Soviet Russia. With the exception of the Communist Workers’ Party 
of Poland (KPRP) and the PPS-Left, almost all Poles and many Western observers, pointed 
to the advance of the Red Army into the Ober-Ost as the trigger for the commencement of 
hostilities between the two recently established states.
54 According to Jan Ciechanowski, 
the Polish Chargé d’Affaires to Britain,  
This war was simply the result of the fact that the Germans carried out their 
evacuation of Lithuania and of the Eastern confines of Poland on purpose in 
such a way as to vacate the territory starting from the Russian side first, and 
evacuating the parts bordering on Poland at the end of their occupation. 
This resulted in the occupation by the Bolsheviks of these territories and 
their  gradual  approach  to  and  even  partial  occupation  of  ethnographical 
Polish territories.
55 
 
A British Foreign Office Memorandum on  Polish Foreign  Relations agreed, observing 
that, “As the Germans retired, the Bolshevik troops stepped into their place and by March 
had penetrated well into ethnographic Poland as far as Bialostok”.
56 Within a short time, 
the  Soviet  Western  Army,  created  on  16  November  1918,  occupied  large  areas  of 
Lithuania, Belorussia, Latvia and Estonia, and moved into lands which had belonged to the 
Polish  nation before the partitions. These included  the  important  population centres  of 
Minsk, Wilno, Grodno, Brest-Litovsk and Białystok.
57  
 
      The Soviet military advance, entitled Target Vistula (Tsel’ Visla), did not however, 
represent the launch of a general offensive against Poland, despite propaganda statements 
that the collapse of the German occupation presented Soviet Russia with the opportunity of 
“liberating” the Baltic territories.
58 Instead, it was a gentle probe, aimed at testing the 
ground for the spread of communism to the borderlands.
59 This operation had originally 
been outlined in  October  1918 when the German Ober-Ost was still in existence, and 
before the reestablishment of the Polish state, but the directives issued used very cautious 
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language and Soviet Western Army action was restricted by the small numbers of troops at 
its disposal.
60 
       
      Moreover, Polish reporting of the war frequently stressed that Piłsudski and the Polish 
Army  had  embarked  upon  an  offensive  eastwards  in  self-defence  and  in  response  to 
appeals  for  help  by  the  local  populations  of  the  borderlands  recently  occupied  by  the 
Soviets. One Polish Foreign Ministry report asserted that, 
...the  population...  of  these  districts  [Wilno,  Grodno,  Brest-Litovsk  and 
Białystok] sent dramatic appeals to the Polish Government, the Chief-of-
State,  and  begged  for  Polish  intervention  and  liberation  from  Bolshevik 
oppression…. The Polish Government had no choice but that of forming an 
army, at the time composed mainly of volunteers... and of sending it to 
liberate the population suffering from Bolshevik tyranny.
61 
 
It is essential, however, to stress that, be this as it may, Piłsudski’s prime motivation for 
launching an eastward advance at the end of 1918, was to secure the recently established 
Polish state, establish her eastern frontier with Russia and defend the country against the 
Soviet  menace.
62  After  the  Bolsheviks’  annulment  of  the  eighteenth  century  Partition 
Treaties,  on  29  August  1918,  the  majority  of  Poles  believed  that  they  were  simply 
reestablishing  control  over  territory  which  had  belonged  to  Poland  prior  to  the  illegal 
partitions.
63 Piłsudski was initially hindered in this objective, however, by the German 
Army’s refusal to allow the Polish Army to cross into the Ober-Ost at Białystok until 5 
February 1919.
64 
 
      On  which  date,  then,  did  the  two  sides  militarily  clash  for  the first  time?  A  front 
between the Polish Army and the Soviet Red Army developed only gradually. A report 
issued by the Polish Army General Headquarters stated that, at 4pm on 1 January 1919, 
Wilno was partly evacuated by German troops, who withdrew to the suburbs of Pohulanka 
and Komuny, resulting in the peaceful establishment of a demarcation line between the 
German and Polish troops in the city.
65 It continued, 
                                                
60  Direktivy  komandovaniia  frontov  Krasnoi  Armii  (1917-1920).  Sbornik  dokumentov,  vol.  4,  no.  13, 
(Moscow, 1969), p. 51 (hereafter DKFKA); N. Davies, “Genesis”, p. 55.  
61 TNA, FO 417/9, no. 31, p. 37; Polish Institute A.12.P.3/5, doc. 4, pp. 16-17. For an expansion of this 
theme see, Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 11, p. 35; Polish Institute, A.12.P.3/5, doc. 2, p. 5. A further 
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Paris Peace Conference to Locarno, )Westport, Conn., 1974), p. 120. 
64 D & M, vol. 2, doc. 68, pp. 84-88. 
65 Polish Institute, A.12.P.1/3, doc. 2, p. 5.   26 
During the night of the 3
rd January the Germans left the city which was 
immediately attacked by the Bolsheviks, acting evidently in full accord with 
the Germans…. Polish troops resisted until their munitions were completely 
exhausted.
66 
 
Similar scenes were reenacted throughout the borderlands as the Germans withdrew and 
the Soviets advanced. 
 
      An extremely important document was issued by the Polish Army General HQ on 20 
March  1919.  This  official  account  dated  the  outbreak  of  fighting  between  Poland and 
Soviet Russia to the beginning of the previous month, by which time Polish troops had 
crossed  the  eastern  frontiers  of  the  former  Kingdom  of  Poland  and  advanced  in  two 
separate directions: White Ruthenia and Volhynia. This report, dispatched to the Polish 
Government  and  Polish  Foreign  Ministry  (MSZ),  stated  that  on  the  White-Ruthenian 
[Belorussian] front, 
The first encounter with small detachments of Bolshevik troops was near 
Purzany on February 2
nd. Cavalry Captain Dabrowski at the head of the 
Wilno Volunteers occupied after victorious fighting, the town of Pruzany... 
and occupied Liskowa and Zabinka (district Kobryn).
67 
 
The Polish Army advanced, occupying the important population centres of Brest-Litovsk 
(9 February), Białystok (19 February) and Antopol and Drohiczyn. On 21 February, they 
encountered Bolshevik forces at Dąbrowa, before reaching the line Dąbrowa, Szczucin and 
Zaludek on 23 February.
68 Meanwhile, on the Volhynia Front, the Polish Army General 
Staff reported that their troops, under the command of General Rydz-Śmigły, had occupied 
the important railway junction of Kowel, evacuated by the Germans on 5 February 1919. 
They then advanced on Kowel, Poworsk and Holoby, before engaging the Bolsheviks on 
18 February at Maniewicz.
69 By 25 February, Polish troops held the line Słonin, Pińsk and 
Łuck.
70 
 
      It is, therefore, certain that by the outset of February 1919, hostilities had begun.
71 
Although  no  formal  state  of  war  existed  between  Poland  and  Soviet  Russia,  over  the 
following twelve months the Polish Army extended its front more than 250 miles east of 
                                                
66 Ibid. 
67 Polish Institute, A.12.P.1/3, doc. 3, p. 6. In contrast, Davies dated the outbreak of fighting between Soviet 
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68 Ibid.   
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70 Ibid. 
71 The majority of contemporary Polish observers and historians and many Western accounts date the conflict 
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the ethnographic Polish border, before halting at the River Berezina. The conflict thereafter 
developed into a war on a much larger scale and was fought with increasing numbers of 
troops and resources, as both Poland and Soviet Russia sought to establish control of the 
borderland territories necessary to secure their infant regimes. 
   
3.2 Soviet Interpretation 
 
      For communists, politicians, military leaders and official historians of Soviet Russia, 
the starting date for the war with Poland was consistently given as April 1920. Although 
military engagements between the Polish Army and Soviet troops, throughout 1919, were 
of  crucial  importance  for  the  security  and  development  of  the  Polish  state,  these 
manoeuvres  were  largely  conducted  on  territories  which  had  belonged  to  pre-partition 
Poland and did not, therefore, directly threaten Soviet Russia. Indeed, until April 1919, the 
Soviet authorities asserted that the fighting was not between Poland and Soviet Russia at 
all, but was fought by Poland and the Lithuanian-Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic 
(LitBel SSSR).
72   
 
      It was only with the Polish offensive towards Kiev, under the leadership of Piłsudski, 
and the occupation of the city on 6-7 May 1920, that the Soviet regime considered itself to 
be  at  war  with  Poland.  If  the  Polish  advance  had  continued,  they  would  soon  have 
approached ethnographic Russian territory and Russia itself would have been endangered. 
The  Soviet  Government  even  went  so  far,  on  occasion,  as  to  claim  that  this  Polish 
offensive had resulted in the actual invasion of Russia.
73 It is significant that by this date 
the Red Army had secured victory in the Russian Civil War over their White opponents: 
N.N. Iudenich (October 1919); A.V. Kolchak (November 1919) and A.I. Denikin (April 
1920),  with  only  Baron  Wrangel  remaining  in  opposition  to  them  in  the  Crimea. 
Consequently, by April 1920, the Soviet regime was, for the first time, in a position both 
politically and militarily, to turn much of its attention towards Poland. 
 
      An  examination  of  the  speeches  and  writings  of  the  Soviet  leadership  in  both  the 
political and military spheres, demonstrates that the outset of the war was, indeed, regarded 
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as being April 1920. There is no mention of the conflict with Poland in the collected works 
of Vladimir Lenin, Soviet Russia’s chief policy maker, between late 1918 and the end of 
1919.
74 In fact, on 27 February 1920, he still rejected the idea that a state of war existed 
between the two nations, writing to Trotsky, “...we must put out a call to prepare for war 
with Poland”.
75 As Commissar for War, Trotsky was directly responsible for Red Army 
engagements, and on 28 January 1920, warned of the possibility of an imminent Polish 
attack along the entire front.
76 Indeed, as late as 29 April 1920, he acknowledged that 
although  the  struggle  on  the  Western  Front  was  taking  on  extensive  dimensions,  he 
believed war with Poland still lay in the future for the Soviet regime.
77 
 
      Soviet Western Front Commander, from 29 April 1920, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, fully 
endorsed this interpretation, informing the Red Army Military Academy in 1923, that war 
between the two nations had commenced only, “...at the moment when the Poles developed 
their attack on our South-Western Front and occupied Kiev”.
78 Dating the outbreak of war 
to Piłsudski’s advance on Kiev in April 1920 allowed the Soviet authorities to present the 
war as a direct result of Poland’s aggressive, expansionist designs. For instance, in his 
autobiography, Trotsky portrayed Russian involvement as entirely defensive, asserting, 
The Polish Government...  consciously and determinedly began the war in 
spite of our indefatigable efforts to preserve peace, efforts that made our 
foreign policy a combination of patience and pedagogical persistence. We 
sincerely wanted peace. Piłsudski imposed war on us.
79 
 
It would have been extremely difficult for Soviet Russia to evade its share of responsibility 
for the outbreak of hostilities if it had acknowledged the conflict as beginning with the 
German withdrawal from the Ober-Ost after November 1918 and its orders to the Red 
Army to immediately advance westwards at that time. 
 
      This official line was, unsurprisingly, continued and promoted by historians from the 
Soviet period. For instance, Kalenichenko wrote, 
It is true that a... clique of Polish landowners and capitalists... carried out 
hostile policies in their relations with the Soviet state.... This aggressive 
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character was seen in the war by the reactionary Polish government against 
the Soviet state, beginning on 25 April 1920.
80 
 
As  late  as  1990,  Chernykh  advocated  that  responsibility  lay  with  the  Polish  Army, 
“...which began the Polish-Soviet War in 1920”.
81 Much Western historiography shared 
this interpretation, placing blame solely on the Polish nation for the outbreak of hostilities 
in April 1920. For example, Benedict Sumner wrote of, “the Polish-Soviet War of 1920, 
begun by Piłsudski”, whilst Louis Fischer regarded the war as commencing on 26 April 
1920 with the Polish advance into Ukraine.
82 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
      Soviet Russia and Poland, therefore, failed to reach a consensus with regard to either 
the nature of the Polish-Soviet War or its date of commencement. The divergent schools of 
thought which had emerged during the conflict, continued to be promulgated both by the 
belligerents  and  subsequent  historians,  and  the  questions  raised  have  failed  to  be 
satisfactorily  resolved  in  the  years  since  its  conclusion.  The  conflict  was  undoubtedly 
complex and multi-dimensional in character. In an attempt to shed light on the debates, 
these themes will be expanded upon in the following chapters. In Chapter 2, the role of 
historical  disputes,  national  identity  and  territorial  and  religious  disagreements  will  be 
examined, as will the role played by the Great War and, in particular, the statesmen at the 
Paris Peace Conference, for the development of Polish-Soviet relations at the start of the 
twentieth century.  
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Chapter 1: Background 
 
      The  Polish-Soviet  War  of  1919-1920  cannot  be  viewed  as  an  historically  isolated 
event.  Historical  relations  between  the  two  protagonists  were  to  prove  decisive  in 
determining  the  outbreak,  development  and  eventual  settlement  of  the  conflict  at  the 
beginning of the twentieth century. For over one thousand years, a deep estrangement and 
persistent  hostility  had  marred  relations  between  Poland  and  Russia,  a  resentment 
sustained, throughout the nineteenth century, by the emergence of the “Polish Question” in 
Europe. Interest in this question gained momentum during the Great War of 1914-1918 as 
numerous manifestos and proclamations were issued to the Poles by the belligerents. With 
the establishment of the world’s first socialist state in Russia in October 1917, and the 
reestablishment of Polish independence thirteen months later, the foundations were laid for 
a resumption of the centuries’ old hostilities in a war which would engulf both states for 
two years. 
 
     Ideology was of paramount importance for the actions of both Soviet Russia and Poland 
during the war. In Russia, the ideological beliefs of three men shaped the development and 
direction of the new socialist regime above all others: Karl Marx, Vladimir Il’ich Ul’ianov 
(Lenin) and Leon Davidovich Bronstein (Trotsky). Were their ideologies uniform, or did 
they contain distinguishing features? For example, how compatible was Lenin’s advocacy 
of national self-determination with the central Marxist doctrine of international socialist 
revolution?  How  did  ideology  impact  upon  their  objectives  towards  Poland?  These 
questions  have  received  little  attention  from  historians  of  the  conflict  but  are  of  vital 
importance to our understanding of it. 
 
     Although the Polish dimension has been researched by historians,
1 it is essential to 
provide a brief analysis of Polish ideological beliefs and aims, particularly those of the 
Head  of  State  and  Commander-in-Chief,  Józef  Piłsudski,  and  his  chief  National 
Democratic  opponent,  Roman  Dmowski,  in  order  to  understand  the  fundamental 
motivation of both states during the war. The differing Soviet and Polish ideologies were, 
moreover, to have serious implications for negotiations of the Paris Peace Conference, 
which ultimately proved either powerless or unwilling to affect the outcome of the Polish-
Soviet War.
2 
                                                
1 Notably, Piotr Wandycz, Norman Davies, Titus Komarnicki and Adam Zamoyski. 
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1. Historical Conflict and the Great War, 1914-1918 
 
      At the height of the Polish-Soviet War in July 1920, the Polish Legation in London 
correctly observed that, “The entire past history of Europe shows Poland’s role as that of a 
bulwark  between  east  and  west”.
3  Territorial  conflict  between  Poland  and  Russia 
frequently characterised their interaction from the tenth century onwards as both states 
struggled  for  control  of  the  kresy:  the  borderlands  situated  between  the  two  nations. 
Russia’s most blatant and destructive intervention occurred in 1772, 1793 and 1795 when, 
in conjunction with Prussia and Austria, Polish state territory was divided, resulting in the 
loss of Polish independence at the final partition.
4 This paradoxically served to strengthen 
the Polish nation and a growth of Polish nationalism, as society, culture and language 
continued to promote a bond between Poles in the three occupied zones.
5 A further, most 
significant consequence arising from the partitions of Poland was a tentative expansion of 
the Polish question from being an inter-Slav concern to a matter of interest for the wider 
international community.
6   
 
      It was during the Great War, however, that the Polish question underwent a remarkable 
evolution. The international community’s initial reticence at openly declaring sympathy for 
the Polish cause dramatically shifted as the Great War progressed from its outbreak on 28
 
June 1914 to its conclusion on 11 November 1918. Indeed, the warring powers were soon 
falling over themselves in a bid to outdo their opponents’ concessions to the Poles.
7 This 
was, primarily, guided by military necessity. Both the Allied and Central Powers needed to 
win and maintain Polish support for their respective war efforts. The territory inhabited by 
the Poles was strategically important, lying at the centre of the European continent, and the 
frontline moved back and forth across this land throughout the conflict. As a result of the 
eighteenth-century carving up of their country, the Poles found themselves on both sides of 
the fighting lines and, consequently, appeals to Polish sympathies were forthcoming from 
both  armed  camps.  This  inevitably  advanced  the  Polish  cause  and  added  a  strong 
international  dimension  to  the  Polish  question.  To  this,  Russia  was  strenuously  and 
resolutely opposed.  
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     Tsarist Russia argued that the Polish issue was, and must remain, a domestic question to 
be resolved by Russia alone. Sergei Sazonov adamantly defended this position throughout 
his tenure as Russian Foreign Minister and on 17 April 1916, asserted that, 
To deny the importance of the Polish question would mean closing your 
eyes to the reality. But by acknowledging this it by no means follows that 
its  solution  must  be  handed  over  to  Europe  and  to  an  international 
conference.  I  believe  that  Russia  must  not  allow  formal  international 
arranging of the Polish question and is obliged by its past and for the sake 
of its future to solve it itself.
8 
 
What then was Tsarist Russia’s Polish policy during the Great War? 
 
      As almost three-quarters of ethnic Polish lands were incorporated within the Russian 
Empire in 1914, on 14 August of that year, a Manifesto to the Poles was issued by Grand 
Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, uncle to the Tsar. This declared, “Poles!... May the frontiers 
which have divided the Polish people be united under the sceptre of the Russian Emperor. 
Under  this  sceptre  Poland  will  come  together,  free  in  faith,  in  language  and  in  self-
government”.
9 Its publication by a military authority prevented the Manifesto from having 
any constitutional power, however, and the unwillingness of either the Tsar or the Russian 
Government to sign it, ultimately made it little more than a propaganda manoeuvre. It 
failed to offer even nominal Polish independence, left her future borders undefined and 
continued  to  tie  the  Polish  question  solely  to  a  Russian  solution.  Furthermore,  its 
implementation was dependent upon a Russian victory over the Central Powers, and retreat 
by  the  Russian  Army  on  the  battlefield  in  1915  forestalled  any  attempt  to  enforce its 
proposals. 
 
      Tsarist policy was further marred by divided counsel and failure to pursue a coherent 
and structured programme. On 29 June 1916, Sazonov composed a draft bill aimed at the 
establishment of Polish autonomy, but although approved by the Tsar, it was decisively 
rejected by the Council of Ministers.
10 The final order of Nikolai II to the Russian Army, 
delivered on 25
 December 1916, called at last for, “...the restoration of a free Poland, 
composed of her three portions”.
11 However, the boundaries, government and international 
status of this envisaged Poland remained undefined and within ten weeks the Romanov 
dynasty itself was irrevocably overthrown. Ultimately, therefore, Tsarist Russia’s Polish 
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policy failed on two counts: it did not develop a concise programme for the Polish lands, 
and it was unable to resolve the Polish question by itself. 
 
      The subsequent internationalisation of the question, to which the Russian monarchy 
had been so vigorously opposed, was clearly demonstrated by the numerous appeals issued 
to the Polish people by both the Central Powers and the Western Allies. The first such 
proclamation was a Manifesto of the Austro-Hungarian and German Supreme Commands, 
on 10 August 1914, which entreated, “Poles trust our protection willingly and with full 
confidence and support us and our struggle wholeheartedly”.
12 Then, on 5 November 1916, 
the  German  Emperor  William  II  and  Franz-Joseph,  Emperor  of  Austria  and  King  of 
Hungary, issued a joint declaration, announcing the creation of, “...an independent State 
with a hereditary monarchy and a constitutional government... the Kingdom of Poland”.
13 
Crucially, the envisaged state was to be autonomous, not independent, and was to comprise 
only the territory of Russian Poland. Furthermore, “…united in friendship and interests”, 
with the Central Powers, the armed forces of this state were to be regulated by mutual 
agreement  in,  “...organisation,  training  and  command”.
14  The  declaration  did  succeed, 
however,  in  enhancing  the  international  status  of  the  Polish  question,  being  the  first 
document to be signed by the heads of state of two of Europe’s leading Empires. 
 
      This renewed interest in the Polish situation was, in turn, greatly encouraged by events 
taking  place  within  the  Russian  Empire  in  early  1917.  Many  Russians  and  Poles 
enthusiastically welcomed the overthrow and abdication of Tsar Nikolai II, on 3 March, as 
a direct result of the liberal, democratic revolution the previous month. Their common 
enemy – Tsarism – had been removed. A new dual system of rule was established in 
Russia, as both the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government struggled to secure 
the reins of power and both bodies quickly issued declarations on “Polish independence” in 
an attempt to win support. 
 
      The Petrograd Soviet acted  first and issued an appeal To the Polish Nation on  14 
March 1917, in which it announced that, 
...Russian democracy stands for the recognition of national-political self-
determination  of  peoples,  and  proclaims  that  Poland  has  the  right  to 
complete independence in national and international affairs…. We… wish it 
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success in the forthcoming struggle for the establishment of a democratic, 
republican order in independent Poland.
15  
 
The  Soviet,  however,  rested  on  a  precarious  power  base  at  this  time  and  had  no  real 
opportunity  to  further  its  support  for  Polish  independence,  given  that  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary still retained control over Polish territory.   
 
     Two days later, the Provisional Government issued a Declaration to the Polish Nation, 
drafted by the Russian Cadet Party leader, Paul Miliukov, which stated, 
The  Russian  Provisional  Government  considers  that  the  creation  of  an 
independent  Polish  state  from  all  territories  where  the  Polish  people 
constitute a majority is  a  certain  guarantee  of durable peace  in a future 
unified Empire.
16 
 
Like all pronouncements on Poland made by the belligerent nations during the war, this 
document contained important qualifications. Unwilling to preside over the decomposition 
of the multi-national Russian Empire, the Provisional Government advocated the creation 
of a state federation of which Poland would be a member. Consequently, “United to Russia 
by  a  free  military  alliance, the  Polish  State  will  become a  strong  bulwark  against  the 
pressure of the Central Powers on Slavism”, although it would remain for the Russian 
Constituent Assembly to ratify the new alliance.
17 This effectively enabled the Provisional 
Government to delay taking any concrete action in support of Polish independence. 
 
     Until this date, out of respect for their Russian Tsarist ally, the Western Allies had 
refrained from commenting upon what Russia considered a domestic matter. However, the 
Provisional Government Declaration facilitated open international discussion on the Polish 
question. The United States of America had been the first Allied nation to directly support 
Polish independence claims, when on 22 January 1917, Woodrow Wilson declared before 
the US Senate, “I take it for granted… that statesmen everywhere agree that there should 
be a united, independent and autonomous Poland”.
18 In reality, no such agreement had 
been reached by the Western Allies, but this assertion by the President of the USA created 
a huge impression. Wilson’s programme for restructuring the post-war world, his Fourteen 
Points,  issued  in  January  1918,  drew  further  attention  to  the  plight  of  the  Poles.  His 
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thirteenth point not only provided an international guarantee of Poland’s independence, but 
also announced that, 
An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the 
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations… assured a free 
and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic integrity 
should be guaranteed by international covenant.
19 
 
Finally, on 3 June 1918, at an Inter-Allied Conference, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and 
Orlando issued a joint declaration which confirmed that, “The creation of a united and 
independent Polish State, with free access to the sea, continues to be one of the conditions 
for a just and durable peace and of the rule of right in Europe”.
20 
 
       The ability of the Petrograd Soviet, Provisional Government or the Western Allies to 
resolve  the  Polish  question  was,  however,  dramatically  forestalled  by  domestic  events 
within Russia. On 25 October 1917, the left-wing Bolshevik faction of the RSDLP, under 
Vladimir Lenin, staged a coup d’état, seizing political power in the country. This had 
tremendous  implications  for  the  Polish  cause  and  led,  ultimately,  to  the  onset  of  war 
between  the  two  neighbouring  states  in  1919.  Driven  by  the  ideological  objective  of 
removing Russia from the Great War, one of the first acts of the newly established Soviet 
regime was to issue a Decree on Peace, in which they proposed, 
...to all belligerent peoples and their Governments the immediate opening of 
negotiations  of  a  just  and  democratic  peace...  without  annexations  (ie. 
without  seizure  of  foreign  territory,  without  the  forcible  annexation  of 
foreign nationalities) and without indemnities.
21 
 
This  appeared  to  many  Poles  as  encouragement  for  the  reestablishment  of  their 
independent state, especially as the Decree defined “annexations” as, 
...the  incorporation  into  a  large  or  powerful  state  of  a  small  or  weak 
nationality, without the definitely, clearly and voluntarily expressed consent 
and desire of this nationality, regardless of when this forcible incorporation 
took place.
22   
 
     Within six weeks, negotiations between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers began at 
Brest-Litovsk. The Poles were denied any representation, and when the final Treaty was 
signed on 3 March 1918, Soviet Russia renounced all claims to sovereignty over Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Ukraine.
23 The majority of Poles were outraged at 
this  further  partitioning  of  their  territory,  but  the  Brest-Litovsk  Peace  was  to  have  no 
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lasting influence on the geography of Eastern Europe. Its boundaries were soon erased by 
Point 15 of the November 1918 Armistice, which forced the Germans to renounce all gains 
made  by  the  Treaty  and  two  days  later,  a  Soviet  decree  announced  that,  “The  toiling 
masses of... Poland... are now called upon to decide their own fate”.
24 
 
      Surprisingly, although during the Polish-Soviet War, the Soviet regime quickly became 
adept at utilising diplomacy and agitation-propaganda, their first official proclamation on 
the Polish  question  was  not issued until  ten  months after  they  came to power.  On  29 
August 1918, Sovnarkom proclaimed that, 
All  agreements  and  acts  concluded  by  the  Government  of  the  former 
Russian Empire with the Governments of the Kingdom of Prussia and the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire in connection with the partitions of Poland, in 
view of their being contrary to the principle of self-determination of nations 
and  the  revolutionary  legal  conception  of  the  Russian  nation,  which 
recognises the Polish nation’s inalienable right to independence and unity, 
are hereby repealed irrevocably.
25 
 
Many Poles subsequently assumed this to mean not only that Russia no longer recognised 
German and Austro-Hungarian interests in Poland, but that the Soviet regime accepted the 
independence of Poland, comprising the Polish lands prior to the first partition of 1772.
26 
This, however, was certainly not the Soviet’s intention and throughout the period of the 
Polish-Soviet  War,  1919-1920,  the  regime  refused  to  renounce  their  interest  in  the 
borderlands. As international treaties cannot be repealed by one of the contracting parties 
alone, in reality, the annulment decree had no legal foundation.
27 It was, instead, a tactical 
manoeuvre aimed at gaining support for the Soviet state, both from the Polish population 
and  the  international  community.
28  As  a  direct  consequence  of  the  Bolsheviks’  dual 
annulment  of  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  and  the  partition  treaties,  however,  a  new 
territorial settlement was urgently required in Central and Eastern Europe. This would be 
achieved domestically and internationally, firstly by the reestablishment of an independent 
Polish state, secondly by the work of the Paris Peace Conference and the resultant Treaty 
of Versailles, and thirdly, and ultimately, by the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920. 
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2. Reestablishment of Polish Independence 
 
      In spring 1914, Józef Piłsudski declared that the European situation was, “...infinitely 
rich in possibilities... Poland’s hour of destiny is approaching and we must be ready for 
it”.
29 This proved to be the reality in November 1918. Domestically, the Poles were ready 
and  willing  to  demand  the  reestablishment  of  an  independent  Polish  state.  A  strongly 
united community, joined together by language, culture, outlook and historical ties, this 
reserve of strength was drawn upon by the Poles at the end of 1918.
30 Politically and 
diplomatically,  the  action  of  Poles  during  the  Great  War  had  increased  international 
awareness of their cause, canvassing their demands to Allied statesmen and refusing to 
accept  a  Russian,  German  or  Austrian  solution  to  the  Polish  problem.
31  This  was  of 
decisive importance for the reestablishment of their independent state. If Polish national 
sentiment had collapsed after 1795, the Polish nation would not have been restored in 
1918.
32   
 
      Domestic readiness combined with a favourable international situation to realise the 
establishment of Poland as a European nation once again. The Great War resulted in the 
abdication  of the  Russian,  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  monarchs and  destroyed  the 
partitioning powers’ unity in their treatment of Poland. It was, therefore, with relative ease 
that Poland reconstructed itself within the ensuing power vacuum and was declared to be 
an independent state by Józef Piłsudski on 14 November 1918.
33 The Allied Governments 
played no direct role in this assumption of power.
34 Instead, like Lenin the previous year, 
Piłsudski  grasped  authority  in  his  hands,  becoming  the  Republic’s  Head  of  State, 
Commander-in-Chief and Poland’s first independent ruler since the eighteenth century. 
According to one contemporary Polish diplomat, “...his prestige as creator and commander 
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of the Polish Legions, his links with the strong and popular Polish Socialist Party and his 
outstanding personality singled him out for the role of leader”.
35 
 
     On 16 November 1918, Piłsudski notified the Allied Powers and Germany that the 
Polish state had been restored on a democratic basis and defined the country’s territory.
36 
In  response,  the  Allies  sent  official  diplomatic  recognition  of  Polish  independence  by 
February  1919.
37  On  25  February  1919,  for  example,  Arthur  Balfour,  British  Foreign 
Secretary, informed his diplomatic colleague in Poland, Sir Esme Howard, that, 
H.M.G. has decided to recognise the independence of Poland. Please offer 
General Piłsudski congratulations of H.M.G…. inform Mr Paderewski that 
His Majesty’s Government henceforward recognise his Government as the 
official Polish Government... as soon as practical arrangements are possible 
they will be happy to enter into formal diplomatic relations.
38 
 
This Allied response did not, however, ensure an easy or unhampered birth for the renewed 
Polish state. 
 
3. The Paris Peace Conference 
 
      The first year of the Polish-Soviet War was dominated on the international scene by the 
Peace Conference, which met in Paris from January 1919. Motivated by the necessity of 
concluding a peace treaty with Germany after the Allied victory in the Great War, the 
discussions, debates and negotiations conducted in the French capital were to have lasting 
ramifications for both Poland and Russia, and their ensuing military conflict. 
 
      The decision-making process adopted by the peacemakers played a crucial role for both 
the Polish and Russian questions and for Allied involvement in the Polish-Soviet War 
itself.  The  resolution  of  Polish  ideological  differences  and  subsequent  presentation  of 
claims by the Polish delegation, under the chairmanship of Roman Dmowski was vitally 
important to the work of the Commission of Polish Affairs. Allied failure to allow Russian 
representation  in  Paris  as  a  result  of  their  abhorrence  of  Soviet  ideology,  and  the 
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conflicting  policies  pursued  by  the  peacemakers  towards  their  former  ally,  similarly 
intensified  difficulties  for  Russia  in  the  international  arena.  The  resultant  Treaty  of 
Versailles,  signed  on  28  June  1919,  reflected  both  the  insurmountable  problems 
experienced by the Conference in its treatment of Poland and Russia, and its absolute 
inability to influence the escalation of hostilities between the neighbouring states. 
 
3.1 Decision-Making in Paris 
 
      Paris, in 1919, was the centre of world government.
39 The decision-making process 
rested  initially  with  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  five  principal  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers:  France;  Great  Britain;  the  United  States  of  America;  Italy  and  Japan,  the 
delegations  of  which  were  headed  by  Georges  Clemenceau,  David  Lloyd  George, 
Woodrow Wilson, Vittorio Orlando and Saionji Kimmochi respectively.
40 In reality, the 
peacemaking process came to be directed by the leading statesmen of France, the USA and 
Britain, in a Council of Three.
41 The Conference was presided over by the French Premier, 
Clemenceau, but an assassination attempt upon his life in February 1919 lessened his grip 
on  proceedings.
42  Wilson,  supported  by  the  political  and  military  power  of  the  USA, 
played a crucial role in defining the peace programme based on his Fourteen Points, but his 
participation in the Conference was his first visit to Europe, of which he had no first-hand 
experience. Decisive influence was, therefore, frequently exercised  by Lloyd George.
43 
Suspicion of the statesmen’s motives was intensified by their conduct of secret negotiation 
which  largely  freed  them  from  domestic  control  over  policy  and  ensured  that  the 
delegations outwith the Big Three, often received little information before decisions were 
made.
44 
 
      This distribution  of authority  had a tremendous impact upon both the Russian and 
Polish questions at the Conference. The Russians were denied any official representation. 
The smaller states, including Poland, were sidelined and limited to a restricted role, often 
only being invited to attend the Plenary Sessions of the Conference, held infrequently. 
Indeed, the principal role of the smaller countries was simply to sanction the decisions of 
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the Supreme Council, thereby denying them any real role in the decision-making process.
45 
The Poles were allowed to participate in discussions concerning their territories in two 
ways: their delegates could submit written reports outlining the concessions desired and 
they were, very occasionally, invited to verbally state their claims before the Council.
46 
Roman  Dmowski,  Poland’s  principal  delegate,  complained  however  that  although  the 
Conference,  “...asked  the  Polish  delegation  to  submit  its  demands  with  regard  to  the 
eastern frontier, it did not undertake any discussion with us about these demands”.
47 This 
lack  of  consultation  inevitably  produced  Polish  claims  far  in  excess  of  their  real 
expectations. 
 
      The peacemakers, themselves, faced a number of important obstacles at Paris. Firstly, 
they faced enormous expectations, not only from many Poles and Russians, but also from 
their own public, and as a result, there was a great and very real risk of disappointment 
from the outset. Time was also of the essence: the Conference was constantly fighting to 
address and resolve issues as quickly as possible. After four years of bitter fighting, there 
was little patience throughout the world for a lengthy peace process and events frequently 
outstripped the Paris statesmen. The decisive position afforded to the leaders of Britain, 
France and the USA allowed the views and prejudices of individuals to shape the peace 
and their failure to consult technical experts led to poor decisions being taken.
48 Each 
delegation  had  its  own  agenda,  inevitably  leading  to  a  clash  of  interest  between  the 
victorious powers. Nowhere can this divergence in aims be seen more clearly than in the 
Paris Peace Conference’s Polish and Russian policies. 
 
3.2 Poland and the Paris Peace Conference 
 
      When the Polish State was reestablished in November 1918, one of the most pressing 
problems it faced was the delineation, establishment and protection of its frontiers. This 
proved to be one of the most complex issues to resolve in the post-war period and it was 
not until 1921, with victory secured over Russia, that Poland’s boundaries were finally 
drawn. When the Peace Conference held its inaugural session on 18 January 1919, the 
Polish state was already in existence. War broke out with Russia the following month.
49 It 
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was  against  this  background  that  the  Conference  attempted  to  resolve  the  question  of 
Poland’s eastern borders.
50 
 
     What did the Poles hope to achieve at Paris and to what extent was this driven by 
ideological motivation? As Polish Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish 
Armed Forces, Piłsudski was largely responsible for determining Polish policy in the war 
with Soviet Russia, whilst Dmowski was appointed head of the Polish delegation at Paris. 
Consequently, an examination of the ideological motivation of both men is necessary if 
Polish conduct is to be understood.   
 
     For Piłsudski, a co-founder of the patriotic Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the practical 
implementation  of  socialism  was  unthinkable,  without  the  establishment  of  national 
freedom and his overriding concern was not class struggle, but the attainment of Polish 
independence. He chiefly viewed socialism as a medium to be utilised in the fight for 
Polish independence, in exactly the same way as Lenin viewed national self-determination 
as a vehicle for the establishment of worldwide socialist revolution.
51 A PPS Conference 
resolved on 29 October 1919 that,  
The party... is desirous that the eastern frontier should be settled on the basis 
of… self-determination.... The party welcomes a union between Poland, the 
Ukraine, Lithuania, White Russia, the Baltic States and Finland as being of 
the greatest importance for the development of international socialism in 
Eastern Europe.
52 
 
This formed the basis of Piłsudski’s federalist ideology.
53 
 
     What  did  this  programme  hope  to  achieve?  The  independent  states  of  Lithuania, 
Belorussia and Ukraine, and possibly also Latvia, Estonia and Finland, would voluntarily 
unite with Poland in a democratic alliance.
54 This would safeguard Polish independence, 
provide an essential buffer between Poland and her much larger Russian neighbour and 
resolve  the  traditional  Polish-Russian  competition  for  control  of  the  borderlands.  By 
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removing  political  and  economic  barriers  between  the  smaller  states,  their  future 
development would be assured. As Piłsudski argued,  
Poland cannot be really free as long as nations around her are subjected to 
terror imposed on them from outside. Having regained the most precious 
thing  on  earth,  her  freedom,  Poland…  decided  to  push  away  from  her 
frontiers anything that threatens that freedom.
55 
   
Thus, the confinement of ethnographic Russia, whether Tsarist, White or Red, behind a 
federation of secure border states was deemed vital for Poland’s survival: the expansionist 
aims of all three regimes imperiled Polish independence and as such, it was Russia itself, 
which  was  a  vital  consideration  for  Piłsudski’s  plans.  He  confirmed  this  at  a  secret 
conference of Diet members on 5 November 1919, when,  
The question of the eastern frontier, stated General Piłsudski, was de facto 
the Russian question.... The object of the war was the defence of Poland and 
the freeing of her neighbours from the Bolsheviks, with a view to giving the 
latter the possibility of deciding about their future and their destiny.
56 
 
The PPS planned to hold plebiscites in any remaining disputed borderlands occupied by 
Polish troops, allowing the inhabitants to choose which regime to belong to: communist 
Russia or democratic Poland.
57   
 
     Moreover,  Piłsudski  viewed  the  Russian  communists  as  violators  of  socialism  and 
condemned what he regarded as the destructive doctrine of Bolshevism. As noted by his 
wife, 
He  was  too  true  a  disciple  of  Socialism  which  lies  at  the  root  of  all 
democracy  to  cherish  any  illusions  regarding  Bolshevism.  When  Lenin 
himself had expounded his creed to him, years before, he had rejected it. He 
stated…“Bolshevism is a disease which is peculiar to Russia. It will never 
grow deep roots in any countries, which are not entirely Russian. In those 
countries  which formed part of  the ancient  Russia, but where  the  social 
organisation is not definitely Russian, such as Poland… Bolshevism may 
flourish  for  a  while  but  it  will  never  be  master.  The  whole  base  of  its 
teaching is class vengeance. The ideal of Socialism is complete equality in 
rights and in laws.
58 
  
He feared and distrusted the Soviet regime, believing that it would destroy any state in 
which it took hold, and vigorously asserted that, “If... it was the will of Providence that the 
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world should try the Russian experiment, we Poles would be the last to try it”.
59 In his 
personal account of the Polish-Soviet War, Rok 1920, Piłsudski clearly defined his goals as 
follows,  
As early as 1918, with no aid from outside, I had come to a clear conclusion 
about the objectives of our war against the soviets. Amongst other things, I 
had decided to make every possible effort to remove as far as possible from 
the place where the new national life was burgeoning and taking shape, any 
attempt that might be made or any snare that might be set with a view to 
imposing  once  more  a  foreign  life  upon  us,  a  life  not  organised  by 
ourselves.
60 
 
As a result, in order to prevent the Soviet regime from imposing socialist revolution on 
Poland, through the use of military force, he sought to, “...interpose between Warsaw and 
the Soviets the greatest possible extent of territory”.
61 
 
      Therefore, despite Soviet claims to the contrary, Piłsudski was driven by a federalist 
agenda, not desire for the imperialist conquest of Russia. Although in early April 1920, the 
Polish Army was in a position to march into Russia, he refused to issue this order for two 
reasons: firstly, he did not know what he would do with any Russian territory occupied by 
the Poles, as his federalist plans did not include Russian lands; secondly, such action would 
arouse Allied condemnation as being militaristic and imperialistic, an outcome he was 
keen to avoid.
62 A Polish invasion of ethnographic Russia would, moreover, have stretched 
the infant Polish Government, economy and administrative structure to breaking point.   
 
     Polish support for federalism was mixed, but was the most popular programme for the 
solution of the kresy question for a time. It was advocated by the PPS, the left wing of the 
Peasant Party, the centre parties and a number of conservative groups, and the Polish Diet, 
on  16  May  1919,  unanimously  resolved  that  Poland  support  a  voluntary  union  with 
Lithuania, based on self-determination.
63 Staff of the Polish Foreign Ministry (MSZ) also 
endorsed it, reporting that the Poles, 
...had to push the Bolshevik forces as far as the Dvina and Dnieper, and help 
in forming a system of smaller states which linking on to Lithuania, Latvia 
and Finland in the North, and Ukraine and Rumania in the South, would 
constitute  a  temporary  safety  belt,  which  would  consolidate  the  Polish-
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Bolshevik  barrier.  This  policy  was  in  no  way  hostile  to  the  idea  of  a 
regenerated  Russia.  These  states  were  to  arise  on  the  basis  of  self-
determination, and in the course of events could either remain independent, 
or federate with Poland or Russia.
64 
 
However, this concept for the restructuring of Eastern Europe led Piłsudski into open 
conflict with a number of opponents at the Paris Conference, including notably the Polish 
National Democratic leader, Roman Dmowski, and the British Prime Minister, David 
Lloyd George.   
 
      Dmowski, leader of the National Democratic Party, Chairman of the Polish National 
Committee and chief Polish delegate at Paris was, according to the Polish diplomat, 
Henryk Sokolnicki, “...the principal Polish figure in Western Europe and our spokesman 
with the British and French Governments”.
65 As a result, his ideology was of great 
importance for the promotion of Polish foreign policy at the Conference and to Polish-
Soviet relations. He fully agreed with Piłsudski on the need for the establishment of a 
strong Polish state between the two much larger German and Russian nations, but the two 
men differed on how best to achieve Polish stability and on how far east the Polish border 
should lie.  
 
     Dmowski regarded Germany as Poland’s chief international opponent and argued that 
cordial  Polish-Soviet  relations  were  vital  to  ensure  the  prevention  of  German-Russian 
cooperation against Poland.
66 Consequently, he believed that federalism would inevitably 
create Polish-Russian tension, threatening the security of the Polish state. A devoted Polish 
patriot and nationalist, he instead advocated the incorporation of the western kresy into 
Poland but, to appease Russia, was willing to allow for a Russian sphere of influence in the 
eastern borderlands.
67 However, the National Democratic Party official programme still 
specifically aimed at the inclusion into Poland of those regions, which had belonged to the 
country  prior  to  the  partition  of  1772  and  which  retained  a  Polish  cultural  influence, 
centred round a sizeable Polish minority.
68   
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     Incorporation was supported by many Poles and the Polish Government itself on 
occasion advocated this programme. For instance, on 2 May 1919, the Sejm declared that 
Belorussia, “...belongs to Poland and is an inalienable part of the Polish state”, 
contradicting Piłsudski’s proclamation to the inhabitants of Minsk issued the previous 
month, and further demanded the annexation of the Grodno, Wilno and Minsk provinces to 
Poland.
69 Opponents denounced the policy as nationalist, annexationist and imperialist, as 
its implementation would have incorporated a large non-Polish population within the 
Polish state boundaries. Piłsudski viewed the National Democratic programme with 
distrust and suspicion and believed, as Hugh Gibson, America’s Minister to Poland 
recalled that, 
…an  ethnographical  Poland  with  a  homogenous  population  would  be  a 
much stronger element than one which straddled over the border territories, 
and such a Poland would in the course of time exert a far greater force of 
attraction on any border states. The problems which Poland had to face both 
as  regards administration and  reconstruction  were already grave enough, 
and he had no desire to see them aggravated.
70 
 
Rumbold also expressed concern of possible, “… trouble with Russia in the future if 
Poland attempted to include in her boundaries large areas inhabited by Russians”.
71 
 
     To enable Polish claims to be presented at the Peace Conference a unified Polish policy 
was urgently required. As Major Julian Coolidge, the USA’s Chief Officer with the Polish 
National Army reported on 11 December 1918, “It is realised by all intelligent Poles that, 
unless unity of action can be found, the Peace Congress will deem Poland incapable of 
self-government and will be little disposed to aid the Polish cause”.
72 A comprehensive 
programme of Poland’s territorial aspirations had to be drawn up, presented and defended. 
The existence of two parallel Polish authorities – Piłsudski’s government in Warsaw and 
Dmowski’s  National  Committee  in  Paris  –  would  unnecessarily  complicate  the  Polish 
cause.
73 A compromise was reached. Piłsudski would remain in Poland to concentrate on 
the domestic problems facing the new state. In return, he conceded that, “...the country’s 
sole official representatives at the conference... should be Dmowski and Paderewski”.
74 
Both Dmowski and Ignacy Paderewski, a world renowned pianist and the Polish Prime 
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Minister  and  Foreign  Minister  from  16  January  1919,  had  crucially  been  awarded 
diplomatic recognition by the Allied Powers during the Great War.
75 
 
     Dmowski’s annexationist policy was officially adopted by the Polish delegation at the 
Peace Conference on 2 March 1919 and despite acknowledging that he was not a diplomat 
by temperament or inclination, Dmowski successfully maintained a tight grip on the work 
of  the  Polish  delegation.
76  As  his  secretary,  Sokolnicki,  recorded  at  Paris,  he  himself, 
“...had little to do, as Dmowski had an excellent memory and drafted all his own speeches 
and notes in Polish.... Dmowski’s memorandum on Polish demands, was prepared… in the 
course of a single morning”.
77  
 
      From  March  1919  onwards,  however,  Ignacy  Paderewski  assumed  an  increasingly 
dominant role within the Polish delegation.
78 As one delegate observed, “Dmowski was 
formally head of the delegation, but Paderewski shone by his eloquence in four languages 
and was a friend of President Wilson’s”.
79 At a meeting of the Commission on Polish 
Affairs on 12 April 1919, Paderewski set out his own position when he stated, “Poland 
today is the country most capable of assuming order in Eastern Europe”.
80   
 
      Although Poland was later regarded by many as the linchpin of the Versailles Treaty, 
the Polish delegation soon realised that they had few pro-active supporters seated around 
the negotiating table in Paris.
81 Of primary concern for the leading statesmen of Europe 
was the restoration of peace and stability throughout the continent and this consideration 
greatly motivated their decisions on Poland. Maintenance of the balance of power was 
paramount  and  British  policy,  in  particular,  was  guided  by  a  desire  to  limit  French 
hegemony in Europe.
82 A conviction that the traditional friendship between France and 
Poland would once again result in Poland being subsumed by French influence encouraged 
Britain to limit Polish claims. Lloyd George was concerned that an extensive Polish state 
would hinder the economic revival of Germany, necessary for the recovery of the continent 
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as  a  whole.
83  The  British  Government  was  further  suspicious  of  both  Piłsudski’s 
Government in Warsaw and Dmowski’s representatives in Paris, regarding the former as a 
radical who had fought against the Allies in the war and the latter as a right-wing, anti-
Semite.
84 
 
      To help formulate Britain’s Polish policy, Lloyd George turned to randomly selected 
“experts”, including diplomats who had served in Russia and whose knowledge of Polish 
affairs,  gained  through  Russian  contacts,  was  inevitably  one-sided.
85  According  to  the 
British  Prime  Minister,  all  departments,  including  the  Foreign  Office,  “...were  fully 
represented in Paris during the whole of the negotiations by their ablest officials, whose 
assistance and guidance the peace negotiators constantly sought”.
86 In reality, he relied 
heavily,  not  upon  the  trained  staff  of  the  Foreign  Office,  but  upon  his  own  personal 
secretariat, including Sir Maurice Hankey and Philip Kerr, for which he was criticised by 
professional diplomats, who were increasingly sidelined during the Conference.
87 
 
      This situation had dramatic consequences for discussions on both Poland and Russia at 
the  Conference,  and  was  not  restricted  to  the  British  delegation.
88  The  opinions  and 
prejudices of Lloyd George himself were also decisive. Having, “...never been guilty of 
pro-Polish  sentiments”,  Lloyd  George  argued  against  Dmowski’s  demands  at  Paris, 
modifying  reports  by  the  territorial  commissions  to  the  detriment  of  Poland.
89  As  he 
informed the House of Commons on 3 July 1919, it was not easy to determine the borders 
of the new Polish State, given the fluctuation of her historic borders over the years.
90 In the 
pre-partition era, Poland had included large areas of Lithuania, Belorussia and Ukraine up 
to  the  Dnieper  River  but  by  1919,  ethnic  Poland  was  situated  hundreds  of  miles 
westwards.
91  
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      A Memorandum by the British Delegation on the Former Russian Empire reported on 
20  January  1919,  that,  “Poland  has  hardly  anywhere  clear  frontiers,  ethnological  or 
natural”.
92 It continued, 
…the first necessity appears to be the creation of a strong and compact 
Poland,  which  should  include  all  indisputably  Polish  territory,  but  from 
which should be excluded, as far as possible, large alien minorities, which 
can only tend to  weaken  and render impossible the position of the  new 
Polish State.
93 
 
If Poland was to receive large numbers of Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Germans 
and Jews, Britain feared that this multi-national state would face both domestic unrest from 
discontented minority groups, and an external threat from surrounding enemies who would 
await  any  opportunity  to  reclaim  their  fellow  countrymen.
94  Crucially,  these  enemies 
included two of the great European powers: Russia and Germany. Suspicion of Polish 
motives was rife in Britain, with Lloyd George arguing that, “When the Poles presented 
their  case  to  the  Conference  their  claims  were  by  every  canon  of  self-determination 
extravagant  and  inadmissable”.
95  He  feared  that  excessive  demands  would  lead  to  the 
outbreak of a new war, into which the Allies would be drawn. Consequently, the British 
delegation recommended in January 1919, that the new Polish state should be based upon 
Russian or Congress Poland, though not even all of this.
96   
 
      In turn, Clemenceau was motivated throughout the Peace Conference by the need to 
secure alliances and strengthen France’s position in Europe. He acknowledged, “There is 
an old system of alliances called the Balance of Power – this system of alliances, which I 
do not renounce, will be my guiding thought at the Peace Conference”.
97 Despite romantic 
attachment to the Polish cause, France initially called for Polish territory in the East to be 
restricted to her ethnographic borders.
98 It was hoped that this would avoid conflict with 
her former Russian ally. France fervently hoped that the Whites would gain victory over 
the  Red  Army  in  the  Russian  Civil  War,  restoring  Russia  to  Great  Power  status  and 
becoming a potential ally against Germany once more. As a result, the French delegation 
believed it expedient to limit concessions to the Poles, restricting active support to the 
Polish-German border debates.   
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     It was only on 23 December 1919, when it appeared that the Bolshevik regime may 
become permanent following victories in the civil war over Iudenich and Kolchak, that 
Clemenceau formulated his policy of fil de fer barbelé. This aimed at imposing a cordon 
sanitaire composed of all Russia’s neighbours, including Poland, as a means of isolating 
Bolshevism.
99 Following the loss of her Russian ally and driven by fear of a revived, 
strengthened Germany on her eastern border, France viewed the creation of a large, secure 
Polish state as essential for the prevention of both German and Soviet expansion in the 
east.
100 Clemenceau argued that Poland, strategically positioned in the heart of Europe, was 
central to this new alliance system and as a result, the French delegation, in contrast with 
their  British  colleagues,  consented  to  Eastern  Galicia  being  given  to  Poland  and  was 
sympathetic to Poland’s plans for the proposed Polish-Lithuanian federation.
101  
 
      The United States of America, like France, had memories of strong historic ties with 
the Poles and it was hoped in American circles that a concrete decision on Poland’s eastern 
borders  could  be  reached  at  Paris.
102  For  instance,  Major  Coolidge  argued  in  a 
Memorandum on 11 December 1918, “It is to be hoped that a solution will be quickly 
found  as,  otherwise,  Poland  is  sure  to  become  a  seat  of  Bolshevist  revolution”.
103 
Nevertheless, although Wilson was convinced that Russian  or Congress Poland  should 
form part of the reestablished Polish  State, he did  not pursue  a clearly defined  policy 
regarding  her  frontiers  at  Paris.  Essentially,  he  wanted  a  Polish  state,  based  on  self-
determination,  to  be  confined  within  her  ethnographic  borders,  although  he  was  not 
entirely clear as to where these lay.
104 
 
      Finally, the two remaining principal Allied and Associated Powers, Italy and Japan, 
were  convinced  that  although  Poland  should  be  reestablished  along  ethnographic 
principles, it would be inadvisable to go further in deciding the fate of a region in which 
Russia was so strongly concerned. Italy, especially, was interested in Poland’s borders, 
given  her  geographical  proximity  to  the  region,  and  was  favourably  disposed  towards 
supporting their incorporation of Eastern Galicia and the establishment of a direct frontier 
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with Rumania.
105 The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire threatened an expansion of 
Russian influence to Bohemia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which the Italians hoped to limit 
through the establishment of a strong Poland.  
 
     Consequently, the Peace Conference invited Poland’s representatives to appear at its 
first session on 18 January and by doing so, gave formal recognition to the reestablished 
State.
106 The Supreme Council decided to establish a Commission on Polish Affairs the 
following month, with a remit to define Poland’s borders.
107 Dmowski’s Memorandum 
outlining Polish claims for her eastern borders, presented to the Commission on 3 March 
1919, did not demand the borders of 1772.
108 Instead, he argued that the boundaries must 
reflect  the  changing  ethnographic  composition  of  the  territories  after  that  date.  This 
required an expansion of Polish lands in the west but a reduction to the line of the second 
partition in the east.
109 Consequently, Dmowski maintained that the, “...eastern frontiers of 
Poland should be curtailed and a large portion remain under Russia”.
110 Wilno was to be 
handed over to Poland, comprising as it did a Polish majority, whilst the areas of Vitebsk, 
Mogilev, Kiev and Minsk had, over the years, been removed from the Polish sphere of 
influence and so were renounced by the Poles at Paris.
111   
 
      The Polish-Russian situation was discussed by the Commission on 20 March 1919 at 
which  time  a  Sub-Commission  of  General  Le  Rond,  as  Chairman,  (France);  Dr.  Lord 
(USA); Mr. H.J. Paton (British Empire); Marquis della Torretta (Italy), and K. Otchiai 
(Japan), was appointed to make a preliminary study of the question.
112 On 12 April, the full 
Commission again met to listen to a speech by Ignacy Paderewski, in which addressed the 
question of Poland’s eastern frontier.
113 
 
     There was no lack of information available for this body to consult on the question of 
Poland and the borderlands. Under the Historical Section of the British Foreign Office, 
Handbook 51, entitled Russian Poland, Lithuania and White Russia, had been prepared in 
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April  1919.
114  This  149  page  document,  available  for  consultation  at  the  Conference, 
provided extensive details outlining the position of Russian Poland in Eastern Europe, her 
borders,  surface  area,  race,  language  and  population  distribution  and  movement,  fully 
supported  by  maps.  It  also  contained  details  of  Poland’s  history,  contemporary  social, 
political and cultural conditions, education, communication networks, industry, commerce 
and financial systems.
115 
 
      The Commission on Polish Affairs unanimously agreed on 14 April, “...to propose the 
line defined in Appendix I of this Report as the Eastern Frontier of Poland”.
116 The line 
ran: Grodno, Vapovska, Nemirov, Brest-Litovsk, Dorogusk, Ustilug, east of Grubeshov, 
Krilov, west of Rawaruska, and east of Przemysl to the Carpathians, largely corresponding 
to the boundary of the Polish Congress Kingdom.
117 To avoid antagonising Russia the 
Commission agreed that it would be guided by strictly ethnographical considerations as far 
as  possible  and  declared  that  those  districts,  “…in  which  doubt  arises  as  to  the 
ethnographical character or wishes of the population cannot at present be assigned to the 
Polish State”.
118 These were to be subject to an enquiry, sent to Poland to examine the 
ethnological,  linguistic  and  religious  character  of  the  region  and  the  wishes  of  the 
inhabitants. However, crucially, the Report concluded that, “…a definite settlement of the 
question  of  the  Eastern  Frontier  of  Poland  should  be  made  as  soon  as  a  Russian 
Government is established, with which the Great Powers can deal”.
119 This enabled the 
Polish question to remain unresolved by the Allied statesmen for the remainder of the 
Peace Conference.   
 
      As a Memorandum of Polish Foreign Relations, issued by the British Foreign Office on 
17 August 1920 recorded, “There is no record of this line having been formally notified to 
the Polish Government, although it became public knowledge in Poland and maps showing 
it were circulated”.
120 This reticence in informing the Poles of their decision may have 
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been due to their strong suspicion that it would be rejected by the Polish Government or 
because the Allies were awaiting the outcome of the Polish-Soviet War before suggesting 
concrete measures, or both. The frontier outlined by the Commission on Polish Affairs in 
April 1919 was, nevertheless, extremely important as it was later promoted by the Supreme 
Council, on 8 December 1919, as Poland’s recognised eastern frontier. 
 
      Thus, the Paris Peace Conference ultimately failed to implement Poland’s proposed 
eastern border as outlined by the Commission on Polish Affairs. Firstly, the Conference 
faced serious limitations on its power. It could attempt to enforce its proposals through 
promises or threats, but a lack of available, willing armed forces after the cessation of the 
Great War, committed to defending its resolutions, severely hampered its work. It was 
unable, therefore, to prevent Piłsudski’s march eastwards in 1919 and could do little but 
protest, as he presented the Conference with a series of fait accompli.
121 Secondly, its 
actions were severely hampered by the Russian situation. It was impossible to establish 
Poland’s  borders  in  the  east  whilst  Russia  was  denied  official  representation  at  the 
Conference and the Russian Civil War continued to be fought in territory of the former 
Russian Empire. Only after the conclusion of this domestic conflict, could the Conference 
have potentially recognised a Russian Government with which to negotiate the question.
122  
 
3.3 Russia and the Paris Peace Conference 
 
      Despite the absence of official Russian representation at the Peace Conference, the role 
of Russia in Europe and the peacemakers’ fear of Bolshevism, greatly influenced decision-
making in Paris in 1919. According to Woodrow Wilson, 
The effect of the Russian problem on the Paris Conference... was profound: 
Paris  cannot  be  understood  without  Moscow.  Without  ever  being 
represented at Paris at all, the Bolsheviki and Bolshevism were profound 
elements  at  every  turn.  Russia  played  a  more  vital  part  at  Paris  than 
Prussia.
123 
 
The  Soviet  regime’s  removal  of  their  country  from  the  Great  War  had  forfeited  any 
opportunity for Russia to participate in the Conference. She could neither be classed as a 
victorious  power,  nor  as  a  liberated  nation.  Having  concluded  a  peace  treaty  with 
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Germany, whilst her former Allies continued to fight, Russia’s name did not appear on the 
list of victors after the war. Neither, however, had she been defeated by the Allied Powers 
and so did not appear on the list of losers. The November 1918 Armistice, at one stroke, 
annulled the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and Germany, but nothing had 
replaced it. In the international arena, Russia was in limbo, cut off and removed from the 
system of alliances.   
 
     This isolation was underlined and compounded by the ideological gulf between the 
Allies and the Soviet regime, as Western democracy and Russian Marxism battled it out 
during the Polish-Soviet War. Karl Marx was one of the 19
th century’s most influential 
philosophers and economic  critics, although his economic, political and social  theories 
made no immediate impact on the workers’ movement until after his death in 1883. The 
coming  to power  of the Bolshevik Party  in Russia in October 1917 provided the first 
practical implementation of his principles and as such, the importance of his writings for 
the Soviet regime cannot be underestimated.  
 
      Marx  provided  no  detailed  model  for  the  establishment  of  a  future  socialist  or 
communist society. Instead, his life’s work provided a critical analysis of the capitalist 
economic system.
124 According to Marx, the fundamental aim of capitalism was profit, 
based on the ownership of private property and achieved through the exploitation of the 
proletariat’s labour. His alternative to this system was socialism.
125 This aimed at the equal 
distribution of wealth through the total abolition of private property and overthrow of the 
ruling classes by a bourgeois revolution, in turn itself to be replaced by an international 
socialist revolution. Although it was the responsibility of communists to guide and direct 
this  process,  Marx  argued  that  “...the  emancipation  of  the  working  classes  must  be 
achieved by the working classes themselves”.
126 Only when social classes ceased to exist 
and common ownership was established, could the ultimate objective of communism be 
achieved.  
 
      Internationalism  is  central  to  Marxist  ideology.  He  believed  that  socialism  could 
become a movement capable of destroying national boundaries and nation-states. As they 
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did not own property and thus, had no loyalty to the state, the proletariat would welcome 
the demise of nationalism.
127 Crucially, this doctrine failed to recognise that conflicts can 
and do take place, not only between classes, but also between the working classes, as 
occurred in both the Great War and the Polish-Soviet War.
128   
 
      Marx  believed  that assisting “historic”  nations, including Poland, against autocratic 
oppression would benefit the proletarian revolution in the long term as, “...the restoration 
of Poland means… the thwarting of Russia’s bid to dominate the world”.
129 Consequently, 
both Marx and Engels demanded the reestablishment of an independent Polish state. In the 
second Polish edition of Manifest Komunistyczny, published in 1892, Engels reiterated the 
basic Marxist tenet that the emancipation of the Polish working class was the responsibility 
of the Polish workers themselves, stating,  
Polish independence… is a necessity for the harmonious collaboration of 
the European nations. It can be gained only by the young Polish proletariat, 
and in its hands it is secure. For the workers of all the rest of Europe need 
the  independence  of  Poland  just  as  much  as  the  Polish  workers 
themselves.
130 
 
     Initially, Marx dismissed Tsarist Russia as a backward, repressive country, lacking the 
well-developed urban workforce deemed necessary to ensure a successful revolution. In 
1882, he surmised that, “If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian 
revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common 
ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development”.
131 It was, 
however,  left  to  Marx’s  followers  to  assess  the  suitability  of  Russia  for  this  socialist 
revolution.   
 
     In 1917, Vladimir Lenin became titular leader of the world’s first socialist state, the 
establishment of which he had unfailingly worked towards, planned for and more than any 
other contemporary was responsible for.
132 How can Lenin’s ideology best be defined? 
What did he expect would happen? And were his expectations met? In order to answer 
these questions, it is essential first to stress the most well known, but equally the most 
significant, element of Lenin’s persona: he was a Marxist. His faith in Marxism as the only 
positive,  progressive  world  doctrine  remained  unshaken  throughout  his  life.  He  was 
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fiercely, passionately and zealously devoted to the credo of Karl Marx, arguing that, “...the 
Marxist world outlook is the only true expression of the interests, the viewpoint, and the 
culture of the revolutionary proletariat”.
133 In keeping with the central Marxist demand for 
continual  critical  analysis  of  changing  world  circumstances,  Lenin  was  not,  however, 
afraid  to  rework  and  reevaluate  Marxist  ideology  to  take  into  account  current 
circumstances. 
 
      Through revolutionary means, Lenin sought the overthrow of the Tsarist dynasty, its 
replacement by a socialist regime, the removal of social classes and their substitution by a 
classless society, the abolition of religion, and the establishment of the common ownership 
of  all  property.  The  ultimate  historic  stage  for  Lenin,  as  for  all  Marxists,  was  the 
establishment of a communist system, under which the dictatorship of the proletariat and 
the existence of the state would wither away. This would leave individuals as equals, free 
from exploitation, working towards the good of all and taking joint responsibility for their 
social, cultural, economic and political development.
134 
 
      As  with  Marx,  internationalism  lay  at  the  very  foundation  of  Lenin’s  ideological 
beliefs.
135 The complete victory of socialist revolution was deemed impossible, if confined 
to  one  country.  During  the  Polish-Soviet  War, he  consistently  stressed  that the  Soviet 
regime could be secured only with the support of the formerly oppressed peoples of the 
Russian Empire, including the Poles. On 1 March 1920, for instance, he commented, “We 
have never made a secret of the fact that our revolution is only the beginning, that its 
victorious end will come only when we have lit up the whole world with these same fires 
of revolution [as in Russia]”.
136 Following the initial establishment of a federation of soviet 
republics,  his  ultimate  objective  was  the  formation  of  a  single  worldwide  Soviet 
Republic.
137 In theory, force was not to be used in this process. Instead, Lenin argued, 
We  want  a  voluntary  union  of  nations  –  a  union  which  precludes  any 
coercion  of  one  nation  by  another  –  a  union  founded  on  complete 
confidence,  on  a  clear  recognition  of  brotherly  unity,  on  absolutely 
voluntary consent.
138 
 
      A  hostile  opponent  of  nationalism,  Lenin’s  advocacy  of  a  nation’s  right  to  self-
determination was conditional upon and provisional until the eventual agreement of all 
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nations to unite within this Soviet federation.
139 The Russian Social Democratic Labour 
Party (RSDLP) Programme in 1903, advocated, “The right of all nations in the state to 
self-determination”, on condition that each be evaluated, “...from the standpoint of the 
interests  of  overall  social  development  and  of  the  proletarian  class  struggle  for 
socialism”.
140 Lenin concurred, 
Our  unreserved  recognition  of  the  struggle  for  freedom  for  self-
determination does not in any way commit us to supporting every demand 
for national self-determination. As the Party of the proletariat, the Social-
Democratic Party considers it to be its positive and principal task to further 
the self-determination of the proletariat in each nationality rather than that 
of peoples or nations.
141 
 
      Although,  in  theory,  Lenin  supported  the  national  demands  of  smaller  nations, 
including Poland, against the domination of larger, oppressive nations, this was a clever 
tactical manoeuvre aimed at utilising the strong nationalist sentiments, existing throughout 
Europe  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  for  the  socialist  cause.  Regarding 
national self-determination as a revolutionary dynamic, he advocated a three-stage process: 
the separation of nations into independent states; the establishment of a revolution within 
each, encouraged by local communists, and their voluntary reunification into the Soviet 
Socialist Republic, driven by economic necessity and the international solidarity of the 
working class.
142 As a result, in 1917, the looming collapse of Russia as a multinational 
empire encouraged the Bolsheviks to state their support for, “...the right of all nationalities 
which  are  now  part  of  the  Russian  state  freely  to  separate  and  to  form  independent 
states”.
143   
 
     How then did Lenin view the specific question of Polish national self-determination, 
which  was  to  prove  central  to  Soviet  policy  during  the  war  with  Poland?  The  Polish 
question had been of interest to Lenin for many years, given its position as a formerly 
independent state, suppressed and partitioned by three great autocratic nations. The Poles, 
he regarded, as providing an excellent opportunity to utilise national sentiment for the 
socialist  cause,  a  central  theme  of  his  1903  article,  The  National  Question  in  our 
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Programme.
144 Quoting Karl Kautsky, Lenin observed that, “Once the proletariat tackles 
the Polish  question  it cannot  but take a stand in  favour of Poland’s  independence”.
145 
Crucially though, he did not seek to actively fight for Polish independence, arguing, 
Russian Social-Democracy does not in the least intend to tie its own hands. 
In including in its programme recognition of the right of nations to self-
determination, it takes into account all possible, and even all conceivable, 
combinations. That programme in no way precludes the adoption by the 
Polish proletariat of the slogan of a free and independent Polish republic, 
even  though  the  probability  of  it  becoming  a  reality  before socialism  is 
introduced is infinitesimal.
146 
 
The article concluded with reiteration of the Marxist principle that only alliance of the 
Russian  and  Polish  proletariats  could  guarantee  the  successful  restoration  of  Polish 
independence. 
 
      Lenin continued to formulate his ideas on the Polish question between 1912 and 1914, 
when  he  lived  in  Kraków.
147  He  believed  that  Polish  hostility  towards  the  Russian, 
Austrian and Prussian autocracies had made them politically conscious and as a result, he 
was  willing  to  accept  Polish  national  aspirations,  fully  convinced  that  once  their 
independence  was  assured,  the  development  of  class  consciousness  would  lead  to 
reunification with Soviet Russia. Consequently, he argued, “In Russia we must stress the 
right of separation for the subject nations, while in Poland we must stress the right of such 
nations  to  unite”.
148  The  slogan  “national  self-determination”  was  to  be  used  as  a 
propaganda tool, aimed at securing Polish support for the socialist cause, while Polish 
communists would simultaneously demand reunification with the Russian Soviet Republic. 
This  was  regarded  by  Lenin  as  essential  not  only  for  the  development  of  the  Polish 
revolutionary movement, but also for the safety of the socialist regime in Russia during the 
Polish-Soviet War. 
 
      One of the most important documents setting out the Soviet leader’s Polish aims during 
the conflict was published for the first time in 1992.
149 At the 9
th All-Russian Conference 
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of the RKP(b), convened in Moscow on 22-25 September 1920, Lenin’s conclusion to his 
political report provided an excellent insight into his real aspirations and objectives in the 
war  with  Poland.  This  secret  speech,  delivered  to  a  closed  session  of  the  conference, 
examined Soviet conduct in the war and provided lucid explanations for the Red Army’s 
overwhelming military defeat at Warsaw in August 1920. Given its highly sensitive nature, 
Lenin requested that it not be published, ordering the stenographer, “Please take fewer 
notes. This should not get into the press”.
150 As a result, he spoke without reserve. 
 
      Indeed,  the  document  remained  hidden  from  public  scrutiny  in  the  Russian  State 
Archive  of  Social-Political  History  (Rossiiskii  gosudarstvennii  arkhiv  sotsial’no-
politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI)) for over 70 years as it blatantly contradicted the official 
Soviet  interpretation  of  events.  During  the  speech,  Lenin  acknowledged  the  need  for 
deception, remarking, 
When the Comintern Congress convened in July [1920] in Moscow, we 
were settling the question in the CC. We could not raise the question at the 
Comintern Congress because that congress had to proceed openly – that was 
its enormous revolutionary, global political significance.
151 
 
He  further  admitted  that  because  a  number  of  congress  delegates,  including  German 
Independents, opposed the forceful sovietisation of Poland as un-Marxist, “...this question 
was  deliberately  not  raised  at  the  Congress”.
152  As  noted,  Marx  argued  that  socialist 
revolution must be the responsibility of the proletariat of each country and could not be 
imposed from outside through the use of military force. The Red Army should, at most, 
assist the efforts of the working class of the given country. It should not be used as a 
decisive instrument in bringing about this change. Soviet plans to use the Red Army to 
spread revolution to Poland, therefore, had to be kept secret.
153 
 
      Even more importantly, for the first time, Lenin acknowledged that the Red Army 
offensive into Poland in July 1920 aimed not only at the sovietisation of Poland, but also at 
taking the military campaign further westwards, in particular, to Germany and England.
154 
This intention was unknown to earlier historians working on the subject.
155 Lenin believed 
that the Red Army offensive would ignite the spark of revolution across Europe, as it 
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advanced, drawing fresh recruits into its ranks, as it had during the Russian Civil War.
156 In 
this way, the Polish-Soviet War could be used as the initial engagement in a war against 
the capitalist Allied states, for the overthrow of the Versailles settlement, admitting, 
This was a most important turning point not only in the politics of Soviet 
Russia but also in world politics... now we said we have become stronger, 
and  we  will  respond  with  a  counterattack  to  each  of  your  attempts  at 
attack… you risk that each of your attacks will expand the territory of the 
Soviet Republic.
157  
 
     Lenin clearly acknowledged in the speech that he had advocated and supported the use 
of the Red Army to take the revolution to Poland by force and would not have hesitated to 
employ this measure in the rest of Europe, admitting, “We used every opportunity to go 
from the defence  to the offence”.
158 Warsaw  represented the heart  of the international 
imperialist system and the Polish-Soviet War was viewed by the Russian communists as a 
unique opportunity to influence politics not only in Poland, but also in Germany, Britain 
and all of Western Europe.
159   
 
     Marxist ideology was further developed in Soviet Russia during the Polish conflict by 
Leon Trotsky, through his development of the theory of “Permanent Revolution”.
160 This 
doctrine was intimately connected with the Marxist goal of international revolution, as for 
Trotsky, 
The  completion  of  the  socialist  revolution  within  national  limits  is 
unthinkable….  The  socialist  revolution  begins  on  the  national  arena,  it 
unfolds on the international arena, and is completed on the world arena. 
Thus, the socialist revolution becomes a permanent revolution in a newer 
and broader sense of the word; it attains completion only in the final victory 
of the new society on our entire planet.
161 
 
He believed that the class unrest steadily intensifying in Western Europe could lead the 
international workers, in a fraternal union, to defend the revolution and argued that, 
The  dictatorship  of  the  Russian  working  class  will  be  able  to  finally 
entrench itself and to develop into a genuine, all-sided socialist construction 
only from the hour when the European working class frees us from the 
economic  yoke  and  especially  the  military  yoke  of  the  European 
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bourgeoisie, and, having overthrown the latter, comes to our assistance with 
its organization and technology.
162 
 
The retention of Soviet power in Russia and the future of socialism were reliant upon 
European working class support. For Trotsky, as for Marx and Lenin, the confinement of 
socialism to one country was impossible.        
 
     In contrast with Lenin, however, Trotsky was very little concerned with the national 
question prior to the war, and the plight of national minorities, including the Poles, lacked 
interest  for  him.
163  He  was  convinced  that  the  nationality  question  would  become 
redundant  with  the  establishment  of  an  internationalist  socialist  movement  and  the 
advancement of an increasingly developed proletariat. It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that 
it was Trotsky, not Lenin, who correctly appreciated the importance of Polish nationalist 
sentiment throughout the conflict, taking this into consideration when arguing against a 
Soviet military advance into ethnographic Poland in July 1920.
164   
 
     As Commissar for War and active participant in the conflict, Trotsky was the Russian 
communist leader who wrote most extensively on the war.
165 For him, as for the RKP(b), 
Poland was not a pressing priority in 1919.
166 Portraying himself as a reluctant participant 
in the Polish-Soviet War, Trotsky recorded, “I did not want this war, because I realised 
only too clearly how difficult it would be to prosecute it after 3 years of continuous civil 
war”.
167 Trotsky is disingenuous here. Even if he did not actively seek war, he believed 
that revolutionary war with Poland was possible by 1920.
168 He fully believed that after the 
Polish proletariat had become masters of their country, a fraternal alliance between Soviet 
Russia and Soviet Poland would be forged. Trotsky was willing to use the Red Army 
machinery, over which he presided, but crucially only in tandem with the wishes of the 
Polish population.
169 On 2 May 1920, he acknowledged, 
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We must inflict a thorough military defeat upon the armed forces of White-
Guard Poland, so as to make politically and psychologically inevitable the 
revolutionary defeat of the Polish bourgeoisie. This second task must be 
wholly carried out by the Polish proletariat. Our duty is only to facilitate 
this task.
 170 
 
      This endorsement of Marxist ideology by the RKP(b) meant that the Soviet leadership 
failed to acknowledge the authority of the Peace Conference and prevented the regime 
from seeking diplomatic representation at Paris in 1919. The Conference, in turn, reflecting 
the Allies fear of Bolshevism, refused to recognise the Soviet Government, either de facto 
or  de jure, or  have  any official dealings with the regime. The absence of  Russia was 
striking and made it impossible to resolve any issues relating to the country. This has been 
condemned as one of the Conference’s greatest failings.
171 
   
     The  Conference  did  have  unofficial  contact  with  representatives  of  non-Bolshevik 
groups, who had united in January 1919, to form the Russian Political Conference. Headed 
by Sergei Sazonov, and including Prince Georgii Lvov, Paul Miliukov, Boris Savinkov and 
Basil  Maklakov,  this  body  was  not  officially  invited  to  participate  in  proceedings. 
However, it met daily, discussed current matters and sent numerous notes to the Supreme 
Council, presenting their requests.
172 Savinkov informed Gazeta Poranna, on 1 July 1920, 
that,  
The fate of Europe and of peace depends entirely on the way in which the 
future Russo-Polish relations are going to be arranged. Should an alliance 
between  Poland  and  Russia  be  frustrated  we  shall  be  confronted  by  an 
ominous Russo-German alliance. It is therefore clear that the policy of the 
Allied Powers should work for a Russo-Polish rapprochement.
173 
 
They  recognized  the  right  of  Poland  to  independent  existence  within  its  ethnographic 
borders west of the River Bug, but disputed all Polish claims to territories further east. The 
border, established in 1795 by the Third Partition, was deemed the rightful Polish-Russian 
frontier.
174 The Political Conference also reserved for the Russian people the final decision 
on the composition of the border states.
175 Its lack of official status at Paris prevented its 
members  from  submitting  authoritative  demands,  however,  and  Russia  suffered  from 
having no representative who could speak for the country as a whole. The former Russian 
Chargé d’Affaires to Britain, Konstantin Nabokoff, decried this situation and argued, “I am 
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firmly convinced that since the Peace Conference met in Paris, the influence of Russian 
politicians, diplomats and casual advisers upon the policy of the Entente was reduced to 
naught”.
176 As a result, the Russian case at Paris was badly promoted and only partially 
understood. 
 
      Moreover, in 1919 there was still much confusion and disagreement amongst the Allied 
Powers as how best to  deal  with Soviet Russia. The long-term  impact  of  the  Russian 
Revolution  on  the  world  stage  remained  unclear  and  there  was  a  severe  shortage  of 
accurate,  reliable  information  on  Russia  available  to  the  peacemakers.
177  The  Allies 
desperately needed to formulate a coherent, consistent and coordinated Russian policy, but 
were unable to do so. They neither established relations with Sovnarkom, nor declared war 
on the Soviet state. They wanted, paradoxically, to develop relations with the Russian 
nation whilst simultaneously fighting Bolshevik ideology. 
 
     The most vehement opposition to Russian representation at the Paris Conference was 
expressed by Clemenceau.
178 Indeed, he went so far as to threaten, with the unanimous 
backing of his Government and Cabinet, to resign his post as President of the Conference if 
Russia was admitted to the negotiations.
179 France had entered the Great War in support of 
her Russian ally and as a result, regarded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as an unpardonable 
betrayal.
180  Woodrow  Wilson,  in  turn,  supported  a  Soviet  Russian  policy  of  non-
recognition and non-intervention.
181   
 
     British policy was first defined in a Memorandum by the British Delegation on the 
Former Russian Empire, issued on 20 January 1919, which stated,  
…until  some  state  of  order  and  established  Government  is  evolved  in 
Russia, it would seem useless to lay down any settled policy as regards the 
country as a whole. We must wait on events, and see how they shape.... it 
would be impossible, for a long time to come, to establish definitely the 
Western frontiers of Russia.
182  
 
An astounding naivety was displayed by the British delegation’s assertion that they would 
consider  entering  into,  “...semi-official  relations”  with  the  Soviet  Russia  on  condition, 
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“That we cannot in any circumstances have dealings with Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and 
possibly some others, who are responsible for the crimes committed by the Bolsheviks”.
183 
These were the leading Bolsheviks with whom it would be necessary to deal if relations 
were to be established.   
 
      Lloyd George played as important a role in the Russian question at Paris, as he did the 
Polish question, and came into conflict with his fellow statesmen as a result of the policy 
he advocated.
184 In his opinion, if Poland, which had claims on Russian territory, was 
invited to Paris, then Russia ought also to have been officially represented and consulted. 
He recorded, 
I  was  becoming  more  and  more  convinced  that  world  peace  was 
unattainable as long as that immense country was left outside the Covenant 
of Nations. I acted upon that conviction up to the end of my Premiership.... 
The affairs of nearly 200 million people could not be settled without hearing 
them.
185 
 
     On 16 January 1919, he outlined the Supreme Council’s Russian policy choices: fight to 
destroy Bolshevism; isolate it from the rest of the world, or invite Russians, including the 
Bolsheviks, to the Conference.
186 Lloyd George argued that the first two measures – Allied 
Intervention and Allied Blockade – had made only limited gains, and consequently, he 
strenuously called for adoption of the third option.
187 An invitation was dispatched inviting 
Russia to send representatives of all political persuasions to the Princes Islands in the Sea 
of Marmora, to discuss bringing, “...peace to Russia and a good understanding between 
Russia and the rest of the world”.
188 The Whites refused to attend and the idea was shelved. 
The shooting and wounding of Clemenceau on 19 February 1919, the very day discussion 
on Russia was due to resume in the Supreme Council, postponed any decision on the 
Russian question indefinitely.
189   
 
      Thus,  ideology  was  of  crucial  importance  in  the  formulation  of  Polish  and  Soviet 
objectives in 1919, and in determining the treatment of both states at Paris. Failure to deal 
decisively with either regime was one of the most important missed opportunities of the 
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Peace  Conference and  procrastination,  thereafter,  became  the  defining  characteristic  of 
Western policy for the duration of the Polish-Soviet War. For Soviet Russia, Marxism 
remained the guiding tenet throughout the conflict, although its leaders were not afraid to 
adapt the ideas of Marx as and when circumstances dictated. Thus, directed by Lenin, the 
Soviet regime cleverly promoted a policy of national self-determination as a short-term 
propaganda move, in order to strengthen their long-term aim of establishing worldwide 
socialist revolution. Ideological motivation also largely determined the aims of the Polish 
state and in pursuit of their objectives the Poles were guided by two distinct, incompatible 
ideological agendas: federalism and annexation. Both schools of thought were to play a 
crucial role in the development of Polish-Soviet diplomatic, political and military relations 
during the critical years 1919-1921. 
  
3.4 The Treaty of Versailles and the Outcome of the Paris Peace Conference 
 
      After five months of deliberation, negotiation and debate, the Treaty of Versailles was 
formally signed on 28 June 1919, signalling the conclusion of the Great War between the 
Allied Powers and Germany.
190 Whilst Poland’s sovereignty was assured by the Treaty and 
the reestablished state was welcomed into the international community, recognition of the 
Russian state, de facto and de jure, was denied. In the difficult matter of establishing new 
state borders in Central and Eastern Europe, the Versailles settlement had mixed success. 
Poland’s  western  frontier  received  detailed  attention.
191  Her  eastern  border,  however, 
proved too contentious an issue for the peacemakers, who were unwilling or unable to 
resolve the question.
192 Any frontier drawn by the Peace Conference would not have been 
recognised by either the Russian or Polish States, which were, at that time, embroiled in a 
military conflict to resolve the question themselves. Instead, the Polish-Soviet frontier was 
referred  to  only  once  in  the  200-page  document,  with  Article  87  stating  that,  “The 
boundaries of Poland not laid down in the present Treaty will be subsequently determined 
by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”.
193 This clearly demonstrated to both the 
Poles and Russians that the Allied Powers lacked any real authority to enforce their wishes 
on the Polish-Soviet War and its outcome. 
                                                
190 Twenty-seven nations were signatories to the Peace Treaty in the Hall of Mirrors, Versailles, J. Man, pp. 
139-142.   
191 Plebiscites were ordered in Upper Silesia and Teschen, whilst Danzig was established as a free city and 
Poland was guaranteed access to the sea, NAS, GD 433/2/18, pp. 41-43; NAS, GD 433/2/18, file 64. 
192 If agreement failed to be reached by Poland and Russia, the Allies planned to refer it for League of 
Nations arbitration, TNA, FO 417/8, doc. 26, enclosure 1, p. 32. 
193  Ibid. Kutrzeba  incorrectly  argued  that the  Treaty  made  no  mention  of  the Polish-Russian  border,  S. 
Kutrzeba, “The Struggle for the Frontiers, 1919-1923”, in W. Reddaway, Marshal Pilsudski, (London, 1939), 
p. 512.   65 
 
      Although the Paris Peace Conference and the Versailles settlement largely defined the 
world order for the rest of the twentieth century, it also left many problems unresolved. 
The Europe which emerged  in June  1919 was dramatically different from the pre-war 
order: the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires had disappeared entirely; Russia and 
Germany had been significantly reduced in size and strength; and nine new independent 
European states were born. It proved to be much easier to break-up the multi-national 
empires than it did to replace them with ethnically homogenous states.
194 Much remained 
unresolved when the Paris Peace Conference wound up on 21 January 1920.
195   
 
      Nevertheless,  one  of  the  most  striking  outcomes  of  the  Peace  Conference  was  the 
reemergence of the Polish State, more than a century after its partition. For Poles, despite 
having many grievances over the terms of the Peace Treaty, the most important factor 
contained within the settlement was the international community’s recognition of Poland 
as an independent state. As the Prime Minister, Paderewski, acknowledged to the Polish 
Diet on 12 November 1919, 
Today we  are  a free nation, one  of  the  largest in  Europe. We gained a 
victory at the Peace Conference, for even though we did not obtain all we 
desired, still we received very much. We have our own sea coast... through 
Danzig...  Lemberg  [Lwów]  is  out  of  danger;  Galicia,  except  for  the 
temporary  solving  of  the  problem,  is  not  menaced;  Vilno  [Wilno]  and 
Minsk are freed from the enemy.
196 
 
Versailles,  however,  also  left  the  new  state  to  face  enormous  domestic  problems  and 
potentially life-threatening border disputes. 
 
      For  the  Russian  communists,  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  embodied  Allied  policy  of 
erecting an insurmountable barrier between Soviet Russia and the West. At the heart of this 
programme lay Poland. On 15 October 1920, Lenin asserted, “It has come to pass that the 
Peace of Versailles now hinges on Poland”.
197 This interpretation of events inevitably led 
to an escalation of hostilities between Poland and her eastern neighbour. Indeed, the failure 
of the Paris Conference to define the Polish-Russian border left the issue to be resolved by 
two methods: Polish-Soviet diplomatic negotiation and direct military action.   
                                                
194 The Conference was criticised as, “...one of the ‘might have been’s’ of history”, by Philip Kerr’s secretary 
in Paris, NAS, GD 1/839/1, p. 7.   
195 Its executive functions were entrusted to The Ambassadors’ Conference, represented by the five Allied 
and Associated Powers, NAS, GD 433/2/18, p. 49. The first official involvement of this body in Polish-
Soviet relations was to ratify the Treaty of Riga in 1923, two years after it was signed.   
196 TNA, FO 417/7, no. 18, pp. 18-19. 
197 V.I. Lenin, PSS, vol. 41, p. 353.   66 
    
4. The Path to War 
 
      The  difficulties  facing  the  infant  Polish  and  Soviet  regimes  early  in  1919  were, 
however, enormous and very similar. Neither country entered the Polish-Soviet conflict 
from a position of strength. Indeed, the war was to exert such a tremendous strain on the 
belligerents,  that  by  October  1920,  both  nations  faced  serious  domestic  crises,  which 
threatened the survival of their respective regimes. Poland and Russia had suffered huge 
losses as a result of the Great War, in terms of human casualties and destruction of their 
country’s infrastructure. 
 
      Piłsudski remarked upon the enormous problems facing the Poles in a Decree to the 
Polish People, issued on 14 November 1920, in which he stated, “Upon my release from 
the  German  prison,  I  was  confronted  with  the  most  chaotic  internal  and  external 
conditions”.
198 Indeed, according to the Polish Head of State, “[Poland’s] far fields were 
laid waste, her cities were in ruins, her people worn down and wearied by war... which had 
left  them  with  neither  the  exaltation  of  the  victor  nor  the  claim  to  pity  of  the 
vanquished”.
199 Isolation compounded these difficulties. Enemies surrounded Poland on all 
sides and the incorporation of a large number of resentful ethnic minorities into the new 
state created much domestic unrest. There was a severe shortage of financial reserves and 
eight  different  currencies  were  in  circulation.  The  economic  base  of  the  reestablished 
country was predominantly agricultural and Poland had only a small industrial heartland. 
The new state lacked a coherent administrative structure and education system.
200 An army 
had to be created from Polish units, which had earlier formed part of the divergent Russian, 
German and Austro-Hungarian armies, in order to protect her long and, as yet, undefined 
frontiers. Crucially, the Poles first had to establish a government and a political system, 
before  they  could  even  begin  to  deal  with  the  problems  facing  the  country,  the  most 
threatening of which at the beginning of 1919, was the war looming with Soviet Russia.
201 
 
      Like  Poland,  Russia  in  1919  remained  predominantly  an  industrially  undeveloped, 
poor, agricultural state. The peasant majority was largely uneducated and illiteracy was 
extremely  high.  The  aftermath of the Great War and the two revolutions  of 1917 had 
created severe disruption within the former Russian Empire. Desperate shortages of food, 
                                                
198 Dziennik Praw Państwa Polskiego, (Warsaw, 1918-1919), doc. 17, p. 40. 
199 Piłsudski Institute, Kolekcja no. 2, 2/7/2a/41/1, p. 3. 
200 Polish Institute, KOL 180, p.10.   
201 Polish Institute, KOL 82/1/5.    67 
raw materials and consumer goods were experienced by Russians and minority populations 
alike. At the time of Poland’s reemergence in November 1918, Russia was embroiled in a 
violent  civil  war,  facing  both  Allied  intervention  and  a  blockade.  War  weariness  and 
discontent  was  rife,  and  diplomatic  isolation  from  the  international  community 
compounded the country’s difficulties.
202 The Soviet regime had no experience as rulers 
and no clear blueprint to follow in order to deal with the crises it faced. Both Poland and 
Russia were, thus, seriously unprepared for the war which broke out between them the 
following month. 
                                                
202 Trotsky argued that, at the beginning of 1919, “Europe resembles a mad-house… even its inmates do not 
know for one half-hour at a time whom they are going to butcher and with whom they will fraternise”, 
Pravda, 26 January 1919.   68 
Chapter 2: Polish-Soviet Diplomacy, 1919 
 
      Diplomatic negotiation was a continuous feature of the Polish-Soviet War, from its 
outbreak in February 1919, until the Treaty of Riga was signed in March 1921. Employed 
by the statesmen of Poland and Soviet Russia, in conjunction with military directives, 
diplomacy  reflected  both  the  nature  and  development  of  the  conflict.  The  term 
“diplomacy” has a number of connotations, including: the conduct of relations between 
states by peaceful means; the business or art of the professional diplomatist; skill in the 
management  of  international  relations,  and  tact  in  mediation,  negotiation  and 
representation.
1  An  assessment  of  Polish-Soviet  diplomacy  must,  therefore,  necessarily 
include  an  examination  of  the  diplomatic  correspondence  between  the  two  states. 
However, “diplomacy” can also be used as a synonym for foreign policy or to describe a 
division of the Foreign Office, the aim of which is to create international confidence and 
attain national objectives. The formulation of this policy by statesmen and its execution by 
diplomats are interdependent, and both dimensions must be examined to fully understand 
Polish-Soviet relations in the period 1918-1921. 
 
1. Foreign Policy and Diplomacy 
 
1.1 Soviet Russia 
 
     The decision-making process employed by the Soviet regime was of crucial importance 
to its Polish policy during the war. Which bodies determined the course pursued by Soviet 
politicians, diplomats and military leaders? Was the programme state or party-controlled? 
The answers to these questions provide much insight into the direction pursued by the 
Soviet regime but have previously been overlooked by historians of the conflict. 
 
      As demonstrated by the following diagram, the distribution of state authority in Soviet 
Russia in 1919-1921 was based on three crucial organisations.
2 
Voting population 
▼ 
All-Russian Congress of Soviets/ 
                                                
1 Collins English Dictionary (Glasgow, 1991). Lord Robert Cecil informed the House of Commons on 31 
July 1918, “...we have passed the day when diplomacy is merely concerned with international duties – with 
peace and war and things of that kind. It has to do with a great deal more than that”, National Archives of 
Scotland, GD193/115/9, 1-43, p. 26, (hereafter NAS). 
2 Diagram modified from D. McLellan, Karl Marx: the legacy, (London, 1983), p. 87.    69 
All-Russian Central Executive Committee 
▼ 
Council of Peoples’ Commissars (Sovnarkom) 
▼ 
Commissariats 
▼ – elections 
 
      Article 12 of the Soviet Constitution of 1918 decreed that supreme authority in the 
Russian  Socialist  Federative  Soviet  Republic  (RSFSR)  was  vested  in  the  All-Russian 
Congress  of  Soviets,  and  during  the  periods  between  Congresses,  in  the  All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee (CEC).
3 These two institutions were responsible for setting 
general policy and had wide-ranging powers which affected Soviet conduct in the war.
4 
These  included:  the  direction  of  foreign  and  domestic  policy;  the  establishment  and 
alteration  of  frontiers;  the  right  to  declare  war,  conclude  and  ratify  peace,  and  the 
appointment and dismissal of Sovnarkom, its chairman and members.  
 
     Soviet policy was then studied and elaborated in Sovnarkom, under the chairmanship of 
Lenin,  before  being  passed  to  the  individual  commissariats  for  implementation.
5 
Commissars were, in turn, responsible to Sovnarkom and the All-Russian CEC. Of the 
sixteen  commissariats  in  1919,  the  most  critically  important  for  the  war  were  the 
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, led by G.V. Chicherin and his deputy, L.M. Karakhan, 
and the Commissariat for War, under Trotsky and his second in command, E.M. Sklianskii. 
In  theory,  therefore,  the  formulation,  elaboration  and  implementation  of  foreign  and 
diplomatic policy rested with state organisations. The reality, however, proved somewhat 
different.   
 
      Throughout the conflict, Soviet policy was in fact governed almost exclusively by the 
Russian Communist Party (RKP(b)). The following diagram demonstrates the decision-
making process adopted.
6 
 
Regional, provincial and local RKP(b) organisations 
▼ 
                                                
3 National Archives of Scotland GD193/327/64, p. 27, (hereafter NAS). The Congress of Soviets comprised 
representatives of Russian provinces and towns with more than 25,000 inhabitants. 
4 However, as the All-Russian Congress of Soviets met irregularly, and for only short periods, the All-
Russian CEC made the majority of state policy decisions, ibid, p. 23. 
5 Ibid, p. 27.    
6 Diagram modified from D. McLellan, p. 87.    70 
Congress of Russian Communist Party  
▼ 
Central Committee (CC RKP(b)) 
▼ 
Political Bureau (Politburo) 
▼ – elections 
 
After  the  October  Revolution  of  1917,  RKP(b)  rule  increasingly  became  equated  with 
Russian  state  authority  as  the  party  ceased  to  function  as  a  distinct  organisation, 
appropriating to itself all important decision-making. The resulting deliberative apparatus 
was invested within the Central Committee and, ultimately, within the Political Bureau.
7 
As the leading figures in the Congress of Soviets and Sovnarkom were also the leading 
lights  of  the  CC  RKP(b)  and  Politburo,  this  proved  to  be  a  relatively  straightforward 
process.   
 
      The CC RKP(b) in January 1920, mid-point in the war, had 18 members, including, 
Lenin,  Trotsky,  J.V.  Stalin,  G.E.  Zinoviev,  L.B.  Kamenev,  and  two  Poles,  Feliks 
DzierŜyński and Karol Radek.
8 It was these party members who held Soviet decision-
making largely in their hands. As Trotsky observed on 26 July 1920,  
…now that we have received an offer of peace from the Polish Government, 
who decides the question?.... We have our Council of Peoples’ Commissars, 
of course, but that, too, must be under a certain control. Whose control? The 
control of the working class as a formless chaotic mass? No. The Central 
Committee of the Party is called together to discuss and decide the question. 
And when we have to wage war… to whom do we turn? To the Party, to the 
CC.
9 
 
      The large  Central Committee proved  too unmanageable when rapid decisions were 
required, however, and as a result, one month after the Polish-Soviet War broke out in 
February 1919, a 5-man Political Bureau (Politburo) was created to guide and direct Soviet 
policy between CC sessions.
10 This body soon became the most powerful decision-making 
                                                
7 As the only officially recognised party in Russia during the conflict, RKP(b) members dominated state 
institutions. 
8 NAS, GD193/327/64, p. 30. 
9 Ibid, pp. 127-128.   
10 Ibid, p. 27, consisting of Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Krestinsky, and Menzhinsky.     71 
institution in the country. As Lenin conceded on 29 March 1920, “The Political Bureau 
adopted decisions on all questions of foreign and domestic policy”.
11  
 
     Western statesmen and diplomats correctly identified Lenin and Trotsky as the two 
leading Russian communists during the war.
12 As a member of the CC RKP(b), Politburo 
and  Sovnarkom;  Commissar  for  Foreign  Affairs  until  March  1918,  and  thereafter 
Commissar for War and Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council, Trotsky played 
an important role in determining Soviet policy. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that, in 
this, he faced limitations as,  
The Civil war [and the Polish-Soviet War] kept me away from the work in the 
Council of Commissars. I lived now in a railway-carriage or in an automobile. 
After weeks and months of such traveling, I got so completely out of touch 
with the current business that I could not pick up the threads again in my brief 
visits to Moscow.
13 
 
As a result, he confessed that his involvement in decision-making was largely confined to 
military  matters  during  the  war.
14  Indeed,  during  these  turbulent  years,  the  frequent 
absence of leading communists, required on the various fronts, prevented the Politburo 
from meeting regularly in Moscow.
15   
 
     Consequently,  it  was  possible  for  Lenin,  the  one  communist  who  remained  in  the 
capital, at the centre of party and governmental work, to assume the role of Soviet Russia’s 
chief policy maker. As recognised leader of the RKP(b), titular head of the Politburo and 
chairman  of  Sovnarkom,  he  concerned  himself  with  policy-making’s  elaboration  and 
execution at all levels.
16 With a primary support base in the RKP(b) and in particular, the 
Politburo,  he  directed  the  Soviet  agenda,  adeptly  coordinating  both  individuals  and 
institutions in pursuit of his objectives. This facilitated a flexible policy, which could shift 
rapidly to meet existing conditions.   
 
                                                
11 Ibid, p. 31. V.I. Lenin, Polnoe sobraniie sochinenii, vol. 40, (Moscow, 1956-1965), p. 238 (hereafter PSS); 
a fact clearly recognised by contemporaries see, The National Archives, FO 418, part 2, doc. 41, p. 128, 
(hereafter TNA).     
12 NAS, GD 433/2/18. A number incorrectly accorded Trotsky a more senior role than Lenin, including Sir 
Hugh  MacKinder  M.P.  who  reported  to  the  British  Foreign  Office  in  December  1920,  “Trotsky  now 
overshadows Lenin”, TNA, FO 418, part 2, doc. 6, p. 23. 
13 L.D. Trotsky, Moia zhizn’: opyt avtobiografii, vol. 2, (Berlin, 1990), pp. 84-85.   
14 Ibid. George Kidston misunderstood the situation when he reported on 4 October 1920 that, “He [Trotsky] 
speaks  almost  exclusively  on  military  questions.  He  is  afraid  of  contradicting  Lenin  and  is  therefore, 
reserved in all political matters”, TNA, FO 418, part 2, doc. 41, p. 128. 
15 TNA, FO 418, part 2, doc. 41, p. 130.   
16 He also chaired the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defence, organising the war effort from July 1920.     72 
     According to the British diplomat, George Kidston, with the exception of Lenin and 
Trotsky, other Communists at Politburo sessions, “...have so little influence that they are 
only allowed to appear, but scarcely ever offer an opinion”.
17 The available evidence does 
not support this assertion. Indeed, Lenin’s writings demonstrate that he was in constant 
contact with all his Politburo colleagues during the war, requesting not only information, 
but seeking their opinions and advice on current issues.
18 In this way, he not only gathered 
all available information before deciding policy, but also kept his colleagues involved, 
preventing  their  isolation  from  the  process.  This  crucially  allowed  Lenin  to  deflect 
criticism by sharing responsibility for decisions taken.  
 
     Although  following  the  Bolshevik  seizure  of  power  in  October  1917,  Lenin  had 
questioned the need for foreign policy, asking Trotsky, “What foreign policy will we have 
now?”, under his guidance the conduct of Soviet foreign policy during the conflict became 
a  well-defined  process.
19  Politburo  directives  were  transmitted  to  Sovnarkom  for 
development  into  specific  policies,  before  being  handed  over  to  the  Commissariat  for 
Foreign Affairs (Narodnyi komissariat po inostrannym delam (NKID)) for implementation. 
Diplomats of the NKID, in turn, provided the Politburo with crucial first-hand information 
from abroad, including the Polish communist, Julian Marchlewski, who was frequently 
consulted by Lenin during the war, heading Soviet diplomatic negotiations with the Poles 
in both July and autumn 1919.
20 
 
      In turn, Marxist theory provided no clear indication of the role diplomacy would play 
in a socialist society and consequently, the Soviet leadership had no diplomatic blueprint to 
follow after the October Revolution. Initially, the regime believed that diplomacy – a hated 
tenet  of  capitalist  society  –  would  become  obsolete  following  the  establishment  of 
worldwide socialist revolution. Lenin’s suspicion of the diplomatic medium was observed 
by Trotsky, who commented that,  
When Lenin… listens over the radio to a parliamentary speech by one of the 
imperialist  politicians,  or  to  a  text  of  a  diplomatic  note  of  immediate 
interest… he looks like a shrewd muzhik not to be taken in by smooth words 
and fooled by polite phrases.
21 
                                                
17 TNA, FO 418, part 2, doc. 41, p. 129, report to George Curzon, 4 October 1920. 
18  Rossiiskii  gosudarstvennii  arkhiv  sotsial’no-politicheskoi  istorii,  f.  68,  op.  1,  d.  8,  ll.  1-23  (hereafter 
RGASPI). Lenin recorded, “…the questions were so numerous that they frequently had to be decided under 
conditions of extreme haste, and it was only because members of the [Politburo]… were so well acquainted 
with each other… and had confidence in each other, that this work could have been done at all”, V.I. Lenin, 
PSS, vol. 40, p. 239. 
19 L.D. Trotsky, Moia zhizn’, vol. 2, p. 63.   
20 See, Biographical Notes. 
21 L.D. Trotsky, On Lenin: notes towards a biography, (London, 1971), p. 146.      73 
As a result, one of the first acts of the new regime, the publication of a Decree on Peace on 
26 October 1917, effectively removed Russia from the traditional European diplomatic 
system. If world revolution proved imminent, the Bolsheviks would have no inducement to 
negotiate with their ideological opponents. 
 
     The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 demonstrated, however, that 
this objective was not immediately attainable, and the subsequent deterioration of relations 
with the West heightened Soviet diplomatic isolation.
22 Priority was thereafter given to the 
consolidation of the infant socialist state, and it was to diplomacy that the RKP(b) turned in 
an attempt to regulate relations with the outside world. Throughout the Polish-Soviet War, 
contrary to initial expectation, the Soviet regime relied heavily upon tactical diplomatic 
negotiation to pursue its objectives in a capitalist, largely hostile world. 
 
     To facilitate this, the NKID was quickly established, under the direction of Trotsky.
23 
The  latter  hoped  that  this  appointment  would  allow  him  to  concentrate  attention  on 
domestic affairs, famously declaring, “I will issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the 
peoples of the world, and then shut up shop”.
24 He was not attracted to diplomacy by 
temperament or outlook, and failed initially to recognise the important role it would play in 
the  consolidation  of  the  Soviet  state.  For  Trotsky,  as  for  all  communists,  diplomatic 
negotiation was regarded as a temporary expedient necessary only until the international 
revolution negated the need for inter-state diplomacy. Consequently, he did not find it a 
“gratifying field” in which to be involved and confessed, “I absolutely cannot understand 
revolutionaries who willingly accept posts as ambassadors and feel like fish in water in 
their surroundings”.
25 He further admitted, “I used to leave the running of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs entirely to Comrades Markin and Zalkin. I limited myself to producing a 
few notes of a propagandist character and receiving a small number of visitors”.
26  
 
     Nevertheless, Trotsky was forced to concede that, “The business [of diplomacy] proved 
a  bit  more  complicated  than  I  had  expected”.
27  To  develop  an  almost  entirely  new 
                                                
22  The  Allies  withdrew  their  diplomatic  corps  from  Russia  following  the  signing  of  this  Treaty,  K.D. 
Nabokoff, The Ordeal of a Diplomat, (London, 1921), p. 230. 
23 L.D. Trotsky, Moia zhizn’, vol. 2, p. 63. 
24  Ibid.  He  later  argued  that  he  had  intentionally  exaggerated  his  viewpoint  as  he  had,  “....wanted  to 
emphasise the fact that the centre of gravity was not in diplomacy at that time”, I. Zalkin, “Iz pervykh 
mesatsev narodnogo komiteta po inostrannym delam”, in Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, (Moscow, 1922), no. 15, 
pp. 55-61. 
25 Ibid, p. 88. 
26 L.D. Trotsky, On Lenin, p. 117.   
27 Ibid.   74 
diplomatic service, he employed exiled revolutionaries who, having lived abroad before 
1917,  had  knowledge  both  of  foreign  languages  and  the  political  situation  in  various 
European states.
28 This ensured that by the end of 1917, the NKID, with a staff of 126, was 
the first commissariat to become fully operational.
29 
 
      Crucial  for  the  future  development  of  the  Soviet  diplomatic  profession,  Georgii 
Vasil'evich  Chicherin,  a  revolutionary  much  more  suited  by  both  experience  and 
temperament, took over the role of Soviet Russia’s leading diplomat, on 8 March 1918.
30 A 
former  tsarist  foreign  office  employee  and  member  of  a  family  long  involved  in  the 
diplomatic profession, Chicherin’s extensive knowledge of international diplomacy, first-
hand experience of negotiation, and contacts with foreign diplomats, combined with his 
abilities  as  an  excellent  linguist,  prompted  Lenin  to  appoint  him  as  Trotsky’s 
replacement.
31  This was a clever  move as Chicherin’s tact in  dealing with the outside 
world  was  well  recognised  and  appreciated  by  contemporaries.  Lord  Derby,  a  British 
diplomat  posted  to  Germany,  deemed  him  to  be,  for  instance,  “...  an  agreeable  and 
intelligent  Russian  with  no  special  sign  of  fanaticism  nor  anything  to  suggest  the 
Machiavelli he is supposed to be”.
32 
 
     Despite being one of Europe’s leading diplomats and Soviet Russia’s chief negotiator in 
the war with Poland, Chicherin was, nevertheless, admitted only a limited role in the 
decision-making process. Communist distrust of diplomacy and, consequently, of 
diplomats, was reflected in his inferior status within the RKP(b) and a number of NKID 
officials outranked him in party status, including Litvinov, Ioffe and Krestinskii.
33 Instead, 
he loyally implemented the foreign policy formulated in the Politburo, renouncing 
independent initiatives to follow the guidance of Lenin.
34 He did, succeed, however, in 
raising the prestige of Soviet diplomacy and was its eloquent spokesman, conducting 
skilful negotiations with the Poles and the West during the conflict. 
 
                                                
28  For  example,  M.  Litvinov,  residing  in  Britain  prior  to  the  revolution,  was  appointed  Soviet  Chargé 
d’Affaires in London. The British Government withheld official recognition of his appointment. 
29 T. O’Conner, Diplomacy and Revolution: G.V. Chicherin and Soviet foreign affairs, 1918-1930, (Ames, 
1987), p. 55. 
30 See Biographical Notes. Trotsky noted that after his release from British prison on 3 January, Chicherin, 
“…arrived in Moscow at the most opportune moment, and with a sigh of relief, I handed the diplomatic helm 
over to him. I was not appearing at the ministry at all then”, L.D. Trotsky, Moia zhizn’, vol. 2, p. 72. 
31 Noting, “Chicherin is an excellent, conscientious, intelligent, knowledgeable worker. It is necessary to 
value such people”, V.I. Lenin, PSS, vol. 50, p. 111.  
32 NAS, GD 433/2/18.    
33 Chicherin did not become a CC RKP(b) member until 1925 and he was never admitted to the Politburo.   
34 G.V. Chicherin, Sbornik statei, p. 3.   75 
      Prior to the outbreak of the Great War, secret diplomacy, unaccountable to the general 
public, was accepted international practice.
35 However, worldwide condemnation of this 
system as one of the principal reasons for the outbreak of the First World War gained 
momentum, with the Russian socialist newspaper Izvestiia arguing, on 18 March 1917, 
Secret diplomacy is the natural offspring of autocracy. It is afraid of light and 
prefers to hatch its dirty ploys in darkness, carefully protecting itself from 
public control... because such diplomacy has only the interests of the ruling 
class in mind and is always directed against the people.
36 
 
The subsequent demand for open, easily scrutinised diplomacy gained impetus following 
the overthrow of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian monarchies in 1917-1918, 
and accelerated a move towards a more democratic, popularly controlled foreign policy on 
an international scale. Indeed, the first of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in January 
1918 demanded the establishment of, “Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after 
which there shall be no private understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed 
always frankly and in the public view”.
37  
  
      The  Soviet  regime  was,  in  fact,  the  first  government  to  announce  its  intention  of 
actively practising open diplomacy, when it unambiguously stated in its Decree on Peace, 
“The Government abolishes secret diplomacy and on its part expresses the firm intention to 
conduct all negotiations absolutely openly before the entire people”.
38 Support for this 
diplomatic genre intensified during the Polish-Soviet War, when the RKP(b), as excellent 
tacticians, realised the benefits to be gained by utilising open diplomacy for propaganda 
purposes. Indeed, for much of the war, Soviet diplomacy and propaganda were virtually 
synonymous.  
 
      Consequently,  revolutionary  appeals,  proclamations  and  peace  proposals  were 
addressed  directly  to  the  Polish  working  class  through  open  radio  transmissions.  This 
provided the Soviet regime with a new, unorthodox, high-profile and widely disseminated 
political weapon against which the Poles were unable to defend themselves. As Lenin 
acknowledged, “We must immediately appeal to the Polish people and explain the real 
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state of affairs. We know full well that this method of ours has a most positive effect in 
tending to disrupt the ranks of our enemy”.
39 
 
      It  is  no  coincidence  that  throughout  the  war,  Soviet  propaganda  and  revolutionary 
diplomatic initiatives regularly coincided with intensified Red Army activity. In response 
to  Piłsudski’s  Kiev  offensive  in  April  1920,  for  instance,  the  CC  RKP(b)  issued  a 
Manifesto  to  the  Polish  People  on  7  May  1920  and  a  number  of  revolutionary 
proclamations to the Entente populations.
40 In one such Appeal to the Workers of the Allied 
Countries, on 18 April 1919, Chicherin protested, 
...your rulers have created and are supporting a savagely reactionary regime in 
Poland, where thanks to them, Polish workers are being shot down en masse, 
and the Polish workers’ and peasants’ movement is being suppressed with the 
utmost ferocity.
41 
 
In this way, the Soviet regime attempted to influence Polish and Entente public opinion, 
foster revolution, prevent military action against Russia and reduce support in Poland for 
the war effort. As Chicherin remarked,  
...the basic feature of our foreign policy was the revolutionary offensive.  It 
took its bearings from the immediate prospect of the world revolution, for 
which the Russian revolution was to serve as the signal. It was directed, over 
the heads of Governments, to the revolutionary proletariat of all countries, 
and  both  in  its  actions,  sharply  opposed  to  the  entire  nature  of  existing 
capitalist Governments, and in its words, its strongly agitational offensives 
were calculated to stir up the revolutionary proletariat of all countries to an 
international revolutionary struggle against imperialism, against the capitalist 
system.
42 
 
The  international  community  observed  the  development  of  this  new  diplomacy  with 
increasing concern. As Lenin remarked, 
...the fact that our new diplomacy is entirely unconventional, unanticipated 
and unprecedented in the history of the monarchical and bourgeois states, it 
can in no way as yet be accepted by the other countries. When the Bolsheviks 
make  straightforward  statements,  literally  no  one  in  a  single  country  is 
capable of understanding that we are really conducting diplomacy on the basis 
of open statements and methods of special diplomacy.
43 
 
                                                
39 V.I. Lenin, PSS, vol. 40, p. 97. 
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      Nevertheless, to the communists’ surprise the conduct of traditional diplomacy proved 
increasingly important as the war progressed. As Chicherin informed the 5
th All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets on 4 July 1918, Russia’s foreign policy required to shift from the 
revolutionary  offensive  to  the  defensive,  both  to  secure  the  Soviet  regime,  politically, 
economically and militarily, and to allow the international revolution time to develop.
44 By 
establishing  cordial  relations  with  Russia’s  western  neighbours  –  Germany,  Poland, 
Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Finland – he hoped that a buffer would be created against the 
West, whilst the regime simultaneously worked to separate the Entente states.
45 
 
      In 1919-1921, Chicherin’s aim, first and foremost, was to consolidate Soviet power 
within Russia, and alleviate Russian isolation in the international sphere fell. As his own 
position was dependent upon his ability to maintain relations with the outside world, it was 
essential  that  he  present  Soviet  policy  as  conciliatory  and  throughout  the  war,  he 
consistently asserted that, “The policies of Soviet Russia in their relations with Poland, as 
in their relations with the other nations, was and is a peaceful policy”.
46 As he noted in the 
latter stages of the war in September 1920, 
Since in America and in many other countries the working masses have not 
conquered power… the Russian Government deems it necessary to establish 
and faithfully to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with the existing 
governments of these countries.
47 
 
Consequently, he was extremely wary of declaring Soviet intentions outright.
48   
 
      By  embroiling  Poland  in  a  carefully  constructed  diplomatic  offensive,  whilst 
concurrently pursuing concrete military objectives, the Soviet authorities hoped to forestall 
a Polish attack on Russia, alienate the Poles from the Entente and remove Poland as an 
obstacle  to  the  sovietisation  of  Eastern  Europe  and  Germany.  Their  efforts  to 
diplomatically play the British and French Governments against one another sought to 
divide Entente support for Poland during the war. Soviet communications with the Western 
Governments thus alternated in tone from appeasement and cooperation to overt hostility 
and  opposition.  As  Lenin  acknowledged  to  the  closed  session  of  the  9
th  All-Russian 
Conference of the Communist Party on 20 September 1920, “We merely tried to exploit as 
                                                
44 Izvestiia, 5 July 1918.  
45 The Treaty of Tartu with Estonia, 2 February 1920, ended Soviet diplomatic isolation, and it was on this 
foundation that Chicherin wished to build. 
46 G.V. Chicherin, Krasnaia kniga: sbornik diplomaticheskikh dokumentov o Russko-Pol’skikh otnosheniiakh 
c 1918 po 1920gg, (Moscow, 1920), p 7. 
47 V. Kluchnikov & A. Sabanin, vol. 3, part. 1, p. 56. 
48 See, for example, I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 19, p. 41.     78 
broadly as possible the splits emerging between the various countries of the Entente, in 
order to defend ourselves”.
49      
 
      Thus,  in  its  relations  with  Poland,  alongside  revolutionary  diplomacy,  the  NKID 
endorsed  the  traditional  diplomatic  medium:  formal  negotiation  and  the  exchange  of 
diplomatic  notes,  as  circumstance  dictated.  Moreover,  despite  claims  to  the  contrary, 
Russia occasionally reverted to negotiating with the Poles in the strictest secrecy. The 
Marchlewski-Boerner discussions, for instance, held in autumn 1919, used the Red Cross 
Societies of Russia and Poland as a cover for the real peace negotiations taking place. It 
has also recently come to light that Chicherin expressed concern to Lenin on 21 August 
1920,  that  secret  Soviet  diplomatic  codes  were  in  danger  of  being  deciphered  by  the 
enemy, reporting, 
I have always regarded our codes with skepticism, have not reported the most 
secret things at all, and several times have cautioned others against making 
such reports.... The most secret reports should not be conveyed other than 
through special couriers.
50 
 
The theory and practice of Soviet diplomacy were often very different. 
 
     These  two  apparently  divergent  methods  of  conducting  Soviet  foreign  policy  were 
ultimately  embodied  in  the  establishment  of  the  NKID  and  the  Third  Communist 
International (Comintern): whilst the former frequently pursued a traditional diplomatic 
approach, the latter represented the institutionalisation of revolutionary agit-prop on an 
international scale. The Comintern, dominated by the RKP(b), chaired by Zinoviev, and 
rigorously  controlled  by  Lenin,  proved  a  second  powerful  instrument  in  the 
implementation of Soviet foreign policy.
51 How easily, then, did these two bodies coexist 
during the Polish-Soviet War?  
 
      On paper, the aims of the NKID and Comintern differed greatly: the latter’s ultimate 
objective was to incite revolution abroad by any means necessary, and to overthrow the 
capitalist governments with whom the former attempted to establish traditional diplomatic 
relations. The agitational work of the Comintern further undermined NKID attempts to 
secure  de  facto  and  de  jure  recognition  of  Soviet  Russia  from  the  West.  Indeed,  so 
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concerned was Chicherin about its negative impact on the work of his Commissariat, that 
he requested both Lenin and Trotsky resign from the Comintern Executive Committee to 
improve Russia’s relations with the Western Governments’.
52 Moreover, the NKID, guided 
by Chicherin, appreciated the importance of subtlety and tact in negotiating with foreign 
diplomats, whilst Comintern representatives, as propagandists and agitators, had no time 
for such an approach. 
 
      Nevertheless,  although  the  NKID  remained  unrepresented  in  the  Politburo  and  the 
Party CC during the war, whilst a number of Comintern delegates were members of both, 
the Politburo remained the ultimate maker of Soviet foreign policy, mediating between the 
two  organisations  and  utilising  each as,  and  when,  the  situation  demanded.  Moreover, 
despite the different diplomatic methods employed by both, the NKID and Comintern, 
driven by Marxist ideology, ultimately sought identical objectives: the spread of revolution 
on an international scale, the protection and consolidation of Soviet Russia, and the need to 
divide Soviet Russia’s enemies: the Entente from Poland, and Britain from France. These 
shared goals united the Soviet leadership and its many supporting organisations throughout 
the conflict.  
 
1.2 Poland 
 
      The formulation of a coherent diplomatic agenda and a realistic foreign policy were 
also of vital importance to the infant Polish state after its rebirth in November 1918. As 
Chief of both the State and Army, Józef Piłsudski forged an inextricable link between 
Polish politics and the military, and throughout the period of the Polish-Soviet War, Polish 
foreign policy directly responded to the strategic moves of the country’s armed forces.   
 
      An enlightening document, detailing Poland’s principal foreign policy objectives in the 
war with Soviet Russia, entitled The Polish-Bolshevist War, was written by the Polish 
Chargé d’Affaires to Britain, Jan Ciechanowski, on 18 July 1920.
53 As such it deserves 
closer  examination  than  it  has  previously  received.  From  the  outset,  Ciechanowski 
declared that, “The Polish-Bolshevik War was not undertaken by Poland in the name of 
imperialistic  aims”,  and  he  listed  a  number  of  convincing  arguments  to  support  this 
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assertion.
54 The Polish nation was already engaged in combat with other neighbouring 
states, including Germans in Posnania, Czechs in Teschen, Ruthenians in Eastern Galicia, 
and  was  faced  with  local  unrest  in  Upper  Silesia.  To  contend  with  these  multifarious 
opponents, Poland could only rely upon a small army of approximately 30,000 men, which 
was hampered by a serious lack of equipment and resources. Furthermore, her boundaries 
were as yet unsettled and her industrial and financial infrastructures were in ruins after the 
partitions  and  the  destruction  of  the  Great  War.  As  a  result,  “Under  these  existing 
circumstances, there was and could be no question on the part of Poland of waging an 
imperialistic war on a powerful neighbour”.
55 
 
      If Polish aims in the war with Soviet Russia were not guided by imperialist ambitions, 
what factors were decisive in encouraging the Polish state to militarily engage with its 
eastern neighbour? Poland’s first and chief objective in the campaign was the liberation 
and protection of her inhabitants from the impending Bolshevik advance.
56 The pressing 
need  to  secure  their  eastern  frontier  made  it  absolutely  essential  that  a  settlement  be 
reached in the borderlands. As Ciechanowski observed,  
Owing to Poland’s geographical position, her inadequate military resources, 
the  hesitating  attitude  of  the  Allies...  and  to  the  ever-growing  Bolshevik 
propaganda, conducted in Poland by Germany and the Soviets, Poland had to 
aim at pushing the Bolsheviks as far eastwards as was possible and to obtain 
territorial guarantees for her future safety.
57 
 
By securing her eastern frontier, Poland hoped to safeguard her independence and facilitate 
her economic reconstruction.
58 Her geo-strategic position, sandwiched between the much 
larger  German  and  Russian  states,  was  vital  in  determining  her  foreign  policy,  which 
aimed  at  rendering  a  Bolshevik-German  rapprochement  impossible.  As  Piłsudska 
commented,  
We had never had any illusions as to the perils of Poland’s position since her 
geographic situation made her a barrier to the expansion of both Germany and 
Russia.  Under  my  husband’s  guidance  all  our  foreign  policy  had  been 
directed towards maintaining a balance between these two powers.
59 
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All  state  resources  were  directed,  in  its  first  years,  towards  Poland’s  consolidation, 
geographically, politically, economically, militarily and internationally. To achieve this, 
the Polish leadership turned increasingly to diplomacy during 1919-1920, in an attempt to 
secure  relations  with  its  powerful  eastern  neighbour  and  ideological  opponent,  Soviet 
Russia.   
 
      Despite  Piłsudski’s  inherent  distrust  of  diplomatic  channels,  preferring  to  endorse 
military solutions wherever possible, diplomacy proved especially important in providing a 
breathing  space for  the Poles,  as  they  struggled  to  formulate a clearly-defined foreign 
policy after the emergence of their state onto a volatile world arena.
60 Piłsudski remained 
unshaken  in  his  belief  that  Soviet  diplomacy  was  inherently  untrustworthy,  and 
consequently  remained  deeply  suspicious  of  all  NKID  diplomatic  proposals  received 
during the war years.
61 Soviet Russia’s revolutionary diplomatic practices, combined with 
their aggressive, widely-disseminated propaganda offensive, further convinced him of the 
insincerity of their diplomacy. However, as with Soviet Russia, it proved essential for the 
Poles that diplomacy be utilised as a means of securing both Poland’s internal development 
and stability and her position within the wider international community. 
 
     In  contrast  with  the  Soviet  regime,  however,  the  important  role  of  diplomacy  was 
immediately  recognised  by  Poles  of  many  political  persuasions.  As  a  result,  a  Polish 
Diplomatic Service was created by the joint efforts of the Polish National Committee in 
Paris  (KNP),  the  Provisional  Council  of  the  State  (TRS)  and  the  Supreme  National 
Committee (NKN).
62 Although the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw 
Zagranicznych (MSZ)) suffered initially from a severe shortage of qualified personnel, a 
network of foreign missions in Paris, London, Washington, Rome and other cities had 
already been established by the Polish National Committee.
63 Work progressed rapidly and 
prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  conflict,  in  early  January  1919,  the  MSZ  employed  252 
individuals.
64  On  15  August  1919,  the  KNP  missions  were  transformed  into  Polish 
diplomatic legations, and foreign diplomatic missions were, in turn, sent to Warsaw.
65  
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      Unlike  the  Soviet  diplomatic  service,  party  affiliation  was  no  hindrance  for  those 
wishing  to pursue  diplomatic careers in Poland. Instead, a good  knowledge  of foreign 
languages,  education  and  contacts  with  the  outside  world  were  regarded  as  essential 
qualifications by the MSZ.
66 The continued pressing need, during the war, for the training 
of professional diplomats was well recognised by the Polish Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister, Ignacy Paderewski. Addressing the Polish Diet on 12 November 1919, on the 
topic of Schools for Officials and Diplomats, he argued, “We need great political schools 
to  prepare a  number  of  state  officials  for the Eastern  and  Western  districts,  where  all 
spheres  and  classes  can  learn  foreign  languages  preparatory  to  representing  Poland 
abroad”.
67 Thus, like the Soviet regime, the Poles were well aware that the hostilities could 
not  be  resolved  purely  by  military  engagement:  intermittent  diplomacy  was  to  prove 
central to the foreign policy of both from the outset and, increasingly, as the Polish-Soviet 
War developed and intensified. 
 
2. Polish-Soviet Diplomacy, 1918 
 
      Poland faced great uncertainty from November 1918 until the war with Soviet Russia 
commenced in February 1919. Surrounded on all sides by potential enemies and with her 
borders as yet undefined, the political, economic, social and military structure of the state 
had to be built from scratch. These difficulties were compounded by the advance of the 
Soviet Red Army into the kresy in November 1918. The existence of the German Ober-Ost 
administration in the occupied lands prevented direct Polish-Soviet communication, with a 
basic radio system serving as the only link between the neighbouring states. Inevitably, this 
restricted  the  development  of  diplomatic  relations,  and  heightened  Polish  and  Russian 
isolation. 
 
      Nevertheless, attempts were made to foster relations. Even prior to the establishment of 
Polish independence, Chicherin had moved to establish diplomatic contact. On 29 October 
1918,  he  addressed  a  note  to  the  Polish  Regency  Council,  offering  that  the  Polish 
communist  and  NKID  member,  Julian  Marchlewski,  be  appointed  as  the  RSFSR’s 
diplomatic  representative  to  Poland,  and  requesting  that  a  Polish  delegate  be  sent  to 
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Moscow in return.
68 To this offer no immediate reply was forthcoming. The Poles had no 
wish  to  recognise  the  Soviet  regime  in  Russia,  which  the  establishment  of  formal 
diplomatic relations would have implied. The movement of Soviet troops westwards and 
arrest  of  the  Regency  Council’s  leader  in  Moscow,  Alexander  Lednicki,  provided  the 
Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Leon Wasilewski, with a credible excuse for rejecting 
this proposal outright.
69 
 
      The  following  month  witnessed  an  intensification  of  diplomatic  correspondence 
between the two states. On 2 December, Chicherin wrote to Wasilewski regarding the 
establishment of safe conduct for Poles in Russia, and again on 12 and 15 December, he 
attempted to persuade the Poles to remove any existing obstacles to the ‘normalisation’ of 
relations.
70 Embroiled in a violent civil war, and facing both Allied intervention and an 
Allied blockade, Soviet isolation was complete. The regime, lacking any recognition by the 
international  community,  desperately  needed  to  establish  relations  with  her  near-
neighbour.  As  a  result,  on  24  December,  Chicherin  requested  permission  for  Russia’s 
diplomatic representative to enter Poland.
71 Six days later, the MSZ issued an official note 
in  which  it  refused  to  open  diplomatic  relations  due  to  Russia’s,  “...aggressive  and 
imperialist policy”, demonstrated by the advance of Red Army troops into the borderlands 
of Lithuania and Belorussia, towards the Polish heartland.
72 This was the final act in the 
theatre of Polish-Soviet diplomacy for 1918. 
 
3. Polish-Soviet Diplomacy, 1919 
 
3.1 January-March 
 
      Militarily, the year 1919 saw the Poles initiate and maintain a clear advantage over 
Soviet Russia.
73 Enmeshed in civil war, the Soviet regime remained absorbed by domestic 
concerns throughout the year, lacking both the time and resources to direct full attention on 
the Poles. In contrast, from the outset, Polish attention was trained on the defence of their 
former eastern territories. As Paderewski remarked to Colonel House at the beginning of 
January 1919, 
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...situation most critical. Bolshevist invasion of former Polish territory still in 
progress. Thousands of people tortured, murdered, many buried alive.  Vilna, 
Minsk, even Grodno menaced.... If action is delayed our entire civilisation 
may cease to exist. The war may result in the establishment of barbarism all 
over Europe.
74 
 
      Initial military engagements witnessed both armed forces manoeuvring for position, 
until  by  March  a  300-mile  front  was  established.
75  The  following  month  the  first 
significant Polish gain was made, with the Polish army occupation of the strategically 
important city of Wilno. Immediately following this, there was little activity on the front as 
the Poles concentrated on the situations developing in Lwów, Cieszyn and Poznań, and the 
Soviets  concentrated  on  their  civil  war  opponents:  Denikin,  Yudenich  and  Kolchak.
76 
Consequently,  by  July  1919  the  troops  engaged  on  the  Polish-Soviet  Front  remained 
relatively limited in scope.
77 The three internal Polish conflicts in Lwów, Cieszyn and 
Poznań were, however, settled the following month, freeing Piłsudski to devote resources 
to the Russian front. An immediate result was achieved: the occupation of Minsk, on 8 
August, by the Poles.
78  
 
      By  the  close  of  1919  Polish  forces  had  advanced  into  the  Wilno  region,  Polesia, 
Volhynia, and Eastern Galicia and controlled almost all of Lithuania and Belorussia. As 
noted  by  Stanisław  Grabski,  a  Polish  diplomat  and  later  Polish  delegate  at  the  Riga 
negotiations, during 1919 the Polish armies freed from Russia the entire area gained by 
Russia at the third partition in 1795.
79 As a result, at the close of the year, the Polish-Soviet 
border ran from the Latvian border on the River Dwina in the north to the Rumanian 
border on the River Dniester in the south.
80   
 
      However, tempting though the prospect of further military gains was, Piłsudski ordered 
a halt to his troops’ movement at the end of the year. Denikin’s forces were advancing 
against the Red Army and a White victory in the civil war threatened Polish independence 
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even more than a Soviet success.
81 It benefited the Poles, therefore, to await the outcome of 
the  Russian  Civil  War  before  attempting  to  establish  relations  with  her  neighbour. 
Furthermore, it would have been extremely difficult for the Poles to inflict a decisive blow 
on the Red Army: the latter always had the option of retreating deep into Russia. A Polish 
advance over such a vast distance would have stretched the Polish economic and political 
systems to breaking point, whilst it would have been almost impossible for the military to 
defend  and  consolidate  their  gains.
82  Nevertheless,  1919  was  a  year  of  great  military 
success against Russia for both the Polish armed forces and their Commander-in-Chief. As 
Piłsudska remarked of her husband, “It was a year of triumph and fulfillment for him.... He 
faced the winter confidently”.
83 
   
      For Soviet Russia, the precedence accorded to domestic considerations in 1918 and 
1919,  allowed  Polish  military  gains  to  be  viewed  as  of  secondary  importance.
84  The 
resultant allocation of military resources to confront internal opponents, forced the Soviet 
regime to rely increasingly upon international diplomacy to secure the state in 1919. As 
noted by Trotsky, although initially sceptical of the role diplomacy could play in the new 
regime,  “With  patience  and  system  which  truly  deserve  the  highest  recognition,  our 
diplomacy did not let a single opportunity go by, day after day, for stressing that peace was 
possible and necessary”.
85 
 
     The Soviet leadership had already decided in April 1918 that revolutionary agitation in 
Poland required to be directed by experienced propagandists and agitators.
86 This was first 
implemented under the cover of a Russian Red Cross Mission, the official objective of 
which was to secure the release of Russian prisoners of war interned in Poland during the 
Great  War.
87  Led  by  the  Polish  communist,  Wesołewski,  the  mission  secretly  entered 
Poland on 20 December 1918. Despite initial approval by the Polish Government for the 
visit, the mission failed to notify the authorities of its arrival and its members, accused of 
engaging in political agitation, were arrested the following day.
88 
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      On  29  December,  the  KPRP  organised  a  demonstration  to  protest  against  the 
internment of the mission, during which the Polish military opened fire, killing 6 people 
and injuring 14.
89 Two days later, the NKID sent a note to Wasilewski, in which Chicherin 
strongly protested against the imprisonment of the Red Cross members.
90 An agreement 
was reached with the Polish Government for the release of the prisoners and assurances 
given for their safe return to Russia.
91 However, on 2 January 1919, at Łapy station, the 
Polish gendarmes escorting the mission murdered four of its members: B. Wesołowski, M. 
Al’ter, M. Aivazova and L. Klotsman, and seriously wounded L. Al’ter.
92 The perpetrators 
declared that they sought to avenge relatives murdered by the Soviet Secret Police, the 
Cheka.
93 Reaction was immediate. Trotsky condemned the killings as a, “...hateful and 
savage baiting of Soviet Russia”.
94 
 
      A breakdown in Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations ensued.
95 The event signified the 
Soviet regime’s first failed attempt to provide the Polish revolutionary movement with 
experienced leadership, a process which culminated in July 1920 with the establishment of 
the Polish Provisional Revolutionary Committee in Białystok. On 16 January 1919, a new 
Polish Coalition Government, established under Paderewski, 
...immediately informed the Soviet Government about their nomination of an 
investigation into the assassination of the Red Cross Mission and proposed 
that all current news be dispatched to Moscow through a special mission, 
under Ventskovsky.
96 
 
The Soviet regime hoped that this would lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with the Poles, for as Chicherin acknowledged, 
 
The  Soviet  Government  did  not  wish  to  confine  agreement  to  routine, 
practical questions. It strove to a general, political agreement with Poland…. 
to  cleanse  the  disputed area  from  the  military  of  both  sides and  to  allow 
workers to vote for the determination of the destiny of these regions. Time, 
however, passed – and from the Polish Government we did not receive a reply 
to the question of a general agreement.
97 
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      The NKID further aimed to exploit the situation by playing to the Allies. Chicherin sent 
a communication to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the USA, 
on  18  February  1919,  in  which  he  portrayed  the  Poles  as  entirely  unreasonable.  This 
propaganda  document  stressed  Russia’s  desire  for  peace  with  Poland  and  highlighted 
Soviet Russia’s interest in the disputed kresy, bound as it was to Soviet Lithuania and 
Soviet Belorussia, “…in firm and close friendship”.
98 It included a veiled warning to the 
Allies to refrain from interference in the dispute and instead, presented itself as mediator 
stating, 
As to the territorial questions, requiring negotiations with the Governments of 
the  Lithuanian  and  White  Russian  Soviet  Republics,  the  Russian  Soviet 
Government expressed to the Government of the Polish Republic its readiness 
to offer its services in working out a peaceful solution to these questions.
99   
 
This was the first step in Soviet Russia’s diplomatic offensive: firstly, to isolate Poland 
internationally;  and  secondly,  to  remove  Entente  support  for  the  Polish  war  effort. 
Tactically it was an astute move. In sharp contrast, and contrary to Allied wishes, Piłsudski 
continued to seek a military solution to Poland’s perilous position in the spring of 1919. 
 
3.2 Polish-Soviet Conflict, April-August 
  
      With the establishment of the Polish and Lithuanian states in 1918, both of which 
desperately needed to quickly establish their frontiers, conflict between the neighbouring 
states was inevitable. During the Polish-Soviet  War, the strategically important city of 
Wilno was claimed as Polish, Russian and Lithuanian. Polish claims were founded on 
ethnographical and strategic factors, whilst Lithuania’s challenge for control of the area 
rested on historical considerations.
100 The population of the city was predominantly Polish 
and  control  of  Wilno  would  provide  the  Poles  with  a  direct  border  with  Latvia, 
strengthening  the  country’s  eastern  border  against  Soviet  Russia.  For  Piłsudski,  on  a 
personal level, the question of Wilno was especially important. He acknowledged, “One of 
the most lovely things in my life had been Wilno, my native city...  that dear city, full of so 
many memories”.
101 Control of this city was pivotal if his ideological programme for a 
federation  of  the  borderland  states  was  to  be  achieved.  In  sharp  contrast,  for  many 
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Lithuanians, Soviet rule of Wilno was preferable to Polish occupation: unlike Poland, the 
Soviet regime was unable to command support at the Paris Peace Conference. This, they 
hoped, would serve to strengthen their own claims on the city.
102  
 
      Whilst  the  statesmen  at  Paris  deliberated  over  the  issue,  Piłsudski  decided  to  take 
matters into his own hands. According to Piłsudska, 
He considered that he had ample justification for his actions. The destinies of 
Poland  and  Lithuania  had  been  linked  together  for  centuries....  Polish 
influence  and  culture  had  always  extended  over  Lithuania.  Her  educated 
classes spoke only Polish and lived according to Polish custom. The citizens 
of  Wilno  had  considered  themselves  to  be  Poles  for  centuries….  of  the 
inhabitants of the city less than one per cent were Lithuanians.
103 
 
In mid-April 1919, he sent a Polish delegation to Kaunas, with a proposal to launch a joint 
Polish-Lithuanian military offensive against Soviet Russia, but this was rejected by the 
Lithuanians.
104 As a result, the Polish Army entered Wilno on 20 April.
105 That same day, 
the Polish Marshal issued a proclamation, To the Inhabitants of the Ancient Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania, in which he set out the Polish agenda, stating, 
The Polish  Army which  came here under my  command in order to expel 
violence and oppression, to abolish a government which opposes the will of 
the population, this army brings to you full independence and liberty… I want 
to  give  you  the  possibility  of  solving  your  internal  national  and  religious 
questions according to your wishes without any constraint or pressure on the 
part of Poland.... I will not institute here a military Government, but a Civil 
Administration to which I shall call men of this country, born amongst you.
106 
 
The administration was to organise and hold free elections on the basis of equal, direct, 
universal  and secret suffrage; maintain  order and peace; organise the food supply and 
work-force of the country, and aid all citizens, regardless of their nationality or religion.
107 
 
      This fait accompli met with a mixed response. Chicherin informed the MSZ on 25 April 
1919  that  Soviet  Russia  was  immediately  withdrawing  from  the  current  Polish-Soviet 
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diplomatic negotiations.
108 Lenin, in turn, demanded a prompt military response by the Red 
Army.
109 In contrast, the inhabitants of Wilno overwhelmingly welcomed the Polish forces. 
Even Piłsudski was surprised at the strength of the reception accorded to them, remarking 
to Paderewski, “I did not expect so warm and touching a welcome.... It surpassed anything 
one could have imagined. The people wept for joy... the only exceptions have been the 
Jews who under the rule of the Bolsheviks were the governing classes”.
110 
 
      The Wilno campaign proved to be one of the most successful operations of Piłsudski’s 
career.  It  signaled  the  virtual  end  of  communist  rule  in  Lithuania  for  a  time  and 
demonstrated the failure of Soviet ideology to appeal to wide sections of the Lithuanian 
population. The diplomatic battle for the city was, however, just commencing. On 16 May, 
the Polish  Diet  unanimously resolved, “…that the Polish Republic has no  intention  of 
annexing the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but on the contrary the Diet desires the 
union with the nationalities of this country on the basis of self-determination”.
111 This was 
followed by the publication of an Official Polish Military Communiqué which stated that, 
“...the  Polish  Government  has  on  July  6  recognised  de  facto  the  independence  of 
Lithuania”.
112 Throughout the Polish-Soviet War, the Lithuanian question remained an area 
of  constant  discord  between  the  Poles  and  Russians.
113  In  spring  1920,  Marchlewski 
participated in Soviet Russian-Lithuanian negotiations, held in Moscow, and on 12 July, a 
treaty was signed between the two states.
114 By this, Lithuania received the region and city 
of Wilno, in return for secretly allowing the Soviet Red Army to pass through Lithuanian 
territory unopposed.
115  
 
      Two  months  later,  Polish-Soviet  communications  resumed,  when  on  3  June  1919, 
Chicherin complained to Paderewski about the continued advance eastwards of Poland’s 
armed forces’.
116 The hands of the Soviet regime were tied by continued domestic unrest in 
Russia, and once again it was to diplomatic negotiation that the Soviet leadership turned in 
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an attempt to stabilise relations with their Polish neighbour in mid-1919.
117 The task of 
reopening discussions, which had halted in April, fell to Marchlewski. As a leading figure 
in  the  Polish  communist  movement  and  NKID  employee  from  October  1918,  he  was 
familiar with the existing volatile diplomatic relations. Consequently, when he offered to 
initiate renewed, secret and unofficial negotiations, Lenin grasped the opportunity. Loyal 
to the Soviet regime and in full accord with its foreign policy aims, he was, “...empowered 
by Lenin to conduct far-reaching negotiations in the matter of peace”.
118 
 
      Marchlewski  departed  Moscow  for  secret  talks  with  Poland’s  representatives,  M. 
Kossakowski and A. Wencikowski, in the BiałowieŜa forest, on 18 June 1919. His remit 
was to: establish diplomatic relations between Poland and Russia; gain Polish recognition 
of the Soviet Government; reach agreement to begin peace preliminaries, and recognise 
Polish territory within the boundaries of the Congress Kingdom.
119 It was hoped that this 
would allow the Red Army to concentrate all its resources on the Russian White forces, by 
neutralising  the  Polish  threat  on  her  western  border.  The  negotiations  were,  however, 
marred  by  mutual  distrust,  a  consistent  feature  of  Polish-Soviet  diplomatic  contact 
throughout the war. The Poles, guided by Piłsudski, were convinced that the talks were 
simply  a  delaying  tactic,  whereby  the  Red  Army  could  regroup,  before  launching  an 
offensive on Poland’s eastern territory, and so rejected participation in any official peace 
talks.
120  On  30  July,  Marchlewski,  disheartened  and  temporarily  defeated,  returned  to 
Russia.
121 It was not until the middle of October that face-to-face diplomatic negotiation 
between Poland and Russia resumed. In the intervening period attention turned, once more, 
to the battlefield. 
 
      The continued eastwards drive of the Polish Army in 1919 resulted in the occupation of 
the city of Minsk on 8 August.
122 As with the movement of Polish troops into Wilno four 
months earlier, the offensive was accompanied by a declaration of Polish intentions, issued 
by  Piłsudski  on  13  August.
123  The  Declaration  to  the  People  of  Minsk  immediately 
proclaimed the city to be Polish territory. This was of absolute necessity if his federalist 
programme was to succeed. Nevertheless, as with the earlier declaration to the Lithuanians, 
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Piłsudski announced that the inhabitants of Minsk would be free to determine their own 
government, declaring, 
At this moment when at the head of my army, I put my foot on this my native 
soil, I have proclaimed that nothing will here be imposed by violence, that 
this land will utter its free voice among the others, and that it will decide of its 
own accord how and under which laws to live. I shall be faithful to my words 
– confirmed by the highest authority – the Polish Sejm.
124  
 
The Polish Army advance pushed the Red Army further eastwards until by the end of the 
month, Piłsudski ordered his troops to halt. By this time, the three vitally important cities 
for the implementation of his federation were under Polish control: Wilno, Lwów and 
Minsk. The military had had its day for the time being: secret diplomatic negotiation once 
again came to the fore to influence the development of Polish-Soviet relations. 
 
3.3 Mikaszewicze Negotiations, October-December 
  
     Thus, two and a half months after the Marchlewski-Kossakowski discussions ended in 
the BiałowieŜa forest, communications resumed. By autumn 1919, the Red Army was in 
danger of defeat at the hands of General Anton Denikin in the Donbass, whilst the Poles, 
lacking  a  solid  military  ally  in  the  war  against  Russia,  were  experiencing  serious 
difficulties in their relations with the Entente. The initiative was seized by the NKID on 12 
August,  when  it  outlined  its  readiness  to  open  Russian-Polish  Red  Cross  Society 
discussions.
125  Utilising  a  non-diplomatic  agency  enabled  Soviet  Russia  to  conceal 
discussion with the Polish Government, whilst simultaneously facilitating agitation and 
propaganda against the Polish authorities: this was the new Soviet “diplomacy” in action.   
 
      Officially, the exchange of hostages, civilian captives and refugees between the two 
countries was sought.
126 On this basis, on 3 September, the MSZ and the Polish Ministry of 
War  instructed  Michał  Kossakowski,  Chairman  of  the  Polish  Red  Cross  Society  in 
Volhynia, to enter negotiations with its Russian counterpart.
127 The location chosen for the 
meeting was the railway station of Mikaszewicze, near Łuck in the Volhynia region and it 
was  to  here  that  the  Polish  and  Soviet  delegations,  headed  by  Kossakowski  and 
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Marchlewski  respectively,  made  their  way  in  early  October  1919.
128  The  prolonged 
discussions which followed lasted from 11
 October until 14 December. Although officially 
the talks aimed to secure the release of Polish and Russian hostages, in fact, according to 
Chicherin,  
Comrade Marchlewski, during his repeated trips to the areas occupied by the 
Poles, simultaneously, with authorisation for the present political tasks, stood 
as a double representative... repeatedly striving to represent the aims of the 
Soviet Government – for the conclusion of a full agreement with Poland and 
to discontinue military activities between Poland and Russia.
129 
 
Marchlewski’s remit was to secure Polish neutrality in the Russian Civil War. To achieve 
this  the  Soviet  regime  was  willing  to  recognise  the  existing  frontline  as  the  political 
boundary between the two states.
130 
 
      In turn, the Polish leadership hoped to exploit the recent victories of Denikin over the 
Red Army, to secure concessions from the Soviet regime. Piłsudski had failed to establish 
diplomatic negotiations with Denikin and greatly feared a White victory in the Russian 
Civil War as crucially, and in direct contrast with the Soviet regime, the White Generals 
refused  to  recognise  Poland’s  right  to  independence.  As  a  result,  Piłsudski  informed 
Marchlewski  that,  “Poland  will  not  be  the  gendarme  of  Europe”,  and  that  the  Polish 
Government would welcome peace negotiations.
131 He gave a personal guarantee to Lenin 
that Polish troops would not cross the existing frontline until the defeat of Denikin by the 
Red  Army  was  achieved  if,  in  return,  the  Soviets  halted  their  propaganda  offensive 
amongst  the  Polish  soldiers.
132  Although  he  remained  deeply  suspicious  of  the  Soviet 
authorities, he hoped that a temporary compromise could be reached. Piłsudski, therefore, 
allowed the lengthy negotiations at Mikaszewicze to take place, fully aware that this was 
of great military assistance to the Soviet regime.
133 The cessation of hostilities would free 
him to promote his federalist programme in the kresy, whilst leaving the Bolsheviks to 
consolidate their authority, unhampered, in Russia.
134 
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      Dual  negotiations,  therefore,  proceeded:  officially  to  resolve  the  hostage  situation; 
unofficially to secure an armistice and peace settlement to end the Polish-Soviet War. The 
former took place openly, in full view of the public and in keeping with the spirit of the 
new diplomacy adopted by the international community, to varying degrees, after the Great 
War. In contrast, the latter were hidden from public view and Entente diplomats, resident 
in the Polish capital, remained oblivious to the real nature of the talks. Horace Rumbold, 
Britain’s  Minister  to  Poland,  informed  his  Foreign  Secretary,  George  Curzon,  on  19 
October 1919, that, 
A mixed commission of representatives of the Polish Red Cross… has opened 
up  negotiations  with the representatives  of the Soviet Government for the 
exchange of hostages. The number of Polish hostages in Russia amounts at 
present to several thousands, whose condition is reported to be lamentable. 
The Poles hold fewer, but as great stress is laid upon the release of some of 
them, it is hoped that the result of the negotiations will be satisfactory.
135 
 
      Positive  results  were  achieved  at  Mikaszewicze.  On  2  November  1919, an  official 
agreement was concluded, by which Kossakowski secured the release of Polish hostages 
held within the RSFSR.
136 This was followed exactly one week later with the signing of an 
accord  for  the  mutual  exchange  of  civilian  prisoners.
137  However,  Polish-Soviet 
correspondence regarding implementation and violation of these agreements continued to 
be dispatched throughout the conflict. For instance, in a letter marked “strictly secret”, 
Chicherin complained to Marchlewski, on 11 December 1919, about Polish obstacles to the 
exchange of both hostages and civilian prisoners, and on 3 January 1920, contacted the 
MSZ regarding Poland’s failure to carry out the terms of the exchange.
138 Nevertheless, 
progress was made, and the following day Rumbold recorded, 
The  Polish  Red  Cross  delegates…  have…  reported  that  the  first  party  of 
Polish prisoners and civilian hostages amounting to about 500 prisoners in all 
are already en route for Poland and have almost reached the place at which 
they should cross the frontier.
139  
 
      In sharp contrast, the unofficial diplomatic negotiations held at Mikaszewicze were 
veiled in the strictest secrecy. Trotsky observed that the negotiations were, “…kept entirely 
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secret”  at  Poland’s  instigation,  whilst  Marchlewski  reported  in  a  Memorandum  to  the 
Politburo on 26 October 1919, that the Soviet delegates credentials to discuss an armistice 
and peace, were not made public, due to Polish concerns.
140 He wrote,  
[Ignacy Boerner] stated that he had no written authorisations; the situation in 
Warsaw is such that they do not wish to put anything in writing. I said that 
this  was  not  necessary:  we  would  not  exchange  authorisations  but  would 
show them to one another and then hide them in our pockets or burn them.
141  
 
To  facilitate  talks  between  Marchlewski  and  Piłsudski’s  envoys,  Captain  Boerner  and 
Lieutenant Birnbaum, “…the ultimatum demanded by the Poles was the preservation of the 
negotiations in complete secrecy”.
142  
 
      This was essential given Poland’s tenuous international position at the end of 1919. If 
the discussions had become widely known, the Entente, and in particular France, at that 
time pushing Poland to assist the White Russian movement and launch a joint offensive 
against Soviet Russia, would have been outraged. The Poles were placed in an extremely 
difficult position. As the Whites vehemently refused to recognise Polish independence, a 
White victory in the Civil War was not in their interest. Nevertheless, France remained the 
chief supporter of Polish claims at the negotiating tables in Paris and Poland’s principal 
overseas supplier of military equipment and resources. As such, Piłsudski could not risk 
arousing French hostility towards the infant Polish state. Consequently, whilst negotiation 
continued, the Polish Army moved troops along its eastern border to convince the Allies 
that they were making serious preparations to launch a major offensive against the Red 
Army.
143 
 
      Initially, the Soviet regime was suspicious of the secrecy surrounding the talks and at a 
Politburo meeting on 4 May 1920, resolved, “To propose to Marchlewski that if there is no 
refusal on his side, to announce in the press the agreement”.
144 The following day, Lenin 
read Marchlewski’s report regarding the armistice and on 7 May, reconsidered his position, 
informing Trotsky, “Comrade Marchlewski is also against publication of his negotiations 
with  Boerner.  It  is  necessary  to  secure  this  decision  in  the  Politburo”.
145  Despite  the 
regime’s earlier promise to avoid secret diplomacy, it was, like the Poles, very much in the 
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Soviet’s interest that the diplomatic discussions remained unacknowledged. Demonstrating 
the willingness of Piłsudski to negotiate with Soviet Russia would have invalidated the 
latter’s  assertion  that  the  Polish  Government  was  an  Entente  puppet,  and  would  have 
fatally undermined Soviet propaganda in Poland and the wider international arena. This 
could not be sanctioned. 
   
      The secret negotiations did succeed in securing two crucial objectives: a temporary 
truce between the armed forces of Poland and Soviet Russia for a period at the end of 
1919,  and  the  presentation,  for  the  first  time,  of  Poland’s  peace  terms.  Firstly,  both 
delegations were united in their goal of securing an armistice, at least until the army of 
Denikin had been defeated. In a Memorandum from Julian Marchlewski to the Politburo, 
penned on 26 October 1919, the chief Soviet delegate recorded, “...for me it was enough if 
[Boerner] informed me verbally that there is a definite and clear decision by the Polish 
command: Polish troops will not go farther”.
146 Boerner concurred, “It is important to us 
that  you  beat  Denikin;  take  your  regiments,  send  them  against  Denikin,  or  against 
Yudenich, we will not touch you”.
147   
 
      To ratify this agreement,  Boerner  suggested that  Piłsudski send a representative to 
Moscow.  A  Soviet  delegate  would  not  be  welcomed  in  the  Polish  capital,  for  fear  of 
inciting  Entente  opposition,  and  presenting  the  Soviet  regime  with  an  international 
platform from which to launch a propaganda offensive. Marchlewski, in turn, expressed 
concern  that  Polish  dependence  on  the  Entente  would  invalidate  any  Polish-Soviet 
agreement reached, and that the Poles would relaunch a military campaign at the behest of 
the Allies.
148 To this the Polish envoy replied, 
No, we will not do that; it is one thing to enter into political deals that are not 
advantageous to us and another thing to attack. It is not advantageous for us to 
attack; we have already gone against the will of the Entente a number of 
times, and we will not go along with it in this case. The guarantee is the 
person of Piłsudski.
149 
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This answer satisfied Marchlewski. Five days after his report was sent to the Politburo, he 
again wrote to Lenin of his determination, “...without fail to secure ‘the suspension of 
military action,’ ie. the matter of stopping the war”.
150 He continued, 
This is everything... since to conclude peace they do not now dare, fearing the 
Entente, on which they depend, not only for part of their finances, but, apart 
from  that,  on  the  question  of  their  southern  border  (business  with 
Czechoslovakia) and also the border in the Ukraine (whispering together with 
Petlura, but hoping that the border there will be solved to their advantage by 
the  allies).  To  conclude  peace,  to  recognise  the  Soviet  government  –  this 
means to break from the Entente, but to stop military action is possible…. 
And I am sure that this can be achieved.
151 
 
      On  14  November  1919,  the  Politburo  met  to  discuss  the  Polish  ceasefire  offer, 
entrusted Chicherin and Trotsky to work out detailed conditions for the armistice, and 
defined  a  demarcation  line  at  which  the  Red  Army  would  halt  at  the  cessation  of 
hostilities.
152  The  resultant  armistice  strengthened  the  Soviet  position  against  Denikin, 
freeing troops for the Reds’ Civil War campaign.
153 Furthermore, so confident was the 
Soviet leadership that peace with Poland would soon be settled, that they began to remove 
troops from active duty, transforming them into labour armies.
154 In reality, however, the 
truce secured only a temporary suspension of hostilities.
155  
 
      Secondly,  the  Polish  delegation  presented  its  ceasefire  conditions,  formulated  by 
Piłsudski on 3 November, for the first time. These announced that, 
The Chief-of-State –  
1.  will  not  order  the  Polish  army  beyond  the  line  Novograd  Volynsk  - 
Oleysk - River Ptich - Bobruysk - River Berezina - Berezina Canal - River 
Dvina 
2.  to avoid misunderstandings, suggests that a belt 10 kms wide shall divide 
the two armies 
3.  declares that he will support the Latvian’s claim to Dunaburg 
4.  demands an end to communist agitation in the Polish army 
5.  demands that the Soviets shall not attack Petlura 
6.  not  believing  in  the  Soviets’  power  of  discretion,  warns  that  any 
indiscretion will engender serious consequences 
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7.  affirms that, if the Soviet government agrees to points 2, 4 and 5, a duly 
authorised representative will be sent to discuss all the conditions directly 
with Mr. Lenin in person.
156 
 
When the Politburo met to discuss these terms on 14 November, it resolved to, 
Accept the conditions… in general as acceptable, with the exception of the 
point about ceasing the armed struggle with Petlura.  Decline this point and 
make  reference  that  with  Petlura  there  are  taking  place  independent 
negotiations and consequently we do not think that it is possible to discuss 
these relations with a third party.
157  
 
Piłsudski rejected the Soviet response to the Petlura condition, believing that Poland had 
demonstrated goodwill by refusing to attack the Red Army whilst Denikin threatened the 
Soviet regime. As a result, he unequivocally and permanently suspended the negotiations. 
On 14 December, the Polish and Soviet delegations left Mikaszewicze for the last time.
158  
 
      What then was the outcome of the Marchlewski-Boerner negotiations? Firstly, they 
secured a temporary armistice between the two warring nations and prevented the military 
escalation  of  the  Polish-Soviet  War  at  the  end  of  1919.  Yet  lack  of  trust  and  mutual 
suspicion scarred  the  discussions.  Marchlewski informed  Trotsky,  “We  had  withdrawn 
units and weakened the front, while they had assembled a striking force”, whilst Lenin 
recorded, “We made huge concessions. These concessions were understood as weakness 
on our part, and led to war”.
159  
 
      In  truth,  both  Lenin  and  Piłsudski  would  only  deal  on  their  own  terms.  Once  the 
Russians had satisfied themselves that Poland would not cooperate with Denikin, they saw 
no reason to accept Poland’s ceasfire conditions. Polish action, too, was driven by the need 
to  secure  the  defeat  of  Denikin  and  it  was  this  single,  shared  objective  which  was 
ultimately responsible for the limited Polish-Soviet armistice achieved at the end of 1919.  
In all other areas, compromise proved to be out of the question. 
 
3.4 The Soviet Peace Proposal of 22 December 1919 
 
      Finally, on 22 December 1919, the NKID reopened official negotiations, addressing a 
formal peace proposal to the Polish Government and requesting that the latter fix a date 
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and place to conclude a peace treaty.
160 Signed by Chicherin alone, the document argued 
that it would prove relatively easy to secure agreement between the two states, despite the 
fact that the previous proposal remained unanswered and that Polish troops continued to 
advance on Soviet Republics, friendly to Soviet Russia.
161 After apportioning blame for the 
previous failed negotiations, Chicherin stated, 
All  the  greater  was  the  astonishment  of  the  Soviet  Government  when  it 
learned  that  on  28  November…  Skrzyński  [Poland’s  Deputy  Minister  for 
Foreign Affairs], replying to a question in the Polish Sejm, declared that the 
Russian  Republic  had  never  proposed  peace  to  Poland,  that  it  threatened 
Poland with  invasion, and  that it had  no inclination whatever to make  an 
agreement which would meet the wishes of the Polish people.
162 
 
As a result, the Soviet Government was now willing to address the present formal peace 
proposal to the Polish Government.  
 
       The  abandonment  of  the  unofficial  armistice  negotiations  at  Mikaszewicze  the 
previous week, led the Soviet regime to turn to that other bastion of Soviet negotiation: 
open diplomacy. In sharp contrast with the previous talks, the NKID directly utilised the 
proposal  for  propaganda  purposes,  transmitting  it  to  the  Poles  over  an  open  wireless 
channel. According to Trotsky, this ensured that, “...the entire world read it”.
163 It also 
provided an opportunity to encourage Polish working-class support for the Soviet regime 
declaring, 
While thus meeting the Russian workers’ and peasants’ desire for peace, the 
Soviet Government is equally aware that its proposals also meets the wishes 
clearly expressed by all workers’ organisations in Poland, irrespective of their 
party allegiance, by numerous democratic organisations, local authorities and 
other Polish public bodies.
164 
 
      Chicherin  argued  that  the  proposal  was  driven,  “...by  the  aspirations  of  the  Polish 
masses to peace”.
165 This was misleading. In actual fact, two primary concerns directed 
this  diplomatic  manoeuvre.  Firstly,  it  was  prompted  by  fear  that  following  the  failed 
autumn negotiations, Piłsudski’s forces would coordinate an attack with the Whites against 
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Soviet Russia. Secondly, it was an immediate response to the Allied Supreme Council’s 
declaration, on 8 December 1919, of their envisaged line for Poland’s eastern border.
166 As 
the Curzon frontier lay more than 100 miles west of the Polish troops’ frontline on 22 
December, the Soviet proposal was a clever attempt to widen the gap between Poland and 
the Entente. Almost all of Belorussia was offered to Polish control as were both Wilno and 
Grodno.
167 To widen the Polish-Entente divide, the Polish Government was castigated as 
an Entente puppet and the proposal commented, 
We are not unaware of the existence of some obstacles which may make it 
difficult for the Polish Government to conclude an agreement with Russia... 
from foreign sources, which in this case are in conflict with the real interests 
of  the  Polish  people.  The  Soviet  Government  hopes  that  the  peaceful 
aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the Polish people... will make 
possible the cessation of hostilities, which merely serve foreign interests.
168 
 
      In the event, the Poles made no response.
169 They neither accepted nor rejected it. 
Instead,  they  waited  to  gauge  the  next  move  of  the  Soviet  regime:  would  it  invoke a 
military or a diplomatic response?
170 This hesitation inflicted difficulties on the Poles. As 
Rumbold reported  to his Government  on 31 December 1919, “This  proposal from the 
Bolshevists is rather embarassing to the Polish Government because, when they get to hear 
of it, the parties of the left are likely to do their utmost to get the Polish Government to 
make peace”.
171 Poland’s failure to respond was, in fact, a direct consequence of Allied 
advice. As noted in  two contemporary commentaries, The  Russian-Bolshevist War and 
Poland and the Soviets, written at the Polish Legation in London,  
When Mr Chicherin… sent his first appeal for peace to Poland/Autumn 1919/ 
the  Polish  Prime  Minister  [Paderewski]  at  that  time  in  Paris,  asked  the 
Supreme Council what Poland’s attitude should be. He was told that there 
could be no question of any negotiations between Poland and the Bolsheviks 
at the time, considering the precarious situation in which such a step on the 
part of Poland would place the Allied and Russian interventionist forces, and 
the  fact  that  the  Soviets  were  not  recognised  by  the  Allies.  Poland  was 
advised to refrain even from giving any acknowledgement to the message of 
Mr Chicherin. Poland acted according to the wishes of the Allies.
172  
  
                                                
166 This later became known as the Curzon line, after the British Foreign Secretary, Lord George Curzon, had 
signed it, TNA FO 417/9, pp. 23-26. 
167 Polish Institute, A.11.49/SOW/20, unnumbered doc., p. 26. 
168 Ibid, p. 313. 
169 L.D. Trotsky, Military Writings, vol. 3, p. 153. 
170 Exhausted militarily by the Russian Civil War, the latter method was adopted at the outset of 1920. 
171 TNA, FO 688/1, p. 620.  
172  Polish  Institute,  A.12.P.2/2,  doc.  11,  p.  198.  This  was  despite  the  fact  that  the  terms  proposed  by 
Chicherin were, “...very advantageous”, for the Poles, Polish Institute, A.12.P.3/4, doc. 1, p. 6; TNA, FO 
417/9, doc. 31, p. 40.  See also, TNA, FO 417/9, doc. 35, p. 53.   100 
      In reality, if Polish objectives could have been secured through diplomatic negotiation 
alone, the Poles would have halted the military offensive. That is why Piłsudski allowed 
the BiałowieŜa and Mikaszewicze negotiations to proceed. However, serious mistrust of 
Soviet foreign policy objectives made diplomatic compromise impossible and encouraged 
Piłsudski and the Polish Army to seek a military solution at the end of 1919. 
   
4. Conclusion 
 
      Throughout 1919, therefore, the diplomacy endorsed by Soviet Russia, Poland and the 
international  community,  directly  influenced  the  development  and  escalation  of  the 
conflict. Despite the absence of clear blueprints to follow, it soon became apparent to the 
leaders  in  both  Russia and  Poland  that  diplomacy  was  of  crucial  importance  for  their 
involvement in the international theatre and, as a result, the NKID, Comintern and MSZ 
were established by the respective regimes. As the year progressed, relations between the 
belligerents alternated between the intermittent pursuit of military offensives and recourse 
to  diplomatic  negotiation,  as  domestic  and  international  conditions  dictated.  The  latter 
were marred, however, by the mutual, inherent, deep-seated suspicion of their opponents’ 
motives.  This  was  heightened  by  the  utilisation  of  unofficial  negotiations  and  the 
widespread dissemination of propaganda and agitation materials by both camps.   
 
      Thus, although militarily, the Poles maintained a clear advantage over Soviet Russia in 
1919,  whilst  the  latter’s  focus  was  directed  towards  domestic  considerations  and  in 
particular, the Russian Civil War, diplomatically, the Soviet regime remained extremely 
active.  Led  by  able  diplomats  and  skilled  propagandists,  the  NKID  and  Comintern 
successfully pursued a two-pronged attack. This aimed at enmeshing their opponents in 
tactically complex negotiations and at creating divisions between Poland and their western 
allies, playing to the latter at every available opportunity. The scene was irrevocably set for 
the decisive culmination of the Polish-Soviet War the following year.    101 
Chapter 3: Polish-Soviet Diplomacy, January-July 1920 
 
1. The Military Situation 
 
     In  a  Letter  to  our  French  Comrades,  Trotsky  reported  the  reaction  of  the  Soviet 
leadership to the military gains secured by the Polish Army in 1919. He stated, “We look 
upon the temporary advance by the weak Polish forces with no great alarm. When we have 
settled Denikin – and that day is near – we shall pour our heavy reserves on the Western 
Front”.
1  This  proved  to  be  the  reality  at  the  beginning  of  1920.  The  temporary  truce, 
concluded  at  Mikaszewicze,  was  observed  only  until  Denikin  had  been  removed  as  a 
threat.  Once  this  had  been  achieved  in  April  1920,  the  Polish-Soviet  War  resumed, 
increasing as the year progressed in scale, scope and intensity.
2 
 
      January 1920 saw the focus of the Red Army directed firmly towards eliminating their 
domestic  White  opponents,  concentrated  around  Denikin.  Trotsky  announced  at  the 
beginning of the year that, “The Western Front is of secondary importance for us.... Today 
the most important front is, and will remain until its tasks have been fully accomplished, 
the Southern Front”.
3 As soon as victory in the Russian Civil War was assured, both Lenin 
and  Trotsky  planned  for  the  demobilisation  of  the  military,  transferring  Red  Army 
conscripts into labour armies to assist in the economic reconstruction of Russia.
4 
 
      This was forestalled by the subsequent civil war swing in favour of the Reds, which 
removed any Polish constraint from taking action on their Eastern Front. On 3 January 
1920, Piłsudski launched an offensive, resulting in the Polish occupation of Dunaburg, 
securing  their  North-Eastern  Front  and  cutting  Lithuania  off  from  Soviet  Russia.
5 
However, difficult winter conditions prevented any further large-scale manoeuvre by the 
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belligerents. Both sides began to plan for a summer offensive. As a result, the leaders of 
Poland and Russia turned to diplomacy in pursuit of their objectives and for the first four 
months of 1920, diplomats, once again, took centre stage in the Polish-Soviet War. 
 
2. Polish-Soviet Diplomacy: January-March 1920 
 
      That Poland increasingly became the dominant concern of the Soviet regime as the 
year  progressed,  can  be  clearly  observed  through  an  examination  of  Russian  archival 
collections.
6 Whilst in 1919 Lenin and his colleagues mentioned Poland infrequently, after 
April 1920, there was a dramatic increase in the output of documents, correspondence and 
telegrams relating to the developing Polish situation.
7 Soviet diplomats issued numerous 
proposals and peace offers which ultimately aimed at the destruction of the Polish State. If 
this  could  be  achieved  through  the  attainment  of  peaceful  relations  with  Poland,  then 
Soviet Russia would grasp at the opportunity. If, however, the initiative failed, the Russian 
Communists, like the Poles, had no qualms in seeking a military solution. As a result, 
throughout  the  year  both  Poland  and  Russia  simultaneously  pursued  dual  policies: 
diplomatic negotiation and military campaign. 
 
     The first significant move of the year occurred when, on 26 January 1920, Chicherin 
expressed concern to Lenin that the Soviet regime avoid any measures which Piłsudski 
could use as a pretext for launching a renewed Polish offensive. He argued that, 
The most serious danger existing for  the  Soviet Republic at the present 
moment is the possibility of a Polish attack. In striving to involve the Poles 
in a war with Soviet Russia, Polish activists are using the argument… that 
Soviet Russia is prepared to attack Poland…. In such a situation there must 
from our side be carefully avoided all that could… be utilised by the Polish 
activists for reinforcement of their accusation.
8 
 
This document, recently published for the first time, suggests that the proposal to open 
peace negotiations with the Poles, issued two days later, may have been initiated by the 
Commissar  for  Foreign  Affairs.  On  24  January  1920,  Lenin  had  argued,  “We  cannot 
demobilise the army because we still have enemies such as Poland”, and three days later 
submitted a draft proposal to Sovnarkom to discuss Poland’s military preparations for an 
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attack  on  Soviet  Russia.
9  The  following  day,  Trotsky  concurred  that,  “All  the  latest 
information tells us of the imminent possibility of an attack by the Poles along the entire 
front”.
10 As a result, he demanded that the following precautionary measures be taken: 1) 
the  mobilisation  of  the  most  reliable  Polish  communists  to  the  Western  Front;  2)  an 
increase  of  printed  agitation  in  the  Polish  language;  3)  a  concentration  on  military 
readiness; 4) an increase of commanders’ training courses.
11  
 
      On the very same day, 28 January 1920, the Soviet leadership issued a peace proposal, 
by radio transfer, to the Poles.
12 This diplomatic initiative, signed by Lenin, Chicherin and 
Trotsky,  was  significantly  addressed  to  both  the  Polish  Government  and  the  Polish 
population. It argued that, despite the failure of the Polish Government to reply to the 
Soviet peace offer of 22 December 1919, the Soviet Government now, 
addressed… to the Polish Government and to the Polish Nation, a justifiable 
statement of their recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the 
Polish republic, about their preparedness not to overstep the determined line 
on the western front and about their wish to begin peace negotiations with 
Poland,  in  order  to  achieve  a  friendly  way  to  resolve  with  her  all 
questions.
13 
 
To exert pressure on the Poles, the Soviet leadership stressed the gravity of the situation 
and  sought,  once  again,  to  drive  a  wedge  between  the  Poles  and  their  Entente  allies, 
stating,  
Poland is now confronted with a decision that for many years to come may 
have grave repercussions on the lives of both nations. Everything shows that 
the  extreme  imperialists  among  the  Allies,  the  colleagues  and  agents  of 
Churchill  and  Clemenceau,  are  at  present  making  every  effort  to  draw 
Poland into a baseless, senseless and criminal war with Soviet Russia.
14 
 
Rejecting all accusations of pursuing an aggressive policy, the declaration announced that 
the Red Army would not advance over the present Belorussian front line, of Drysa, Dzisna, 
Polock, Parycko, the station of Ptycz and Białokorowicze.
15 If this proposed line had been 
accepted by the Poles, it would have proven extremely advantageous, lying as it did to the 
east  of  the  Polish-Soviet  border  eventually  established  by  the  Treaty  of  Riga.  The 
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communication categorically confirmed that no agreement, aimed directly or indirectly at 
Poland, had been concluded with Germany or any other country and asserted that,  
So far as the essential interests of Poland and Russia are concerned there is 
not a single question, territorial, economic or other, that could not be solved 
in a peaceful way, through negotiation, mutual compromise or agreement.
16  
 
      Was this assertion supported by the reaction of the Polish Government and people to 
the Soviet peace offer? The declaration had, indeed, been skillfully composed and was 
calculated to appeal strongly to considerable sections of the population. By reasserting 
their recognition of Poland’s right to independence, the Soviet regime immediately drew 
favourable comparisons with their White Russian opponents, who had failed to officially 
define  their  Polish  policy.
17  As  the  British  diplomat,  Douglas  Savery,  reported  from 
Warsaw to his Government on 9 February 1920, 
The attitude of the press is now decidedly more favourable towards opening 
up negotiations than it was ten days ago, and in this it really seems to reflect 
a  change  in  public  opinion.  Now  that  the  public  has  had  time  to  get 
accustomed to the idea of treating with Soviet Russia it is beginning to 
realise what an enormous gain it would be to this country, firstly, to get rid 
of the vast unproductive expenditure in the army, and, secondly, to settle the 
question of the eastern frontiers of Poland.
18 
 
The Polish Legation in London also supported this assertion.
19 However, the KPRP Central 
Committee, unsurprisingly, demanded that the Soviet offer be accepted and on 27 February 
denounced Polish Government secrecy surrounding the declaration.
20 Even a number of 
committed  Polish  federalists,  including  Daszyński,  Chairman  of  the  PPS,  declared 
themselves to be in favour of accepting the Soviet offer to negotiate, on condition that 
Poland’s  eastern  frontier  be  drawn  according  to  the  wishes  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
disputed territory.
21 
 
      Nevertheless,  Polish  opinion  was  certainly  not  uniform  in  its  reaction  and  many 
remained distrustful of Soviet intentions. Deep divisions in the country over the pursuit of 
war or peace placed the Polish Government in an extremely difficult position.  Mindful of 
the  Entente’s  position,  the  Poles  were  greatly  concerned  at  the  propaganda  onslaught 
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which diplomatic negotiation with the Soviet regime could facilitate. As British diplomats 
in Warsaw reported, 
The Polish Government... consider that the Soviet Government is… devoid 
of  any  honour  or  scruples  and  that  its  policy  is  determined  solely  by 
questions  of  expediency.  They  realise  that  their  geographical  situation 
exposes them in an especial degree to Bolshevik propaganda and that if they 
make peace with the Bolsheviks, any representative accredited by the latter 
to Poland will not hesitate to conduct Bolshevik propaganda to the utmost 
extent  of  his  power,  whatever engagements  they  may  have  taken  to the 
contrary.
22 
 
This lack of trust between the two adversaries was a continual and recurring theme of 
Polish-Soviet negotiation throughout 1920, as it had been the previous year. The Poles 
were further concerned that neither the Soviet Government nor any succeeding Russian 
Government would abide by an agreement reached.
23 The National Democratic Party, in 
particular, remained deeply suspicious of the Soviet diplomatic proposal.
24 Piłsudski, too, 
feared that it had been made to gain time to enable preparations for a Red Army offensive 
against the country, whilst Soviet propaganda simultaneously worked to undermine the 
morale of the Polish soldiers. This suspicion was confirmed when the French Intelligence 
Service  provided  Piłsudski  with  documentary  proof  of  a  Soviet  plan  for  a  renewed 
offensive.
25 Soviet forces along Poland’s eastern front did, indeed, increase rapidly in the 
two months following the proposal.
26  
 
      The  immediate  response  of  the  Polish  Government  was  to  telegram  their  Soviet 
counterpart on 4 February confirming that an answer would be returned in due course.
27 
The question was then referred to the Commission for Foreign Affairs and the Army Staff 
for joint discussion. Consultation with Poland’s allies was also essential before a final 
decision could be taken and as a result, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stanisław 
Patek,  was  dispatched  to  London  and  Paris  to  consult  with  Allied  statesmen.  On  23 
January, the Polish Prime Minister informed the Diet that, whilst a tendency in favour of 
peace undoubtedly existed amongst the Poles, it was necessary to await the return of Patek 
before a response could be issued.
28 Patek was to explain the attitude of the Poles to the 
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peace offer, clarify the extent of possible Allied aid to Poland and confirm if the British 
and French Governments would guarantee any peace treaty concluded between Poland and 
Soviet  Russia.
29  His  subsequent  meeting  with  Lloyd  George  was  of  great  importance, 
clarifying as it did the extent to which Britain was willing to commit herself to the defence 
of Poland.   
 
      During the interview, the latter unequivocally informed Patek that, “...while it was not 
for Great Britain to advise Poland, which must take full responsibility for deciding as 
between  peace  and  war,  the  British  Government  certainly  did  not  advise  the  latter”.
30 
Lloyd George drew attention to the withdrawal of the Allies from military intervention in 
Russia, the recent conclusion of peace treaties between Russia and the Baltic States and 
Finland, and the fact that British public opinion would reject further involvement in the 
war. The Poles, alone, would be left to fight the Bolsheviks. As a result, he felt compelled 
not to give Poland the slightest encouragement to pursue a war with Russia.
31 In fact, he 
openly  criticised  the  Poles  for  jeopardising  earlier  Polish-Soviet  agreement  with  the 
advance of the Polish Army eastwards in 1919 and the resultant incorporation of territory 
containing large Russian minorities.
32   
 
     Lloyd George offered an ambiguous promise of British assistance in the event of a 
Soviet attack, stating that, “...if the Poles made a sincere attempt to make an equitable 
peace  and  the  Bolsheviks  either  refused  peace  or,  having  made  peace,  proceeded  to 
repudiate it, Great Britain would feel bound to assist Poland to the best of its powers”.
33 
However, he reported that it would be impossible for the Allies to guarantee any future 
Polish-Soviet peace treaty. Instead, “...it was really a question of the balance between the 
risk of making peace with an unstable Government and the risk of war”.
34 When Patek 
queried if this was the opinion of all the Allied Powers, Lloyd George answered that it was 
certainly  the  view of the  British Government, that  the  Italian, Signor Nitti, “...entirely 
agreed with them”, and while he had not as yet had the opportunity to discuss the question 
with Millerand, “He was pretty confident ... that France and the Supreme Council... would 
take the same attitude as he had just outlined”.
35 
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      This  was  not,  however,  the  reality.  There  was,  in  fact,  no  consensus  within  the 
Supreme  Council.  In  direct  contrast  with  the  British  position,  the  French  Government 
favoured  a  continuation  of  the  Polish-Soviet  War  and  desired  that  a  Polish  military 
offensive be vigorously pursued against Soviet Russia. The latter, consequently, advised 
the Poles not to negotiate with the Soviet regime and further reasserted French willingness 
to  support  the  Poles  in  the  event  of  a  Bolshevik  attack.
36  The  American  Minister  in 
Warsaw, in turn, having received no direct guidance on the question from his Government, 
withheld his opinion.
37 
 
      As a result, the Polish Government anxiously awaited the return of Patek to Warsaw.
38 
When he arrived, on 1 February, he immediately attended the Belvedere Palace, where a 
meeting had been arranged for 11.30am with Piłsudski, the Polish Prime Minister and the 
Director  of  the  Political  Department,  to  consider  Poland’s  response  in  light  of  Allied 
advice.
39 It was decided that Lloyd George’s guidance made it impossible for the Polish 
Army, despite their misgivings about Soviet intentions, to resort solely to military means to 
resolve the conflict. Too great was their need for supplies and equipment from both Britain 
and France. Diplomacy was, therefore, now desperately required. 
 
      Consequently, at a secret session of the Committee for Foreign and Military Affairs in 
the Polish Sejm on 6 February, it was decided to prepare Poland’s peace terms.
40 The 
Polish Commander-in-Chief informed General Carton de Wiart, a member of the Allied 
Military Mission, on 9 February 1920 that he had drawn up very stiff terms, keen as he was 
to avoid any appearance of Polish capitulation, and that these were presently set before the 
Polish Government for consideration.
41 Two days later, the MSZ demanded: the annulment 
of all consequences of the 1772 partitions, including Soviet renunciation of all resulting 
territorial rights; that all Polish properties and possessions removed by Russia after the 
partitions be returned and indemnities paid for all destruction; the recognition of, “national 
states arising on the territory of the former Russian Empire”, and non-intervention in their 
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domestic affairs; the cessation of all Soviet propaganda; the withdrawal of the Red Army 
from Polish territory to the borders of 1772, and the conclusion of a Russian-Polish peace 
treaty.
42  Whilst  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  continued  to  formulate  a  draft  Polish-
Russian Treaty, Piłsudski, simultaneously, began to make military preparations.
43 Such a 
policy of negotiating harsh terms from a position of military strength was consistently 
employed by both Poland and Russia throughout 1919 and 1920. The superiority of their 
respective armed forces enabled the diplomats of both camps to expand their demands at 
the negotiating table. A seesaw motion was, thus, established with either Poland or Russia 
in the diplomatic ascendancy at any one time. 
 
      The Polish terms were never, in fact, formally presented to the Soviet Government.
44 
Instead, they were sent to the Allied Governments, on 13 March, with a covering note, 
which stated that the Poles were prepared to open peace negotiations towards the end of 
March.
45 This was entirely in-keeping with the advice given by Lloyd-George the previous 
month.
46 What, then, was Allied reaction to this Polish initiative?  France, still hopeful of a 
White victory in the Russian Civil War, directly opposed the Polish terms which would 
have forced Russia to renounce all territorial claims to Poland’s pre-1772 lands.
47 The 
prevalent British Government reaction can be observed in a memorandum, Polish Peace 
Terms to the Bolsheviks, which severely criticised Poland’s conditions, arguing that, 
The total number of Poles in the world is very much smaller than the non-
Polish population of the “Eastern Borderlands” now claimed by them…. the 
White  Russians  and  Little  Russians  are  branches  of  the  Russian  nation 
…bound up with Russia not merely by the social interest of the peasantry, 
but by tradition, language, culture and religion…. the small group of White 
Russian intelligentsia... professing a nationality separate from that of Russia 
could probably be seated on a large-sized sofa.
48 
 
This condemnation was widely shared by the British public.
49 In actual fact, Piłsudski had 
demanded the presentation of severe terms in order to allow the Poles to secure their state, 
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gauge Soviet reaction, comply with British demands to commence negotiation and gain 
time for military preparation if the latter were rejected.
50  
 
      Whilst  the  Polish  Government  debated  its  response  to  the  Russian  offer,  Soviet 
diplomacy once again pursued a dual policy of reducing support within Poland for the war 
effort  and  splitting  the  Entente  from  the  Poles  through  the  combined  use  of  open 
diplomacy and a well-defined propaganda offensive. This was visibly demonstrated when, 
on  the  very  same  day  that  the  Soviet  regime  radioed its  peace  proposal  to  the  Polish 
Government and nation, 28 January 1920, it concurrently issued an Appeal to the Toilers of 
the Entente Countries. Exhorting the working classes of Britain and France to pressurise 
their respective governments to withdraw support from the Poles in the conflict, it stated, 
At this very moment, when Polish workers’ organisations of all tendencies 
are loudly demanding peace with Soviet Russia and the Polish people... the 
Entente  Governments  want  to  force  them  to  shed  their  blood  for  the 
representatives of the same Tsarist reaction which has oppressed the Polish 
people  for  centuries....  The  only  obstacle  in  the  way  of  peace...  is  the 
reactionary imperialist policy of the Allied Governments.
51 
 
It asserted that the Soviet regime presented no threat to Poland and that it was both ready 
and willing to halt military proceedings and conclude a prolonged peace with the Poles.
52 
The regime was disingenuous here - it already planned to attack when militarily stronger – 
but was clearly winning the diplomatic and propaganda battles at this time. 
 
      At a CEC meeting of the Soviet on 2 February, a further radio appeal To the Polish 
Nation  insisted  upon  the  regime’s  peaceful  position  and  striving  to  establish  peaceful, 
friendly relations with the Poles.
53  Lenin even went so far as to state that the regime had 
offered peace conditions to the Poles which were highly unfavourable to Soviet Russia,  
...because  we  rated  the  peaceful  economic  work  to  which  we  had 
transformed the life of the army and that of tens of thousands of workers 
and peasants very much more highly than the possibility of liberating by 
military successes, Byelorussia and part of Ukraine, or Eastern Galicia.
54 
 
                                                                                                                                              
overwhelmingly Russian, but it would also bring Poland dangerously near the gates of the three Russian 
capitals – Petrograd, Kieff and Moscow”, TNA, FO 417/9, doc. 35, pp. 54-55.   
50 TNA, FO 417/8, doc. 28, p. 34. 
51 V. Kluchnikov, & A. Sabanin, (eds.), Mezhdunarodnaia politika noveishego vremeni v dogovorakh, notakh 
i deklaratsiakh, vol. 3, part 1, (Moscow, 1928), p. 5. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Krasnaia kniga, p. 7; D & M, vol. 12, doc. 311, pp. 511-513. 
54 V.I. Lenin, “The International Significance of the War with Poland”, in A. Richardson, (ed.), In Defence of 
the Russian Revolution: a selection of Bolshevik writings, 1917-1923, (London, 1995), p. 138.   110 
He argued that this introduced a “new diplomacy... a special kind of diplomacy”, as Soviet 
Russia was willing to retreat in order to avoid war, but feared that the Poles regarded this 
approach as a sign of weakness.
55 
 
     Poland’s failure to respond to their January peace offer until 27 March, further served to 
intensify  the  Soviet  leaders’  mistrust  of  the  Polish  Government.  The  Polish  Bureau 
attached to the CC RKP(b) reported on 27 February, for instance, that the lack of a Polish 
response made it absolutely essential that Russia’s Western Front be strengthened to deny 
the Polish Army an easy victory.
56 They also recognised, however, the important role still 
to be played by diplomatic negotiation in the following months, arguing, 
...it is necessary to carefully prepare negotiations. Our position is good since 
our  opponents  are  economically  weak,  isolated  and  even  encircled  by 
enemies.... But slips attached to the negotiations can damage our position.
57 
 
      Apportioning blame for the failure of Polish-Soviet diplomacy developed during the 
war,  and  has  continued  to  flourish  ever  since,  supported  by  much  historiography. 
Ponomaryov et al wrote, for instance, that, 
In the period from January to March 1920 the Soviet Government made 
several attempts to start peace talks, but the reactionary Polish Government 
was obsessed with its idea of seizing Ukrainian, Belorussian and Lithuanian 
territories and it turned a deaf ear to the voice of reason.
58   
 
In contrast, many Polish and a number of Western historical accounts have pointed to the 
increased  concentration  of  Soviet  troops  along  Poland’s  eastern  border,  whilst  the 
negotiations  were  proceeding  as  evidence  of  Soviet  insincerity  in  January  1920.
59  In 
reality, although both sides were willing to allow their diplomats opportunity to secure 
their objectives by peaceful means, neither the Soviet nor Polish leadership would hesitate 
to employ military force to achieve their ultimate war aims, as and when the need arose. 
Mutual  suspicion  abounded  and  engulfed  every  move  of  the  Polish-Soviet  diplomatic 
battle. 
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      This situation ensured that two months passed before a Polish reply to the January 
peace proposal  was finally received by  the  Soviet  Government at the end of  March.
60 
What, then, was the latter’s reaction? In a word: mistrust. Lenin informed the 8
th Congress 
of the RKP(b) two days later, that in its Polish policy, the regime, 
…must  be  extremely  cautious.  Our  policy  demands  the  most  careful 
thought. Here it is hardest of all to find the proper policy, for nobody as yet 
knows on what track the train is standing; the enemy himself does not know 
what he is going to do next... they do not know what they want.
61 
 
Nevertheless,  he  believed  that  the  revolutionary  movement  in  Poland  was  gaining 
momentum and as a result, the Polish proposal could assist Soviet propaganda: securing 
peace would, “...open channels for our influence a hundred times wider”.
62 This three-
pronged diplomatic-agit-prop-military approach was the cornerstone of Soviet conduct. As 
Lenin declared, 
That is why we must manoeuvre so flexibly in our international policy and 
adhere so firmly to the course we have taken. That is why we must prepare 
for anything. But the measures we take for peace must be accompanied by 
intensified preparedness for defence.
63 
 
      Chicherin too recognized the need for flexibility in dealing with the Poles, cautioning 
Lenin on 26 February 1920 that, “...it is clear that the conditions which will be supplied 
will be more than unacceptable... it is necessary to be prepared for the attack on us by the 
Poles, now well armed and we must seriously think about the defence of the Western 
Front”.
64  The  following  day,  Lenin  ordered  the  Military  Revolutionary  Council  to 
strengthen the Western Front to prepare for a possible future Polish offensive.
65 Indeed, the 
Soviet leadership had received a warning from the Polish Bureau, ten days earlier, that 
even if peace negotiations between Poland and Soviet Russia were held, “...the Polish 
Commanders  strive  to  create  a  strategic  situation  under  which  Poland  can  dictate  the 
conditions. It is beyond doubt that the Polish Army is in a position to go both to Kiev and 
Smolensk”.
66  As  a  result,  Trotsky  considered  it  necessary  to  increase  agit-prop 
preparations against Poland.
67 Deeply suspicious of Polish motives, he argued that, 
The advance of the Poles can have an ambiguous meaning: a) either the 
Poles, before entering into negotiations want to seize the most land possible, 
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thinking that up to a well-known boundary that we will not strongly resist 
them; b) or the Poles have been ordered to provoke us into large military 
action in order to stir up throughout the world agitation to benefit heroic 
Poland, suffocating Russia …to create a political situation for large-scale 
intervention.
68 
 
      The official Polish offer to open peace negotiations at the end of March, did not in the 
end include the Polish terms agreed upon by the Committee of Foreign Affairs. The MSZ 
diplomatic  note,  sent  by  Patek  to  Chicherin,  simply  proposed  the  commencement  of 
diplomatic negotiations on 10 April at the border town of Borisov. Upon being informed of 
the Soviet regime’s preparedness to send delegates, military orders would be issued to 
cease hostilities along the Borisov sector 24 hours before that date.
69  
 
      Chicherin proposed leaving the harsh Polish terms unanswered, reasoning that they 
would highlight Polish unreasonableness. Furthermore, as the Poles were determined on 
their  policy,  no  Soviet  argument  would  alter  their  course  of  severe  peace  terms  and 
military offensive.
70 This suggestion was vigorously opposed by Trotsky, who two days 
later countered, 
I  consider  that  Comrade  Chicherin’s  new  proposal  (to  ignore  the  Polish 
terms) is mistaken. This proposal is tacitly aimed at inducing the Poles to 
think that we shall accede to their terms and will make the Poles go further 
along  a  path  which  will  inevitably  end  in  war:  in  other  words,  it  is  a 
provocation to war.
71 
 
He argued that armed conflict could still be averted by the Soviet regime’s reaction to the 
terms, as he did not believe that either Britain or France had the authority to force the Poles 
to  go  to  war.  Instead,  if  the  Polish  workers  were  incited  to  resist  a  renewed  Polish 
offensive, full scale war could be frustrated. Indeed, failure to reply would lull the Polish 
working class to sleep: if no protest was made by Russia against such “...insolent terms”, 
the Polish workers would believe them to be acceptable to Soviet Russia.
72 In the event, 
Trotsky’s position prevailed. 
   
      If  agreement  could  have  been  reached  in  the  spring  of  1920,  Lenin  and  Piłsudski 
would, given the domestic chaos facing both states, have grasped a settlement with both 
hands. However, the very nature of the Polish-Soviet War, the ideological and traditional 
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opposition of both states, and their conflicting aims and objectives, ensured that only the 
military defeat of one protagonist would force the signing of peace preliminaries. A further 
seven months were to pass before this took place. Before this, once more, diplomacy had 
its day. The pourparlers commenced for Borisov. 
 
3. The Borisov Negotiations 
 
3.1 Why Borisov on 10 April 1920? 
 
      Why was the town of Borisov chosen by the  Polish Government for  the  proposed 
Polish-Soviet negotiations in April 1920? According to Grabski, it was Piłsudski himself 
who  suggested  the  location  for  the  talks.
73  The  need  to  restrict  the  output  of  Soviet 
ideological  propaganda  within  Poland,  which  would  inevitably  accompany  any 
negotiations, was of real concern for the Poles. The capital, Warsaw, was immediately 
ruled out, providing as it would an international platform from which to launch a concerted 
propaganda offensive.
74 According to Patek, this was of absolute necessity given that, 
The  Soviet  representatives  would  undoubtedly  come  well  provided  with 
funds for propaganda purposes....  May and June were likely to be critical 
months from the food point of view, and the Bolsheviks would not be slow 
to exploit the distress caused by the food shortage.
75 
 
The same consideration also prevented the talks from being held in a neutral location.
76  In 
contrast, Borisov, a small, frontline town, recently captured by the Polish Army, would 
inevitably limit both the dissemination and the impact of Soviet propaganda.
77 
 
      Furthermore, geographically, Borisov had merit. It had good railway connections and 
telegraph communications with both Warsaw and Moscow and according to the Polish 
Government, “...it was possible to link Borysow for transport and telegraphy with the two 
capitals within 48 hours”.
78 The River Berezina also formed a loop at Borisov, which could 
help to ensure that an opportunity for peaceful discussion, free from military interference, 
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was secured.
79 Finally, there was plenty of available accommodation in Borisov for both 
delegations.
80 
 
      Initially, the Soviet leaders were willing to allow the Poles to determine the location of 
the negotiations.
81 They were aware, however, that the Polish Army held a strong military 
position  by  March  1920  and  that  Borisov  lay  only  five  miles  behind  the  frontline.
82 
Wandycz has questioned if the town was specifically chosen by the Poles in order to test 
Soviet intentions and this does seem likely.
83 If the Poles had offered a truce for more than 
24 hours duration, or had accepted negotiations at any other site, the Red Army would 
have potentially been able to strengthen its military resources unhindered.  The Poles’ 
refusal, however, to consider a different location, greatly heightened Soviet suspicions and 
according to Trotsky, 
In this they pursued a two-fold aim: to keep our delegates in an atmosphere 
of Polish militarism and “frighten” them with an offensive into Ukraine, 
and, at the same time, by a partial armistice on the Borisov sector, to tie our 
hands in selecting the direction for our counter-blow.
84  
 
Lenin was in complete agreement with this assessment of Polish motives, arguing, 
The Poles have proposed that the peace talks should take place in Borisov 
without  any  cessation  of  hostilities.  Conducting  negotiations  in  this 
particular  place  would  prevent  us  from  continuing  hostilities  during  the 
talks, while giving Poland complete freedom of action in this respect. Of 
course, we could not conduct peace negotiations on such terms.
85  
 
Located on the main Russian railway line, near the junction of the Western and South-
Western Fronts, negotiations at Borisov would have allowed the Poles to continue their 
advance  towards  Ukraine,  whilst  protecting  them  from  flank  attack.  If  hostilities 
recommenced, the Red Army would be prevented from launching a counter-offensive in a 
north-westerly direction.
86 Consequently, the Soviet leadership did not take the proposed 
talks seriously. 
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      The date of 10 April was fixed by the Poles for the meeting of the delegations. Firstly, 
this would allow the Finnish Government sufficient time to participate in the peace talks if 
they so wished, greatly strengthening the Polish position at the negotiations.
87 Secondly, 
the Polish Government was desirous not to provide the Soviet regime with an opportunity 
to criticise the Poles for rushing into the talks unprepared.
88 
 
3.2 Polish-Soviet Negotiations: 28 March-25 April 1920 
  
      Despite personally  selecting  the  militarily  advantageous town of Borisov,  Piłsudski 
regarded the negotiations with suspicion. In a conversation with Patek, he confessed that it 
was  strange  that  he,  as  Commander-in-Chief,  should  be  waging  war,  whilst  Patek,  as 
Foreign  Minister,  was  simultaneously  preparing  peace.
89  Moreover,  Piłsudski  warned 
Patek that a location must be agreed upon quickly: from a military perspective, the Polish 
Army could not wait indefinitely and would soon be forced to advance if no diplomatic 
result  was  forthcoming.
90  The  Polish  Marshal  knew  that  the  Poles  were  in  a  strong 
position, militarily, and, therefore, had no reason to either sue for peace or to accede to 
Soviet demands. In April 1920, the scales were tipped firmly in Poland’s favour. 
 
      Nevertheless, despite these reservations, Polish preparations to attend the peace talks 
proceeded apace. It was decided that the delegation sent from Warsaw and led by Patek 
would consist of fifty persons and would include two main commissions of four delegates 
each,  accompanied  by  a  large  number  of  Polish  journalists.
91  In  contrast,  there  is  no 
evidence  that  the  Soviet  regime  appointed  a  delegation,  raising  questions  as  to  their 
sincerity in conducting negotiations with the Poles at this time. On 28 March, Chicherin 
notified  acceptance  of  10  April  for  the  first  meeting,  but  objected  to  the  proposed 
temporary truce on only one sector of the front, suggesting instead an immediate armistice 
along the entire frontline. He further indicated that a town in Estonia would be regarded as 
a more suitable meeting place.
92  
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     The Polish Government responded, on 1 April, with an insistence on Borisov and a 
rejection  of  an  immediate  truce  on  the  whole  front.
93  Firstly,  military  considerations 
prevented acceptance of this condition. Deep-seated distrust of Soviet intentions can be 
clearly observed in two diplomatic memoranda issued by the Polish Chargé d’Affaires in 
London, in which he argued, 
To conclude an armistice on a front of that length would have necessitated 
considerable time and the Polish Government had all reason to fear that this 
time would be used by the Bolsheviks for further concentration of forces 
and preparation of an offensive.
94 
 
Evidence of a continued concentration of Red Army troops along the Polish-Soviet Front, 
whilst these diplomatic exchanges took place, supported this concern.
95 If an armistice was 
achieved and Polish soldiers were immobilised, it would have proven extremely difficult 
for  the  Poles  to  renew  the  offensive.
96  Consequently,  they  could  have  been  forced  to 
negotiate  a  peace  treaty,  even  on  disadvantageous  terms.  As  a  result,  the  Polish 
Government wished to avoid anything in the nature of a general armistice.
97 
 
     Secondly,  the  Poles,  and  Patek  in  particular,  greatly  feared  that  the  signing  of  an 
armistice  would  open  the  floodgates  for  the  dissemination  of  Soviet  propaganda, 
undermining the morale and loyalty of the Polish soldiers and facilitating fraternisation 
with Red Army troops.
98 A propaganda appeal was, indeed, issued by the Red Army to 
Polish  soldiers,  in  which  the  dual  refusal  of  the  Polish  Government  to  conclude  an 
armistice  and  to  begin  negotiations  in  neutral  territory  was  roundly  condemned.
99  
Furthermore, by creating the impression that peace with Russia was already assured, Soviet 
propaganda would have significantly weakened the position of the Polish diplomats at the 
negotiating table.
100 
 
      Soviet condemnation of the Polish position was immediate. In a note sent by Chicherin 
to Lenin on 2 April, marked “Completely Secret”, he adamantly rejected Borisov, initially 
arguing that, “Negotiations in Poland are not acceptable”.
101 Instead, he suggested that 
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either Estonia or Russia should accommodate the peace talks. However, Chicherin soon 
altered tack at Lenin’s instigation and, recognising the propaganda potential of negotiating 
in Warsaw, suggested meeting in the Polish capital. He admitted that the Soviets could not 
insist on a truce, since Soviet-Estonian negotiations had proceeded without one, but that if 
an armistice were agreed it should be “Either on the entire front, or not at all”.
102 At a joint 
session of the All-Russian CEC, the Moscow Soviet and leaders of the trade unions and 
factory committees, on 5 May 1920, Trotsky reported Polish conditions as follows, 
Here  is the  little town  of  Borisov,  which  we  have  taken  from  you. We 
command you to present yourselves in this place. Here, around Borisov, we 
shall arrange an armistice for your benefit – three sazhens to the right, three 
sazhens to the left – but in other sections, if we wish, we shall advance”. 
Only a barbarian “Excellency”, drunk with victory, with his foot on the 
neck of a prostrate foe, could speak like this.... It is quite obvious that we 
had to refuse this demand.
103 
 
Lenin was in complete agreement with the assessment of his two commissars.
104 
 
       The relentless, unremitting diplomatic exchange which followed culminated on 8 April 
with the categorical rejection of Borisov by the Soviet Government and acknowledgement 
that, 
...we are brought face to face with the most regrettable eventuality, that the 
negotiations with Poland will come to nothing owing to the question of 
where they will be carried on, which is a fact unparalleled in the annals of 
international relations.
 105 
 
The  Soviet  Government  then  changed  tack  and,  in  an  attempt  to  increase  diplomatic 
pressure on the Polish Government, informed Patek that a note had been issued to the 
Allied Governments, on the same day, requesting their assistance with the Poles.
106 It was 
hoped that this would force the Poles to agree to meet in a different location.
107 Once 
again, the Soviet leaders’ representation to the international community of the Poles as 
obstinate and intractable was a tactically astute diplomatic manoeuvre.
108 Aware that the 
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continued  isolation  of  Russia  from  the  European  economic  and  trade  network  was  a 
concern for many in the West, including, notably, Lloyd George, the Soviet note to the 
Allies shrewdly reported, 
Poland  is  continuing  her  war  against  the  Russian  and  Ukrainian  Soviet 
Republics, hindering, in this manner their peace action, preventing them 
from taking advantage of their internal riches, and from supplying other 
nations with the products which they require.
109  
 
It  informed  the  Allied Powers  of  the  Poles’  rejection  of an  Estonian  town,  Petrograd, 
Moscow or Warsaw, and suggested instead that London or Paris would be acceptable, 
“...where the Allies themselves can judge of our peaceful intentions”.
110 This seemingly 
conciliatory gesture was not as placatory as it might at first appear. The propaganda value 
of conducting Polish-Soviet negotiations in an Allied capital would have been enormous. 
Indeed, Patek accurately recognised that the Soviet note to the Allies was itself, “...in the 
nature of propaganda”.
111 
 
The appeal concluded, 
 
If.... the obstinacy of the Polish Government in not agreeing to any other 
town besides Borysow as the place for negotiations with Russia, forms the 
only obstacle to these negotiations... it will not be possible for the Entente 
Governments to avoid their responsibility in this event, as their influence 
might, most evidently, induce the Polish Government to take up a position 
less irreconcilable in this matter.
112 
 
The Allies did not wish, however, to accept any such responsibility and so simply advised 
the Polish Government, on 19 April, not to be too insistent on Borisov.
113 As was the 
situation throughout the conflict, they preferred to watch the diplomatic drama unfold, in 
April  1920,  from  afar.  Thereafter,  both  the  Polish  and  Soviet  Governments  issued 
statements blaming their opponent for the diplomatic stalemate which ensued.
114 
 
                                                
109 TNA, FO 688/3, pp. 51-53.  
110 Ibid, pp. 52-53. Chicherin questioned, “Perhaps the Poles are unwilling to go to Estonia because Estonia 
was the first to make peace, and they feel their presence would be the greatest compliment to the superiority 
of the Estonian Government?” Manchester Guardian, 15 April 1920, p. 5. This was, indeed, exactly why the 
Soviets had suggested an Estonian town. 
111 TNA, FO 417/7, doc. 49, p. 70; Polish Institute, A.12.P.3/4, doc. 2. 
112 Ibid, pp. 53-54. The Soviet regime remained convinced that the Poles were acting on Entente instructions. 
According to Rumbold, “...the presence of members of Allied legations at Borisov would be misrepresented 
and give rise to the idea that the Allies were in some way superintending the course of the peace negotiations 
and would be a party to the same”, TNA, FO 417/8, doc. 42, p. 58. The Allies were keen to avoid this 
responsibility at all costs.  
113 TNA, FO 417/9, doc. 35, p. 54.  
114 J. Marchlewski, Rosja proletarjacka, pp. 19-21; Krasnaia kniga, doc. 86, pp. 102-103.   119 
3.3 Responsibility for the Breakdown in Diplomatic Relations, April 1920 
 
      Although the Soviet Government may have sincerely desired to negotiate peace at the 
end of December 1919, the situation had clearly altered four months later. Following the 
Red  Army’s  defeat  of  Denikin,  the  signing  of  a  peace  treaty  with  Estonia,  and  the 
discovery of the willingness of Lithuania and Latvia to enter into peace talks, the Soviet 
regime changed tack. Their improved military position allowed it to utilise the debate over 
the meeting place to prolong the preliminary peace talks, guarantee Polish isolation and 
simultaneously prepare for an offensive against Poland.
115 Borisov further served to gain 
time for the Red Army to turn its attention towards General Wrangel in the Crimea, before 
its full force could be sent against the Poles. Thus, in the middle of the negotiations, Soviet 
Western Front Commander, Tukhachevsky, was ordered to plan, “...a deep advance into 
Poland”, to be carried out in July 1920.
116 Piłsudski’s doubts as to the sincerity of the 
Soviet peace proposals were certainly well-founded.
117 
 
      A  Soviet  diktat  could  then  be  imposed  upon  the  Poles.  Undoubtedly,  any  peace 
settlement reached would have been of a temporary, provisional nature until such times as 
the Soviet regime felt able to spread revolution to the industrialised countries of Western 
Europe.  This overriding  long-term and dearly-held objective lay at the heart  of Soviet 
conduct during the war with Poland.  
 
      Neither, however, were the Poles blameless. Refusal to reconsider the location for talks 
was at best tenacious, at worse, a demonstration of Polish insincerity. The Poles aimed to 
paralyse the Red Army in a vitally important sector of the Western Front.
118 It would 
appear that Piłsudski no longer sought a peaceful solution. Secret Polish military plans for 
the launch  of an offensive  into  Ukraine were proceeding  simultaneously  alongside the 
negotiations.  This  sought  to  remove  Ukraine  from  the  Soviet  sphere  of  influence  and 
secure it as a Polish ally. Indeed, this was visibly and indisputably demonstrated by the 
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launch of the Polish offensive on 25 April, which occurred too soon after the breakdown in 
diplomacy not to have been prepared in advance. 
 
     Thus, the Polish Government may have appointed a delegation and prepared its peace 
terms, but these were never handed over to the Soviet Government. In turn, it does not 
appear  that  the  Soviet  Government  either  nominated  a  delegation  to  participate  in  the 
diplomatic  negotiations  or  formulated  its  peace  conditions.  Instead,  the  Borisov 
negotiations provided the diplomats of both Poland and Soviet Russia with an opportunity 
to play to a large domestic and international audience. Although in this battle Chicherin 
and the Soviet regime undoubtedly played the more skilful and astute game, following the 
failed Borisov negotiations, diplomatic stalemate ensued. The scales were now irrevocably 
tipped, by the leaders of both nations, in favour of a military dénouement. 
 
4. Kiev: April-May 1920 
 
      The military solution sought by Piłsudski was to direct an offensive towards Ukraine 
and the strategically important city of Kiev. Following the cessation of the Great War in 
November  1918,  Ukrainian  lands  had  witnessed  chaos  and  anarchy,  as  rival  groups 
attempted to assert control over the country.
119 The year 1919, alone, saw the establishment 
there of nine rival governments.
120 War had broken out between Ukraine and Poland in 
November  1918  and  again  in  May  1919,  before  Soviet  control  over  the  country  was 
temporarily secured in early 1920.
121 
 
      Before Piłsudski launched his attack in April 1920, to rid the country of its Soviet 
occupiers, he required to secure a Ukrainian ally who would be responsible for establishing 
and maintaining an independent Ukraine, friendly to Poland. The man chosen was Simon 
Petlura, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Directorate. Petlura had presided over a 
Ukrainian  independence  movement  for  longer  than  any  other  leader;  had  obtained 
considerable, active aid from the Allied Powers, and expected and promised a general 
Ukrainian uprising against the Soviet regime.
122 After suffering defeat at the hands of both 
the Soviets and the Whites in the autumn of 1919, he was exiled to Poland and, there, 
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entered into negotiations with Piłsudski.
123 The discussions bore fruit on 21 April 1920, 
when  a  political  agreement  was  signed  by  the  two  men  in  Warsaw.
124    Through  this 
understanding, Piłsudski promised military aid to Petlura in the fight against Soviet Russia, 
recognised the right of Ukraine to self-determination, acknowledged Petlura as Head of the 
Ukrainian  People’s  Republic  and  reached  agreement  on  the  delineation  of  the  Polish-
Ukrainian  border.  In  turn,  Petlura  recognised  Eastern  Galicia  as  a  Polish  sphere  of 
influence  and  undertook  to  cede  Lwów  and  Volhynia  to  Polish  control.
125  A  Polish-
Ukrainian military convention on 24 April and a draft provisional economic understanding 
on 1 May 1920, followed.
126 
 
     What motives, then, guided Piłsudski to launch a military attack towards Kiev in April 
1920?  Firstly,  the  establishment  of  an  independent,  friendly  Ukraine,  federated  with 
Poland, was central to his ideological programme. By imposing a third fait accompli in the 
kresy, Piłsudski sought to resolve the area’s territorial questions without having to take into 
account Allied wishes. He further believed that, “Refusal to aid a nation with whom we 
lived in a voluntary union for five hundred years would be an indelible stain on Polish 
honour”.
127 It would, moreover, provide an example to the other populations of the kresy 
and the Baltic states of the potential benefits to be gained from forming an alliance with the 
Poles. In this way, Poland would once again receive international recognition as a great 
European power and the balance of power in Eastern Europe would be realigned in their 
favour.  
 
      Secondly, and crucially, following the ongoing failure of Polish diplomacy to secure 
agreement, it would allow the Polish Government to negotiate a peace settlement for the 
region from a position of military strength. Piłsudski remained convinced that the Soviet 
regime,  driven  by  a  desire  to  spread  socialist  revolution  westwards,  would  launch  an 
offensive into the Polish lands, as soon as the White forces were defeated in the Russian 
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Civil War.
128 He hoped to forestall this by launching a preemptive drive on Kiev and 
thereby determine the timing of future Polish-Soviet military engagements.
129  Piłsudski 
aimed to gain control of the South-Western Front, capture the right-bank Dniester and turn 
his  forces  north  to  face  the  Red  Army  on  Belorussian  territory.
130  Polish  military 
intelligence demonstrated that the concentration of Red Army troops, following the defeat 
of  Denikin,  was  increasing  along  the  Northern  Front,  to  a  greater  extent  than  on  the 
Southern Front. Consequently, he hoped that a knock-out blow in the south would prevent 
a Soviet advance in the northern sector.
131  
 
      By April 1920, Piłsudski sincerely believed that the Poles held the decisive military 
cards in their hands. As his friend, de Wiart, recorded, 
…having taken  Kieff he admitted to feeling  uneasy, for he told me  that 
every commander who had attempted to take the Ukraine had come to grief. 
I asked why he had attempted to take it against his superstitions. His answer 
was that he had felt his luck stood so high that he thought he could risk it.
132 
 
However, Piłsudski had admitted to the British M.P., Sir Hugh MacKinder, in December 
1919 that his intention was not to invade ethnographic Russia. Although, “...it was his 
opinion as a General that he could march to Moscow next May”, as a politician, he added, 
“what could I do when I got there?”
133 A Polish occupation of the Russian capital would 
quickly hand the initiative to the Red Army as Russians, of all political persuasions, would 
unite against the Polish occupiers. 
 
      Finally, the Ukrainian lands were of great economic value to both Poland and Russia. 
Rich in natural resources, in particular grain, control of Ukraine, strategically situated on 
the Black Sea coast, would help both to secure their future economic stability and state 
reconstruction.
134  Combined  with  the  Soviet  regime’s  vision  of  Ukraine  as  a  socialist 
bridge to south-western Europe, these goals set the two states ideologically, politically and 
economically, on a collision course. 
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      The importance of the battle which followed cannot be underestimated. It transformed 
the Polish-Soviet War in both scale and intensity, and had serious implications for the 
protagonists. The onset of the Polish offensive has been accorded a variety of dates by 
contemporaries.
135  Four  days  after  the  signing  of  the  Piłsudski-Petlura  agreement,  the 
advance commenced and on the following day, 26 April, Polish forces secured Zhitomir, 
Korostein’ and Radomisl.
136 This was the first time that Piłsudski led his army as Marshal 
of Poland and his confidence was fueled by the rapid progress of the Polish Army. He 
wrote from Rowno, on 1 May, 
Well,  I  have  taken  the  first  plunge...  I  am  preparing  the  second….  If  it 
proves as effective as the first, the whole Bolshevik Army will be crushed. I 
have  made  prisoners  of  nearly  half  their  force,  and  taken  a  quantity  of 
material  at  the  base.  The  remainder  of  their  army  are  for  the  most  part 
demoralized and dispersed. My own loss has been extraordinarily small. On 
the whole front it amounts to only 150 killed and 300 wounded.
137  
 
This initial confidence was not misplaced. Following the evacuation of Kiev by the Red 
Army, the Polish Army entered the undefended city on 7 May and, largely unhindered, 
occupied almost all Ukrainian territory up to the right bank of the River Dnieper.
138 
 
      Soviet  consternation  at  the  Polish  occupation  of  Kiev  was  quickly  replaced  by 
optimism.  The  potential  for  increased  support  within  Russia,  sympathy  from  the 
international  community  and  an  intensification  of  the  propaganda  drive  soon  became 
evident  to  the  regime.
139  For  the  first  time  in  the  war,  Soviet  agit-prop  officially  and 
directly petitioned Russian nationalist sentiment for support of the war effort.
140 On 29 
April,  the  RKP(b)  CEC  issued  an  Appeal  to  All  Workers,  Peasants  and  Members  of 
Russian Society, to defend Soviet Ukraine, whilst the Commissar for War directly called 
for  the  support  of  Russian  patriots  and  nationalists  in  a  proclamation  entitled  To  all 
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Workers, Peasants and Honourable Citizens.
141 In this he advocated, “…the peace that the 
Polish landlords and capitalists want to bring to you on their bayonets, means complete 
enslavement not only of Lithuanian and Belorussian, but also of the Ukrainian workers and 
peasants, and of millions of purely Russian people”.
142  
 
      The nation responded by rallying to the defence of Russia: conservatives, liberals and 
socialists alike. The approach of the Polish Army towards ethnographic Russia transformed 
the war, for the majority of the population, into a national war, against a foreign adversary. 
For instance, the former Tsarist General, A.A. Brusilov, wrote on 1 May 1920 expressing 
fear of, “...how wide the Polish offensive will be which wishes to capture all the land 
which comprised the Polish kingdom until 1772, and perhaps will not limit itself to only 
this”.
143 Polish actions aroused Russian patriotism and as noted by Trotsky, “The capture 
of Kiev by the Poles, in itself devoid of any military significance, did us a great service; it 
awakened the country”.
144  
  
     A sustained, well-organised Soviet response was required. In a “Top Secret” telegram 
sent  by  Trotsky,  on  26  April  1920,  to  Lenin,  Stalin,  DzierŜyński,  Kamenev  and 
Serebriakov
 he argued that, 
The situation in Ukraine demands the most serious attention...  as well as 
military  measures,  extensive  ideological  measures  are  necessary.  A  very 
considerable  number  of  local  political  workers  must  be  transferred  to 
Ukraine at once. It is equally essential that staunch political workers from 
departments at the centre should be seconded there for duty.
145 
 
The previous day, the Politburo had requested that Trotsky define the RKP(b)’s response 
to the offensive and as a result, he penned a 16-point theses, The Polish Front and Our 
Tasks, on 30 April 1920.
146 This document stressed both the class and international nature 
of the war (points 1-5, 8-9), reflected his optimism regarding the Polish workers’ and 
peasants’ support for communism (point 8), and the extreme importance of the conflict for 
Soviet Russia by April 1920 (points 7, 10). It was now essential that the whole of Soviet 
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Russia be directed towards supporting the war effort (points 13-16) and that immediate 
tasks in the agit-prop sphere (point 11), and the economy (point 12), be carried out.
147  
 
      The  regime  further  utilised  the  Polish  occupation  of  Kiev  to  pursue  its  stated 
diplomatic  agenda  of  dividing  Poland  from  the  Entente.  Accordingly,  on  19  May,  a 
telegram was dispatched to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United 
States of America, regarding the unjust Polish attack on Ukraine.
148 The Soviet cause, 
thereafter, gained considerable sympathy amongst the political left in the West.
149 
 
      In Poland, in contrast, many warmly greeted Piłsudski’s occupation of Kiev, with the 
Sejm telegramming the Marshal that, “The news of the brilliant victory... fills the whole 
nation  with  joyful  pride”.
150  Dissenting  voices  were,  however,  heard.  The  National 
Democrats were “...sincerely opposed to Piłsudski’s offensive against Kiev”.
151 The KPRP 
condemned the Polish initiative outright and resolved, “...to explain to the wide masses, 
that in the interests of the working people, then all men must give their energy to secure 
Soviet Russia and Ukraine from Poland and world imperialism”.
152 Furthermore, the PPS 
issued  a  Manifesto  opposing  the  occupation  of  Kiev  as  it  presented  a  direct  threat  to 
Ukraine’s right to independence.
153   
 
      In turn, the majority of the Ukrainian population failed to respond to Petlura’s appeals 
to join the Polish Army in its fight against Soviet Russia and those who did were badly 
equipped.
154  Most  reacted  to  the  Poles  with  neither  enthusiastic  support  nor  hostile 
opposition. This had devastating implications for the continued Polish offensive in May 
1920. Ukrainian nationalism was both anti-Russian and anti-Polish, and according to one 
observer, Lord Derby at the British Embassy in Berlin, “...the Ukrainian peasants hated 
whatever Government was in power, and considered any form of compulsion or control 
intolerable”.
155 
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      Finally, the Polish offensive met with a mixed response from the Allied Governments. 
King George V of Britain sent a message to the Poles and Piłsudski, on 10 May, with his 
congratulations and good wishes for the reestablished Polish state.
156 Rumbold praised the 
Polish Army for achieving a victory over Soviet Russia, which the Allies had, themselves, 
failed to achieve through intervention in the Russian Civil War. He informed Curzon, “The 
Poles… in defending their own country have undoubtedly protected Central Europe.... The 
Poles have therefore rendered real services to Europe as a whole in the struggle against 
Bolshevism”.
157  This  interpretation  was  echoed  by  Colonel  Willey  during  a  British 
Parliamentary debate on 26 May 1920, when he stated that, 
...Poland succeeded with hardly any assistance from outside in re-occupying 
lost territory and advancing as far as was necessary for the strategic safety of 
the State. Everywhere the Polish Army was welcomed as liberators of the 
oppressed populations and at every opportunity the Polish Chief of State and 
Government  openly  proclaimed  that  they  had  no  imperialistic  aims.  The 
entire nation backed the efforts of the Polish military.
158 
 
      Nevertheless, Piłsudski’s presentation of another fait accompli to the Allies was badly 
resented and lost the Poles much international goodwill. Following the occupation of Kiev, 
Lloyd George warned that, “Unless the Poles are careful they will revive and intensify the 
spirit of Russian nationalism.... The Poles are inclined to be arrogant and they will have to 
take  care  that  they  don’t  get  their  heads  punched”.
159  Indeed,  so  deep-seated  was  the 
hostility of the British public to the Polish advance, that Bonar Law was forced to provide 
A Ministerial Assurance, on 13 May 1920, that the British Government had had no prior 
knowledge of Piłsudski’s plans for the offensive and that Britain had not provided any 
equipment for this purpose.
160 The aftershock of the Kiev offensive was felt not only in 
Ukraine, but had ramifications for Poland, Russia and the wider international community.   
 
5. The Soviet Counter-Offensive: May-July 1920 
 
      The  Soviet  military  responded  quickly.  On  28  April  1920,  General  Mikhail 
Tukhachevsky, fresh from victory over Denikin, was appointed Western Front Commander 
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and given the task of leading the Soviet counter-offensive. On 14 May, the Red Army 
attack towards Belorussia, commenced.
161 Ciechanowski later argued, 
It is generally supposed that the last Polish offensive (Kieff) caused, as a 
reaction,  the  Bolshevik  offensive....  This  view  is  incorrect….  the  Soviet 
offensive  was  launched  seven  days  after  the  Poles  had  taken  Kieff… 
conducted by troops freshly brought from the eastern confines of Russia and 
the  Caucasus...  these  reasons  alone  prove  sufficiently  that  the  Russian 
offensive had been planned and prepared carefully for a very long time.
162  
 
Plans to prepare a strike force for advance into Galicia certainly had been prepared by the 
Soviet leadership prior to Piłsudski’s April offensive. In a secret, coded telegram sent by 
Lenin to Stalin on 14 February 1920, the Soviet leader requested that the latter, “Advise 
more precisely what measures you propose for the creation of a Galician striking force…. 
Our diplomacy ought to… keep silent about Galicia”.
163 Indeed, the need to formulate 
plans  for  a  military  offensive  against  Poland  had  been  recognised  by  the  Soviet 
Government as early as January 1920.
164 
 
      On 26 May, Piłsudski issued a proclamation To all the Inhabitants of the Ukraine, 
reassuring that the Polish Army had advanced into Ukrainian territory solely to defend the 
native population against the Soviet occupiers. He announced, 
Polish  troops  will  remain  in  the  Ukraine  only  until  such  time  as  it  is 
necessary for a legitimate Ukrainian Government to be formed and set to 
work. As soon as the future of the Ukrainian state is assured… the Polish 
troops will retire, having fulfilled their glorious duty as liberators of the 
people.
165 
 
The proclamation met with instant derision in Soviet Russia. Trotsky denounced it as a 
“...foxy manifesto”, issued by “...a savage wolf”.
166 Chicherin believed it to demonstrate 
the Poles’ “...boundless imperialistic outlook” whilst Lenin argued that, “...it is tantamount 
to Poland’s declaration of war on Ukraine”.
167  
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      The  Soviet  counter-offensive  on  the  South-Western  Front,  led  by  A.I.  Egorov  and 
spearheaded by the Soviet cavalry of Budiennyi, was launched on the very same day, 26 
May  1920.  By  10  June,  the  Poles  had  evacuated  Kiev.
168  An  Official  Polish  Military 
Communiqué glossed over this retreat, reporting, 
In the Ukraine we have evacuated Kieff after destroying the bridges on the 
Dnieper.  Our  regroupment  is  proceeding  in  the  fullest  order....  The 
Bolshevists  have  suffered  enormous  losses.  Ammunition  and  large 
quantities of war material were captured.
169 
 
In reality, however, this was the prelude to a Polish Army retreat along the entire front.
170  
      The controlled Polish withdrawal was soon overwhelmed, when on 4 July the Red 
Army launched a counter-offensive which it had been actively planning since 10 March 
1920.
171 For the next six weeks, the Polish military situation deteriorated as the Soviet 
regime’s  first  campaign  on  foreign  territory  proceeded  rapidly.  Separated  by  the 
impassable Pripet Marshes, the Soviet forces advanced on two fronts: the Soviet Western 
Front,  under  Tukhachevsky,  moved  into  Belorussia  and  Lithuania;  the  South-Western 
Front, under Egorov, headed towards Lwów.
172  
 
      On 7 July, the Polish General Staff reported that the Soviets’ were advancing along the 
entire  front  from  the  Dwina  to  the  Dniester  Rivers.
173  Four  days  later,  Soviet  troops 
captured the Belorussian capital, Minsk. The signing of a Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty, on 12 
July 1920, handed Polish-claimed Wilno, Grodno and Suwałki to Lithuania and, by secret 
protocol, allowed the Red Army to pass unhindered through Lithuanian territory on its way 
to Poland, further strengthening the Soviet position. Time was of the essence and on 17 
July 1920, the Politburo decreed that the military cross the ethnographic Polish border.
174 
 
      The importance of this decision cannot be underestimated. Indeed, it may be regarded, 
along with the Polish rout of the Red Army at Warsaw in August, as the pivotal turning 
point in the conflict, representing as it did a major ideological shift by the Soviet regime. 
Marx’s doctrine that socialist revolution must be the work of a nation’s own proletariat had 
previously governed the Soviet leaders’ actions and it was to this end that their pursuit of 
open, people’s diplomacy, in combination with a well-planned agit-prop offensive, were 
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directed prior to July 1920. Abandonment of this ideological tenet in July 1920 proved 
fatal.  
 
      What drove the Soviet regime to adopt such a risky strategy in July? What was the 
motivation? It can, firstly, be argued that the Soviet counter-offensive provided a welcome 
deflection  from  the  desperate  Russian  domestic  situation,  stemming  from  four  years 
fighting in the Great War, two domestic revolutions, and three years consumed by civil 
war. The new policy firmly directed the political focus outwards. 
  
      Of far greater importance for the regime, though, was the fact that if successful, the 
Polish  campaign  would  not  only  secure  Soviet  authority  in  Russia,  but  would  spread 
socialist revolution westwards and provide a viable international alternative to capitalism. 
This was a risk which they were willing to take. As Marxists, the Soviet leadership was 
adamant that the revolution had to spread to the more advanced countries of western and 
central Europe if it was to seriously challenge capitalism on a worldwide scale. Lenin 
believed that, “Poland, as the buffer between Russia and Germany… is the fulcrum of the 
entire Versailles treaty”.
175 Removing the Polish nation from the capitalist system would, 
thus, be the first step in overthrowing the Paris Peace settlement in Europe.
176 As a result, 
Poland could not simply be neutralised as an opponent, but must be sovietised in order to 
actively support the Soviet advance into Western Europe, in 1920. This would draw Poland 
within the Soviet federation of states, secure Russia’s western frontier and assist in the 
settlement of the volatile kresy region. 
 
      This conviction was shared by his colleagues. Trotsky’s belief in revolutionary war 
remained unshaken prior to July 1920 arguing, “...there can be no room for doubt as to the 
outcome of the impending conflict…. The Polish proletariat will transform their country 
into a socialist republic”.
177 Karol Radek agreed on 4 May 1920 that, “If white guard 
Poland cannot exist side by side with Soviet Russia, then a Soviet Poland will”, whilst on 
13  July  1920,  L.B.  Kamenev,  a  Politburo  member,  commented  that  the  only  possible 
guarantee of avoiding a future war was the “sovietisation of Poland”.
178 The RKP(b), thus, 
hoped that the Red Army advance four days later would act as a catalyst for a Polish 
workers and peasants-led socialist revolution.  
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      Furthermore, Poland’s geo-strategic position at the heart of central-eastern Europe was 
a vital component in Soviet Russia’s designs on the country in July 1920. The Polish 
nation had the potential to either exist as a bridge, over which communism could spread to 
the rest of Europe, or as a barrier, capable of preventing its development.
179 The RKP(b) 
determined that the former position would prevail, and directed their policy accordingly. 
Poland  would  provide  two  paths  along  which  the  socialist  revolution  could  march  to 
Germany in the west and to Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia in the south-west.
180 
As early as 30 October 1918, Trotsky had identified the importance of Poland to this plan 
stating, 
Free Latvia, free Poland and Lithuania, free Finland, and on the other side 
free Ukraine will not be a wedge but a uniting link between Soviet Russia 
and the future Soviet Germany and Austria-Hungary. This is the beginning 
of a European communist federation – a union of the proletarian republics of 
Europe.
181 
  
     First of all, Germany as one of the most industrially advanced nations in Europe, in July 
1920, was pivotal to the Russian revolution’s chances of survival. According to Trotsky, 
“If it were necessary for us to go under to assure the success of the German revolution, we 
should have to do it. The German revolution is vastly more important than ours”.
182 In 
1919 there was good cause for believing that Germany was ripe for revolution and could 
act as a potential base from which to spread socialist ideology throughout Europe.
183 At the 
9
th Party Congress, Lenin gave a clear indication of the importance of Germany to Soviet 
policy, saying, 
The approach of our troops to the borders of eastern Prussia… showed that 
all Germany was seething. News began to come out that tens and hundreds 
of  thousands  of  German  communists  were  crossing  our  borders,  and 
telegrams flew [from] German communist regiments.
184  
 
      Secondly, the newly established states of Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia in 
south and south-east Europe, following the trauma of the Great War, were also deemed to 
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be ready to welcome socialist revolution.
185 On 13 July 1920, Kamenev stated that Soviet 
control  of Eastern Galicia was essential  to provide,  “...a gateway  to Hungary”  and an 
alternative route to Poland.
186 By the time the Politburo resolved to cross into ethnographic 
Poland, Lenin was convinced that the revolution should not only target Germany, but also 
the  countries  in  south-west  Europe.  Six  days  after  the  decisive  17  July  meeting  he 
telegrammed Stalin, 
The situation in the Comintern is splendid. Zinoviev, Bukharin, and I, too, 
think that revolution in Italy should be spurred on immediately. My personal 
opinion is that to this end, Hungary should be sovietised, and perhaps also 
Czechia and Romania.
187 
 
He  later  acknowledged  the  great  significance  of  this  decision  in  his  secret  speech  of 
September 1920, when he stated, 
We  understand  perfectly  well  that  the  stakes  are  high,  that…  in  taking 
Galicia,  where  Soviet  rule  is  assured  [and]  which  has  a  connection  to 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where things are seething – by doing this – 
we are opening a direct road for revolution. This is worth fighting for; such 
a fact cannot be scorned.
188 
  
These coveted objectives of the Soviet political élite  were mirrored  by the Red  Army 
leadership,  entrusted  with  conducting  the  offensive  against  Poland.  Tukhachevsky, 
Western Front Commander argued, 
There is not the slightest doubt that, if we had succeeded in breaking the 
Polish Army of bourgeois and seigneurs, the revolution of the working class 
in Poland would have been an accomplished fact. And the tempest would 
not have stopped at the Polish frontier. Like a furious torrent it would have 
swept over the whole of Eastern Europe.
189 
 
      Soviet  Russia’s  aims,  by  July  1920,  were  also  clearly  recognised  by  the  Poles. 
Piłsudski acknowledged their plan to sovietise Poland stating, 
...it is an indisputable fact…that in making war on us, Soviet Russia was 
conforming  to  a  set  plan,  namely,  the  plan  of  setting  up  in  Poland  an 
organisation  identical  with  its  own,  that  is  to  say,  a  Soviet  one.  This 
objective was christened “Exporting the Revolution”. It was well-known to 
me that this was the war aim of the Soviets.
190 
 
He  further  recognised  that,  despite  public  protestations  of  the  Soviet  leaders  to  the 
contrary, the regime was willing to utilise the Red Army to spread this ideology to Poland: 
                                                
185 For a fuller examination see, Chapter 5: Was International Revolution Possible? 
186 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 70, p. 134.   
187 R. Pipes, Unknown Lenin, doc. 54, p. 90. 
188 Ibid, doc. 59, p. 110. 
189 M.N. Tukhachevsky, “Pokhod za Vislu”, in Izbrannye proizvedeniia, vol. 1, (Moscow, 1964), p. 167. 
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as “...the revolution did not exist in Poland… it was necessary to impose it on us at the 
point of the bayonet”.
191 The Poles also recognised the second crucial Soviet objective of 
using the Polish nation as a land link with the West. As early as 1919, the Polish Council 
of National Defence issued a proclamation which stated that, “...the Soviet Armies took 
Lithuania and threatened to march on Warsaw through the Polish corridor to the German 
frontier and then through Germany on to the Rhine”.
192 
 
      Thus, when the Red Army entered into ethnographic Poland on 23 July it quite simply, 
and irreversibly, altered the complexion of the war.
193 For the majority of Bolsheviks, 
carried away by the rapid Soviet advance and in direct contradiction of Marxist teachings, 
it was now deemed acceptable to utilise the Red Army to bring socialist revolution to 
Poland. The most tacit recognition of this crucial change in policy was made by Lenin at 
the closed session of the 9
th Party Congress on 22 September 1920, when he stated, 
We decided to use our military forces to assist the sovietisation of Poland. 
Our subsequent overall policy followed from this. We formulated it not in 
an official resolution in the minutes of the CC representing the law for the 
party and the new congress, but we  said among ourselves that we must 
probe  with  bayonets  whether  the  social  revolution  of  the  proletariat  in 
Poland had ripened.
194 
 
Ultimately, this error of judgement was responsible for the unprecedented defeat for the 
Red Army before the gates of Warsaw the following month. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
      The first half of 1920, therefore, witnessed a dramatic reversal in the fortunes of the 
protagonists: an initial Polish stronghold in the kresy, secured by the military, culminated 
in the occupation of Kiev, before a strengthened Soviet counter-offensive threw the Polish 
Army back ever westwards from early May onwards.  
 
      Piłsudski clearly overestimated the strength of the Polish Armed Forces, overstretched 
his  troops  and  underestimated  the  resources  of  the  Red  Army.  He  was  also  guilty  of 
misinterpreting Ukrainian support  for both Petlura  and the Polish  offensive, neither  of 
                                                
191 Ibid.  This was an uncanny turn of phrase, mirroring as it did almost exactly Lenin’s secret admission to 
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th Party Congress in September 1920. 
192 Piłsudski Institute, kolekcja 23/2/8, p. 86.   
193 The Soviet Command approved a plan on 23 July, to capture Warsaw by 12 August, Z. Musiałik, General 
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which were forthcoming. The Soviet counter-offensive made it impossible for Poles to 
present  the  peace  terms  prepared  in  March  1920,  closing  the  door  on  diplomacy.  In 
contrast,  support  in  Russia  for  the  Soviet  regime  reached  an  all-time  high  as  Russian 
nationalism entered the equation for the first time during the war.
195   
 
     The failed Polish offensive had lasting repercussions in Poland as the state was brought 
close to collapse.
196 Skulski’s Government was forced to resign and a lengthy cabinet crisis 
ensued.  Indeed,  when  the  Polish  Diet  met  on  20  and  21  January  1921,  the  National 
Democratic  Party,  Witos’  Peasant  Party  and  the  Polish  Socialists  demanded  that  an 
investigation be held into the Kiev débâcle of the previous summer, to establish, 
1) How it happened that the advance to Kieff was carried out in defiance of 
the  will  of  the  Diet,  the  Government  and  the  Allies  and  who  was 
responsible?  
2)  Why  military  preparations  for  the  undertaking  were  inadequate  from 
every point of view?
197  
 
The situation was critical.
198  On the battlefield, the Poles continued to be thrown back and 
the first day of August saw Brest-Litovsk fall to the Red Army. Piłsudski had lost control 
of all territory acquired by his troops the previous year.
199 
 
      Soviet forces stood at the River Bug, poised to enter ethnographic Polish territory. 
Debates  had  raged  in  the  Politburo  over  the  desirability  of  crossing  this  line,  but  the 
eventual outcome was unequivocal: proceed to Warsaw. The Soviet regime was convinced 
that, “To export revolution was a possibility”.
200 So confident was the RKP(b) that the 
Polish workers and peasants would rise up to welcome the advancing Red Army, that it 
supported  the  establishment  of  a  Polish  Provisional  Revolutionary  Committee 
(Polrevkom),  earmarked  as  the  first  Soviet  Polish  Government,  on  30  July  1920  in 
Białystok.
201 The stage was being prepared for the battle of Warsaw, the outcome of which 
had lasting repercussions, not only  for the belligerents,  but for the entire international 
community.  
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Chapter 4: The Polish Provisional Revolutionary Committee 
 
      The  Polish  Provisional  Revolutionary  Committee  (Polrevkom),  established  by  the 
advancing Soviet authorities in the Polish town of Białystok, in July 1920, at the height of 
the Polish-Soviet War, was one of the most significant events of the conflict and yet its 
origin, objectives and activities remain little studied by historians.
1 The importance of the 
Polrevkom cannot, however, be underestimated. If the Polish-Soviet War formed part of 
the  Bolsheviks  earliest  venture  to  export  revolution  by  military  force  westwards,  the 
Polrevkom was their first attempt to establish a Socialist Soviet Republic on ethnographic 
Polish territory. Consequently, it was to have lasting implications for the development of 
Soviet ideology, the development of the Polish State and the evolution of relations between 
the two neighbouring states. 
 
      Traditionally,  and  for  obvious  reasons,  many  Polish  and  Russian  historians  have 
consciously overlooked the workings of the Polrevkom.  For the majority of Poles it was, 
and continues to be, regarded as an alien institution, imposed by a foreign invader, worthy 
of little attention and meriting no credit.
2 In turn, Soviet historians primarily wished to 
avoid raising difficult questions, such as why did this Soviet organisation fail to gain the 
support of the majority of Poles?  Why did it last for only twenty-three days?  Why was its 
fate so closely bound up with the Red Army’s defeat at the gates of Warsaw in August 
1920?
3  Nevertheless,  over  the  years,  intermittent  interest  in  the  subject  developed  in 
Poland  and  Russia,  especially  amongst  those who  sympathised  with  the  organisation’s 
objectives.
4 Much information can also be found in the writings of its members.
5  
 
      However,  it  is  the  opening  of  the  Russian  archives,  in  particular,  the  Rossisskii 
gosudarstvenii  arkhiv  sotsialno-politicheskoi  istorii  (RGASPI)  in  Moscow,  after  the 
                                                
1  In  Polish,  Tymczasowy  Komitet  Rewolucyjny  Polski;  in  Russian,  Pol’skii  Vremennyi  Revoliutsionnyi 
Komitet. 
2 See, for instance, T. Teslar, Polityka Rosji Sowieckiej podczas Wojny z Polską: trzy momenty, (Warsaw, 
1937).   
3  For  a  traditional  Soviet  interpretation  of  the  Polrevkom  and  its  activities  see,  Istoriia  Pol’shi,  vol.  3, 
(Moscow, 1955), pp. 136-143. 
4  The  most  valuable  are,  A.  Litwin,  Tymczasowy  Komitet  Rewolucyjny  Polski,  (Warsaw,  1955);  P. 
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rodnym, (Moscow, 1958); F.E. DzierŜyński, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, vol. 1, (Moscow, 1977); F. Kon, Feliks 
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collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 which has permitted the present reevaluation. This 
holds especially important fondy relating to the work of the Polrevkom, the Polish Bureau 
of the CC RKP(b) and the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Workers’ Party 
of Poland (CEC KPRP). These sources have been supplemented, in the present work, by 
the extremely rich archival collections of the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, the 
Piłsudski  Institute  and  The  National  Archives  in  London,  and  have  facilitated  a 
reinterpretation  of  the  role  of  the  Polrevkom.  In  particular,  the  establishment  of  the 
organization, the choice of Białystok as its location and the involvement of the Central 
Committee of the RKP(b), shall be discussed. New light is shed on Polrevkom objectives 
and  on  its  immediate  tasks,  most  notably  regarding  industry  and  agriculture.  Heavily 
involved  in  disseminating  Soviet  ideology  through  propaganda,  it  issued  enormously 
diverse  appeals,  covering  socio-economic,  political,  cultural  and  military  issues  and 
targeted a wide social range, including Polish workers, peasants, soldiers, Red Army men, 
and the international community. Public sentiment and the reception of the Polrevkom by 
the inhabitants of Poland proved crucial to its survival, with the archives, finally, providing 
information about its fate and what its lasting consequences were for Bolshevik, Polish and 
international politics. 
     
1. Establishment of the Polrevkom 
 
      The need to establish an organisation to direct the sovietisation of Poland and lead a 
socialist revolution in the country had long been recognised by Polish communists. As 
early as 15 January 1919, the CEC KPRP wrote to the CC RKP(b) that the future advance 
of the Soviet army onto Polish territory, would be impossible, “...without a whole series of 
political acts… the transfer of the leadership of the movement against the Polish bourgeois 
government,  must  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  an  organisation  created  by  the  Polish 
revolutionary  proletariat”.
6  However,  the  military  situation  throughout  1919,  when  the 
Polish Army held the initiative, and in the first half of 1920, when the Red Army was 
advancing on non-Polish territory, prevented any such action being taken. Only after the 
Politburo ordered the Soviet Army, under the command of Western Front Commander, 
M.N. Tukhachevsky, on 17 July 1920, to cross into ethnographic Polish territory, could the 
question  of  establishing  a  Bureau  to  lead  communist  party  work  in  occupied  Polish 
territory, again be raised. 
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      In  direct  response  to  this  military  order,  Polish  communists  met  in  Moscow  the 
following  day  to  discuss  the  mobilization  of  all  Polish  communists  residing  in  Soviet 
Russia for the imminent entry of the Red Army onto Polish territory.
7 Feliks DzierŜyński 
proposed that the CC RKP(b), “… create an organ which would direct all preparatory 
work, allocate mobilised comrades, draw up instructions and plans of action”.
8 As a result, 
the  RKP(b)  Orgburo  meeting  on  19  July  1920,  at  which  Krestinskii,  DzierŜyński, 
Aleksdandrov,  Próchniak  and  Al’sky  were  present,  endorsed  the  Polish  communists 
initiative, “To nominate a Special Bureau of RKP(b) for leadership of party work in those 
localities  of  Poland,  which  will  be  strategic  considerations  for  occupation  by  the  Red 
Army”.
9 Its membership was confirmed as including the well-known Polish communists 
Julian  Marchlewski,  Feliks  Kon,  Eduard  Próchniak  and  Józef  Unszlicht,  under  the 
chairmanship of Feliks DzierŜyński.
10 Two days later, the Orgburo officially registered the 
group’s name as the “Polish Bureau CC RKP(b)” (Pol’bureau) and formally received a 
request from DzierŜyński, on its behalf, for financial assistance.
11 In recognition of the 
envisaged  role  it  would play in  the  sovietisation  of Poland, the Orgburo allocated the 
substantial sum of 10 million roubles to the Pol’bureau for its work.
12 
 
      The Bureau’s ultimate objective was, like that of the Russian Communist Party, to 
establish  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  through  the  creation  of  a  Polish  Soviet 
Government and a Socialist Republic.
13 It acknowledged, however, that before this goal 
could be attained it had to provide responsible leadership to guide and direct events.
14 The 
large Pol’bureau CC RKP(b) fondy in RGASPI provide an excellent indication of the wide-
ranging tasks with which the Bureau was involved. These included implementing Soviet 
ideology in Polish territory occupied by the Red Army; conducting agitational-propaganda 
(agit-prop)  amongst  the  local  population;  carrying  out  cultural-educational  work, 
especially amongst Polish youths and women; developing relationships with communist 
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organisations in the borderlands; establishing ties with the KPRP, and looking after Soviet 
prisoners of war interned in Poland.
15 
 
      However,  the  most  critical  of  all  Pol’bureau  tasks  was  its  establishment  of  the 
Polrevkom, resolving on 29 July 1920, that, 
...the Bureau will appear as a Provisional Revolutionary Committee, will 
issue a manifesto to the workers, explaining the motives for the Red Army’s 
entry...  will  establish  local  revolutionary  committees  and  lead  all 
organisational  and  political  work....  The  Revolutionary  Committee  will 
proclaim the Polish Socialist Republic of Soviets.
16 
 
This document clearly demonstrates that it was the Pol’bureau, not the CC RKP(b), which 
was  responsible  for  its  establishment,  and  for  defining  its  programme.  It  was  not,  as 
suggested by Soviet historians, created by a popular, spontaneous workers’ movement.
17 
Neither, however, was it established directly on the initiative of Lenin, despite assertions 
that, 
...simultaneously with the resolution to continue the pursuit of the Polish 
Army on its own territory, arose the question about the Red Army giving 
help  to  the  Polish  workers  through  the  establishment  by  them  of 
revolutionary  authority  in  Poland....  Lenin  had  an  idea  about  a  new 
authority in Poland.
18 
 
 
      Instead,  the  initiative  lay  with  the  Polish  Communists.  The  establishment  of  the 
Polrevkom allowed the RKP(b) to, “...probe with bayonets whether the social revolution of 
the proletariat had ripened”, but the Soviet regime in Moscow was neither initially, nor 
directly, responsible for its formation.
19 Indeed, the decision to form the Polrevkom was 
taken  quickly,  without  a  great  deal  of  advance  planning  by  the  Polish  communists.
20 
Nevertheless, in line with RKP(b) thinking, they did regard it, primarily, as a means of 
implementing Soviet ideology in Poland.  
  
      The  Polish  town  of  Białystok,  occupied  by  Red  Army  troops  on  28  July  1920, 
witnessed the establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland two 
days later. Its Manifesto, published the same day, announced that,  
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In  the  territory  of  Poland, freed from  the  yoke  of  capital, a  Provisional 
Revolutionary Committee of Poland has been established, the membership 
of which is composed of comrades Julian Marchlewski, Feliks DzierŜyński, 
Feliks Kon, Eduard Próchniak and Józef Unszlicht.
21 
 
The  RKP(b)  newspaper,  Pravda,  also  published  the  membership  list.
22  The  Politburo 
further  resolved  on  10  August,  “To  include  in  the  Polish  Bureau  CC  and  Polrevkom, 
comrade Radek”.
23  Its composition was, thus, well known in both Poland and Russia.   
 
      Confusion  existed,  however,  over  the  exact  date  of  the  Polrevkom’s  formation.  A 
telegram sent by Próchniak, on behalf of the Pol’bureau, to Pravda, reported on 31 July, 
“Today in Białystok was organised a Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland”.
24 
That this was clearly a mistake was verified by a telegram from DzierŜyński, which stated, 
“Transmit  to  Lenin:  the  manifesto  and  notification  of  the  creation  of  the  Polrevkom, 
printed with the date 30, town Belostok”.
25 Yet, on 30 July many of its members were not 
yet resident in Białystok. On 3 August 1920, S. Budkevich, a military commissar on the 
Soviet  Western  Front,  reported  that  Marchlewski  remained  in  Grodno  or  Białystok, 
Próchniak was in Vilnius and DzierŜyński had arrived from Grodno only that day.
26 In fact, 
the Committee first met on 24 July in Smolensk, moving by train via Minsk on 25 July and 
Vilnius on 27 July, before finally arriving in Białystok three days later.
27  
 
      As  both  the  Soviet  leaders  and  Pol’bureau  were  keen  to  stress  the  Committee’s 
independence from the Russian regime, thereby improving its credibility with the Polish 
population, Julian Marchlewski was appointed by the Pol’buro as titular Chairman of the 
Polrevkom on 23 July 1920.
28 Crucially, Marchlewski was not a member of the RKP(b). In 
contrast, DzierŜyński, its real guiding influence, was not only Chairman of the Pol’bureau, 
but was also the highest ranking Pole in the Soviet Government, a RKP(b) CC member, 
and the feared head of the Cheka.
29  
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      In a further attempt to strengthen its credentials, the Polrevkom comprised only Polish 
communists, and stressed in an appeal To Legionaries, on 1 August, 
Our  names  are  well-known  as  we  have  worked  for  long  years  for  the 
emancipation  of  the  working  classes...  our  names  form  a  sufficient 
guarantee for  you, to be  elected by  you and the Councils of Workmen, 
Peasants  and  Soldiers’  Delegates  as  a  permanent  revolutionary 
Government.
30 
 
The Committee was only too aware that the Polish population could potentially view the 
Red Army as foreign aggressors, little different from the Tsarist armies which had invaded 
their  homeland  in  the  past.  As  a  result,  its  leaders  were  careful  to  stress  their  Polish 
nationality. 
 
      Why then was Białystok viewed as, “The Provisional revolutionary capital of workers-
peasants Poland”?
31 As one of the first large towns occupied by the Red Army after it 
crossed the ethnographic Polish border, Białystok was an ideal location for the Polrevkom. 
It  was  essential  that  the  Committee  be  established  on  recognised  Polish  territory  to 
strengthen its assertion that it was not a Russian puppet, but a genuine Polish organisation. 
Furthermore, although Marchlewski had recognised on 14 July 1920, that the Białystok 
regional uezdy contained a population which was largely backward and agrarian, “Catholic 
and strongly Polonised”, Białystok itself contained a large Jewish population which was, as 
a traditional opponent of Polish Roman Catholic rule, more supportive of a Soviet-style 
regime than the majority of Poles.
32 Under the Russian Tsars, a Jewish Pale had been 
created from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south, roughly following 
the frontier of the old Polish Kingdom, within which the majority of Jews were compelled 
to reside. This provided the Polrevkom with a good support base in the town, but almost 
certainly gave it a false sense of the support it could expect to receive throughout Poland. 
 
      Białystok  was  also  a  large  industrialised  centre,  crucial  to  Bolshevik  plans,  as  the 
sovietisation of Poland required to be carried through by the local urban working class.
33 
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101.   
33 Białystok, with a population of 50,000, was the industrial centre of the country prior to November 1918, 
N.P. Vakar, Belorussia: the making of a nation, (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 43. Fischer incorrectly asserts 
that failure to establish a Polish Soviet Government in 1920 was partly due to the Red Army’s inability to   140 
As a result, DzierŜyński was delighted to report on 5 August that, “In the Belostok region 
all industry (textile, tanning, chemical, woodworking) remain intact…. There are 19,000 
workers.  The  mood  of  the  meetings  is  excellent”.
34  Finally,  there  already  existed 
considerable support for a socialist Polish republic in Białystok, upon which the Polrevkom 
could build. The Neue Lodzer Zeitung reported on 9 September 1920, that the PPS in 
Białystok  had  already  accepted  the  principles  of  the  Third  International  (Comintern), 
breaking to the left from the main PPS.
35 Indeed, cooperation between the Polrevkom and 
local grass-root communist organisations had been one of the Polish Bureau’s immediate 
wishes,  recording  on  29  July  1920,  “We  hope  that  we  shall  meet…  with  crucial 
representatives of party organisations and we shall negotiate with them concerning the 
future steps for soviet work”.
36 Crucially, when the Red Army entered the town on 28 July, 
there existed a local military revolutionary committee, organised largely by the local KPRP 
group,  and  it  was  hoped  that  this  would  provide  much  needed  support  to  the  infant 
Provisional  Revolutionary  Committee.
37  Consequently,  the  Polrevkom  was  established, 
without opposition, on 30 July in the Branicki Palace, Białystok. 
 
2. Aims and Objectives of the Committee 
 
      The Polish Bureau entrusted Marchlewski, on 25 July, with the task of preparing the 
Manifesto of the Polrevkom, to be published five days later.
38 In this document the Polish 
Provisional Revolutionary Committee stated their agenda for the occupied Polish regions, 
clearly and unequivocally, for the first time and as such, it is worth recording in full.   
Until  the  creation  of  a  permanent  Workers’-Peasants’  Government  of 
Poland – to construct the foundation for the future Soviet system in a Polish 
Socialist Republic of Soviets. 
With this the aim of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland is: 
a)  to deprive the authority up until now existing in the szlachta-bourgeois 
government, 
b)  to reestablish and again to organise factory committees in the towns and 
farm labourers’ committees in the villages, 
c)  to organise local revolutionary committees, 
d)  to hand over ownership of the nation’s factories, property and forests to 
the management of the town and village workers’ committees, 
                                                                                                                                              
occupy a large industrial town, L. Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs: a history of relations between the 
Soviet Union and the rest of the world, 1917-1929, vol. 1, (Princeton, 1951), p. 269. 
34 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 95, p. 170. 
35 TNA, FO 688/8, doc. 588; TNA, FO 417/9, doc. 54. 
36 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 82, p. 153. 
37 P. Kalenichenko, “O deiatel’nosti pol’skogo vremennogo revoliutsionnogo komiteta”, in Ia. Manusevich 
(ed.), Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia i zarubezhnye slavianskie narody, (Moscow, 1957), p. 182; J. Marchlewski, 
Pisma Wybrane, vol. 2, p. 768. 
38 I.I. Kostiushko, vol.1, doc. 78, p. 149; ibid, doc. 86, p. 161.   141 
e)  to guarantee the inviolability of the peasants’ lands,
39 
f)  to call to life organs of public safety, the economy and food supply, 
g)  to guarantee to citizens, loyally acting on the orders and directions of 
the revolutionary authorities, complete security. 
                                          Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland 
                                                                                             30 July 1920.
40 
 
According to Eduard Próchniak, their objective in issuing the Manifesto, was to encourage 
the  Polish  masses  to,  “...rise  up  against  the  bourgeois-landowners’  government  of 
Piłsudski”,  in  the  certain  belief  that  “…a  lasting  peace...  is  possible  only  between  a 
socialist Russia and a socialist Poland of workers’ soviets”.
41 Poland’s sovietisation would 
facilitate a peace settlement between the newly-established socialist regimes in Eastern 
Europe. However, although the Manifesto’s publication directly fulfilled the Pol’bureau 
agenda set at its meetings on 23 and
 29 July 1920, it crucially failed to clarify how its 
objectives would be implemented in practice. 
 
      The  ultimate  aim  of  the  Polrevkom  was  again  clearly  defined  in  its  appeal  To 
Legionaries  on  1  August,  when  it  stated,  “We  form  a  Provisional  Revolutionary 
Committee of Poland which will take in its hands the interests of the working classes and 
will  solve  all  [its]...  problems”.
42  To  this  end,  it  would  organise  soviets  of  workers’ 
deputies,  professional  unions,  factory  and  farm  committees,  workers’  cooperatives  and 
other  workers’  organisations.
43  As  a  result,  Marchlewski  believed  that,  “...the  Polish 
workers could soon achieve the possibility of establishing in the town and in the village 
their own authority, proletarian authority, as in the soviet system”.
44 
 
      The  Polrevkom  was  extremely  careful  to  stress  that,  as  indicated  in  its  title,  the 
Committee was temporary, un-elected as it was by the Polish workers. This would be 
rectified immediately upon its move to Warsaw, where it would, “…transfer its power to 
the  Communist  Party  of  Poland,  would  summon  the  Polish  workers  to  create  a 
revolutionary government, and only after this congress of workers’ and peasants’ deputies 
                                                
39 This echoed Lenin’s view but, significantly, did not represent the views of the majority of Polrevkom 
members on the agrarian question. This condition may have been imposed by Lenin on the Committee or, 
more likely, given the Polrevkom’s later independence from RKP(b) agricultural policy, Soviet policy was 
used as a guide before they had time to determine their own programme.   
40 RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 1-2. One Russian language copy in this delo excludes DzierŜyński from the 
list of members, omits point c altogether and incorrectly dates the document to 30 August.  
41 RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 1, l. 5; Pravda, 3 August 1920. 
42 TNA, FO 688/6, p. 32, author’s italics. 
43 D & M, vol. 3, doc. 126, p. 222. 
44 J. Marchlewski, Pisma Wybrane, vol. 2, (Warsaw, 1952), pp. 764-765.    142 
would  be  founded  a  permanent  Soviet  government”.
45  This  shared  objective  of  the 
Polrevkom,  Polish  Bureau  and  CC  RKP(b)  was  strenuously  reinforced  by  Polrevkom 
propaganda.  For  instance,  its  appeal  To  the  Polish  Working  People  of  the  Towns  and 
Villages, published on 30 July, stated, “When in all Poland will be overthrown the bloody 
authorities... the congress of deputies of working people of the towns and villages will 
establish a Polish Socialist Republic of Soviets and... establish the new regime we have, in 
Poland”.
46 
 
      Therefore, despite protestations by the Pol’bureau and Polrevkom that they maintained 
independence  from  the  Soviet  regime  in  Moscow,  and  despite  policy  disagreements 
between the Polish communists and the Russian Soviet leaders, there clearly remained a 
close dependency between the communist movements in both countries. In August 1920, 
for instance, Chicherin wrote that the Pol’bureau was obliged to provide the Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs with details about, “…that which is going on in Poland, in particular in 
governmental circles and in the sejm”.
47 A highly valued source, Pol’bureau members 
were heavily relied upon in determining Soviet Russia’s policy during the final stages of 
the Polish-Soviet War. 
 
      The same is  certainly true of the Polrevkom.  As a political  instrument,  capable  of 
exporting socialist revolution abroad, Lenin was extremely interested in the activities of 
the Committee.
48 On 30 July 1920, Marchlewski wrote to Lenin to officially inform him of 
the Polrevkom’s establishment. He thanked the Russian workers and peasants, for entry of 
the Red Army into Poland, “...as energetic comrades-in-arms in the struggle of the Polish 
proletariat with the Polish landowners and bourgeois oppressors” and credited the Russian 
Soviet regime with providing a blueprint and “…guiding example” for the Polrevkom.
49 
This emphasised the solidarity of the Polrevkom with the RKP(b), and the shared ideology 
of both. 
 
      However, despite this correspondence, it was upon DzierŜyński, a fellow CC RKP(b) 
member,  that  Lenin  continued  to  rely  for  information  about  the  political  struggle  in 
                                                
45 J. Marchlewski, Voina i mir mezhdu burzhuaznoi Pol’shei i proletarskoi Rossiei, (Moscow, 1921), p. 22; J. 
Marchlewski, “Polska BurŜuazyjna a Rosja Proletariacka” in Pisma Wybrane, vol. 2, pp. 764-765, author’s 
italics. Thereby predetermining the nature of the future Polish government.   
46 RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 1, l. 14.   
47 RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 43, l. 6.  
48  V.I.  Lenin,  Voennaia  perepiska,  1917-1920,  (Moscow,  1956),  p.  244;  V.I.  Lenin,  Polnoe  sobraniie 
sochinenii, vol. 41, (Moscow, 1965), p. 651, (hereafter PSS).  
49 RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 8, l. 4.   143 
Poland.
50 Indeed, on 4 August 1920, Sklianskii reported to him, “Lenin categorically asks 
that  you  send  information  without  fail  every  day  and  utilise  for  this  all  means  of 
communications,  including  sending  packages  by  courier  and  telegraphs”.
51  The  Soviet 
leader was clearly concerned to keep up-to-date with the latest Polrevkom developments.     
The following day, DzierŜyński confirmed, “You will receive reports daily”, and as the 
archives  clearly  demonstrate,  he  consistently  fulfilled  this  promise.
52  Throughout  the 
Polrevkom’s existence, the Cheka leader continually updated Lenin about the situation in 
the  Red  Army-occupied  Polish  territories,  providing  information  critical  to  the  Soviet 
decision-making process.
53   
 
      The  policies  adopted  by  the  Polrevkom  were,  however,  largely  determined  by  its 
Committee members and not by Lenin or the CC RKP(b). In fact, the Committee received 
very  little  direct  instruction  from  Moscow  and,  with  the  exception  of  Lenin  and 
DzierŜyński, was seldom referred to by the Bolshevik leaders.
54 Indeed, its intention to act 
independently from the RKP(b) can be clearly observed in the following conversation: in 
response to a comment by Lenin, “You should achieve… [revolution] in a different way 
than we did”, Marchlewski retorted, “No, we will do what you did, but we will do it 
better”.
55 
 
3. Immediate Tasks 
 
      Faced with the enormous task of Soviet construction in the occupied Polish territories, 
the  Polrevkom’s  first  undertaking  was  to  assign  duties  to  its  members  at  a  meeting 
convened on 4 August. It was agreed that Marchlewski would be in charge of industry and 
agriculture,  Kon  was  given  responsibility  for  party  work,  culture  and  publishing, 
DzierŜyński  controlled  military  affairs  and  the  Cheka,  and  Tadeusz  Radwanski  was 
appointed editor of the Committee newspaper, Goniec Czerwony.
56 This designation of 
                                                
50 DzierŜyński was nominated to the CC at the Second Congress of the Comintern, on 16 July 1920, F.E. 
DzierŜyński, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, vol. 1, (Moscow, 1977), p. 478. 
51 I.I. Kostiushko, vol.1, doc. 92, p. 166. 
52 RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 8, ll. 1-23. 
53 See, for example, F.E. DzierŜyński, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, vol. 1, pp. 209-210; D & M, vol. 3, doc. 157, 
pp. 169-170.    
54 Leon Trotsky, Soviet Commissar for War, made no direct reference to the Polrevkom in his autobiography 
Moia zhizn’ and in his writings Kak vooruzhalas revoliutsiia.  
55 V.I. Lenin, PSS¸ vol. 29, pp. 152-153. Disagreements between the two authorities did arise, including in 
August 1920, over the Committee’s agrarian programme.  
56 RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 3, l. 7.   144 
duties,  it  was  hoped,  would  clarify  and  ease  the  burden  of  work  facing  the  fledgling 
organisation. 
 
      The most urgent problem facing the Polish communists at the beginning of August 
1920 proved to be the stabilisation of the economy in the occupied region, in both the 
industrial and agrarian spheres. On 5 August, DzierŜyński indicated that the five principle 
economic tasks facing the Polrevkom were: 1) immediate mobilisation of Poles, Polish 
language  experts,  and  Russian  instructors  for  Soviet  construction;  2)  accelerating  the 
renewal of railways and telegraph communications; 3) mobilization of large numbers of 
workers to bring in the harvest to supply the industrial centres, necessary to avoid famine. 
4)  sending  monetary  tokens  to  allow  factories  to  continue  production;  5)  dispatching 
instructors and organisors in the textile, tanning, chemical and wood-working industries.
57 
The Polrevkom’s foremost duties were, therefore, the organisation of industry, transport 
and communication lines, agricultural production and the establishment of a food supply 
system. 
 
      The Polrevkom’s immediate industrial objectives were published on 30 July 1920, in a 
communiqué To the Polish Working People of the Towns and Villages. In this it argued 
that,  “It  is  necessary  to  take  factories  and  mines  out  of  the  hands  of  the  parasites  – 
capitalists  and  speculators.  They  must  be  transferred  to  the  freed  people  and  their 
administration  must  be  taken  over  by  the  workers’  committees”.
58  In  this  way  the 
Committee attempted to begin the transition of the Polish capitalist system to a Marxist 
economy,  introducing  measures  similar  to  those  which  the  Bolsheviks  themselves  had 
undertaken three years previously in Russia.
59 Nationalisation of industry in Białystok was 
initiated.
60 The town relied heavily upon textile-weaving, leather factories, chemicals and 
wood-working  for  its  industrial  base.  Of  these,  eight  textile  works  were  successfully 
nationalised and placed under the control of leaders nominated by the industrial department 
of  the  Białystok  District  Revolutionary  Committee  (revkom)  and  local  workers’ 
committees.
61 Occasionally, as in Russia, former owners were appointed as specialists in 
the nationalised factories. 
 
                                                
57 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 94, p. 169. On the same day, he informed Rykov, Chairman of the Supreme 
Council  of  the  National  Economy  of  Soviet  Republics  (VSNKh)  that,  “It  is  necessary  urgently  to  have 
instructors-organisers of industry, perhaps Russians”, ibid, doc. 95, p. 170. 
58 RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 1, l. 14; Pravda, 3 August 1920. 
59 Clear parallels between the two authorities can be drawn.   
60 RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 3, l. 2; RGASPI, f. 63, op. 1, d. 88, ll. 1-19. 
61 P. Kalenichenko, p. 155; TNA, FO 688/8, doc. 588; TNA, FO 417/9, doc. 54.   145 
      Nevertheless, despite endorsement of this policy, it is extremely difficult to ascertain 
the impact of measures taken by the Polrevkom in industry. Only a permanent authority 
could have established full control over the region’s industry, but this was never achieved 
by  the  Polish  communists.  The  available  archival  holdings  present  two  completely 
different  interpretations  of  Polrevkom industrial  policies,  contrasting  quite  dramatically 
between  the  RGASPI  archives  in  Moscow,  which  present  a  positive  picture,  and  the 
archives  of  the  Polish  Institute  and  Sikorski  Museum  and  The  National  Archives  in 
London, which present a very different interpretation of the Committee’s activities.
62 
 
      Recognising the crucial importance of the local Białystok population for the success of 
Polrevkom  initiatives,  DzierŜyński  was  keen  to report  to  Lenin,  on  5 August,  that  the 
reaction of the Białystok workers to the Committee, at a mass meeting, was excellent and 
their policies had been well received.
63 Ten days later he recorded that, “The mood of the 
Belostok  workers  has  improved”,  with  numerous  labour  festivals  held  to  celebrate  the 
reopening of factories in the town.
64 He did, however, hint that the implementation of a 
socialist industrial policy was proving problematic when he complained to Tomskii and 
Serebriakov that, “Factories for the present stand still because of the change of authority 
and shortage of money tokens. Serious difficulties are arising connected with tariffs, and 
on this basis, high costs and shortages of supplies are developing”.
65 
 
      In stark contrast with this generally positive evaluation of Polrevkom industrial policy, 
the reports sent by Sir Horace Rumbold, British Minister in Warsaw, to his Government, 
were of an entirely different nature. At the beginning of September, he catalogued a list of 
Polrevkom  offences  against  the  local  Polish  population  in  Białystok,  including:  their 
requisitioning,  without  payment,  of  900,000  metres  of  cloth;  their  inability  to  provide 
sufficient raw materials and money to restart factory production; escalating unemployment; 
and the payment of very low wages to those fortunate to find work.
66 Furthermore, the 
Polrevkom  was  censured  for  sacking  the  house  of  the  Dziennik  Białystocki  publisher, 
removing important papers from the Riga bank, and conducting “...a policy of pillage” in 
                                                
62 This discrepancy is even more apparent when the attitude of the Polish population to the Polrevkom is 
examined later in the chapter. 
63 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 86, p. 162; doc. 96, p. 171. Amongst the policies introduced was an eight-hour 
working day, N. Davies, White Eagle, p. 154. 
64 F.E. DzierŜyński, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, vol. 1, p. 212.  
65 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 95, p. 170. On 15 August, he admitted to Lenin that, “Organisational work to 
regulate the economy, food supply and administrative work are slowly progressing because of shortages of 
experienced instructors and the speed of the army’s advance”, F.E. DzierŜyński, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 
vol. 1, p. 212.  
66 TNA, FO 688/8, doc. 588; TNA, FO 417/9, doc. 54.    146 
the  town.
67  Especial  scorn  was  reserved  for  those  placed  in  charge  of  the  newly-
nationalised factories. According to Rumbold, 
The efforts of the “factory commissaries” were primarily directed towards 
providing for themselves. Thus one of them, besides taking the best cloth 
for himself, used the horses of the factory to cart milk and wood to his own 
house in Białystok. Meanwhile, his own daily occupation was the delivery 
of violent propaganda harangues. Other “commissaries” are said to have 
behaved still worse.
68 
 
Finally, he reported that the Committee had allowed the Bolsheviks to take, “...17 hostages 
at Białystok from the Polish Jewish bourgeoisie…. 6 were shot”.
69  
 
      British details were, however, extremely sketchy and questions of objectivity arise. In 
the same report, for example, Rumbold recorded that the Polrevkom was still residing in 
the town, when in reality it had long since ceased to function. Furthermore, much of the 
information received by the British Minister was obtained through second-hand sources, 
including German newspaper reports. Nevertheless, the true importance of this ongoing 
correspondence  was  that  it  served  as  justification  for  Entente  policy  during  the  war, 
providing ample evidence of Soviet atrocities.  
 
      Nonetheless, this information cannot simply be dismissed out of hand and is supported 
by a large body of correspondence held in the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum. One 
report by an American officer on the Southern Front, Major Griffith, to his government on 
10 August 1920, noted, for example, that, 
In the district of Białystok, the Bolsheviks are taking hostages from all the 
villages and order foodstuffs to be delivered – if the quantity demanded is 
not delivered at the time stated the hostages are shot, the villages sacked and 
the inhabitants tortured. In Białystok famine is reigning – the price of food 
has  attained  unheard  of  figures  –  about  one  thousand  arrests  have  been 
made.
70 
 
      As a result of this situation, it was essential that the Polrevkom establish a clearly 
defined agricultural policy. Responsibility was immediately deferred to Marchlewski, an 
agrarian expert, at the Pol’bureau meeting on 23 July 1920, which decreed that, “...in the 
agrarian sphere [he]… must outline our slogans and… together with DzierŜyński, is to 
                                                
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid; TNA, FO 417/9, doc. 55, p. 80. This was directly contradicted by Marchlewski’s statement that, 
“...no-one was shot, the number of those arrested was small, the majority of them were comparatively quickly 
freed”, J. Marchlewski, Voina in mir, p. 31.  
70 The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 28, p. 126, (hereafter Polish Institute).   147 
coordinate with Lenin”.
71 This was of prime importance given that the area the Polrevkom 
sought authority over was overwhelmingly rural and agrarian. Its manifesto To the Polish 
Working  People  of  the  Towns  and  Villages,  of  30  July,  announced  that,  “Farms  and 
forests... must be transferred to the property and put under the administration of the people. 
Landowners must be driven out, and the administration of the farms given over to the farm 
labourers’ committees”.
72 The latter were to make inventories of all landowners’ estates, to 
establish  control,  preserve  property  and  prevent  looting  by  the  peasantry.
73  Finally, 
peasants were to be accorded access to the forests for the provision of building materials 
and fuel.
74 
 
      The problem of supplying the industrial centres with sufficient food was critical for the 
Polrevkom, affecting as it did both workers and peasants. On its first day, DzierŜyński 
admitted concern that resources for the nourishment of the workers were insufficient.
75 
This was compounded by a lack of transportation, and by the fact that the speed of the 
offensive, forced the Red Army to source its own food and utilise peasants’ carts and 
horses.
76 Famine appeared imminent. DzierŜyński, therefore, requested that the army take 
over supplying the towns and that responsible food workers with an understanding of local 
conditions, be sent to assist.
77  
 
      The Polrevkom also appealed for the protection of railway routes, essential for the 
supply of food to the towns.
78 However, as Marchlewski recorded, the Białystok workers,  
...showed  that  if  there  were  no  horses,  then  they  needed  to  harness 
themselves... People by their own backs, brought sheafs to the threshing-
machines or harnessed themselves to the carts... The work went quickly 
and... the danger of hunger was averted.
79 
 
                                                
71 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 77, p. 148. For Marchlewski’s views on agriculture prior to the war see, J. 
Marchlewski, Pisma Wybrane, vol. 1, pp. 589-625; vol. 2, pp. 556-668; J. Marchlewski, Wobec kwestii rolnej 
w Polsce, (Moscow, 1918).   
72 RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 1, l. 14. See also, Pravda, 31 July 1920. 
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74 Tymczasowy komitet, p. 89. Concern over fuel soon led Stanisław Bobinski, Polrevkom Commissar for 
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76 Ibid, doc. 96, p. 171.    
77 Ibid. This was not implemented.  
78 Tymczasowy komitet, pp. 128-129, pp. 130-131.  
79 J. Marchlewski, Pisma Wybrane, vol. 2, p. 771. DzierŜyński concurred on 18 August that, “Agricultural 
workers… work several ploughs, feeling the shortage of horses”, F.E. DzierŜyński, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 
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The problem of providing for the Red Army was addressed by the Polrevkom in an appeal, 
To the Polish Peasants, on 5 August, in which the retreating Polish landlords were blamed 
for, “...destroying foodstuffs which many prepared for the Red Army”, and reassurance 
given that, “…the Red Army takes only that which is necessary. For plunder and violence 
towards workers and peasants the soldiers are threatened with deadly execution”.
80 
 
      By  7  August,  the  situation  had,  however,  deteriorated  further  and  DzierŜyński, 
Marchlewski and Smilga were forced to telegram Lenin that, “Absolutely necessary for the 
success  of  our  business  is  to  place  the  food  supply  of  the  Belostok  workers...  on  the 
military supply organs. It is necessary immediately to send bread because already famine is 
beginning”.
81 In an attempt to establish firm control over the local economy and food 
supply the Polrevkom made considerable concessions to the local peasant population two 
days later in an attempt to gain support. It provided for the opening of all petty trade; 
allowed market trade and the importation by peasants of all types of food; prevented the 
requisitioning and confiscation of peasants’ imported food; entitled them to keep registered 
reserves of up  to one  month’s supply  of food for  their  own  use, and prohibited  town 
dwellers from confiscating peasants’ cattle.
82 
 
      The success of the revolution and the sovietisation of Poland now depended upon the 
Polrevkom’s ability to feed the workers. In an attempt to assert centralised control over 
these overwhelming economic problems, the Committee reached a secret agreement, on 9 
August 1920, with the Special Representative of Western Front for Supply to nominate a 
representative, “...who in the name of both contracting parties will unite and regulate all 
the national economy in Polish territory”.
83 Mikhel’man was nominated by the CC RKP(b) 
as  Plenipotentiary  Representative  of  VSNKh  to  direct  the food  supply  situation,  on  13 
August,  but  was  unable  to  actively  promote  concrete  measures  before  the  Committee 
folded at the end of the month.
84 The Committee consistently faced time constraints in all 
its  tasks,  existing  as  it  did  for  only  twenty-three  days  and  as  each  concern  required 
immediate attention, the prioritisation of work proved extremely problematic.  
 
                                                
80 Tymczasowy Komitet, p. 88. 
81 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc 98, p 172.  
82 Ibid, doc. 102, pp. 175-176. 
83 Ibid, doc. 101, p. 174. To simplify the economic situation, the Polrevkom defined the strength of the Polish 
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      A coherent policy was also required for the treatment of removed factory owners and 
landowners. On 4 August, the Committee passed a directive, “...that all those dangerous for 
the socialist revolution in Poland, all representatives of the Polish bourgeoisie and large 
landowners… are to be arrested and directed to concentration camps”.
85 Eleven days later, 
it  ordered  that  all  Białystok  factory  owners  be  arrested  and  appear  before  the  town 
revolutionary committee, whilst landowners families were to be immediately evicted from 
their estates and deprived of the right to gain profit from the hired workers’ labour.
86 The 
reality was, however, somewhat different. According to Marchlewski, this order was not 
uniformly carried out and the vast majority of landowners succeeded in evading arrest.
87 
 
      These  detailed  agricultural  policies  aimed  to  assist  in  the  construction  of  a  Polish 
socialist economy. However, disagreement raged both within the Committee and between 
the Polrevkom and the CC RKP(b), in particular with Lenin, about their implementation. 
When, on 30 July, DzierŜyński reported to the latter that the Polrevkom was to discuss the 
transfer  of  landowners’  estates  to  farm  labourers  and  land-hungry  peasants,  he  little 
realised that it would lead to a debate which would rock the Polrevkom and threaten its 
relations  with  the  Communist  leader  and  CC  RKP(b).
88  The  Committee’s  agricultural 
programme was strongly censured by Soviet historians and its independence from Moscow 
listed as one of the principal reasons for its failure. One such account remarked that, 
The position of the Polish Communists did not attract the working peasants 
to the side of the revolution. The Polrevkom did not take into account… the 
political  experience  of  Soviet  Russia…  in  the  solution  of  the  agrarian 
problem. The majority of Polrevkom members did not listen to the advice of 
V.I. Lenin... about the necessity of transferring part of the landowners land 
to the peasants.
89 
 
 
      Traditional Polish peasant holdings in 1920, in contrast with Russian villages, were 
already part of the capitalist economic system, having access to fertilisers, crop-rotation 
systems, newer agricultural machines and improved strains of livestock.
90 Consequently, 
the majority of Polrevkom members believed that the division of Polish farms between 
farm labourers and land-hungry peasants should be prohibited. Marchlewski, in particular, 
deplored  peasant  seizures  as  these  often  resulted  in  an  enormous  loss  of  buildings, 
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livestock and equipment.
91 Instead, they proposed that through nationalization, individual 
farms would be transformed into large state farms, and placed under the management of 
farm  labourers’  committees.
92  This  would  prevent  farms  being  divided  into  too  small, 
unsustainable plots, threatening the collapse of agricultural production.  
 
      However, not all Polrevkom members supported this agrarian policy. It was opposed, 
most  notably,  by  DzierŜyński  who,  in  correspondence  with  Lenin,  argued,  “...for  the 
inclusion of the demand for the transfer of landlords’ estates to farm labourers and land-
hungry  peasants”.
93  The  debate  also  impacted  upon  the  Polrevkom’s  relationship  with 
Lenin and the CC RKP(b), which became increasingly, “...disturbed by part of the appeals 
of  the  Polrevkom,  dealing  with  the  peasant  question”.
94  Radek  acknowledged,  on  15 
August, “Our fears about mistakes in the agrarian question are confirmed”, and five days 
later, Lenin criticized Polrevkom policy to DzierŜyński, Radek and the KPRP, remarking, 
If… land-hungry peasants have begun to seize estates, then it is absolutely 
necessary to give out special decrees of the Polrevkom, in order that without 
fail part of the landowners’ lands are given to the peasants and in this way 
reconcile the peasants who are land-hungry with the factory labourers.
95 
 
The existence of peasant unrest was confirmed by the Polish Chief Commander of State 
Police on 16 August, when he stated that, “…farm labourers and land-hungry peasants 
already have begun to wilfully divide the land”.
96 
 
      However, again, timing proved crucial and the collapse of the Polrevkom ultimately 
prevented a resolution being agreed, forestalling publication of a comprehensive decree on 
the distribution of landowners’ estates. Marchlewski argued that the complexity of land 
nationalization  and  the  “provisional”  nature  of  the  Committee  was  responsible  for 
deferment of the question until a Polish Socialist Government was established. So, too, did 
DzierŜyński, informing Lenin on 15 August that, “The question about the land policy will 
be  examined in  full capacity  in  Warsaw”.
97  Yet,  undoubtedly,  this  procrastination  and 
failure to provide effective leadership, inflamed the Polish peasantry, encouraging them to 
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seize land on their own initiative, as had their Russian counterparts three years earlier. 
Peasant discontent with the Soviet authorities, and in particular the Polrevkom, inevitably 
followed. 
 
4. Propaganda and the Polrevkom  
 
      In an attempt to address this dissatisfaction and win the support of the local population 
for its work, the Polrevkom was deeply committed to propaganda and agitation work. An 
unbroken  and  extensive  stream  of  manifestos,  appeals  and  proclamations  were 
disseminated in the Białystok region and beyond.
98 Following the example of the Russian 
Soviet  regime  during  the  war,  the  Polrevkom  directly  addressed  its target  audience  of 
workers,  peasants  and  soldiers,  over  the  heads of  the  Polish  Government  and  military 
leadership.  To  this  end,  it  began  to  publish  its  own  newspaper,  Goniec  Czerwony, 
providing the Poles with information about the Committee’s objectives and activities in the 
Polish territories occupied by the Red Army.
99   
 
      The circulation of propaganda was absolutely vital to the interests of the Polrevkom. 
DzierŜyński acknowledged to Lenin, on 6 August 1920, that it was necessary, “To send 
messengers  and  take  measures  to  disseminate  the  manifesto  and  appeals  of  the 
Polrevkom”, whilst Marchlewski argued for, “...the conduct of intensive propaganda and 
agitation” amongst agricultural workers.
100 Responsibility for its distribution was placed on 
Polrevkom  members,  the  KPRP,  Polish  communist  and  worker  organisations,  local 
revolutionary committees and the advancing Red Army.
101  
 
      Soviet aeroplanes were used to scatter thousands of appeals and announcements to 
reach  the  widest  possible  audience,  in  remote,  outlying  districts.  Radek  telegrammed 
Lenin,  Trotsky  and  Chicherin  that  many  appeals  were,  “…spread  with  the  help  of 
aeroplanes”, whilst DzierŜyński recorded, “We publish Goniec Czerwony, our daily organ, 
appeals and orders... spread... by aeroplanes”.
102 This echoed Soviet policy throughout the 
war and on 3 August, Lenin ordered Tukhachevsky and Smilga, “…to take every measure 
for the dissemination in Poland of the manifesto of the Polrevkom by the widest means 
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possible. Use our aviation for this”.
103 Therefore, although the RKP(b) did not itself issue 
numerous propaganda appeals about the Polrevkom, it was certainly happy to utilise its 
own  resources  to  support  the  Committee’s  own  agit-prop.  The  Soviet  military  shared 
RKP(b)  support  of  Polrevkom  propaganda,  with  P.V.  Suslov  arguing,  “Our  leaflets, 
appeals, bulletins, proclamations and newspapers break the power of the enemy... no less 
than do bayonets, machine-guns and rifles”.
104 
 
      A  variety  of  propaganda  methods  were  employed  by  the  Committee  to  gain  local 
support. Their appeals  frequently catalogued  Polish ruling class oppression  against the 
workers,  stressing  the  former’s  subservience  to  the  Entente  and  aggressive  ambitions 
towards  the  eastern  borderlands  and  Soviet  Russia.  One  proclamation  reported,  for 
instance, that, “...the ruling classes of Poland, taking for themselves the role of hangmen of 
revolutionary  Russia,  must  also  be  the  hangmen  of  the  Polish  revolutionary  working 
people”.
105 Polish communists, realising that the Red Army offensive into ethnographic 
Poland could be regarded by the local population as a national war, utilised propaganda to 
address  this  concern.  Making  clever  use  of  the  traditional  Polish  slogan  “For  Your 
Freedom and Ours”, first employed during Polish anti-tsarist revolts in the 19
th Century, 
they  presented  Russian  soldiers  as  united  in  fraternal  alliance  with  the  Poles  in  the 
international anti-capitalist struggle.
106 The Polrevkom also used propaganda in an attempt 
to empower the local population, consistently inciting the Poles to, “...take your destiny 
into your own hands”, and invoke action with phrases such as, “Workers!  Your Future is 
in Your Hands”.
107 
 
      Extremely diverse in subject matter and target audience, Polrevkom propaganda was 
very impressive given the organisation’s short life-span. It addressed not only its economic 
and political agenda, but also its cultural, religious, educational, military, and international 
programmes. At a Committee meeting on 12 August, for example, it was resolved that 
responsibility for the safekeeping of libraries, museums, art collections, paintings, statues, 
musical instruments, objects of antiquity, furniture, clothes and domestic utensils would be 
placed on farm-labourers’ committees, whilst any objects not listed could be utilised by 
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agricultural workers, their families and the poorest peasants.
108 Failure to comply would 
lead  to  severe  punishment.  Clearly,  although  anxious  to  begin  immediate  policy 
implementation, it was determined to maintain strict control of the transfer of power to the 
working class. Lawlessness would not be tolerated. 
 
      During this volatile period, Polrevkom members were forced to determine policy from 
day to day, hour to hour and as a result, inconsistencies were inevitable. On 1 August, for 
instance, a Declaration about Freedom of Conscience announced that religion was, “...a 
personal matter of conscience”.
109 This was a clever tactical manoeuvre given that Poland 
was an extremely religious country, with an overwhelmingly Roman Catholic population, 
and such concessions would be required if the local inhabitants were to be won over by 
communism.  However,  in  its  desire  to  separate  the  church  from  the  state,  the  order 
prohibited  the  clergy  from  “interfering”  in  politics,  resulting  in  widespread  Polish 
outrage.
110 
 
      The Polrevkom was also aware that it was being closely observed by the international 
community, providing it with an opportunity to direct its propaganda outwith the Polish 
borders.  In  an  appeal  To  the  Proletariat  of  All  the  World,  published  on  5  August,  it 
declared, “To you we appeal, comrades! Give help to the Red Army, give help to the 
revolutionary proletariat of Poland!... Not one person, nor one tool, nor one cartridge for 
the  army  of  the  Polish  counter-revolutionaries!”
111  This  mirrored  Soviet  propaganda 
appeals  which had successfully influenced workers in the West, especially in London, 
where quayside dockers had refused to load ammunition onto ships bound for Poland three 
months earlier.
112 
 
      Inevitably, given that the Polrevkom was called into existence during war-time and that 
one of its declared objectives was securing peace between a socialist Poland and socialist 
Russia, it is hardly surprising that much of its propaganda efforts were directed towards the 
military of both countries. Two days after its establishment, it released an emotive appeal 
                                                
108RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 4, l. 1; RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 1, l. 1. Following Soviet Russia’s example, the 
Polrevkom  planned  to  nationalise  all  culture,  including  public  and  private  theatres,  cinemas,  publishing 
houses and libraries, Goniec Czerwony, 10 August 1920. 
109 RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 4, l. 2. 
110 Ibid. This was further intensified by the closure of all religious schools in the region, under the guidance 
of Feliks Kon, Commissar for National Education, F. Kon, “Szkoła Proletariacka” in Goniec Czerwony, 15 
August 1920. 
111 Tymczasowy komitet, pp. 93-94; Goniec Czerwony, 7 August 1920. 
112 See, L.J. MacFarlane, “Hands off Russia: British Labour and the Russo-Polish War 1920,” in Past and 
Present, vol. 38, (1967), pp. 126-152.    154 
To Legionaries of the Polish Army, designed to evoke civilian and military outrage against 
the Polish authorities, which began, 
The  inevitable  has  happened!  Poland  is  completely  ruined,  distress  and 
famine  are  everywhere  and  the  Polish  Army  is  dispersing....  Polish 
Soldiers!... Where are your allies who drew you into this murderous war? 
Where is their help and support? Where are those Polish squires who sitting 
in the Diet and smoking good cigars from a distance encouraged you to 
fight? Where are those who played with the life of thousands delivering 
them to torture and suffering and to the hell of war and death?.... They are 
not with you.
 113  
 
In contrast, it stressed that the Red Army was not staffed by professional soldiers, but by 
workers in uniform, fighting for Poland’s liberation, a consistent Polrevkom tactic.
114 A 
further appeal To the Warsaw Proletariat, published on 5 August, called on inhabitants of 
the  city  to  take  power  into  their  own  hands  before  the  Red  Army  reached  the  Polish 
capital.
115  In  this  way,  the  Committee  hoped  to  prepare  the  ground  for  the  Battle  of 
Warsaw by invoking support for the Soviet authorities before the Polrevkom transferred to 
the city on the back of the Red Army.
116 
 
      However, it was also felt necessary to appeal directly to Red Army soldiers engaged in 
military action on Polish territory. Controlling relations with the local civilian population, 
upon whose support the Polrevkom depended, was vital and as a result, the Committee 
sought to prevent Russian soldiers from carrying out depredations or atrocities.
117 On 1 
August, a leaflet entitled Comrade Red Army Men, underlined to the soldiers, 
You are entering onto Polish territory, on territory covered in the blood of 
Polish  workers...  you,  sons  of  the  revolutionary  nation,  do  not  bring 
oppression,  but  freedom  as  in  your  country...  for  the  sins  of  the  Polish 
landowners  and  capitalists  you  will  not  subject  the  unfortunate  Polish 
people.
 118 
 
To prevent communism being regarded as an invading, external force, the Polrevkom and 
RKP(b) called for the establishment of a Polish Red Army.
119 This was to comprise Poles 
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living in Russia, Polish prisoners-of-war and Poles already serving in the Red Army on the 
Western Front.
120 However, although this objective was supported by the Red Army High 
Command, developing military action forced these plans to be shelved.
121 Once again time 
constraints proved crucial in hampering the work of the Committee. 
 
      The Polrevkom, therefore, utilised a variety of propaganda methods to spread their 
policy objectives and disseminate their appeals to the Polish population they encountered. 
In this way, they were able to reach a diverse range of people in a short space of time, 
including Polish workers, peasants, agricultural workers, soldiers, the inhabitants of the 
capital city and Red Army men, as well as the populations of the Entente countries. The 
reaction of the local population to this propaganda onslaught shall be examined shortly.   
 
5. The Wider Picture: Revkomy  
 
      It is important to remember that the activities of the Polrevkom were closely bound up 
with  a  wider  movement  to  establish  Soviet  revolutionary  committees  (revkomy), 
throughout  the  occupied  territories  of  Poland  and  the  Kresy.  On  23  July  1920,  the 
Pol’bureau resolved that, “In the Polish localities, occupied by the Red Army, are to be 
organised  revolutionary  committees”  and  immediately  following  the  Polrevkom’s 
establishment, it called on the Poles to, “Create local revolutionary committees”.
122 As 
early  as  19  May  1920,  Soviet  Western  Front  Commander  ordered  that  revkomy  be 
established in localities abandoned by the Polish Army and by 1 July, over thirty had been 
formed.
123 On 12 August, the Committee appointed, “Noskiewicz, a communist of part 
Polish origin, to organise Soviets in all Polish territory under Bolshevik occupation… this 
work is being carried out with the utmost rigour”, with revkomy already set up Białystok, 
ŁomŜa and Tarnopol.
124   
 
      The  RKP(b)  clearly  supported  the  establishment  of  local  revkomy,  although  the 
initiative came, as with the Polrevkom, from the Pol’bureau. The latter issued directives 
defining revkomy membership and on 27 July, DzierŜyński and Smilga wrote to Krestinskii 
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requesting that one billion roubles-worth of credit be opened for the Western Front.
125 In 
response, on 1 August, Sovnarkom released this sum, “...for the organisation of revkomy 
and Soviet authority in the territories captured from Poland”.
126 
 
      The revkomy aimed to establish  soviets of workers’  delegates, professional unions, 
farm and factory committees, and agricultural cooperatives, with the stated intention of, 
“...strengthening contact between the revkomy and the politically conscious part of the 
working  class”.
127  On  5  August,  Smilga  elaborated  their  tasks  as  including:  the 
establishment  of  workers’  authority;  registration  of  food and  other  supplies  within  the 
Polish  Republic;  disarming  and  detention  of  the  bourgeoisie;  arming  of  workers  and 
communists; preservation  of national property from  damage and plundering,  especially 
transport  facilities,  and  the  organisation  of  a  soviet  militia.
128  An  agenda  to  carry  out 
Polrevkom policies at the local level was, therefore, immediately defined. Indeed, on 16 
August,  Marchlewski  issued  a  fifteen-point  programme  on  behalf  of  the  Polrevkom, 
following Smilga’s initiative, regarding the objectives of the revkomy. Most importantly, 
...2)  ...the  revolutionary  committees….  must  themselves  create  the 
necessary departments: administration; land; and a department for supply. 
3) ...must create a peoples’ militia in the towns and villages for the safety of 
the working masses and to defend the peoples’ property from robbery... 
6) ...must arrest all those without exception, employees of the gendarmerie, 
counter-intelligence, open and secret police and also spies of the bourgeois 
government... 
8) ...must register all means of travel. 
13) ...must give in every possible way help to the Red Army….
129 
 
 
      What  then  was the Polrevkom’s relationship with these local organisations, largely 
established to carry out its instructions? In theory, firstly, the Polrevkom was to liaise with 
revkomy to coordinate Soviet policy in the occupied Polish lands.
130 It was also responsible 
for guiding the elections of revkomy at all levels, and for examining the activities of the 
local  organisations,  clarifying  their  position  as  either  uezd  or  oblast  revkomy  and 
dispatching its own members to support revkomy as necessary.
131  
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      However, in reality, on 4 August, it admitted that, due to the rapid advance westwards 
of the Red Army, “...it is absolutely impossible for the Polish-Soviet Government to take 
upon itself the organisation of Soviet authority in the freed localities”.
132 As a result, it was 
decided  that  the  Western  Front  Revvoensovet  be  given  full  responsibility  for  both  the 
organisation  of  Soviet  authority  and  the  practical  leadership  of  Soviet  organs,  thereby 
making it the highest civil-military authority in occupied Poland.
133 Cooperation between 
the civilian and military organisations was essential if the sovietisation of Poland was to 
succeed.
134  This  was  the  clearest  indication  to  date  that  the  Committee  was  entirely 
dependent upon the Soviet armed forces for its continued survival. Without the Red Army, 
the Polrevkom could not have itself functioned, nor controlled the local revkomy, in the 
occupied Polish lands. Herein lay its fundamental weakness. 
 
6. Polish Reaction to the Committee 
 
      As noted by Count Paul von Wolff Metternich, in June 1808, “Public opinion is the 
most powerful medium of all”.
135 This observation could easily have referred to the Polish-
Soviet War, 114 years later. Central to the Polrevkom’s long-term objective of becoming 
the Socialist Government of Poland was contemporary reaction to it: the local population 
in Poland ultimately held the Committee’s fate in its hands. It was, moreover, crucial in 
determining the conduct, development and eventual outcome of the conflict for the Polish 
State. What then was the view of the Polish population towards the war and thus, the 
Committee? Did a homogenous opinion exist? 
 
      From  the  beginning  of  July,  the  month  in  which  the  Polrevkom  was  established, 
support for the Polish Army began to intensify throughout the Republic with the approach 
of the Red Army towards ethnographic Poland. A strong defensive movement, organised 
by the Polish Government, made the task facing the Polrevkom extremely difficult from 
the outset. A diverse cross-section of Polish society patriotically remained loyal to the state 
and following the publication of an appeal by the Council of National Defence, signed by 
                                                                                                                                              
be filled by a wide range of PPS members, National Democrats, anarchists, and Jewish leftists, P. Wandycz, 
Soviet-Polish Relations, p. 227; P.V. Suslov, p. 144. 
132 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 89, p. 164, this decision was taken at a joint meeting of the Polrevkom, the 
Białystok revkom and the Red Army.  
133 Ibid. 
134 For details of Polrevkom relations with Western Front Revvoensovet see, RGASPI, f. 68, op. 1, d. 10.   
135 K. Hamilton & R. Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: its evolution, theory and administration, 
(London & New York, 1998), p. 124.   158 
Piłsudski, on 12 July 1920, members from all social classes voluntarily joined the Polish 
armed forces. In fact, 
All political parties, all the most important social organisations, associations 
of scientists, teachers, students and Sokols issued proclamations exposing 
the gravity of the situation and calling upon all the citizens to offer their 
services to their threatened country. Members of Parliament, Government 
officials, men of letters, artists, are hurrying to the Colours.
136 
 
      Even  more  worrying  for  the  Polish  communists  who  were  soon  to  establish  the 
Polrevkom,  was  the  reaction  of  Polish  socialists,  their  potential  allies,  to  the  Soviet 
advance. On 15 July, in a Manifesto to Socialists of the World, the Polish Socialist Party 
(PPS)  summoned  all  socialists  to  support  Poland  in  the  war  against  Soviet  Russia, 
declaring, “The Red  Russian army is led by  Tsarist  Generals. The Russian militarised 
newspapers are full of racial hatred and threaten to dictate peace on the smouldering ruins 
of  Warsaw”.
137  Regarding  the  Red  Army  occupation  as  imperialist,  the  PPS  further 
questioned the type of socialism which would be established in their country, declaring, 
It is not the social revolution which is threatening the gates of Poland… the 
Soviet  leaders  bow  before  imperialist  militarism,  replacing  the  old 
principles of liberty by an appeal to annex foreign territories....  We say to 
the workmen and peasants of Poland…. Tell them that we are masters in our 
country and that we ourselves will bring about the Socialist reconstruction 
of our country and that we will not allow Tsarist Generals to introduce into 
Poland a pretended sham Socialism.
138 
 
The PPS believed it to be a national war, not class, despite both the Soviet Russian regime 
and the Polrevkom stressing that this was the nature of the conflict. That the vast majority 
of the Polish population shared this interpretation as soon as the Red Army crossed over 
the ethnographic border had critical implications for the longevity of the Polrevkom and, 
ultimately, for the outcome of the Polish-Soviet War.  
 
      Crucially,  therefore,  the  Committee  not  only  faced  strong  Polish  governmental 
opposition from the outset, but also deep-seated grassroot hostility from left-wing, Polish 
socialists, upon whom it was dependent upon for support. This established opposition to 
Soviet authority before the Polrevkom had even been formed, meant that the Committee 
was to face an uphill struggle to gain recognition and support both from the Białystok 
region and the wider Polish population. 
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      Following  the  Committee’s  establishment,  the  majority  of  Polish  political  parties, 
condemned outright its objectives, ideology and activities. Piłsudski was well aware of the 
potential threat which the Polrevkom posed to the Polish State, commenting to a newspaper 
correspondent, “Do you wonder that I am afraid of the Bolsheviks coming here uninvited 
to reorganise the Polish Government?”
139 Daszyński, Vice-President of the Polish Council, 
and a socialist deputy in the Witos Government, informed the Warsaw newspaper, Journal 
de Pologne of his, “...utter disbelief in the possibility of the institution of a Soviet form of 
Government in Poland except by brute force....  Soviets… were an imported article which 
would never take root in Poland”.
140  This well-organised political opposition was led by 
President  of  the  Council,  Wicenty  Witos,  leader  of  the  Peasant  Party,  as  he  issued 
numerous propaganda appeals, calling for the defence of the Polish Republic during late 
July and August 1920.
141  In a proclamation to the Polish peasantry, he announced, for 
instance, 
Peoples’  Poland  is  threatened  by  a  catastrophe;  the  Bolsheviks  have 
attacked  the  land;  are  already  in  Polish  villages  and  towns  carrying 
destruction and aiming at the extermination of the State and the servitude of 
the people. These very Bolsheviks... are penetrating further and further into 
Poland to subdue the Poles, to take their goods and property, and to force on 
them a form of government which has turned the great land of Russia into a 
desert.
142 
 
Witos stressed the crucial role to be played by the Polish peasantry in the rebuttal of Soviet 
authority and, “...addressed not an appeal, but a summons, to each of his brother peasants 
to fulfill his duty and to each one capable of carrying arms to go to the front”.
143 In a 
predominantly  agrarian  country,  this  Polish  Government  announcement  recognised  the 
crucial  role  which  the  peasant  community  would  play  in  the  struggle  against  the 
Polrevkom. Whichever organisation won the loyalty of this class would, ultimately, control 
the Polish Republic. 
 
      What, then, was the view of the Polish peasantry towards the Soviet advance and the 
activities  of  the  Polrevkom?  Soviet  historians  and  Committee  members  traditionally 
stressed  a  positive  reaction  from  the  Polish  agricultural  workers,  farm  labourers  and 
landless peasants.
144 DzierŜyński, for instance, was keen to report to CC RKP(b) on 18 
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August that, “A conference of agricultural workers from neighbouring estates took place in 
Belostok  yesterday.  Their  attitude  –  is  magnificent.  Many  arrived  after  walking  over 
twenty versty”.
145 The Polrevkom newspaper, Goniec Czerwony, frequently listed goods 
and supplies which had been voluntarily presented to the Red Army by the local peasant 
population.
146 It would appear, moreover, that Polrevkom propaganda did initially produce 
a  limited  reaction  amongst  the  peasantry,  who  were  led  to  expect  that  confiscated 
landowners’  estates  would  be  distributed  amongst  them,  without  payment  of  rent.
147 
According  to  one  contemporary  newspaper  report,  “...the  Bolsheviks  appear  to  have 
succeeded by their policy of pillage in setting the country population against them with the 
exception  of  the  agricultural  labourers  who  enjoyed  the  opportunity  of  living  in  the 
deserted manor houses and robbing the landlords without any payment”.
148   
 
      This  picture  does  not,  however,  present  an  entirely  accurate  picture  of  peasant-
Polrevkom relations. Often, the former remained completely passive to the work of the 
Committee. In a telegram to Lenin on 15 August, DzierŜyński was to concede that, “In the 
region of Mlawy-Włotsławek the mood of the peasants is neutral”, whilst Marchlewski, 
admitted that, “The peasants with characteristic distrust…. in general remained neutral”.
149 
More  frequently,  Polrevkom  agrarian  policies  invoked  a  strong  reaction  from  farm 
workers. The inclusion of DzierŜyński, as member and unofficial leader of the Polrevkom, 
lessened  any  opportunity  for  the  Committee  to  gain  support,  infamous  as  he  was 
throughout  Poland  as  the  brutal  head  of  the  Cheka.  As  noted  by  a  resolution  of  the 
Parliamentary Club of the Polish Peasants’ Party, the peasantry had been forced to bear all 
necessary  sacrifices  to  repel  the  invasion.
150  According  to  one  contemporary  observer, 
“The Polish peasants in recently occupied territory are infuriated against the Soviets, who, 
despite  their  promises  and  their  very  extensive  propaganda  amongst  them,  have  taken 
everything methodically without payment”.
151 For many this echoed the fresh and painful 
memory of tsarist oppression.     
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      The  available  evidence  clearly  suggests  that  the  majority  of  peasants  were  soon 
disappointed by Polrevkom agricultural policies and their failure to deliver promises. A 
Polish Foreign Ministry communiqué, reported on 30 August 1920, 
Witos…  visited  various  localities  liberated  from  the  Bolshevik  invasion.  
On  August  28  the  Premier  traversed  the  province  of  Plock,  which  was 
particularly devastated. Everywhere traces of atrocities and violence were 
visible.... The peasants throughout the whole devastated areas showed bitter 
hostility to the invaders.
152 
 
Discontent intensified following the Red Army’s requisitioning of food supplies, carts, 
horses and cattle for its own use, the payment of extremely low prices to peasants for 
goods purchased, and frequent repression and atrocities carried out by the Soviet forces 
against  the  local  populations,  in  which  peasants  were  the  dominant  class.
153  The 
Committee’s  preference  to  await  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  Polish  socialist 
government, to resolve the thorny agrarian issues over which its members had so strongly 
disagreed, proved fatal. 
 
      Further evidence of Polish hostility towards the Soviet regime, the Red Army and the 
Polrevkom is, ironically, provided by communists and Red Army soldiers. Marchlewski 
was forced to acknowledge that, “The Red Army could not attract the peasants”.
154 The 
1920 Diary of Isaac Babel, a Red Army political worker attached to the First Cavalry 
Army,  commanded  by  Semen  Budennyi,  also  provides  illuminating  details  of  locals 
perception of the advancing Soviet troops. On 6 August 1920, at Khotin, he recorded, 
“...we are destroyers... hated by everyone”.
155 Twenty days later he further explored this 
disillusionment, reporting that at Sokol, “The cobbler had looked forward to Soviet rule – 
and what he sees are Jew-baiters and looters, and that he won’t be earning anything, he is 
dismayed and looks at us mistrustfully”.
156   
 
      What,  then,  was  the  reaction  of  the  workers,  who  were  the  Polrevkom’s  intended 
support base and in whose name the Committee was working in Białystok and beyond? 
Communists in Poland and Russia, Soviet historiography and a number of contemporary 
Western observers suggest that Soviet ideology, Polrevkom objectives and the Red Army 
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were enthusiastically greeted and supported by the Polish population, as liberators from 
capitalist  domination  by  “White-Guard”  Poles.  These  accounts  draw  on  the  various 
meetings,  demonstrations  and  rallies,  held  in  several  Polish  localities  in  support  of 
communism  and  Soviet  Russia.  For  instance,  the  Soviet  publication  Istoriia  Pol’shi, 
recorded that in response to an appeal by the CC KPRP on 29 April, which called on the 
Polish population to demonstrate against the war, 
On 1 May massive meetings and demonstrations took place. In Warsaw the 
demonstration against the anti-Soviet War saw about 30,000 persons take 
part. Large demonstrations took place in Dombrovsk Basin, Lodz, Ozorkov, 
Aleksandrov,  Egezh,  Pabianitsa,  Blotslavk,  Zhirardov  and  other  Polish 
towns.
157 
 
 
      The Red Army reported similar scenes as it advanced towards Warsaw. A telegram 
sent to Lenin on 12 August 1920, by Revvoensovet Western Front member and Polish 
Communist, I.T. Smilga, stated that although there was no discernable movement by the 
farm  labourers  in  the  Polish  territory  occupied  by  the  Red  Army,  the  town  workers, 
railwaymen  and  the  local  Jewish  population  were  supportive.
158  Marchlewski  further 
contended that, “...the proletarian elements stood on the side of the revolutionary army… 
represented  by  the  revolutionary  committee”.
159  This  was  corroborated  by  the  British 
diplomat Edgar D’Abernon, who spoke of,  
…the extent to which sympathy with the Bolsheviks dominates the working 
classes  in  Central  Europe.  This  sympathy  is  almost  more  religious  than 
political. It is unaffected by ordinary considerations of interest and survives 
the complete failure of Bolshevik economic administration – no less than 
their admitted brutality and cruelty.
160  
 
 
      RGASPI also holds numerous letters, proclamations and telegrams expressing support 
for the work of the Polrevkom, as do Soviet documentary collections.
161 The latter record, 
for instance, that a mass meeting of workers’ representatives in Białystok on 31 July 1920, 
declared, “We with enthusiasm welcome the rising up of this government as having the 
most appropriate aims and interests of the workers”.
162 Izvestiia reported that, at a large 
workers’ meeting in the town on 2 August, “The speech of Marchlewski, which set forth 
the programme of the Polrevkom’s activities, was accompanied  by an  ovation”,  and a 
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meeting  of  railwaymen  of  the  Białystok  Junction,  on  the  same  day,  confirmed,  “We 
welcome  the  Polrevkom,  we  express  in  them  full  confidence  and  swear  that  in 
circumstances of necessity, we shall stand to defend them”.
163 In Russia too, 1,200 Polish 
POWs resolved on 14 August to fight to support the Polrevkom if the opportunity arose.
164 
 
      It is, thus, likely that the Polrevkom enjoyed support amongst elements of the Polish 
working class, and indeed it was this group which the Committee claimed to represent.
165 
However,  even  here  the  Polrevkom  faced  problems.
166  DzierŜyński  was  forced  to 
acknowledge to the CC RKP(b) that despite initial reports about the excellent mood of the 
Białystok population, by 12 August, “...all military strength of Belostok and the region 
consists of seventy people…. Such a situation we recognise as intolerable, fraught with sad 
consequences”.
167 So great was his concern that he requested a disciplined battalion of the 
Cheka be sent, “...for the defence of the Polrevkom”.
168 Therefore, although the Polrevkom 
appears to have enjoyed a level of worker support during the initial phase of its activities, 
within two weeks this had waned. The reality of factories and industries remaining at a 
standstill, the authorities failure to pay wages, the high cost of living, increasing rise of 
unemployment, and the very real risk of famine engulfing the town, quickly dampened 
support.
169   
 
      This  was  also  certainly  the  position  with  Białystok’s  Jewish  population.  It  would 
appear that the Jewish majority supported the Soviet authorities, at least initially, with 
many  contemporaries  recording  evidence  of  communist-Jewish  support  in  the  Polish 
towns.
170 Upon its establishment, the Polrevkom recognized both Polish and Yiddish as the 
official languages of the Committee and only those who spoke either were given positions 
within  the  organisation.
171  However,  although  Marchlewski  claimed  that  the  Jews 
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maintained  excellent  relations  with  the  Polrevkom,  sections  of  this  sizeable  group  of 
workers  became  increasingly  alienated  by  the  Committee’s  dissolution  of  the  Jewish 
commune,  welcoming  the  return  of  the  Polish  town  authorities  after  the  Battle  of 
Warsaw.
172 Indeed, one observer expressed surprise that prior to the battle most of the 
people  he saw erecting barbed wire defences against  the  approaching Red Army were 
Jews.
173 Deep-rooted anti-semitism, evident in a number of Red Army units, including 
Budennyi’s cavalry, and the failure of the Soviet authorities to deal with it, were important 
reasons why the Jewish population in Poland turned against the Committee.
174 DzierŜyński 
was forced to admit that crime and mistreatment were factors in the relationship of the 
occupying forces with the populations in the Polish lands.
175 Białystok also contained a 
sizeable Lithuanian population and here again the Committee lost a potential support base 
following Marchlewski’s announcement that, after the establishment of a Polish Socialist 
Government, the only official language throughout the country would be Polish.
176  
       
      Finally, the Polrevkom failed to win the support of the Polish socialists and was unable 
to coordinate its activities with the one Polish group which supported it fully, the KPRP.
177 
The day after the formation of the Polrevkom, the Białystok PPS group welcomed the 
Committee  and  expressed  their  willingness  to  cooperate  with  it.
178  However,  for  the 
majority  of  PPS  members,  opposition to  the  Polrevkom,  deemed  a,  “...pseudo-socialist 
government”,  prevailed.
179  The  majority  of  Poles,  including  many  workers,  regarded 
national independence and security as more important than the achievement of a socialist 
revolution or adoption of an alien Soviet ideology. The KPRP was limited in size, many of 
its leaders were in exile or prison, and it failed either to raise widespread awareness of 
Soviet aims or to organise mass demonstrations in support of the Polrevkom. Indeed, on 
the 10
th anniversary of the Polish-Soviet War, the party’s theoretical organ, Nowy przegląd, 
acknowledged,  “Not...  always  and  not  everywhere  were  we  sufficiently  active  in  a 
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revolutionary way.... In various sectors the certainty of the Red Army’s victory... created 
an atmosphere of passivity”.
180  
 
      Soviet  assertions  of  deep-seated,  widespread  support  are,  thus,  contradicted  by  the 
overwhelming majority of available sources, including such diverse commentators as the 
Polish Foreign Ministry, western observers, Polish Communists and political workers in 
the Red Army. These contemporaries witnessed the existence of a strong and resilient anti-
Bolshevik  sentiment  across  the  whole  spectrum  of  Polish  society  during  the  war.
181 
Socialist revolution had, in reality, no real support base in Poland upon which to draw. 
Neither did the Polrevkom. Its failure to deal with the many, diverse problems requiring its 
attention drove its initial supporters to abandon it to its fate. As DzierŜyński acknowledged 
with great honesty, the work of the Committee failed as it was, “…not moved forward by 
any internal struggle in Poland itself”.
182 
 
      Reaction  to  the  Polrevkom  was  also  varied  in  Russia.  Although  the  CC  RKP(b) 
supported the organisation, provided blueprints for it to follow and, crucially, financed its 
work, disagreements did break out with the Committee over policy issues, most notably the 
agrarian question. Even amongst the general public, divergent opinions could be discerned. 
Telegrams  of  support  were  sent  to  the  Polrevkom  from  numerous  soviets  throughout 
Russia, the kresy and beyond, including, Tver, Vladikavkaz, Georgia, Armenia and Eastern 
Galicia.
183 Many Russians remained doubtful, however, about the Committee’s activities 
and questioned the possible success of a Polish revolution. As noted by the Commander of 
the Soviet IV Army, for example, 
The outbreak of a Polish Revolution was considered seriously only by those 
Soviet authorities, which were far from the front. The Red Army did not 
believe in it. The failure to enroll a Polish army in Białystok was ample 
evidence that this hope was without foundation.
184 
 
 
      In direct contrast, the Polish Chargé d’Affaires in London, Jan Ciechanowski, noted 
that the advancing Polish Army was welcomed in all the towns and localities into which it 
advanced, freeing the population from Soviet rule.
185 Indeed, a petition, signed by 35,000 
inhabitants of Minsk, Sluck, Bobrujsk, Thumen and Borisów, belonging to the Roman 
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Catholic, Orthodox and Jewish faiths, was presented to the Polish Government and Allied 
representatives on 22 August 1920. This stated that, 
The population of our country will never consent to it being granted to the 
Bolsheviks without the expression of its will... if the Bolshevik army does 
not immediately withdraw beyond the Dnieper and the Dzwina, we, citizens 
of the outraged country… will begin an action on our own initiative.... two 
months  ago  our  population  sent  a  delegation  to  Warsaw  with  an 
authorisation containing 250,000 signatures and that now state this to be our 
final warning.
186 
 
 
 7. Conclusion 
  
      By mid-August, there were significant levels of discontent against the Polrevkom. Had 
the outcome of the Battle of Warsaw been different, however, there is no reason to doubt 
that  its members would have  been  transferred to  Warsaw and  established there as the 
Polish Socialist Government. Indeed, on 15 August, DzierŜyński, Marchlewski and Kon 
left Białystok for Warsaw with this objective in view.
187 
 
      Why then did the Polrevkom fail to establish its longed-for socialist government in 
Poland? Primarily, and fatally, the Committee failed to win the support of the local Polish 
population, who refused to be inspired by Soviet ideology. It failed also to coordinate its 
actions and policies with the one organisation which unreservedly supported it, the KPRP. 
This party potentially provided an infrastructure for organising socialist authority through 
existing  local  revolutionary  committees  but  action  between  the  two  bodies  was 
disjointed.
188  Radek  complained,  for  instance,  on  15  August  that  the  revkomy 
communications with Warsaw did not exist, whilst DzierŜyński, stated four days later, 
“There is no constant communication with party organisations”.
189   
 
      The Polrevkom itself was also not as coordinated as previously imagined. For example, 
Marchlewski complained that many officials who worked for the Committee were, “...one-
sided, narrow-minded”, individuals who were, “...not familiar enough with the obligations 
and  duties  of  a  revolutionary  power”,  to  be  of  great  assistance.
190  Its  members  often 
worked  from  hour  to  hour,  deciding  policy  ad  hoc,  rejecting  Russian  methods  as 
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sometimes inappropriate to the Polish situation. This made it difficult not only for the 
Polrevkom to spread its ideological objectives to the localities, but also for the Committee 
to react quickly to changing circumstances in the political, economic and social spheres. 
Furthermore,  time  constraints  frequently  prevented  implementation  of  agreed  policy 
initiatives. 
 
      Nevertheless, the Polrevkom did carry out a huge amount of work in a very short space 
of time. Although established without detailed planning, in response to the Red Army 
crossing into ethnographic Poland, the Polrevkom successfully initiated a huge range of 
diverse economic, political, social, cultural, religious, military and international policies. 
With only the Russian Soviet regime capable of providing the Committee with an example 
to follow, it was frequently forced to decide policy on its own initiative. Founded by well-
known, competent and experienced Polish communists, who were not afraid when the need 
arose, to stand up to CC RKP(b) criticism and follow an independent line, the Polrevkom 
may have succeeded in becoming the first socialist government of Poland, if the military 
situation  had  been  more  favourable.    However,  in  this  dilemma  lies  the  crux  of  the 
Polrevkom’s collapse. 
 
      Undoubtedly, the principle reason for the failure of the Committee was that it had 
always been utterly dependent upon the forces of the Red Army to control the areas over 
which it sought to establish authority. Its influence, therefore, only ever extended into 
Soviet-occupied Poland as far as the Red Army frontline.
191 Thus, when Tukhachevsky’s 
forces suffered a crushing defeat on the outskirts of the Polish capital in mid-August, no-
one, not even the Polish workers, whom it claimed to represent, were willing to take up 
arms in its defence, and the fate of the Polish Provisional Revolutionary Committee was 
sealed. 
 
      What lasting impact therefore, did the Polrevkom make?  If it lasted only twenty-three 
days, can it have made any impression at all on Poles, Russians and the wider international 
community?  The  answer  to  these  questions  must  be  a  resounding  yes.    Firstly,  the 
Committee’s activities left an indelible imprint on the populations it ruled over, raising 
awareness  amongst  the  Polish  population  of  the  communists  aims  and  objectives, 
especially  through  its  industrial,  agricultural  and  agit-prop  activities.  At  its  height  it 
certainly enjoyed support amongst elements of the working classes, the peasantry and the 
                                                
191 At the peak of its success, the Polrevkom possessed authority over the lands encircled by the Western and 
South-Western frontlines, the East Prussian frontier to the north, and the Bug River to the east.   168 
Jewish communities in the occupied territories. Its work impacted upon not only Poles, but 
also Russians and the populations of the Kresy – Lithuanians, Belorussians and Ukrainians 
– who resided in the occupied lands. Its policies touched lives across the classes, and 
encompassed  workers,  peasants, soldiers,  landowners,  industrialists,  government  circles 
and  military  leaders.  This  legacy  was  not  immediately  forgotten  by  events  on  the 
battlefield at Warsaw. 
 
         Secondly, as an embryonic Polish socialist government, which had controlled at the 
peak of its success, almost a quarter of ethnographic Poland, it served as a warning to the 
Polish Government, and their Western allies, about the threat posed by the Soviet regime. 
If  anyone  had  doubted  Bolshevik  intentions  during  the  Polish-Soviet  War  before  July 
1920, the establishment of the Polrevkom left them in no doubt about the Communists 
ultimate objective: the establishment of a Soviet Socialist Republic. Indeed, so concerned 
was the Polish Government by the Polrevkom and its implications for their state, that the 
eventual peace treaty signed between the Soviet Russian regime, the Ukrainian SSR and the 
Polish Government, included a term specifically designed to prevent its reestablishment on 
Polish lands at a future date. When the Preliminary Peace Treaty and Armistice Agreement 
was signed on 12 October 1920, ending the Polish-Soviet War, the second article stated, 
Both contracting parties include in the peace treaty an obligation neither to 
create  nor  to  support  organisations  which  have  as  their  aim  an  armed 
struggle against the other contracting party, which have as their aim the 
overthrow of the state or social order of the other side, making an attempt 
on its territorial integrity, as well as of organisations assuming the role of a 
government of the other side.
192 
 
      Finally, the Polrevkom left an indelible trace on Soviet history.
193 The Committee was 
the ultimate attempt by Polish communists and the Soviet regime in Moscow to impose its 
ideological objectives, not simply through propaganda, but through decisive and concrete 
practical action. Exporting revolutionary government to Poland was a direct break with 
Lenin’s earlier policy of national self-determination, but after the Politburo decision to 
cross  into  ethnographic  Poland,  taken  largely  at  the  Soviet  leader’s  instigation,  the 
establishment of the Polrevkom exactly reflected his aims by mid-1920. More than any 
other  event  of  the  Polish-Soviet  War,  the  establishment,  conduct  and  activities  of  the 
                                                
192 TNA, FO 417/9, doc. 83, enclosure 1. 
193  Soviet  historians  traditionally  focused  upon  its  importance  for  the  development  of  the  revolutionary 
movement in Eastern Europe, believing that, “...it proved that between the working classes of Poland and the 
working classes of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia, there could not be any cause for hostile relations, and that 
their interests coincide”, Istoriia Pol’shi, vol. 3, p. 143. 
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Polrevkom graphically demonstrated that which Soviet Russia hoped to achieve in Poland 
and beyond. Moreover, its collapse ably demonstrated the reasons for Soviet inability to 
gain support in Poland. As such, it deserves far greater attention than it has previously 
received by historians of the conflict. Although it failed to achieve its ultimate objective, 
the Polrevkom would provide a blueprint for a later Soviet generation to finally establish a 
Polish Socialist Republic after World War Two.    170 
Chapter 5: Polish-Soviet Relations, July-August 1920 
 
1. Baranowicze Negotiations 
 
      Before the final military manoeuvres of the war were enacted, diplomacy once again 
entered the theatre of Polish-Soviet relations. Indeed, rumblings of the need for renewed 
peace negotiations could be heard in both camps, during July, as the Red Army continued 
its advance westwards.
1 Chicherin hoped to secure a temporary armistice, strengthening 
the position of both the Soviet state and the Red Army. On 13 July 1920, he sent an 
extremely important, secret note, recently published for the first time, to Lenin, Trotsky, 
Krestinskii and Kamenev, in which he argued, 
We  must  utilise  the  advantage  of  the  proposed  armistice  and  avoid  its 
disadvantages. From Minsk to Brest 300 versts; the armistice will give this 
to us at no cost…. [but]…will be without date and will have a very short 
time  of  refusal  –  install  a  new  line…  at  once  inform  Poland  of  our 
conditions; and if not obeyed, renew the offensive from the new line.
2 
 
      Clearly,  Chicherin  promoted  a  dual  approach:  diplomatic  and  military.  He  tacitly 
acknowledged, however, that the former was unlikely to secure its aims stating, “…we will 
stand at the new line and will carry out negotiations until we can organise supplies. If we 
need to end operations... it will be possible to begin to stretch out the negotiations about 
the armistice.”
3 He argued that at the subsequent peace conference in Warsaw, “...we will 
set  out  our  ultimatum”.
4  The  peace  treaty  was, thus,  to  be  a  diktat.  By  proposing  the 
“...stretching out of negotiations” to assist the Red Army, light is shed on the leading 
Soviet diplomat’s view of the Baranowicze negotiations which commenced two weeks 
later.
5 
 
      Playing to an international audience four days later, Chicherin informed the British 
Government of Russia’s willingness to secure an armistice and peace treaty with Poland.
6 
Ironically, the very next day, the Soviet High Command issued an order that Warsaw be 
                                                
1 T. Dombal proposed a draft resolution in the Polish Sejm for the conclusion of the War on 30 July 1920, 
Dokumenty i materialy po istorii Sovetsko-Pol'skikh otnoshenii. vol. 3, (Moscow, 1965), doc. 61, p. 107 
(hereafter D & M). See also, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennii arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii, fond 68, opis 1, 
delo 12, (hereafter RGASPI). 
2  I.I.  Kostiushko  (ed.),  Pol’sko-Sovetskaia  voina  1919-1920:  ranee  ne  opublikovannye  dokumenty  i 
materialy, vol. 1, (Moscow, 1994), doc. 68, pp. 130-131. A verst was 1.06 kilometres. Italics in the original.    
3 Ibid.  Italics in original.    
4 Ibid.   
5 Ibid. 
6 D & M, vol. 3, doc. 93, pp. 157-162. Poland had itself proposed an armistice but received no reply from 
Soviet Russia before the deadline ran out on 18 July, The National Archives, FO 688/5, p. 179 (hereafter 
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captured  by  12  August.
7  The  Polish  Foreign  Minister,  Eustacy  Sapieha,  confessed  to 
Rumbold on 21 July that the Polish proposal to open peace talks with Soviet Russia had 
been delayed, “...at the instigation of the [Polish] generals”.
8 For the soldiers and diplomats 
of Poland, too, a dual policy was pursued. 
 
1.1 Diplomatic Negotiation, July-August 1920 
 
      On 22 July, the Polish Government radioed to the Soviet regime, proposing immediate 
armistice  negotiations.
9  The  Head  of  the  Polish  Army  General  Staff,  General  T. 
Rozwadowski, simultaneously telegrammed the Supreme Commander of the Red Army, 
S.S.  Kamenev,  with  a  proposal  to  end  all  military  action.
10  The  Red  Army,  however, 
continued its offensive and on the same day Trotsky sent a telegram to the RVS Western 
and South-Western Fronts, marked “Highly Urgent”, which stated, 
The Polish Government proposes an armistice and peace. It proposes that 
parliamentarians  go  down  to  the  line  between  Baranowicze  and  Brest-
Litovsk…. Chicherin is replying immediately... about a well-timed dispatch 
of  representatives  from  our  side  for  a  meeting  with  the  Polish 
parliamentarians. Further instructions will be received tomorrow. Until new 
instructions, all old remain in effect.
11 
 
The initiative remained firmly with the military.   
 
      The same day, the Politburo entrusted Chicherin to send a delegation to negotiate an 
armistice and peace with Poland’s representatives, although it had already resolved that the 
Red  Army  must  cross  the  ethnographic  border  and  advance  to  Warsaw.
12  The  Soviet 
agreement to negotiate, communicated by Chicherin to the Polish Government, and by the 
Red Army High Command to the Polish Army High Command, on 23 July 1920, thus 
served as a smokescreen, behind which the military could advance.
13 If diplomacy could 
have  secured  Soviet  objectives,  the  regime  would  most  probably  have  responded 
positively: it was not in their interest, following the Great War and Russian Civil war, to 
prolong  military  engagements  unnecessarily.  If  this  proved  impossible,  however,  the 
majority had no qualms, contrary to Marxist teachings, in using military force to impose 
                                                
7 J. Piłsudski, Rok 1920, (London, 1987), p. 212. 
8 TNA, FO 417/9, doc. 16, p. 22. See also, TNA, FO 417/9, doc. 18, pp. 23-28.  
9 Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 3, (Moscow, 1959), doc. 18, p. 61, (hereafter DVP). 
10 D & M, vol. 3, doc. 107, p. 190. 
11 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 79, pp. 150-151. Author’s italics. 
12 Ibid, doc. 78, p. 149.  
13 DVP, vol. 3, doc. 18, pp. 60-61.    172 
their ideological agenda on the Poles and the rest of Europe.
14  By now, Marxism had 
metamorphosed in Russia into Marxist-Leninism. Still the Soviet offensive continued.
15 
 
      On 27 July, the Soviet regime informed the Poles that, “The road suggested by you, 
viz. between Baranowicze and Brest has been chosen. The crossing of the front by your 
representatives will be made on July 30 at 8pm”.
16 The Poles accepted the proposed date 
for the meeting, but protested vigorously against an insinuation in the Soviet telegram that 
30 July had been decreed by the Polish General Staff.
17 On 27 July, the Politburo CC 
nominated Karl Danishevsky to lead the Soviet delegation.
18 The following day, the Polish 
Chargé d’Affaires in London, Jan Ciechanowski, wrote to the British Foreign Secretary, 
George Curzon,   
I  am  instructed  by  my  Government  to  inform  Your  Lordship  that  the 
Government of the Soviets, with the obvious desire to delay the eventual 
assistance of the Allied Powers to Poland, have proposed the 30
th July as the 
date on which the negotiations for an armistice… are to begin…. The Polish 
Government has had no part in delaying the opening of negotiations for an 
armistice till 30
th July.
19 
 
Embroiling the Polish diplomats and Government in haggling over minute detail served a 
two-fold purpose: firstly, Polish attention was distracted from the wider diplomatic game, 
and  secondly,  the  Soviets  were  able  to  present  the  Poles  as  divisive,  petty  and 
unreasonable. This provided diplomatic opportunities to drive a wedge between the Poles 
and their Western Allies.
20 
 
      The Poles were extremely sceptical of Soviet sincerity, not least because the Red Army 
continued its advance into ethnographic Polish territory.
21 Reaction in the Polish capital to 
the  Soviet  agreement  to  negotiate  was  witnessed  by  Edgar  D’Abernon,  chief  British 
diplomat in the Allied Military Mission. His diary entry for 27 July recorded, 
                                                
14 As discussed in Chapter 1, p. 54, Marx had argued that socialist revolution in Poland would be a 
spontaneous event, driven by the Polish working class itself.  
15 The Times, 27 July 1920, p. 14. 
16 TNA, FO 688/2/10, p. 3.  
17 Ibid; Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, A.12.P.2/1, doc. 25, p. 74, (hereafter Polish Institute); Polish 
Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 23, p. 96. L.B. Kamenev informed Lloyd George on 5 August, that Rozwadowski 
had, “...mentioned the 30 July as the date of the meeting”, TNA, FO 418/54, doc. 47, p. 228. 
18 Izvestiia, 1991, no. 2, p. 118.  See, Biographical Notes.  
19 Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 15, p. 15. This document was sent, in an effort to raise Allied support for 
the Polish cause, to The Times, Daily Telegraph, Morning Post, Reuters, International News Service, New 
York Sun and The United Press of America, Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 16.   
20 For correspondence between Krasin, Kamenev and Lloyd George, over the negotiations, see TNA, FO 
418/2/24, p. 78; TNA, FO 418/2/69, pp. 247-248. 
21 See, Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/3, doc 6; Kurjer Polski, 27 July 1920; Gazeta Poranna, 27 July 1920; 
Gazeta Warszawski, 4 August 1920; Rzeczpospolita, 4 August 1920, Robotnik, 4 August 1920.   173 
At  3pm  today  a  telegram  from  London  announced  that  the  Soviet 
Government  was  ready  to  negotiate  a  favourable  armistice  with  Poland.  
This  news  came  as  a  surprise  here  and  is  not  generally  credited.  The 
expectation has been that the Soviets would drag on armistice negotiations 
while their troops advanced. When it came to signing the demands would be 
so excessive as to be unacceptable.
22  
 
This is indeed exactly what happened when the Soviet regime presented their terms to the 
Poles on 5 August.
23 Polish preparations to attend the peace talks continued, however, and 
the delegation received the following instructions on 30 July, 
…the  Polish  Government  was  in  the  last  resort  prepared  to  accept  a 
minimum frontier which was even less favourable to the Poles than the Spa 
frontier. The Polish delegation had instructions, 
not to accept less than the above-mentioned frontier, 
not to agree to disarmament of the Polish Army as this would leave the 
Poles helpless vis-á-vis the Russians, 
not to accept interference in the internal affairs of Poland in the direction of 
prescribing the form of Government in this country.
24 
 
This  latter  term  was  crucially  important,  given  that  the  Polrevkom  was  established  in 
Białystok on the exact same day. In turn, the preliminary Soviet peace terms were defined 
by the Revvoensovet of the Republic on 30 July and revised by Chicherin the following 
day.
25   
 
      When  the  Polish  delegation  arrived  at  Baranowicze  on  30  July,  the  Soviet 
representatives  insisted  that  proceedings  be  adjourned  for  a  few  days.
26  Curzon  was 
informed by Rumbold that he had received, 
...exceptionally reliable information that the Commissar of Staff of one of 
the Soviet armies has been notified as follows, ‘We have arranged not to 
inform the Poles of armistice conditions before 4 August instead of 30 July. 
You have, therefore, four more days in which to continue fighting Poles 
until you receive orders from staff.
27 
 
As  a  result,  when  the  Poles  presented  their  credentials  on  1  August,  the  Red  Army 
representatives, Shutko and Leov, informed General Romer and Wroblewski, that they 
required a written mandate, signed both by Piłsudski as Chief-of-State and by the Polish 
Government. This “…should empower the Polish Delegation to sign not only an armistice 
                                                
22 E. D’Abernon, The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World, (London, 1931), p. 37.   
23 Ibid.  
24 TNA, FO 688/2/10, p. 7. See also, Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 17.   
25 For full text see, I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 84, pp. 155-160.   
26 Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series 1, vol. XI, (London, 1946), p. 422.   
27 Ibid, p. 422.   174 
but also the preliminaries of peace”.
28 It was then suggested by the Soviet representatives 
that the mandate could be received either by radio communication, the dispatch of fresh 
delegates,  sending  a  courier  to  Baranowicze,  or  by  the  Polish  delegates  themselves 
returning  to  Warsaw.  The  communication  concluded  with  a  request  that  the  new 
credentials be received by 4 August, allowing the negotiations to begin on that date at 
Minsk.
29 
 
      The  Poles  insisted  on  returning  to  Warsaw  to  receive  instruction  from  their 
Government.
30  As  noted  this  suggestion  was  initially  made  by  the  Soviet  delegates, 
although the Soviet regime traditionally presented this event as a sign of Polish bad faith. 
For instance, L.B. Kamenev informed Lloyd George on 5 August that, “...such limited 
powers did not correspond to the tasks with which the conference of the delegates were to 
deal”, whilst a Soviet historian remarked, “It became obvious that the Polish ruling circles 
were in no hurry to sign a peace treaty; their purpose was to hinder the offensive of the Red 
Army and win time”.
31 
 
      The  Polish  Vice-President,  Ignacy  Daszyński,  informed  the  newspaper,  Journal  de 
Pologne, on 31 July that following the conclusion of an armistice, the Polish Government 
would accept an immediate peace on two conditions: 1) that the independence of Poland be 
recognised, 2) the border states, lying between Poland and Russia, be awarded the right of 
self-determination.
32 This interview is of extreme importance to our understanding of the 
failed  Baranowicze  negotiations  as  it clearly  demonstrates  that  the  Polish  Government 
sought an armistice first and only when this was secured, would they commence peace 
pourparlers. Moreover, the Polish delegation had not been given powers to conclude a 
peace  settlement,  as  it  had  been  proposed  by  the  Allied  Governments  at  the  Spa 
Conference earlier in the month to hold a peace conference in London, over which their 
                                                
28 TNA, FO 688/2, pp. 108-109; TNA, FO 418/54, doc. 47, p. 229; Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 19, p. 
75. Shutko was plenipotentiary delegate of RVS of Western Front, Leov was plenipotentiary delegate of the 
Staff and Wroblewski was Polish Under-Secretary of State. 
29 Lenin telegrammed Stalin on 2 August, to inform him that, due to the serious threat posed to the Soviet 
regime by Wrangel, “...the opinion is mounting in the Central Committee that peace with bourgeois Poland 
should be concluded immediately”, V.I. Lenin, Polnoe sobraniie sochinenii, vol. 51, (Moscow, 1965), doc. 
435, p. 247, (hereafter PSS). 
30 Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/1, doc. 25, p. 75; TNA, FO 688/2/10, p. 13. 
31 TNA, FO 418/54, doc. 47, p. 228; B. Ponomaryov, A. Gromyko & V. Khvostov, (eds.), History of Soviet 
Foreign Policy, 1917-1945, (Moscow, 1969), p. 132. 
32 TNA, FO 417/9, doc. 22, p. 28.   175 
representatives would preside.
33 Also, at no time prior to the Baranowicze negotiations had 
the Soviets intimated that additional credentials would be required.
34  
 
      The Polish response to Soviet demands was of resentment, incredulity and suspicion, as 
clearly demonstrated by an MSZ Information Office Report, issued on 3 August, which 
stated that, 
It  is  evident  that  the  Soviet  Government  tends  to  draw  out  armistice 
negotiations hoping to delay help from our Allies. It is also evident that 
meeting on August the 4
th is a physical impossibility since the departure of a 
delegation… cannot take place at so short notice… the Government must 
necessarily await the report of the Delegation from Baranowicze before the 
departure of new delegates.
35 
 
The Polish Commander-in-Chief also reacted with hostility, recording, 
We  had  to  send  a  peace  delegation  –  where?  To  Minsk,  to  M. 
Tukhachevsky’s  own  headquarters,  to  beg  for  peace.  “Begging”  is  the 
correct term, since we had to initiate peace conversations at the moment 
when the victorious enemy was knocking at the gates of our capital and 
threatening  to  undermine  the  whole  organisation  of  the  state  before  he 
would utter the word “peace”.
36 
 
By proposing Minsk the Soviets could indeed suggest that the Poles were attending the 
Soviet military headquarters as a defeated power, forced to sue for peace. It also gave the 
Soviet regime the opportunity to isolate the Polish delegation from any potential Allied 
assistance during the talks. As a document, recently published in Moscow demonstrates, on 
10 August 1920, the Politburo had resolved, 
… if it is possible to surround [the western newspaper correspondents’] train 
so that they will be completely isolated. To [ensure]… the possibility of 
accomplishing such isolation... the Special Department of VChK [Cheka] 
will not allow the train of foreign correspondents to go to Minsk for the 
peace negotiations.
37  
 
      A further complication surrounding the Baranowicze talks was the difficulty which the 
Polish  delegation experienced in dispatching radio communications to  its Government. 
Suspicion of Soviet interference in this matter led the Polish representatives to issue a 
protest to the Soviet regime on 3 August.
38 In response, Chicherin blamed a weakening of 
                                                
33 Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 23, pp. 96-97. 
34 Ibid, p. 97; TNA, FO 688/6, p. 52. 
35 Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 19, p. 75. This interpretation of Soviet motives was shared by the British 
Minister in Warsaw, TNA, FO 688/2/10, p. 12. 
36 J. Piłsudski, Rok, p. 113.   
37 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 103, p. 176.   
38 Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 19, p. 75.   176 
the radio current due to bad weather, for the Soviets inability to accept Polish telegrams.
39 
The same day, Polish Ministers discussed an allegation that the Baranowicze delegation’s 
return to Warsaw had been impeded by Red Army troops and that the route to Minsk was 
almost  entirely  impassable.
40  This  simply  served  to  heighten  Polish  mistrust  of  Soviet 
motives. As a result, the Poles appealed to the Allies for assistance on 4 August.
41 In 
response, Lloyd George met with Kamenev and Krassin and, “...made it plain to them that, 
if they made further difficulties about the armistice and advanced into Poland, complete 
rupture with the allies was inevitable”.
42   
 
      On 5 August, Kamenev, a member of the Soviet trade delegation to Britain, informed 
Lloyd George that the Soviet Government reaffirmed its recognition of the Polish state 
within wider frontiers than those suggested by the Supreme Council and indicated by the 
British Government note of 20 July.
43 At the exact same time, the Red Army advance was 
proceeding rapidly and, having crossed every conceivable frontier, was within 40 kms of 
Warsaw.
44  
 
      Later that day, Sapieha informed Chicherin  that,  desiring  cessation of the war, the 
Polish  Government  accepted  the  proposal  to  send  a  delegation  to  Minsk  and  to 
simultaneously negotiate peace preliminaries and an armistice.
45 Peace, at this time, was 
greatly  desired  by  the  Poles,  given  that  the  Polish  Army  was  being  pushed  back 
dangerously close to Warsaw. He demanded that all aggressive military manoeuvres by 
both the Red Army and the Polish Army cease from the outset of the Minsk negotiations.
46 
Ironically, this Polish condition for an armistice along the whole front was the exact same 
term which the Soviet regime had insisted upon at the failed Borisov negotiations. Once 
again, the Moscow radio station refused to accept the Polish communiqué on 5 August.
47 It 
                                                
39  Polish  Institute,  A.12.P.2/2,  doc.  26,  pp.  118-119;  Daily  Telegraph,  4  August  1920.  Lloyd  George 
informed Kamenev, on 11 August, that the constant refusal of the Russian wireless stations to receive Polish 
messages, whilst the Red Army was advancing, could not fail to arouse suspicion, TNA, FO 688/2/10, p. 48.   
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46 Ibid.   
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was finally accepted by the Soviet authorities on 9 August.
48 The convenient breakdown in 
Moscow’s  radio  system would  indeed appear well-timed, especially given the Soviets’ 
secret  intention  of  delaying  diplomatic  proceedings  until  the  Red  Army  had  taken 
Warsaw.
49 
 
      On  6  August,  the  Polish  Government,  faced  with  an  impending  Soviet  military 
advance, stepped up its own propaganda offensive and issued a press statement, denying 
responsibility for the delay to the peace negotiations.
50 The Polish Council of National 
Defence  published  a  proclamation,  in  which  it  called  the  Soviets  to  account  for  their 
actions, arguing that the, “Soviets want to gain time: they want to take Warsaw and dictate, 
there, terms of peace to a defeated Poland”.
51 The Red Army, meanwhile, continued its 
westward progression. The next day, 7 August, the NKID instructed the MSZ that, “...our 
delegates will arrive at Minsk on 11 August, and we propose that your delegates cross the 
Chaussee-Siedlce-Miedzyrecz-Brest-Litovsk frontline on 9 August at 8pm”.
52 
 
      The  Soviet  diplomatic  offensive  began  to  reap  rewards  as  the  Allied  Powers 
increasingly questioned Polish sincerity. On 9 August, a joint British and French telegram 
recommended  that the Poles do their  utmost  to conclude an  armistice and  preliminary 
peace.
53  It continued, 
If, however, the Russian Soviet Government insists on terms, which infringe 
the legitimate independence of Poland, and the Polish Government rejects 
them, the British and French Governments will: 
Take  all  the  steps  they  can  to  interrupt  contact  between  Russia  and  the 
outside world and put pressure on Russia by other means to  respect the 
independence of Poland; 
Supply  the  Polish  Army  with  military  material,  but  cannot  send  further 
Allied troops; 
Do  their  utmost  to  keep  open  communication  between  Poland  and  the 
Allies.
54 
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In turn, the Poles were required to: publicly declare their intention to fight to the end for 
Poland’s  independence,  and  appoint  a  Commander-in-Chief  who  would  hold  no  other 
official office, be willing to accept the assistance of Allied officers, and accept and act on 
Allied military advice.
55 These conditions were regarded as an insult to Polish honour and 
integrity. Sapieha informed Rumbold two days later, that the Poles had repeatedly assured 
the Allied Mission in Warsaw of their intention to fight to secure their independence.
56  
 
      At the same time, Curzon telegrammed Rumbold that the, 
French Government have exactly the same information as we have as to 
refusal of Polish Government to act reasonably or to listen to advice and 
they tell us that Poles even scout advice of General Weygand who is ablest 
and  most  experienced  Chief  of  Staff  in  the  world.  The  French  are  now 
gravely suspicious that Piłsudski means to compromise with Bolsheviks and 
Sovietise Poland provided that his own power is safeguarded.
57 
 
This statement indicates the extent to which the Western Allies were out-of-touch both 
with the current Polish situation and the aims and objectives of the Polish Marshal. This 
was further demonstrated by the Allies refusal to assist the Poles, “...unless the Poles are 
really prepared to fight as vigorously and tenaciously for their independence as the Allies 
were for their own freedom”.
58 To suggest that the Poles would refuse to fight for their 
independence was entirely misguided. In fact, with the exception of the KPRP, the PPS-
Left  and  left-wing  elements  of  the  Jewish  community  in  the  Bund,  this  had  been  the 
dominant concern of the vast majority of Poles since the reestablishment of Poland in 
November 1918. Their determination to secure and consolidate their state was one of the 
principal reasons for the Polish-Soviet War in 1919 and 1920. 
 
1.2 Soviet Peace Terms and Reaction 
 
      On the evening of 10 August, Kamenev provided the British Government with a copy 
of the peace terms, which the Soviet regime was to offer to the Polish delegation at Minsk. 
The Polish Army was to be reduced to a civic militia of 50,000 men, whilst the army 
command  and  administration  was  to  be  limited  to  10,000  men.  Demobilisation  of  the 
Polish Army was to be completed within one month and all arms, except those required by 
the reduced army and civic militia, were to be handed over to Soviet Russia and Ukraine. 
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All  Polish  war  industries  were  to  be  demobilized  and  the  Poles  were  banned  from 
importing either troops or war material from abroad.
59  
 
     Lloyd George insisted that when Rumbold handed the Soviet terms to the Poles on 11 
August, he was to, 
...tell them that His Majesty’s Government are of the opinion that, provided 
these terms are bonâ fide offered at Minsk, and that no substantial addition 
is made to them, they would appear to leave the independence of Poland 
within her ethnographic frontiers unimpaired.
60 
 
The British Prime Minister believed that these terms were simply designed to guarantee 
Soviet Russia against future attacks.
61 
 
      The Poles did not regard the proposals in the same light. Indeed, so outraged was 
Sapieha, that he informed Rumbold, on 13 August, of his refusal to even communicate the 
advice of the British Prime Minister to his Government.
62 He further declared, 
Poland will not agree to any humiliating terms – there can be no question of 
demobilisation and disarmament. Poland does not need to issue declarations 
that  she  is  prepared  to defend  her  independence,  which  is a  humiliating 
demand,  as  Poland  is  decided  upon  defending  her  independence  in  the 
fullest meaning of the word....  We shall continue to defend ourselves even 
if deserted by all our allies.
63 
 
He further rebuked the Western Allies stating, 
When we placed the question of peace or war in the hands of our Allies we 
could not have supposed that they would advise us to conclude a disgraceful 
peace, which we will never accept. The Bolshevist terms are equivalent with 
the destruction of Poland. The Polish delegation is leaving tomorrow for 
Minsk with instructions to agree to no humiliating or wrongful terms.
64  
 
The Polish Minister also argued that if news of Lloyd George’s advice became public 
knowledge in Poland, the bitterest reaction against the British Government would result.
65 
  
      In an attempt to salvage the situation, Curzon apologised to Rumbold for the offence 
caused and reasoned that it was dictated by the refusal of the British public to become 
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directly  involved  in  the  war.
66  The  damage,  however,  had  been  done.  The  British 
Government came under severe criticism, including from its own diplomats. D’Abernon 
argued  that  the  terms  were  so  extravagant  that  the  Polish  Government  could,  on  no 
account, consider them, and that the British Government should have refused to pass them 
on.
67 Churchill condemned the Soviet diplomatic move as an attempt to, “...carry out a 
Bolshevik  revolution  in  a  disarmed  Poland”.
68  In  contrast,  the  French  Government, 
outraged at both the Soviet terms and the British advice, informed the Polish Government 
of its full support in the matter.
69 
 
      Still, the Poles, facing the continued Red Army offensive, and shaken by Britain’s 
response, prepared for the Polish-Soviet diplomatic negotiations at Minsk. Zdisław Okęcki 
of  the  Polish  MSZ  and  Major  Stamirowski  arranged  with  the  Soviet  authorities,  to 
commence talks on 14 August.
70 The Polish delegation, led by Jan Dąbski, former Deputy 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and comprising representatives of all Diet parties and the 
General  Staff,  duly  left  on  the  specified  date.
71  As  Sapieha  noted,  “The  discussions 
amongst the… delegation would take place in private and... would present a united front to 
the Bolsheviks”.
72  
 
      At  the  exact  moment  of  the  delegates’  departure,  a  large-scale  military  operation, 
planned  by the Polish General  Staff at the beginning of  the  month, was launched. As 
Piłsudski recollected, “...as Commander-in-Chief or as Head of State, it was up to me to 
ensure that our delegation did not leave the capital except with the certainty that Warsaw 
would hold out”.
73 The Battle of Warsaw had begun. 
 
      Soviet reaction was immediate. Trotsky announced that, 
This moment in diplomatic relations is extremely crucial. I believe that it is 
necessary for us to… abruptly accuse Poland, France and even Britain of 
breaking off or tolerating the disruption of negotiations with Poland in order 
to present us with an opponent’s peace.
74  
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This directly reflected the situation on the battlefield. As soon as the Polish Army launched 
its response to the Red Army offensive, the Soviet regime made immediate diplomatic 
moves. For both sides during the conflict, when  the military situation was proceeding 
favourably, diplomacy took a backseat, but when the tables began to turn, the diplomats 
again  took to the  stage. As a  result, diplomatic  negotiation continued as  the  Battle  of 
Warsaw raged on. 
 
1.3 Failure of the Talks 
 
      The  failure  of  diplomacy  in  August  1920,  once  again,  witnessed  the  participants 
seeking to apportion blame for their inability to reach agreement. And, once again, lack of 
trust and deep-seated suspicion lay at its heart. A Polish report, issued by the Legation in 
London, entitled The Present Situation in Poland with regard to the Bolshevist Menace, 
argued that, “…the real policy of the Soviets cannot be judged by the utterances of their 
Foreign Minister which only serve as a mask to cover their true intentions”.
75 It is certainly 
true that the Soviets sought, via diplomacy, to gain time for the Red Army advance and to 
allow the widely disseminated Soviet propaganda to bear fruit in Poland.  
 
      In contrast, the Soviet regime argued that the negotiations failed due to Polish play-
acting and dishonesty. Chicherin laid the responsibility for the breakdown in the peace 
talks firmly at the door of the Polish Government, informing Kamenev on 11 August 1920 
that, 
It is certain that the Poles are trying to protract preparations to negotiation 
and to delay the latter…. This has continued already for three weeks and 
every  time  the  delay  comes  from  the  Poles.  It  is  obvious  that  they 
passionately desire the negotiations to be delayed; probably they think that if 
Warsaw is taken it will force the Allies to intervene, and they lead, thus, to a 
policy of provocation.
76 
 
This opinion was shared by Soviet contemporaries and a number of Western historians.
77 
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      Who then was to blame for the failure of the Baranowicze peace talks? In July and 
August 1920, it benefited the Soviet regime to draw out diplomatic initiatives, whilst the 
Red Army offensive was being pursued. Quite simply, it was not in the interest of the 
NKID to negotiate until the lines on the battlefield had been drawn. The optimism of the 
Soviet leaders in a potential Polish socialist revolution and their conviction that the Red 
Army would be victorious at Warsaw, removed any pressing need to negotiate before these 
objectives had been achieved. The Polrevkom resided in the wings, ready to grasp political 
power in Poland as soon as the Polish Army was defeated. What incentive was there, then, 
for Lenin and his colleagues to negotiate with a Polish Government, soon to be replaced by 
an ideologically allied socialist government? Instead, the Baranowicze talks allowed the 
Soviet regime to play once again to an international audience and embroil the Poles in a 
confusing web of diplomatic manoeuvres. Poland was not, however, blameless. For the 
Poles, also, the outcome of the battle was awaited before they would fully commit to 
participating in negotiations. Guided and led by Piłsudski, they, too, were confident of 
victory.  
  
2. The Battle of Warsaw 
 
2.1 The Battle 
 
      The advance of the Red Army in August 1920 and the resultant Battle of Warsaw was 
of  decisive  importance  for  the  development  of  Soviet  Russia,  Poland  and  the  wider 
international community. As recorded by one contemporary observer,  
...the battle which was fought on the plains of the Vistula was not the battle 
for Warsaw alone, or even for Poland. It had a far wider significance…. It 
was the battle for civilisation, for liberty and justice, and for every principle 
for which democracy stands.
78 
 
If  successful,  the  Soviet  authorities  aimed  to  spread  their  ideology  and  incite  socialist 
revolution not only in Poland, but throughout the European continent and beyond.
79 For the 
Poles, the battle signaled their final stand in the struggle to consolidate and secure their 
infant state. 
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      The Polish military offensive was devised by Piłsudski during the night of 6 August 
1920 at the Belvedere Palace and, despite reservations expressed by various Polish military 
experts, he refused to alter his strategy. This,  
...involved a considerable  element of risk, for it  depended on letting the 
enemy concentrate his full strength against the defences of Warsaw while 
Piłsudski and his army waited for the critical moment to launch an attack on 
the Russian flank from Puławy. Correct timing was of vital importance and, 
therefore, he insisted on waiting, though telegrams from Warsaw repeatedly 
urged him to attack.
80  
 
Instead of organising strong lines of defense around the city, Piłsudski prepared to strike 
against the Red Army.
81 Whilst the Soviet Command expected the Polish forces to be 
concentrated in the north, Piłsudski sent them south of Warsaw.  
 
      Meanwhile, the Soviet advance continued. On 8 August, Western Front Commander, 
Mikhail Tukhachevsky, ordered his troops to avoid a direct frontal assault on Warsaw.
82 
Instead, they were to advance towards three separate targets: the right wing was to move 
along the Prussian border and capture Toruń; the central group to cross the Vistula below 
Warsaw and launch an attack on the city from the west and south, and the left flank to 
capture Lwów.
83 Three days later, the Red Army crossed the River Vistula at Włocławek 
near Toruń and by 13 August, was positioned six miles from the Polish capital.
84 The 
occupation of the city appeared imminent.
85 The Poles intercepted a Soviet radio message, 
which indicated that the Red Army attack was to commence the following morning at 
5am.
86 Soviet confidence in securing a speedy victory remained high.
87 The majority of 
Allied  diplomats  and  the  Allied  Mission,  fearing  Soviet  occupation,  left  Warsaw  for 
Poznań.
88 The diplomats had lost all control of events.  
 
      In contrast, the Polish civilian population rallied to the defense of their country. As 
early as 11 July 1920, an Official Polish Communiqué reported that, “Volunteers from 
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every part of the country are joining the fighting forces. During the last two days, over 
300,000  volunteers  from  Polish  territory  have  enlisted  in  the  army”.
89  In  the  week 
preceding the Battle, Rumbold observed that, “Bands of volunteers paraded the streets and 
even  a  women’s  corps,  which  looked  very  workmanlike,  has  made  its  appearance”.
90  
Polish  patriots  fired  by  the  approach  of  their  historic  opponent  towards  the  capital, 
displayed steely determination to fight to the last.
91 
 
      Unsurprisingly, the Red Army offensive was accompanied by an intensified Soviet 
propaganda  drive,  reflecting  both  military  and  political  initiatives.  An  appeal,  To  the 
Proletariat of Warsaw!, issued on 5 August, by the Polrevkom, declared, 
Comrades, the revolutionary Red Army in its victorious march to Warsaw is 
a messenger of the collapse of capitalist slavery and complete freedom of 
the working class. At this moment, the heroic proletariat of Warsaw cannot 
passively wait for events.... We call you to action.… Warsaw must be taken 
by you, yourselves…. The hour of liberation is approaching! To arms!
92  
 
The Soviet propaganda machine went so far as to spread misinformation that Warsaw had 
already  been  captured  by  the  Red  Army  on  13  August.
93  This  blatant  untruth  was 
immediately decried by the Poles.
94 
 
      In the vitally important days prior to and during the battle, a large number of Polish 
propaganda proclamations and appeals were issued. In these, the Red Army was portrayed 
as a weakened force, requiring only a concerted effort to be ousted from Polish territory.
95 
The  Polish  population  immediately  responded.  Crucially,  the  majority  of  workers,  the 
Soviets’ intended audience, continued to view the war as a nationalist conflict against a 
traditional enemy. As Feliks DzierŜyński, head of the Cheka and Polrevkom member, was 
forced to acknowledge, 
The  PPS  are  developing  rapid  agitation  for  the  defense  of  Warsaw.  Its 
influence is still great among skilled, well-earning workers…. thousands of 
men and women are being dispatched to dig trenches [and] to establish wire 
obstacles… in the streets.
96  
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On  6  August  1920,  the  Polish  Council  of  State  Defence,  mirroring  Soviet  diplomatic 
practice, issued an international proclamation to the Western Allies, warning, 
If Polish freedom dies tomorrow yours will be threatened. Think how the 
fall  of  Poland  may  become  the  commencement  of  a  new  world  war. 
Bolshevist victory on the Vistula threatens all Western Europe: a new world 
war hangs over the world like a storm cloud. Wake up, nations of the world, 
humanity, justice and truth call you.... Not only our, but also your future is 
at stake today on the Vistula.
97 
 
      The decisive blow took place on the 15-16 August. Piłsudski launched a flank attack, 
which resulted in the virtual annihilation of the Red Army in Poland.
98 Poor coordination 
of the Soviet advance allowed a gap to emerge between the Soviet armies. The Polish 
Marshal withdrew six of his most reliable divisions, organised them into “shock groups” 
and  advanced  into  the  vacuum,  driving  a  wedge  through  the  Soviet  ranks.
99  He  later 
recollected the ease with which the Polish Army advanced and stated, 
On the 16
th, I let loose the attack – if one can call it an attack. Only the 21
st 
Infantry  Division  came  into  action,  and  engaged  in  a  light  and  easy 
combat.... by the evening all Divisions had covered well over 30 or more 
kms towards the north.... It was like a dream.... The 17
th August came... I 
spent the whole day motoring, seeking for traces of the phantom enemy, and 
endeavouring to discover troops, which I feared.
100 
 
An Official Polish Military Communiqué confirmed that by 19 August, the Polish counter-
offensive was rapidly advancing.
101 Two days later the Polish Command reported, 
We  have  retaken  Brest-Litowsk.  Our  action  in  the  direction  of  Bielsk-
Białystok is progressing. The engagements in the sector of Lwów (Lemberg) 
are developing in our favour.... In the sector under Command of General 
Sikorski, 10,000 prisoners, 33 guns and 112 machine guns have been taken 
since the beginning of our operations.
102 
 
      Still, Chicherin attempted to gloss over events. On 24 August, he informed the Soviet 
trade delegation in London that, “The Russo-Ukrainian Army is ready for a new advance 
when the moment is considered favourable. The Polish radio communications about a great 
victory belong to the domain of fable”.
103 This was nothing more than wishful thinking. A 
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large number of Soviet units had been driven over the Prussian border and disarmed.
104  
The losses suffered by the Red Army following the Battle of Warsaw were extensive in 
terms  of  both  manpower  and  equipment.
105  The  Red  Army  had  been  well  and  truly 
defeated by the Poles. Piłsudski’s strategic plan had been fully implemented and the Polish 
Army had imposed the first military defeat, by a foreign adversary, on the Soviet Russian 
Republic. 
 
2.2 Who was Responsible for the Polish Victory? 
 
      Responsibility for the Polish victory has been claimed by, and accorded to, a number of 
groups and individuals. In particular, the Allied Military Mission, sent to Warsaw in July 
1920, and the French General, Maxime Weygand, have been signaled out for praise by 
contemporaries  and  historians  of  the  war.  For  others,  it  was  the  planning,  action  and 
leadership provided by the Polish General Staff, under Piłsudski, which drove the Red 
Army from the Polish lands in the summer of 1920.   
 
      Praise for the Allied Mission in securing the Polish victory was first promulgated by its 
diplomatic leader, Edgar D’Abernon.
106  He asserted,   
Had there been no mission, or had we been unsuccessful in establishing 
communication  between  Warsaw  and  Danzig,  or  again  had  we  failed  to 
inspire the Polish Government with reliance on the support of the Western 
Powers,  I  have  little  doubt  that…  the  Polish  Army,  driven  back  so  far, 
would have been incapable of serious resistance and impotent to prevent the 
Bolshevik troops from capturing Warsaw.
107 
 
This interpretation has been taken up by later historians, including Bryant Russell, who 
argued that, “...the Anglo-French Mission did indeed play a major role in the defeat of the 
Bolsheviks before Warsaw”.
108 
 
      D’Abernon  further  singled  out  the  role  of  General  Weygand  as  crucial  to  Polish 
success, informing Curzon on 28 August 1920, that, 
...great credit is due to the Polish commanders who devised the plan, and to 
General Weygand who improved it in many directions and who certainly 
contributed vastly to its successful execution... without General Weygand, 
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who insisted on the Poles adopting a definite plan and sticking to it – and 
who  also  introduced  the  novelty  (for  Poland)  of  written  orders  to 
commanders of troops – and vastly improved, if he did not create, a liaison 
service  between  units,  and  without  French  officers,  it  is  most  doubtful 
whether success would have been attained.
109   
 
This  interpretation  was  supported  by  many  contemporaries  and  historians,  including 
Piłsudski’s opponents, who sought  to discredit the  Polish Marshal and promote  Allied 
importance in the victory.
110 This was paradoxical, given the intransigence demonstrated 
by the Allies and, in particular, Lloyd George, in assisting the Poles in any meaningful way 
during the war. Without doubt, Weygand did carry out a considerable amount of work, 
organising the defences of Warsaw prior to the battle, helping to secure transport links and 
war  supplies,  and  reorganising  the  Polish  Army  command  structure.
111  Indeed,  in 
recognition of his efforts, the French General was awarded Poland’s highest military medal 
– the Vituri Militari.
112  
 
      Polish historians, in contrast, tend to stress that Weygand’s role was limited, unfamiliar 
as he was with local Polish conditions and unacquainted with the morale of the Polish 
troops.
113 In a revealing account of the war, Zdzisław Musiałik charted Weygand’s own 
presentation of events. Initially, the French General asserted that, 
This is a purely Polish victory. The preliminary operations were carried out 
in accordance with Polish plans and by Polish generals. My task, like that of 
the other officers of the French Mission, has  only been to make certain 
suggestions regarding the details of execution.
114 
 
However,  by  the  time  he  wrote  his  memoirs,  first  published  in  1957,  Weygand  had 
significantly  increased  the  importance  of  his  own  role.
115  In  reality,  he  was  neither  a 
commander on the battlefield, nor the author of Poland’s military strategy. 
 
      This honour rested firmly with Piłsudski, who had devised the military strategy, and 
commanded the Polish Army, which carried it out to the letter.
116 This was recognised by 
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contemporary Polish and Allied observers, including General Kazimierz Sosnkowski. An 
active  participant  in  the  battle,  he  recollected  that,  “...the  super-human  efforts  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  his  brilliant  conduct  of  the  campaign  together  with  perfect 
manoeuvering  led  to  a  final  triumph”.
117  Douglas  Savory,  MP,  recorded  that,  “The 
masterly turning manoeuvre which outflanked the Russians, was exclusively the idea of the 
Marshal  himself  seconded  by  General  Sikorski”.
118    Even  D’Abernon  was  forced  to 
acknowledge  that  Piłsudski,  as  Head  of  State  and  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Polish 
Army, “...has immense authority here and a greater knowledge of local conditions than 
anybody”.
119 Piłsudski’s utilisation of these dual roles, enabled him to direct, guide and 
lead the Polish state, assisted by his command staff, during the decisive battle. He, himself, 
vehemently  denied  receiving  any  concrete  Allied  assistance  from  either  the  Military 
Mission or General Weygand, stating, 
As regards military questions… I was not disposed to submit to any [Allied] 
dictation….  I  offered  to  share  command  with  General  Weygand.    He 
refused,  saying  with  great  justice  and  good  sense  that  the  Command  of 
troops so rapidly formed as ours, of whose value and that of their leader he 
knew nothing would be too difficult and indeed impossible for him, since he 
would not know what he could ask of his soldiers. It was for this reason that 
he confined himself to expressing theoretical judgments and, at least so far 
as I was concerned, abstained from exercising the slightest pressure on my 
orders and decisions whatsoever they were.
120 
 
      Finally, however, credit for the victory must be accorded to the Polish population, 
which, consumed by patriotic fervour, rallied to the defence of the nation. Tukhachevsky 
later claimed that, “All the verbiage about  the awakening of national sentiment in the 
Polish working class in connection with our offensive is merely due to our defeat”.
121 This 
is  entirely  incorrect.  The  Polish  Marshal  was  much  better  acquainted  with  Polish 
sentiment,  when he  reported that, “...the  Soviet  revolution could never get beyond the 
bayonet-point, because it had no real influence within Poland”.
122 Even Lenin was forced 
to acknowledge this truth. At the 9
th All-Russian Conference of RKP(b), on 22 September 
1920, the Soviet leader recalled a statement of the Polish delegation in Minsk that, “We 
know that it was not the Entente that saved Warsaw and Poland; it was unable to save us. It 
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was the upsurge of patriotism that saved us”, to which Lenin added, “Such lessons are not 
to be forgotten”.
123 
 
2.3 Reasons for the Soviet Defeat and Reaction 
 
      The statesmen and military leaders of the Soviet regime were deeply shocked by events 
at Warsaw. So confident were they of success that plans had already been made to transfer 
the  Polrevkom  to  the  Polish  capital  to  take  over  the  reins  of  the  new  socialist  Polish 
State.
124 The prestige of the world’s first socialist army was shattered by the defeat. The 
immediate  response  of  many  was  to  relaunch  a  Soviet  counter-offensive.    Trotsky 
recorded, “I found Moscow favouring a second Polish War. Now even Rykov went over to 
the other camp. ‘Once started’, he was saying, ‘we must carry it through to the end’”.
125 As 
noted by an Official Polish Military Communiqué, on 31 August, the Soviets went so far as 
to order a general mobilisation for 18 to 50 year olds.
126 The Western Front Command also 
favoured continuing the war. Trotsky recollected, 
I found the headquarters at the front in favour of another war. But there was 
no conviction there; it was simply a reflection of the attitude in Moscow. 
The lower I went on the military ladder – from an army to a division, a 
regiment, a company – the more I realised the impossibility of an offensive 
war.
 127 
 
He subsequently urged Lenin to reject a renewed offensive.
128 So great was his concern, 
that  if  the  Politburo  voted  to  proceed  with  the  war,  he  would  refuse  to  submit  to  its 
decision and appeal directly to RKP(b) members.
129 Previously, Lenin had asserted, “If we 
have to wage a winter campaign we shall win, despite exhaustion and fatigue. There can be 
no doubt on that score”.
130 However, following Trotsky’s assessment, the Soviet leader 
agreed  that  to  continue  the  offensive  would  pose  a  grave  risk  to  the  security  of  the 
regime.
131 The Politburo resolved to sue for an immediate peace.
132 
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      Ironically,  both  the  Polish  Government  and  Polish  delegation  at  Minsk  entirely 
misunderstood the  real debate  taking  place  within  the  Soviet  leadership.
133  The  Polish 
diplomat, Łukasiewicz, informed Rumbold in September 1920, 
There were… two parties in Russia, which were about equally matched. 
There was the party of Lenin, which desired peace, because it thought that 
the Bolshevik principles, in which it sincerely believes, could be best spread 
by  means  of  peaceful  penetration....  But  the  party  of  Trotsky  was  quite 
diffferent; it was not interested so much in the spread of Bolshevik ideals as 
in the perpetuation of the present régime in Russia, and the only means of 
doing so, in its opinion, was to keep on fighting.
134 
 
Thus, although the Poles were aware of Soviet disagreement surrounding the continuation 
of the war, they were entirely incorrect in their placing of Lenin and Trotsky at the head of 
each group. The reverse was the reality. 
 
     Publicly, the Soviets launched a propaganda offensive to gloss over the defeat. The 
regime asserted that the overwhelming military force of the Entente was responsible for the 
result.
135 In an article composed on 10 September 1920, entitled, We are stronger than we 
were, Trotsky publicly asserted, “We have dealt the Poland of the gentry a mighty blow. 
And today we feel more capable than ever before of dealing a second blow, mightier than 
the first”.
136  This was blatantly untrue. In The Polish Gentry Do Not Want Peace, he 
changed  tack,  declaring  that  the  Soviet  drive  had  succeeded  in  compelling  the  Polish 
Government to make peace.
137 Publicly, Lenin, too, maintained this façade, informing the 
9
th All-Russian Conference of the RKP(b) on 22 September 1920, “...we have never been 
and are not far from victory over Poland”.
138 He maintained that the Battle of Warsaw had, 
...a profound effect on the revolutionary movement in Europe, particularly 
in Britain... We have succeeded in influencing the British proletariat and in 
raising the movement there to an unprecedented level, to an absolutely new 
stage of the revolution.
139  
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If the Red Army had been victorious, he argued that the entire Versailles system would 
have been irrevocably overthrown.
140  
 
      Privately, however, the Soviet authorities recognised the devastating catastrophe which 
had befallen the international socialist movement. In his secret speech in September 1920, 
recently  opened  by  the  Russian  archives  and  never  intended  for  publication,  Lenin 
acknowledged that the Battle of Warsaw had been a major turning point not only in the 
Polish-Soviet War, but also for the entire world.
141 Crucially, for the first time, he admitted 
that the Polish workers did not desire a socialist revolution, the likelihood of which he had 
consistently overestimated throughout the war, and that, contrary to all Marxist teachings, 
the Soviet regime had authorised the use of the Soviet military to overthrow the existing 
Polish state. Lenin admitted, 
As far as we were able to probe with a bayonet the readiness of Poland for 
social revolution, we must say that this readiness was slight…. We did not 
really manage to test the true mood of the proletariat masses among either 
farm labourers or the industrial proletariat.
142  
 
Accordingly,  an  error  had  been  made,  resulting  in  a  gigantic,  previously  unheard  of, 
defeat.
143 Lenin argued that, 
...a mistake has undoubtedly been committed; after all, we had victory in 
hand and we let it slip....  The mistake clearly had to be either in policy or in 
the strategy of war....  Perhaps the mistake was political, perhaps it was 
strategic as well...  I will state now that the Central Committee analysed this 
question and left it open.
 144  
 
Significantly, no mention was made of Trotsky’s doubts about the Red Army crossing the 
ethnographic Polish border in late July 1920. Clearly, the Soviet leader wished to avoid 
any responsibility for insisting on the Politburo support for this action. Instead, he deemed 
that the question of mistaken Soviet policy would be decided by historians.
145  
 
      Soviet and much Western historiography have shed little light on the principal reasons 
for the Soviet defeat.
146 Fiddick argued that Russia’s retreat may have been pursued to 
allow the reestablishment of Soviet diplomatic relations with the West and the replacement 
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of War Communism with the New Economic Policy domestically.
147 In this, he entirely 
misread  the  situation.  If  the  Red  Army  had  been  successful  in  spreading  socialist 
revolution  to  the  industrial  countries  of  Western  Europe,  there  would  have  been  no 
question  of  retreating.  The  subsequent  introduction  of  NEP  and  the  establishment  of 
diplomatic relations with the West were as a result of the Red Army defeat at Warsaw, not 
the reason for that defeat. 
 
      Accounts by Red Army participants also often fail to enlighten the reader.
148 A culture 
of blame developed around the question, as each leading participant sought to remove 
personal responsibility for the catastrophic result. Aware of the potential internal conflict 
within the RKP(b), Lenin avoided fanning the flames of discontent by refusing to place 
blame on individuals for the Soviet defeat.
149 His colleagues were not as restrained. Stalin 
was criticised for moving the Red Army’s left flank towards Lwów and for its failure to 
support the drive on Warsaw.
150 Semen Budennyi was singled out for condemnation.
151  
Trotsky,  too,  received  criticism  for  his  role.
152  The  Soviet  Commander-in-Chief,  S.S. 
Kamenev, came under fire for vacillating between the demands of Tukhachevsky and those 
of Egorov and Stalin.
153 Finally, the finger was pointed at Tukhachevsky.
154 Ironically, 
only Lenin, the instigator of the Red Army advance in July 1920, avoided condemnation. 
 
      Did the Soviet mistake lie in the sphere of military strategy or in the formulation of 
Soviet  policy  towards  Poland?  Tukhachevsky  himself  acknowledged  that  the  Soviet 
authorities  had  made,  “...errors  in  our  strategical  consideration”.
155  The  strategy  of 
directing troops in three separate directions, north-west to reach Germany, west to take 
Warsaw, and south-west into Eastern Galicia, has been severely criticised.
156 This dispersal 
of Soviet forces hampered Red Army communications prior to and during the battle. A 
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poor  supply  system  and  troop  desertion  compounded  the  difficulties.
157  Tukhachevsky 
asserted that, “The essential cause of our defeat was insufficient technical preparation of 
troop commanders”, whilst at the 10
th All-Russian Congress of RKP(b) in March 1921, 
Lenin  admitted  that,  in  part,  it  “...was  due  to  the  fact  that  we  had  overestimated  the 
superiority  of  our  forces”.
158  Finally,  lack  of  coordination  between  the  force  led  by 
Tukhachevsky towards Warsaw and the Red Army’s left flank (12
th Army and Budennyi’s 
1
st Cavalry Army), commanded by Egorov and supervised by Stalin, allowed a gap to 
develop.
159 This was a direct result of Lenin’s order that the south-west sector establish a 
revolutionary  bridge  to  Southern  Europe,  especially  to  Hungary,  Czechoslovakia  and 
Romania.
160 Piłsudski wasted no time in driving a wedge between the two Soviet fronts 
and destroying their communication and supply lines. 
 
      These military mistakes were, however, compounded by critical errors in misguided 
Soviet policy. The primary reason for the Soviet defeat in August 1920 was the failure of 
the long-anticipated  Polish revolution  to materialise and  the  active  participation  of the 
Polish population in defending the nation against the Red Army invaders. In June 1920, 
Lenin acknowledged that, 
The  most  dangerous  thing  in  a  war…  is  to  underrate  the  enemy  and  to 
reassure ourselves with the thought that we are the stronger. That is a most 
dangerous thing, which may lead to defeat in the war; it is the worst feature 
in the Russian character.
161 
 
Six  weeks  later,  the  Soviet  regime  and  Lenin  failed  to  heed  this  warning  by  fatally 
underestimating the Poles. They sincerely believed not only that the demoralised Polish 
Army would prove entirely incapable of resisting the Soviet advance, but that the Polish 
workers  and  peasants  would  welcome  the  Red  Army  as  liberators  from  bourgeois 
oppression. The reverse was the reality. 
 
      Firstly, Polish resistance, fired by nationalist sentiment, intensified the closer the Red 
Army approached to the capital. As Lenin acknowledged, “...the tide turned…. the Polish 
troops, supported by a wave of patriotism in Warsaw, and with a feeling that they were 
now  on  their  own  soil,  found  encouragement  and  a  fresh  opportunity  to  advance”.
162 
Secondly, and of absolutely decisive importance for the outcome of the battle, was the 
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failure of socialist revolution to take root in Poland, despite the best efforts of both Soviet 
propaganda and the Polrevkom. Communist ideology failed to inspire the vast majority of 
the Polish population.
163 DzierŜyński’s insistence on drafting large numbers of Chekists to 
support the Polrevkom, suggests that he, too, questioned the potential for revolution among 
Polish workers and peasants, prior to August 1920. 
 
      Marchlewski blamed the late organisation of the Polrevkom, its promulgation of too 
radical  a  programme,  and  the  failure  of  Polish  communists  to  inspire  and  direct  the 
workers, for the failure of the Polish revolution.
164 Many communists failed to return to the 
country from Russia and the KPRP proved ineffectual. Strikes organised by the KPRP and 
Jewish Bund failed to attract support, efforts to establish Polish Units in the Red Army 
collapsed and many communists were arrested by the Polish authorities.
165  
 
      In  reality, for  the  majority  of  Poles  the  Red  Army  was  indistinguishable  from  the 
traditional  invading  armies  of  Tsarist  Russia,  bent  on  subjugating  their  reestablished 
nation. Polish patriotism strengthened, regardless of social class. At best, the Polrevkom 
reported, “...the peasants regard the war indifferently and avoid mobilisation”.
166 At worst, 
the workers, the Soviets intended target leaders of the Polish revolution, failed to respond 
to communist propaganda. According to E.N. Sergeev, “...our information agencies had 
been too optimistic as regards the state of affairs in Poland”.
167 As Rumbold observed, 
“...even when the Bolshevik forces were at the very doors of Warsaw there was no sign of 
a communist movement in this town”.
168 
 
      Ultimately,  the  old  adage  that  opinions  can  prove  stronger  than  armies  was 
demonstrated by the Polish-Soviet War. As Trotsky was forced to acknowledge, 
Where the action of armies is measured by days and weeks, the movement 
of  people  is  usually  reckoned  in  months  and  years.  If  this  difference  in 
tempo is not taken fully into account, the gears of war will only break the 
teeth of the revolutionary gears, instead of setting them in motion. At any 
rate, that is what happened in… the Polish War.
169 
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As he had suspected, the Red Army could not be used to launch a revolution in Poland. 
Marx decreed it mandatory that the establishment of socialist revolution be the work of the 
local population itself. The Soviet Russian regime paid a heavy price in August 1920, for 
ignoring this socialist ideological dictum. 
 
3. International Revolution 
 
3.1 Was International Revolution Possible? 
 
      Throughout  the  Polish-Soviet  War,  the  desire  to  establish  international  socialist 
revolution dominated Soviet ideology and the conviction of the Soviet leadership that this 
was not only possible, but was immediately achievable, directly influenced their conduct 
during the conflict. How realistic, then, was this objective? 
 
      As Marxists, the Soviet leaders sincerely believed that the October Revolution of 1917 
would ignite the spark of revolution in more industrially advanced countries and on 26 
December  that  year,  awarded  two  million  roubles  to  the  NKID  to  assist  left-wing, 
internationalist labour movements across the world to this end.
170 With the conclusion of 
the Great War in late 1918, it appeared to many that the international tide was turning in 
the Soviets’ favour. As D’Abernon noted, “…circumstances were particularly favourable 
to revolution. The minds of men were so weakened by the terrific strain of the years of war 
that they had become a ready prey to any subversive doctrine.... Bolshevism... was still a 
gospel of hope”.
171 Following the Red Army drive westwards, by December 1918, Soviet 
Republics had been established in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. Civil war had broken out 
in Finland, Germany was facing a power vacuum, and Kiev was occupied by February 
1919.
172  The  previous  month,  a  radical  left-wing  regime,  under  Kurt  Eisner,  was 
proclaimed  in  Bavaria  and  Workers’  and  Soldiers’  Councils  emerged  throughout  the 
German State.
173   
 
      The year 1919 witnessed the pinnacle of communist optimism. This was not without 
foundation.  In  January  1919,  the  Red  Army  occupied  large  areas  of  both  Latvia  and 
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Lithuania, including the cities of Riga and Wilno, and a Spartacist Uprising, a spontaneous 
workers’ movement,  which aimed to  overthrow the German Socialist Government and 
later attracted communists, took place in Berlin.
174 Unrest, as a result of war-weariness, 
hunger and shortages, spread throughout the Allied countries and waves of strikes took 
place  in  France,  Italy  and  Britain.
175  According  to  a  British  Report  (Political  and 
Economic) of the Committee to collect Information on Russia, compiled in May 1920, 
“The outbreak of the revolutions in Germany and Austria-Hungary inspired in them [the 
Soviet leaders] the belief that revolutions would shortly take place in Great Britain and 
France”.
176 On 27 February, the Lithuanian and Belorussian Soviet Republics united to 
create the Soviet Socialist Republics of Lithuania and Belorussia (Litbel) and on 21 March 
1919, a Hungarian Soviet Republic, led by Béla Kun, was established.  
 
      This  revolutionary  upsurge  induced  the  Soviet  regime  to  establish  the  Third 
Communist International (Comintern) in Moscow, the principal task of which was to help 
establish Communist parties abroad and to direct and lead the developing insurrections.
177 
Euphoric optimism led Trotsky to write on 5 August 1919 that, “In Poland, as it appeared, 
the  revolution  was  developing  at  a  rapid  pace”.
178  By  November  1919,  Lenin  felt 
sufficiently confident to argue that, “The victory of Soviet power throughout the world is 
assured. It is only a question of time”.
179 
 
      This positive outlook continued in Soviet Russia during the first half of 1920. One 
month  before  the  Polish  offensive  towards  Kiev,  Lenin  stated,  “...never  has  the 
international position of the Soviet Republic been as favourable and as triumphant as it is 
now”.
180 Confidence in the emergence of a Polish revolution by mid-1920 was displayed in 
a speech given by the Soviet leader to Moscow workers and Red Army men on 13 May 
1920, in which he unequivocally stated, “We... think that the Polish proletariat, together 
with the proletariat of Lithuania and Byelorussia, will see to it that the Polish bourgeoisie 
and nobility are driven out of the country”.
181 This conviction led the Soviet regime to 
endorse the establishment of the Polrevkom two months later.  
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      Belief in the future Polish socialist revolution was shared by Tukhachevsky. Even after 
the Soviet defeat, he remained convinced of Polish and European revolutionary potential, 
reporting  to  the  Moscow  Military  Academy  in  1923,  “What  was  the  condition  of  the 
proletariat  in  Western  Europe?  Was  it  prepared  for  revolution?....  the  answer  to  this 
question was definitely in the affirmative”.
182  He further asserted, 
The situation in Poland was favourable to revolution. A powerful movement 
among  the  proletariat,  and  a  no  less  threatening  movement  among  the 
agricultural workers, were placing the Polish bourgeoisie in an extremely 
awkward position... all our experience in the part of Poland we occupied 
was  entirely  in  favour  of  the  socialist  offensive  and  showed  general 
readiness to support it.
183  
 
In response Piłsudski remarked, 
...in his [Tukhachevsky’s] imagination, there was a state of class tension in 
Poland which was reflected in a general simmering and ferment of unrest 
among the population... such  contradictions, so evidently opposed  to the 
“réalité des choses” could be reconciled only in the mind of a doctrinaire.
184 
 
In reality, the revolutionary upsurge had already long since passed in much of Europe by 
the time the Soviets crossed the ethnographic Polish border in July 1920. 
 
3.2 The Failure of International Revolution 
 
      As early as 5 August 1919, Trotsky had acknowledged privately to the CC RKP(b) 
that,  “...the  European  revolution  appears  to  have  withdrawn  into  the  background”.
185 
January 1919 had witnessed the brutal suppression of the Spartacist Uprising in Berlin, 
resulting in the murder of the German Communist Party (KPD) leaders Rosa Luxemburg 
and Karl Liebknecht. The Bavarian Soviet Republic lasted only six weeks, before being 
overthrown by Freikorps and Reichswehr units. In Austria, the revolutionary upsurge of 
the  summer  was  quickly  extinguished,  and  Kun’s  Hungarian  Soviet  Republic  fell  in 
August 1919. The communist governments hastily established in the Baltic states during 
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the winter of 1918-1919 crumbled by mid-1919.
186 In Italy, Antonio Gramsci’s efforts to 
establish a socialist “United Front” against fascism ended in failure. In the United States of 
America, in 1919, the Socialist Party under Daniel de Leon was persecuted and the long 
anticipated British and French revolutions failed to materialise.  
 
      The tide of public opinion, worldwide, had clearly rejected socialist revolution. With 
the  establishment  of  an  apparently  durable  peace  at  Versailles,  the  European  nations 
increasingly turned their back on international concerns, focusing attention on domestic 
issues.  The  Comintern  proved  ineffective  in  uniting  and  directing  the  international 
movement. As Lenin was forced to concede in December 1919, 
...from  the  point  of  view  of  the  speed  of  the  development  [of  world 
revolution], we have endured an exceptionally difficult period; we have seen 
for ourselves that the revolution’s development in more advanced countries 
has  proved  to  be  considerably  slower,  considerably  more  difficult, 
considerably more complicated.
187 
 
This dramatic shift in international opinion was conveniently overlooked by the Soviet 
leaders and failed to shake their confidence in a Polish revolution, with fatal consequences 
in August 1920.
188  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
      The Allied  Powers, in turn, were deeply shocked at the change of  events.
189 They 
misunderstood both the intention and ability of the Soviet regime to launch an offensive 
into Poland and had underestimated the capability and determination of the Polish Army 
and nation to defend their state from foreign aggression during the summer of 1920. For 
their part, the Allies had failed to provide any concrete assistance to the Poles, despite 
promises to this effect. Indeed, this culminated with the British Prime Minister, desirous of 
reestablishing British-Russian trade relations, encouraging the Poles to accept humiliating 
peace terms at the beginning of August 1920.
190 Those Allied statesmen based in Poland 
were  not,  however,  slow  to  acknowledge  the  great  significance  of  the  Polish  victory. 
Rumbold informed the British Foreign Secretary on 24 August, 
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In  my  view  the  issue  at  stake  was  nothing  less  than  the  final  ruin  and 
probable disappearance of Poland... a great deal of anxiety has incidentally 
been removed from the shoulders of the allied statesmen.... Once again the 
flood of barbarism which threatened to overwhelm Central Europe has been 
rolled back.
191  
 
The diplomatic leader of the Allied Military Mission recorded that it had been a privilege 
to take part in this episode, in which reality so far outran expectation.
192 Nevertheless, the 
Western  Allies  could  claim  no  plaudits  for  the  Polish  victory:  credit  was  due  to  the 
exertions of the Polish civilian population and military forces alone. 
 
     For Soviet Russia, the Battle of Warsaw signified a devastating defeat for the new 
regime, which it was unable to either forgive or forget.
193 It also marked a turning point in 
Soviet ideology as the state increasingly began to direct its resources towards its internal 
consolidation.  The  focus  became,  very  assuredly,  inward  looking.  The  spread  of 
international  revolution,  that  driving  Soviet  objective  throughout  the  war,  receded 
temporarily, into the background.  
 
      For the Polish Republic, victory over the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw secured the 
independence of the state, removed the threatened installation of a puppet Soviet regime 
and  laid  the  foundation  of  Polish-Soviet  relations  for  the  next  25  years.  It  secured, 
furthermore, the European continent from the onslaught of Soviet forces until the outbreak 
of  World  War  Two.  A  Soviet  victory,  as  noted  by  Lenin,  would  have  shattered  the 
international system established by the Allies at the Paris Peace Conference.
194 The Battle 
of Warsaw was, indeed, 
...a battle no less decisive than Sedan and the Marne in its influence on the 
culture of the world, on its science, religion and political development.... had 
the  Soviet  forces  overcome  Polish  resistance  and  captured  Warsaw, 
Bolshevism would have spread throughout Central Europe, and might well 
have penetrated the whole continent.
195 
 
The stage was set for the concluding chapter of the Polish-Soviet War. At last, diplomacy 
was to have its day.  
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Chapter 6: The Treaty of Riga 
 
1. Introduction 
 
      The  Polish-Soviet  War  advanced  along  its  well-established  path  from  mid-August 
1920, when military action on the battlefield was accompanied by the pursuit of diplomatic 
discussion  at  the  negotiating  table.  Piłsudski’s  attack,  launched  on  16  August,  was 
followed  the  next  day  by  the  opening  of  peace  talks  at  Minsk.  The  discussions  were, 
however, stillborn.  
 
      Both camps were intent on awaiting a favourable military outcome to ensure that the 
peace would be negotiated from a position of strength.
1 D’Abernon reported to Curzon on 
23 August 1920, that he had been informed by captured soldiers of the 16
th Soviet Division 
that,  
It was common talk in the Army that the Minsk Conference was not serious, 
but had only been arranged to pacify the Entente and to impress the political 
parties  in England  with the Bolsheviks good intentions. The whole Army 
understood that no peace was intended before Warsaw was captured.
2 
 
That this policy was indeed pursued by the Soviet regime can be clearly observed in a 
recently published archive document. On 17 August 1920, Chicherin suggested to Lenin 
the feasibility of protracting negotiations with the Poles, remarking, 
The  change  in  the  situation  at  Warsaw…  leaves  in  Minsk  only  two 
alternatives… 1) we can send an ultimatum with demands for an immediate 
signing of a peace and afterwards we can refuse to tear it up, 2) or we can go 
to protracted negotiations, drawn out by the Poles.  The first path places us in 
the odious position of razing the negotiations to the ground. Although an 
ultimatum would have the aim of soon concluding a peace, the wide masses 
would  only  understand  that  we  broke  off  the  negotiations.  With  the  new 
situation our main aim must be our agitational influence in the West… with 
long drawn out negotiations the situation becomes more flexible.
3 
 
As a result, no questions were satisfactorily settled in the official discussions held between 
the Polish and Soviet delegations in the Belorussian city from 17 August until 2 September 
1920. 
 
      Minsk had been carefully chosen by the Soviet authorities as the location for the peace 
conference which they were so keen to prolong. Not only was this the headquarters of 
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M.N.  Tukhachevsky,  but  it  was  also  a  most  unsuitable  spot  at  which  to  conduct 
negotiations.  It  was,  according  to  one  member  of  the  Allied  Military  Mission, 
“…inaccessible  by  telegraph  or  radio.  Messages  never  seem  to  get  through,  cars  are 
stopped by broken bridges, while messengers, with the now uncertain moving front, are 
more likely to be shot than to arrive at their destination”.
4 
 
      In an attempt to dishearten the Polish delegation, thereby making them more amenable 
to  the  Soviet  peace  terms,  and  to  prevent  them  from  discovering  the  outcome  of  the 
military campaign, the Soviet regime practically imprisoned the delegates in their lodgings 
and prevented them from communicating by radio with the Warsaw Government. The 
accommodation  provided  was  extremely  uncomfortable.
5  As  one  Polish  delegate, 
Stanisław Grabski, later recorded, 
The Bolshevik authorities did not make the Polish delegation’s path easy. We 
only arrived at Minsk on the third day, when the retreat of the Soviet armies 
had already begun. Everything possible was done to prevent us learning the 
result  of  the  battle.  We  were  accommodated  in  a  house  with  a  garden 
surrounded by a high board-fence. Outside were sentries who did not allow 
the local population  to come  into the least  contact  with us. We were not 
allowed  to  go  into  the  town.  We  were  “de  facto”  interned.  The  Russian 
newspapers which reached Minsk contained no war news at all.
6      
 
 
      This account was confirmed by a report of Prince Eustachy Sapieha, Polish Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, on 31 August 1920, which recounted close observation by the Soviet 
authorities and the imposing of severe regulations forbidding the Polish delegation from 
circulating  without  an  armed  escort.
7  Indeed,  the  previous  day,  Sapieha  had  radioed 
Chicherin directly to complain about this “intolerable situation”.
8 Crucially, it now appears 
that this was not the work of the local Soviet authorities, but was instead directed by the 
Russian leadership itself. Trotsky, as Soviet Commissar for War, was personally involved 
in the decision and, on 19 August, sent a note to I.T. Smilga and Chicherin regarding the 
condition  of  the  delegation  at  Minsk,  in  which  he  questioned,  “Is  it  impossible  to 
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accommodate [the Polish delegation] in the town and to surround it with a sharp fence 
around a well-known square, prohibiting them from leaving…?”
9  
 
      Despite the Polish delegation having taken a portable wireless transmitter with them to 
Minsk to facilitate continuous communication with their Government, they reported that, 
“…at the hours appointed for our talks “atmospherics” invariably caused such disturbances 
as  to  make  communication  impossible”.
10    On  22  August,  in  response  to  Sapieha’s 
communication, Chicherin informed the Polish Foreign Minister that, 
We are not responsible for the quality of your wireless apparatus and state 
that all telegrams which the Polish Government sent to Moscow for your 
delegation  and the latter’s telegrams to  the  Polish Government have been 
transmitted without delay.
11 
 
 
      In this, Chicherin was disingenuous. On 17 August, Danishevskii admitted that the 
Polish delegation could not communicate with Warsaw and the rest of the world due to the 
Bolshevik wireless station’s policy of deliberately interfering with their communication 
channels.
12 Indeed, the opening of Russian archives reveals that on 21 August, Chicherin 
himself demanded that the radio-transmitter of the Polish delegation be sealed up.
13 In this 
instance, it was again a leading Soviet statesman who was directly responsible for the 
policy of consciously isolating the Polish delegates as the Battle of Warsaw continued.
14 
 
2. The Minsk Negotiations 
 
2.1 Soviet Peace Terms and Reaction 
  
      As a result, the diplomatic initiative at Minsk rested primarily with the Soviet Russian-
Ukrainian delegation, which submitted its peace proposals to the Poles at the first plenary 
session on 17 August.
15 The continued optimism of the Soviet regime in the possibility of a 
Red Army victory at Warsaw was reflected in the extremely severe fifteen-point proposal 
                                                
9 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 128, p. 201, notes that, “V.I. Lenin was in agreement with this”. 
10 S. Grabski, p. 24.  
11 TNA, FO 688/2/10, p. 128; Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 37, p. 155.    
12 TNA, FO 688/2/10, p. 127; Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 39, p. 161. 
13 I.I. Kostiushko, vol. 1, doc. 128, p. 201. 
14 The Polish delegation only learned of the reversal of fortunes on the battlefield on 21 August, when a 
Polish wireless operator, “...succeeded in catching part of a war communiqué broadcast from Warsaw.  From 
it we learnt that the Bolsheviks were in full retreat”, S. Grabski, p. 24.  
15  For the  full  text  see,  J.  Dąbski,  pp. 48-53;  V.  Kluchnikov  &  A. Sabanin,  Mezhdunarodnaia  politika 
noveishev vremeni v dogovorakh, notakh i deklaratsiakh, (Moscow, 1928), vol. 3, part 1, p. 47. For details of 
the delegations membership, see TNA, 688/2/10, p, 127. The Soviet terms were announced by Moscow radio 
on 21 August, TNA, FO 417/9/36, pp. 55-56.   203 
it laid before the Polish delegation. The first three conditions initially appeared to be both 
diplomatic and conciliatory, promising that the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics 
recognised the independence of the Polish Republic, that they would not demand payment 
of an indemnity and designating Poland’s eastern frontier as the line fixed by Curzon on 11 
July. In addition, Poland would be awarded districts to the east of Białystok and Kholm.
16 
The  following  five  terms  aimed,  however,  at  the  reduction,  indeed  almost  complete 
annihilation, of the Polish Armed Forces, demanding that, 
… 4) Poland will demobilise her army to 50,000 men. For the maintenance of 
order a citizens’ militia of workmen will be formed. 
5) The above demobilisation is to take place within one month from the date 
of signing of the Peace Treaty. 
6)  Poland retains  enough arms  and war  material for  the above-mentioned 
army; the remainder will be handed over within one month to Soviet Russia 
and Soviet Ukraine…. 
7)  Poland  will  cease  to  manufacture  arms  and  war  material.  Munitions 
factories are to be demobilised. 
8) Poland undertakes not to allow the passage through her territories of men, 
horses and war material for states which are hostile to Russia and Ukraine.
17 
 
Military operations were to cease 72 hours after the signing of the armistice and a neutral 
zone  between  the  states  measuring  50  versty  was  to  be  created.  The  proposed  peace 
envisaged that the combined Russian and Ukrainian forces would, at 200,000 men, number 
four times the Polish Army.
18 Furthermore, the Polish Government was to undertake to 
return all material taken from Soviet territory formerly occupied by the Poles, repair all 
bridges  and  give  land  to  the  families  of  Polish  citizens  killed  or  wounded  during  the 
Polish-Soviet War.
19 Free transit of goods through Poland was to be awarded to Soviet 
Russia and Ukraine, the railway line Wolkowsk-Białystok-Grajevo placed at their disposal 
and Poland was to grant complete amnesty to all.
20 
 
      Unsurprisingly,  though  ironically,  the  head  of  the  Soviet  delegation  was  keen  to 
present  these  terms  as  both  reasonable  and  generous.  In  an  interview  given  to  the 
Manchester  Guardian,  Danishevskii  argued  that  the  Soviet  authorities had  no  wish  to 
interfere in Poland’s internal affairs or to dictate in any way their form of government.
21 
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When  asked  if  the  Soviet  demand  to  arm  the  Polish  workers  could  be  interpreted  as 
interfering in the domestic life of Poland, Danishevskii replied, 
By no means. It means, and actually is, a concession, not an interference.  We 
have  two  alternatives:  disarm  Poland  or  leave  arms  in  the  hands  of  the 
workers,  who  we  may  trust  will  never  use  them  against  Russia….    As  a 
matter of fact, our proposal increases, not diminishes, the armed forces of 
Poland.
22 
 
Moreover, when the Soviet diplomat was asked if it was intended to be a dictated peace, he 
responded, 
No,  not  at  all….  We  are  ready  to  listen  to  the  Polish  delegates.  We  are 
sincerely determined that this conference should lead to peace. There is not 
going to be any dictation, and no condition is meant as an ultimatum.  Our 
only aim is to secure our own safety from Polish aggression…. All the talk 
about our desire to secure a way for our army west is nonsense.
23 
 
Adolph Joffe supported this interpretation on 14 September 1920, when he informed the 
Latvian newspaper Latwijas Kareiwis, that the Soviet Republic did not consider her peace 
conditions as categorical.
24  
  
      A less diplomatic indication of the Soviet view of the negotiations can, however, be 
observed  in  an  order,  posted  on  the  streets  of  Minsk  by  M.N.  Tukhachevsky,  Soviet 
Western Front Commander, on 20 August. In this publication, the Polish delegation was 
denounced  as  being,  “...composed  exclusively  of  spies  and  counter-espionage  agents”, 
whose sole objective was “…to utilise its position for the purposes of espionage”.
25 On 23 
August, Chicherin was forced to state that, “Insulting pranks of such a kind create an 
atmosphere in which negotiations are completely impossible… it is necessary to abstain 
from tricks”.
26 Even the Politburo, Soviet Russia’s highest decision-making body, felt the 
need  to  condemn  this  blatant  propaganda  move  as,  “…worse  than  a  tactless  order, 
undermining the policies of the party and government”, and ordered the RVSR to repeal it 
immediately.
27 
 
      What then was the Polish reaction to the Soviet peace terms? The vast majority of 
Poles were horrified at the Soviet communication. According to Stanisław Grabski, the 
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Soviet  draft  peace,  “…would  have  made  Poland  into  a  political  vassal  of  the  Soviet 
Union”.
28 In defining their own demands for the negotiations, the Poles had attempted to 
demonstrate  moderation.
29  On  19  August,  Jan  Dąbski,  Deputy  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs, had informed the conference that, guided by the desire to secure a “…lasting, 
equitable and democratic peace”, the fundamental conditions of peace presented by the 
Poles  was  simply  the  assurance  of  the  independence  and  integrity  of  Poland  without 
interference in her internal affairs.
30 
 
      Upon learning of the Red Army defeat at the Battle of Warsaw, the Polish delegation 
wasted no time in categorically rejecting the Soviet peace terms at the third meeting of the 
Minsk conference on 25 August 1920.
31 All fifteen Soviet demands were refused.
32 Jan 
Dąbski,  head  of  the  Polish  delegation,  opened  proceedings  by  condemning  the  Soviet 
Government’s three-fold objective. He argued that the Soviets aimed to: reduce the Polish 
Armed Forces, thereby preventing Poland from defending herself against a future attack; 
obtain special rights enabling the Soviet regime to interfere in the internal legislation of the 
Polish Republic, and to take upon itself the role of special protector of the Polish working 
class against the State.
33 As a result, he declared, 
It is evident that these conditions are not dictated by peaceful designs, but are 
the result of an imperialistic spirit…. Such peace can be dictated only by the 
victor  to a nation which is on its knees  and which is forced to  complete 
capitulation…. The Polish Delegation declares that the principles of peace 
which have been presented by the Russian Delegation cannot be accepted.
34 
 
Dąbski then proceeded to systematically reject each of the Soviet terms, outlining Poland’s 
reasons for refusal. For example, Article 4, calling for the establishment of a civil militia in 
Poland, was most vehemently refuted by the Polish delegation which declared that it, 
…rejects categorically the intention of the Russian Government to force on 
Poland a one-sided undertaking to reduce her armed forces, and expresses its 
surprise that such a condition has been put forward which touches the dignity 
of the Polish nation…. The proposal for a partial substitution of the armed 
forces  through  a  workmens’  militia  aims  evidently  at  a  violation  of  the 
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principles of sovereignty which would result in intervention in the internal 
problems of Poland: it, therefore, cannot be even discussed.
35 
 
      This forthright rejection of the Soviet terms convinced Danishevskii that the Polish 
delegation  had  learnt  of  the  Red  Army  defeat  at  Warsaw  and  he  desperately  tried  to 
redeem  the  situation.  Firstly,  he  expressed  regret  at  the  tactless  publication  of 
Tukhachevsky’s order and secondly, conceded that the Soviet draft treaty was simply a 
starting point for future peace talks.
36 In reality, however, the negotiations had reached a 
stalemate. 
 
2.2 From Minsk to Riga 
 
      The arrival in Minsk of Karl Radek, a Polish Jewish communist, to conduct semi-
official talks with the Polish delegation, led to a joint decision being taken by the Soviet 
and Polish diplomats to transfer the negotiations to a neutral country.
37 This relocation was 
widely  desired  by  both  camps.  For  the  Poles,  Minsk  symbolised  involvement  in 
humiliating  peace  negotiations,  in  spite  their  military  superiority  and  the  continued 
advance of their army eastwards.  For  the  Russians, weakened by  both the resounding 
defeat of the Red Army and the failure of the Polish revolution, it was desirable to sue for 
peace in a less hostile environment. 
 
      On 29 August 1920, the Polish delegation communicated to Sapieha that their radio 
had  been  destroyed  under  suspicious  circumstances  and  that,  consequently,  they 
considered it absolutely essential that the conference immediately be transferred to Riga.
38 
As a result, the following day, the Polish Foreign Minister telegrammed Chicherin and 
reported that, 
…in order to avoid delays I addressed myself to the Government of Latvia 
with  a  view  to  obtaining  their  agreement  to  transferring  the  peace 
negotiations to Riga…. At the same time I draw your attention to the fact that 
your proposal, suggesting Esthonia was received by the Polish Government 
after the transmission of our telegram to the Latvian Government. The latter’s 
reply,  accepting  our  proposal  with  regard  to  Riga,  having  arrived  this 
morning (August 30) I propose so as to avoid any loss of time that you accept 
                                                
35 Ibid, p. 59. On 11 September 1920, Rumbold reported, “M. Lukasiewicz said that there had been one really 
amusing episode in the negotiations…. M. Dombski [sic] remarked, if Poland accepted a militia of workmen, 
would Russia agree to arm her bourgeoisie? M. Lukasiewicz said that he would never forget the Russian 
delegates look of bewilderment when this proposal was translated to them”, TNA, FO 417/9, doc. 52, p. 75. 
36 Polish Institute, A.12.P.2/2, doc. 44, p. 175.  On 26 August, the Soviet Government agreed to remove 
contentious Article 4, TNA, FO 418/54, doc. 54, p. 236. The NKID had been widely censored, even by 
Soviet sympathisers, for its inclusion, Manchester Guardian, 27 August 1920, p. 6. 
37 S. Grabski, p, 25. 
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Riga as affording all advantages for both sides in the way of communications 
and conditions of living.
39  
 
On 1 September, the Governments of the RSFSR and Ukrainian SSR informed the Polish 
Government of their agreement to conduct further negotiations in Riga and the following 
day witnessed the final meeting of the Polish-Soviet negotiations at Minsk.
40 An important 
juncture in Polish-Soviet diplomacy had closed. The final chapter, which opened on 17 
September  in  the  Latvian  capital,  was  to  finally  draw  the  Polish-Soviet  War  to  a 
conclusion six months later. 
 
3. The Riga Negotiations 
 
3.1 The Riga Conference Opens 
 
      The  Polish-Soviet  diplomatic  negotiations,  commenced  at  Minsk,  and  continued  at 
Riga, had developed against a background of continued military operations. It was only in 
October, with the final victory of the Polish Army over its Red counterpart at the Battles of 
the Niemen and Szczara, that fighting between the belligerents ceased to accompany the 
peace talks.
41 Even then, Piłsudski, intent on securing complete victory, wanted his troops 
to  pursue  the  Soviet  army  further  eastwards.  He  was  prevented  from  achieving  this 
objective, however, by the Allies failure to support Polish claims in the kresy. A direct 
territorial agreement with the Soviet Republics now proved essential.
42 Likewise, Soviet 
Russia’s precarious military, domestic and international situation, weakened by the Civil 
War and the Polish-Soviet War, forced the hand of its leaders to seek an immediate peace. 
As Lenin reported on 15 October 1920, “The position of the Soviet Republic is most 
grave, which made us hurry to conclude peace before the winter campaign set in”.
43 For 
the final time, the diplomats of Poland and Russia took centre stage. 
 
      Preparations for the transferred negotiations began immediately in both states. The 
Polish delegation, once again headed by Jan Dąbski, comprised representatives of the six 
parties in the Diet and three delegates chosen by the Head of State and Commander-in-
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40 TNA, FO 417/9/62, pp. 88-98. 
41 M. Tarczyński (ed), Bitwa Niemenska 29 VIII-18 X 1920. Dokumenty operacyjne, (Warszawa, 1998); N. 
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43 V.I. Lenin, Polnoe sobraniie sochinenii, vol. 41, (Moscow, 1965), p. 363, (hereafter PSS).   208 
Chief,  Piłsudski.
44  This  delegation aimed  to  represent  the  widest  possible  spectrum  of 
Polish political and military life. The Soviet delegation, led by the experienced diplomat 
Adolf Joffe, and representing both the RSFSR and Ukrainian SSR, was selected by the 
Politburo at its meetings on 1 and 6 September.
45   
 
      The talks opened at the Blackheaded Hall, in the Latvian capital, on 21 September 
1920.
46 Six days later, the Soviet peace terms were presented to the Polish delegation by 
Joffe.
47 Given the weakened Soviet position following the resounding defeat of the Red 
Army, what did the Russian authorities hope to achieve at Riga?  As had been the case 
throughout the conflict, Lenin continued to wield a tight grasp of Soviet conduct at the 
conference, exchanging telegrams and supervising the daily activity of his delegation.
48 He 
also remained inherently suspicious of Poland and the Allies, arguing less than six weeks 
before the signing of the Treaty of Riga, that France desired to push Poland into a fresh 
war with Russia.
49  
 
      However, the results on the battlefields forced his hand and he acknowledged on 22 
September 1920, “We are now faced with the question of war or peace with Poland.  We 
want to avoid a winter campaign that will be hard on us and are again offering Poland a 
peace that is to her advantage and our disadvantage”.
50 In order to achieve this objective, 
he was quite prepared to make further concessions to the Poles at the Riga conference.
51 
This was of vital importance for Soviet Russia. Joffe stated on 14 September 1920, that the 
conclusion of peace with Poland, would successfully free Russia from a series of endless 
wars.
52 Furthermore, of significant benefit would be, “…the renewal of political-economic 
relations  with  the  West,  without  which  the  restoration  of  Russia  is  in  some  respects 
                                                
44 Representing the Diet were Grabski (People’s National Union); Kiernik (Peasant Party); Barlicki (PPS); 
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167-168. 
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hampered”.
53 This new willingness to make concessions on the part of the Soviets was 
recognised and appreciated by the Polish delegates. According to Grabski, 
There [in Riga] we met a very different delegation, composed of much more 
qualified persons under the chairmanship of the practised diplomat Joffe, and 
provided with a totally different set of instructions…. Moscow sent to Riga a 
delegation prepared for a really reasonable compromise.
54 
 
 
      What  then  were  the  aims  and  objectives  of  the  Polish  delegation  at  the  Riga 
Conference? According to Grabski, when the federalist plans of the Head of State failed to 
materialise, Piłsudski did, 
…relinquish it sincerely and boldly…. When the realisation of this project 
turned  out  to  be  impossible…  he  recognised  the  necessity  of  basing  the 
security of Poland, not on its separation from Russia by buffer states such as 
an  independent  Ukraine  and  White  Ruthenia  would  have  been,  but  by  a 
permanent peace with Russia.
55    
 
In  reality,  unlike  Lenin,  Piłsduski  largely  withdrew  from  the  negotiating  process, 
disillusioned as he was by the failure of the Polish and borderland populations and the 
Entente to support his federalist programme.
56 His position was further weakened by the 
constant opposition he faced in the Sejm, particularly from the National Democrats over 
the peace settlement.
57   
 
     It was the National Democrats which crucially directed the Polish conference agenda.
58  
Consequently, on 14 November 1920, the Polish Press Agency in Riga issued Information 
Bulletin, no. 57: Rząd i wojsko, which reported that, 
Poland shall say in Riga, that she will not demand for herself anything but her 
ethnographical  frontiers….  It  will  not  allow  her  great  territories  but  will 
secure  the  solidity  of  a  peace  that  will  guarantee  to  Poland  and  Eastern 
Europe the conditions for a democratic and civilised development.
59  
 
This desire not to retain large numbers of non-Polish inhabitants within the Polish borders 
was guided by Dąbski and Grabski, as Chief Polish delegate and Chairman of the Polish 
territorial  commission  at  Riga,  respectively.  The  Polish  representatives  were  heavily 
criticised by many Poles for their failure to prolong the peace talks until the Polish Armed 
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Forces had reached the December 1919 frontline, especially as the Soviets would most 
likely have agreed to this line.
60 
 
      Poland’s peace terms, almost identical to those proposed at the Minsk conference, were 
presented to the conference on 24 September 1920. They called for, 
a)  The  termination  of  the  struggle  between  Poland  and  Russia  for  the 
territories in dispute between them, and the establishment of a basis for 
good neighbourly relations. The state frontier should not be determined 
by reference to historical claims, but by a just harmonisation of the vital 
interests of both negotiating parties. 
b)  The just solution of questions of nationality in the above said territories in 
accordance with democratic principles. 
c)  The  permanent  assurance  of each  of  the  negotiating  states against  the 
possibility of attack by the other.
61 
 
Crucially, on 5 October, Joffe and Dąbski signed a protocol which stated that agreement 
had been reached on the principal conditions for a Preliminary Peace Treaty.
62   
 
3.2 The Preliminary Peace Treaty, 12 October 1920 
 
      The Preliminary Peace Treaty and Armistice which ended the Polish-Soviet War was 
finally signed at Riga on 12 October 1920.
63 The opening text of this document closely 
followed  the  Soviet  draft  document  presented  by  Joffe  on  27  September,  reading  as 
follows, 
The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and the Ukrainian Socialist 
Soviet Republic on the one side and the Polish Republic on the other… to 
work out terms which should be made the basis of a stable, honourable peace, 
equally acceptable to both sides, have decided to enter into negotiations with 
the  object  of  concluding  an  armistice  and  the  preliminary  conditions  of 
peace.
64 
 
      The importance of the question of the Polish-Soviet border can be clearly observed, 
forming as it did the first Article of the Treaty. The Soviet Republics accepted, without 
alteration,  the  frontier  line  proposed  by  the  Poles,  whilst  Poland  recognised  the 
independence of Ukraine and White Russia. It was agreed that those areas currently in 
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dispute between the Poles and Lithuanians to the west of the boundary would be settled by 
Poland  and  Lithuania  alone  without  outside  interference.
65  In  return,  transit  through 
Lithuania for the Soviet Republics was guaranteed and the final treaty would not appear as 
a Polish diktat.
66 
 
      In  direct  response  both  to  the  prolonged  Soviet  propaganda  onslaught  conducted 
during the War and to the establishment of the Polrevkom and local revkomy throughout 
Poland, aimed at the overthrow of the Polish Government, Article 2 of the treaty addressed 
these crucial security issues. It further reflected Soviet concerns that Poland, as a puppet of 
the Entente, was a spearhead aimed at the heart of the regime in Russia. By this extremely 
important condition, 
Both contracting parties mutually confirm complete respect for their State 
sovereignty  and  abstention  from  any  kind  of  interference  in  the  internal 
affairs of the other side. Moreover, both [undertake]… an obligation neither 
to  create  nor  to  support  organisations  which  have  as  their  aim  an  armed 
struggle  against  the  other  contracting  party,  which  have  as  their  aim  the 
overthrow  of  the  State  or  social  order  of  the  other  side…  as  well  as  of 
organisations assuming the rôle of a government of the other side.
67 
 
      The following two conditions allowed individuals to freely choose Polish, Russian or 
Ukrainian  citizenship,  and  guaranteed  nationals  the  right  of  free  development  of  their 
culture, language and religion.
68 Article 5 stipulated that both parties mutually renounced 
the repayment of war expenses and indemnities for war losses, while the following four 
provisions concerned the exchange and safety of prisoners of war, civilian hostages, exiles 
and refugees, and the reciprocal granting of full amnesty by Poland, Ukraine and Russia.
69 
By Article 10, the contracting parties reciprocally recanted all rights to the State property 
of the other side. It was agreed that, “…archives, libraries, works of art, historical war 
trophies, antiquities and the like”, removed to Russia following the Polish partitions, as 
well as all moveable Polish property forcibly or voluntarily taken to Russia after 1 August 
1914, with the exception of war booty, be returned to the Polish Republic.
70 
 
      Negotiations  were  to  commence  immediately  to  secure  conventions  on  commerce, 
navigation, sanitation, communication, post and telegraph, whilst the exchange of goods, 
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and  the  right  of  transit  for  Poles,  Russians  and  Ukrainians  in  each  three  states  was 
guaranteed.
71 Article 15 determined that immediately upon the signing of the preliminary 
peace, all parties would enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a final treaty.
72   
 
      Crucially, the 13
th condition of the preliminary peace invoked “…a special agreement 
for an armistice”.
73 The resultant Armistice Agreement, also signed on 12 October at Riga, 
was integral to the preliminary peace treaty and had the same binding force. It stated that, 
One  hundred  and  forty-four  hours  after  the  signature  of  the  treaty  of  the 
preliminary  conditions  of  peace  i.e.  at  midnight,  18  October  1920,  mid-
European time, both contracting parties are compelled to cease all military 
activities by land, air and water.
74 
 
The armistice terms could be renounced by either side if 48 hours notice was given.
75 As 
reported  by  an  Official  Polish  Military  Communiqué  on  15  October  1920,  the  Peace 
Preliminaries and Armistice came into force 144 hours after it was signed.
76 The Polish-
Soviet War, thereby, ended at 24.00 hours on 18 October 1920.
77 Both documents were 
ratified by Ukraine on 21 October, by the Polish Sejm the following day, by the RSFSR on 
23 October and by Piłsudski on 27 October.
78  
 
3.3 Riga Negotiations, October 1920-March 1921 
 
      Following the signing of the Preliminary Peace Treaty and Armistice, both the Polish 
and Russian delegations returned to their respective capitals to organise the diplomats 
selected  to  negotiate  the  Treaty  of  Riga.
79  It  was  expected  that,  as  the  preliminary 
settlement had established Polish-Soviet agreement on the main questions of peace, the 
final treaty would be drafted and signed relatively quickly. This hope was soon dashed. 
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      As with Polish-Soviet diplomacy throughout the war, the peace negotiations, driven by 
suspicion  and  mistrust,  developed  into  a  protracted  affair.  The  Soviets,  in  particular, 
launched  an  international  diplomatic  offensive  against  the  Polish  State  for  alleged 
violation of the preliminary peace and armistice. Militarily defeated, agit-prop remained 
their  only  available  weapon.
80  On  29  October,  for  instance,  a  Soviet  diplomatic  note, 
signed by Obolenskii and sent to Dąbski, accused the Poles of violating point 5 of the 
Armistice Treaty.
81 Krasin, on 1 November, protested to the British Government about 
Poland and the Entente arming the troops of Balachowicz and Petlura in their conflict with 
White Russia and Ukraine in the kresy.
82 Rumblings of discontent continued to be heard, 
however, throughout the months of the conference.
83 
 
      What then was achieved by the diplomats of Poland and the Soviet Republics between 
November 1920 and March 1921? Firstly, on 14 November, a Military Agreement, signed 
by Dąbski and Joffe, laid down conditions for the evacuation of the Polish-occupied zone 
as required by the preliminary peace treaty.
84 At the next meeting of the conference, two 
commissions were appointed to elaborate the conditions for the exchange of hostages and 
prisoners of war, and to study the outstanding economic questions, respectively.
85 
 
      In  an  attempt  to  facilitate  agreement,  one  unconventional,  some  would  argue 
undiplomatic, method adopted was the decision of the two chairmen to meet privately to 
discuss matters of crucial importance. This action greatly facilitated the work of the Riga 
conference, allowing them to dispense with diplomatic formalities.
86 The diplomats no 
longer had any need to showboat to an international audience. Sapieha reported on 20 
October 1920 that, 
In  his  private  conversations  with  M.  Dąbski….  M.  Joffe  had  said  on 
numerous occasions that if any particular demands were pressed by the Poles 
he would have to give way, as he was not in a position to resist, but that his 
object was to make a peace which would have the appearance, and so far as 
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possible  the  substance,  of  a  genuine  compromise  between  conflicting 
interests, and not that of terms imposed by the victor on the vanquished.
87 
 
Joffe may have been negotiating from a weaker bargaining position, following the defeat 
of the Red Army, but he was the more experienced diplomat. Stephen Tallents, head of the 
British Relief Mission to the Baltic States in 1919-1921 spoke to his Foreign Office on 28 
September 1920, of “…the superiority which, in the opinion of all neutral observers that I 
have met, M. Joffe has established over M. Dąbski in the course even of the three mainly 
formal sessions which have so far been held in Riga”.
88   
 
      By February 1921, both camps were increasingly desperate to sign a final treaty.  On 8 
February, Dąbski informed Witos that, “…the date of the Upper Silesian plebiscite hangs 
over him like a nightmare”.
89 It was absolutely essential that peace be secured before this 
date. Failure to do so may discourage the inhabitants of Upper Silesia from rejoining with 
Poland. Similarly, domestic unrest within Russia, in particular at Kronstadt and Tambov, 
pushed  the  Politburo  on  21  February  1921,  to  resolve  to  secure  peace  as  quickly  as 
possible.
90  Three  days  later  the  Polish  and  Soviet  delegations  signed  a  reparations 
agreement,  a  protocol  to  extend  the  armistice  treaty,  a  supplementary  protocol  of  the 
preliminary peace conditions and a protocol regarding a mixed border commission.
91 The 
following month, the full treaty of peace between Poland and the Soviet Republics was 
finally signed. 
 
4. The Treaty of Riga 
 
4.1 The Treaty of Riga, 18 March 1921 
 
      At 7pm on 18 March 1921, the Polish-Soviet War formally ended with the signing of 
the Treaty of Riga between Poland, the RSFSR and Ukrainian SSR. It was signed on behalf 
of Rzad Rzeczypospoliteij Polskiej by Jan Dąbski, Stanisław Kauzik, Edward Lechowicz, 
Henryk Strasburger and Leon Wasilewski.
92 The Soviet delegates accorded the honour of 
                                                
87 TNA, FO 417/9/89, pp. 151-152. 
88 TNA, FO 417/9/63, p. 99.   
89 Polish Institute, KOL 104/3, p. 205. 
90 R. Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, 1919-1924, (London, 1994), p. 192. 
91 D & M, vol. 3, doc. 267, pp. 502-514.  
92 Polish Institute, A.11.76/30, p. 2.    215 
witnessing the peace were Adolf Joffe, Jakub Főrstenberg-Hanecki, Emmanuel Kviring, 
Leonid Obolenskii and Jur Kotsubinskyi.
93   
 
      The opening preamble stated that all three contracting parties sought the conclusion of, 
“…a  final,  lasting  and  honourable  peace  based  on  a  mutual  understanding  and  in 
accordance  with  the  peace  preliminaries  signed  at  Riga  on  October  12,  1920”.
94  A 
cessation of the state of war between the two camps was announced in the first Article, 
followed  by  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Ukraine  and  White  Ruthenia,  and  an 
extremely detailed description of the frontier between Poland and her eastern neighbours.
95 
The frontline coincided roughly with the Polish-Russian border of 1793-1795, splitting the 
ethnically mixed kresy between the signatories. By Article 3, 
Russia  and  the  Ukraine  abandon  all  rights  and  claims  to  the  territories 
situated to the West of the frontier laid down by Article 2 of the Present 
Treaty. Poland, on the other hand, abandons in favour of the Ukraine and 
White Ruthenia, all rights and claims to the territory situated to the East of 
this frontier.
96 
 
Again,  concern  over  the  establishment  of  alien  institutions  and  the  dissemination  of 
agitation-propaganda in their respective territories was expressed in the fifth Article.
97 The 
parties undertook neither to create nor protect organisations formed to encourage armed 
conflict against the other party or to undermine its territorial integrity. They further agreed 
not to subvert by force the political or social institutions of the contracting parties and to 
prohibit  both  military  recruiting  and  the  entry  into  their  territory  of  armed  forces, 
munitions and war material destined for any such organisations.
98 Minority, religious and 
educational rights were granted to national minorities by Article 7.
99 The Treaty, of crucial 
importance for the peace of continental Europe, was ratified by the Polish Government on 
15 April and by the Soviet Republics one week later.
100 
 
      What was the public reaction to this event? How was the peace settlement received in 
both Poland and Soviet Russia? This was not a treaty imposed by a victor state on its 
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vanquished opponents and its compromise nature was greatly stressed by the Chairmen of 
both the Polish and the Soviet delegations. Dąbski, stated, 
By common agreement we have traced the frontiers and have decided that 
neither  party  shall  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  other;  we  have 
granted every privilege to national minorities; we offer the greatest possible 
faculties for the choice of citizenship; we have come to an understanding on 
many  complicated  questions  concerning  economics  and  the  settlement  of 
accounts; we have laid the foundations for future relations both economic and 
political;  we  have  endeavoured  to  solve  all  questions  in  a  fair  and  just 
manner;  we  have  each  made  concessions,  not  only  in  order  to  reach 
agreement, but to render our future relations easier.
101 
 
Similarly,  Joffe  stressed  the  conciliatory  atmosphere  in  which  the  negotiations  were 
conducted,  which  rendered  it  much  easier  to  reach  a  conclusion  acceptable  to  both 
parties.
102 As a result, he believed that they had, “…signed a peace which entirely satisfies 
all the essential, vital and just demands of the Polish people”.
103 It could be argued that 
both sides abated their extreme claims in an attempt to find common ground. In reality, 
however, Soviet Russia’s catastrophic military defeat gave her little alternative. 
 
      The Riga settlement was certainly a territorial compromise.  For the first time since the 
outbreak of the Great War, the Treaty delimited the frontier between the Polish and Soviet 
states. It thereby succeeded in achieving an objective which the Treaty of Versailles had 
failed to secure almost two years earlier. Nevertheless, it was never going to be easy to 
resolve the extremely complex and diverse Polish-Soviet border issues. Despite the best 
efforts of the peace delegations to take into account economic, political, geographic, ethnic 
and local factors, the resultant settlement was unsatisfactory to many. In an attempt to 
establish future peaceful relations with Soviet Russia, the Poles agreed to terms which, 
“…were  exceedingly  moderate  and  restricted  to  territories  essential  to  safeguard  her 
economic and strategic independence”.
104   
 
     The new frontline, which ran 50 to 100kms west of the border proposed by the Soviet 
Government in April 1920, rested between the Curzon and Borisov Lines and between the 
Russian frontier of 1914 and the Polish border prior to the 1772 partition.  It also ran 
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further west than the line proposed by Soviet Russia on 28 January 1920.
105  The Kresy, 
between the Rivers Dnieper and Dwina in the east, and the River Bug in the west, was thus 
divided  between  the  Poles  and  Soviets.
106  Consequently,  Poland  renounced  claims  to 
120,000 square miles of territory, annexed by the partitions.
107 This land was less than that 
claimed by Dmowski at the Paris Peace Conference, but more than the Allies recognised 
as being indisputably Polish territory.
108 The Poles retained control of the historic cities of 
Wilno and Lwów, but lost huge areas previously retained by the Polish Commonwealth. 
The  national  census  of  1921  recorded  that  Poland  controlled  389,000kms  of  territory, 
making her the sixth largest country in Europe.
109 
 
      In turn, Soviet Russia was forced to concede territory far to the east of the Curzon 
Line,  including  all  of  Eastern  Galicia.
110  Nevertheless,  only  150,000  Russians  were 
recorded as residing on Polish territory in 1921.
111 Moreover, Russia retained the territory 
acquired by the Tsarist authorities at the second partition and succeeded in achieving a 
border more favourable than that proposed by the Poles at the Versailles Conference.
112 
  
      Neither  did  the  Treaty  of  Riga  represent  a  political  victory  for  either  belligerent. 
Instead, both sides were forced to concede their inability to secure the war aims defined by 
their  leadership  at  the  onset  of  the  conflict.  The  peace  settlement  failed  to  realise 
Piłsudski’s goals both of re-establishing Poland as a great European power and of creating 
a  federation  of  East  European  states  to  act  as  a  defensive  barrier  against  the  Poles’ 
traditional Russian opponent. Whilst the Polish terms were to a large degree formulated by 
the annexationist National Democratic Party, they too were unable to fully dictate the final 
settlement, being forced to forfeit the border sought at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.  
 
      Likewise,  the  Soviet  leaders  were  forced  to  concede  failure  in  their  attempts  to 
sovietise  Poland,  through  a  dual  diplomatic-propaganda  and  military  offensive.  Their 
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ultimate  objective  of  breaking  out  of  isolation  by  spreading  socialist  revolution  west, 
across the Polish bridge, to industrialised Germany, failed to materialise despite social 
unrest across the continent in 1919 and 1920. Indeed, the single most important political 
gain achieved by the Soviets through the Treaty of Riga was the Polish granting of de jure 
recognition of the Russian communist regime. 
 
4.2 Reaction to the Peace Settlement 
 
      Was there, therefore, dissatisfaction in Poland and Russia at the signing of the Treaty? 
On the contrary, the immediate response in Poland was of general and widespread relief. 
According to the Polish diplomat Roman Debicki, “Poland’s acceptance of the Treaty of 
Riga as the solution to the conflict was genuine and sincere”, whilst Aleksandra Piłsudska 
believed that, “Poland was rid of the menace of Russia for the time being at least”.
113 The 
National Democrats, in particular, felt that they had achieved a great success over the 
federalists. In Poland, it was hoped that the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet War would 
usher in a period of stability and peace, during which attention could be turned to the 
pressing domestic concerns facing the country.   
 
      Nevertheless, many Poles, including Piłsudski, remained deeply suspicious of Soviet 
intentions and the longevity of the Riga settlement. He argued that, “When she [Russia] is 
weak she is ready to promise anything…. But she is equally ready to break those promises 
the moment that she feels herself strong enough to do so”.
114 A soldier first and foremost, 
Piłsudski’s distrust of diplomacy as a tool of international relations was reinforced by the 
events of the Polish-Soviet War. Of the Riga settlement he commented, “For centuries 
men have proclaimed peace with their lips and yet continued to make war…. Why should 
we suppose that human nature is going to undergo a complete change?”
115 
 
      In Russia, the Treaty was regarded as a Soviet diplomatic victory. In March 1920, 
Lenin had written that, 
The idea of compromises must not be renounced. The point is through all the 
compromises  which  are  sometimes  necessary…  to  be  able  to  preserve, 
strengthen, steel and develop the revolutionary tactics and organisation… of 
the working class and its organised vanguard, the Communist Party.
116 
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This was, indeed, the Soviet reaction to the peace settlement. Although the conditions of 
peace  were  “very  burdensome”  to  Soviet  Russia,  Trotsky  acknowledged  that  its  most 
important outcome was the avoidance of a winter campaign, essential for the revival of the 
Soviet economy.
117 Furthermore, the Poles could have achieved better conditions in March 
and April 1920 before the Kiev offensive.
118 This point was also stressed by Lenin, who 
argued that, 
…the peace terms give them less territory than was previously offered…. We 
have emerged from  this war by  concluding a favourable  peace.   In other 
words, we have won.  Anyone who examines the map will see that we have 
won, that we have emerged from this war with more territory than we had 
before it started.
119 
 
However, theoretically the Soviets did not measure victory by the territory acquired, given 
their belief that international borders were transitory and would be unnecessary upon the 
victory of a worldwide socialist revolution. As a result, the front defined by the Treaty was 
never acknowledged by the Soviet regime as a permanent solution to the Polish-Soviet 
conflict. In September 1939, the establishment of the Riga frontiers were to be once again 
questioned by the armed forces of the Soviet regime. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
      Upon the signing of the Treaty, the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mayerovitch, 
argued that, 
This treaty is of great importance not only to Poland and Russia, but to the 
whole of Europe – in particular to Eastern Europe.  The Peace Treaty of Riga 
is a fundamental condition for the closer approach and union between the 
nations of Eastern Europe.
120 
 
Was this hope realised?  Did the peace of Riga resolve the age-old Polish-Soviet conflict? 
 
      The history of hostile relations and mutual suspicion between the Poles and Russians 
ensured that the implementation of the Treaty was not easily achieved. Attempts were 
certainly  made  to  establish  a  level  of  cooperation  between  the  two  states  and  many 
contemporaries, desperate to facilitate the establishment of cordial relations between the 
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East European states, were keen to stress these achievements. For instance, a collection of 
official Polish Government documents reported that, 
From  1921  to  1939…  relations  developed  normally  and  were  gradually 
extended and improved.  Thus, during the years that followed the signing of 
the peace treaty, a number of conventions were concluded in a spirit of good 
neighbourhood.
121 
 
These included the regulation of passenger and freight  travel on  the Moscow-Warsaw 
railway,  the  establishment  of  a  sanitary  convention  and  the  signing  of  a  postal  and 
telegraphic arrangement.
122  
 
     However, the peace signatories consistently complained after March 1921 that their 
counterpart  had  failed  to  meet  its  commitments.
123  Many  remained  sceptical  about 
securing a Polish-Soviet rapprochement after 1921.
124 These problems were compounded 
by the failure of the Allied Powers to recognise the Treaty of Riga for almost two years. 
Only  on  15  March  1923,  did  the  Conference  of  Ambassadors  accord  British,  French, 
Italian and Japanese recognition of the Peace Settlement.
125 The United States of America 
granted  its  acceptance  on  5  April  1923.
126  Given  consistent  Allied  procrastination 
throughout the War, the accordance of Allied recognition so late was not surprising. 
 
      In  truth,  relations  between  the  two  states  fluctuated  greatly.  For  the  Poles,  Russia 
incited  historical,  political,  geographic  and  ideological  opposition.  The  Soviets,  too, 
remained suspicious of Poland for historic, national, social and ideological reasons.   The 
Polish-Soviet War had deepened antagonism between the two states, which the remaining 
inter-war years were unable to overcome. Severe Soviet humiliation at the outcome of the 
War made it inevitable that once Soviet Russia regained its stability and strength to redress 
the situation, its attention would turn once more to its Polish neighbour. The Treaty of 
Riga, as with the earlier Versailles Settlement, had failed to provide either a concrete or 
enduring solution to Polish-Soviet relations. 
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Conclusion 
 
      The  Polish-Soviet  War  of  1919-1921  was  a  direct  consequence  of  the  ideological 
objectives pursued by the belligerents. The Soviet regime in Russia was united, guided and 
driven in every decision it made and every action it took, throughout the conflict, by the 
desire to implement the Marxist doctrine of international socialist revolution. The Poles, in 
contrast, were led by two opposing and contradictory ideologies: a federalist programme 
vigorously  pursued  by  Piłsudski  and  an  annexationist  agenda  desired  by  Dmowski. 
Although at the two peace conferences which delimited the war: Paris in 1919 and Riga in 
1921, Dmowski dominated the Polish programme, it was the war aims of Piłsudski which 
ultimately directed Polish policy towards its eastern neighbour during the war. 
 
      Ideology shaped the political agenda and war aims of both states, and was implemented 
through the foreign policy, diplomatic negotiation and military engagements pursued. It 
also proved to be the principal obstacle to securing cordial relations between the newly-
established, infant regimes. This indisputable fact has become abundantly clear through the 
examination of, in particular, the Soviet dimension in greater detail than it has previously 
received.  The  motivations  and  objectives  of  the  regime, and  the  victories  secured and 
defeats  suffered  by  it  in  the  political,  foreign  policy,  diplomatic  and  military  spheres, 
stemmed from the unflinching goal of the RKP(b) leadership to implement the principles 
of  Marx  and  to  pursue  a  socialist  agenda  in  its  relations  with  Poland  and  the  wider 
international  community.  However,  what  was  developed  with  the  export  of  socialist 
revolution is something which historians would distinguish as Marxist-Leninism. 
 
      As demonstrated, ideology directed both the participant’s perception of the conflict and 
was responsible, in part, for their failure to agree upon its definition or nature, or even to 
reach  agreement  about  its  date  of  commencement.  The  unannounced  and  unplanned 
conflict developed and escalated as the hostilities became of greater importance for the 
safety of the respective regimes, but it is clear that it must be dated from the earliest days 
of February 1919. From this time it was of crucial importance for the security of the new, 
and fragile, Polish state.  
 
      For  Lenin  and  his  fellow  communists,  the  hostilities  were  initially  viewed  as  a 
continuation  and  extension  of  the  Russian  Civil  War,  by  which  domestic  and  foreign 
opponents had  sought to  overthrow the Soviet regime, since its foundation in October 
1917. During the course of the war this altered and it came to be regarded as a means of   222 
exporting the revolution westwards. In this way, the Civil War could be transformed into 
an international war between the classes, directed not only against Poland, but also against 
the Entente and the wider capitalist world. This transformed it from a domestic affair into a 
conflict with much wider implications.  
 
      Conviction that socialist revolution was impossible if confined to one country drove 
Soviet  policy.  As  a  result,  Lenin  advocated  a  three-stage  revolutionary  process:  the 
separation of nations, the establishment of socialist revolutions within each state, and their 
voluntary  reunification  into  a  Soviet  Socialist  Republic.  This  thesis  has  argued  that, 
fundamentally, Lenin regarded the Polish-Soviet War as representing the second stage in 
this process. This fact is absolutely critical for our understanding of the policies which the 
Politburo endorsed and implemented in its Polish policy in 1919-1921. It is now certain 
that the Red Army offensive into Poland in July 1920 aimed not only at the sovietisation of 
Poland, but also at spreading the military campaign further westwards, in particular to 
Germany,  Britain  and  south-western  Europe.  Lenin  was  convinced  that  the  offensive 
would ignite revolutions across Europe, drawing fresh recruits into the ranks of the Red 
Army as it had during the Russian Civil war. War with Poland, the linchpin of the Treaty 
of  Versailles,  thus  provided  the  Soviet  regime  with  a  unique  opportunity  to  influence 
politics not only in Poland, but in all of Europe, and was as a result, viewed as the initial 
engagement in a war to overthrow the Versailles settlement. 
 
      In contrast, for the Poles, regardless of their political persuasion, the war was first and 
foremost a national conflict against a traditional foreign adversary. Piłsudski’s resultant 
promotion of a federalist programme sought to safeguard Polish independence, provide an 
essential buffer between Poland and Russia and resolve their traditional conflict for control 
of the kresy. Interestingly, both he and Lenin, demonstrated great practical flexibility in 
pursuit of their ideological objectives: Piłsudski regarded socialism as a medium to be used 
in the fight to secure Poland’s independence in exactly the same way that Lenin viewed 
national self-determination as a means to assist the establishment of worldwide socialist 
revolution.  
 
      There can be no doubt that the historical context of the war proved crucial not only for 
its outbreak, but also for its development and eventual settlement. The Great War and the 
resultant Paris Peace Conference facilitated the establishment of the world’s first socialist 
state in Russia in October 1917 and the reestablishment of Poland’s independence thirteen 
months later. It further laid the foundations for a resumption of traditional Polish-Russian   223 
hostilities. Ideology, again, had lasting implications for the treatment of both states at Paris 
and  the  resultant  conflicting  policies  pursued  by  the  peacemakers  greatly  intensified 
difficulties for Poland and Russia in the international arena.  
 
      The Poles, guided by Dmowski’s annexationist agenda, were criticised as nationalist 
and imperialist and Britain, under Lloyd George, in particular, sought to limit Polish claims 
at  every  turn.  Ultimately,  the  Conference  failed  to  implement  the  border  proposed  as 
Poland’s eastern frontier and, lacking willing armed forces to defend its decisions, was 
unable  to  prevent  Piłsudski’s  military  drive  eastwards.  Soviet  endorsement  of  Marxist 
ideology  prevented  the  regime  from  seeking  any  diplomatic  representation  at  Paris. 
Abhorrence of Soviet ideology, in turn, prevented the Allies from allowing any official 
Russian representation in Paris, or from recognising the Soviet regime de facto or de jure, 
largely  at  the  insistence  of  Clemenceau  and  the  French  delegation.  Yet  although  the 
Conference was unable to formulate a coherent, consistent and coordinated Russian policy, 
fear of Soviet ideology influenced decision-making in Paris at every turn. Russia’s absence 
was one of the Conference’s greatest failings, making it impossible to resolve any Russian-
related issues and compounding her isolation in the international arena.   
 
       The  Treaty  of  Versailles  embodied  the  insurmountable  problems  facing  the 
Conference in its Polish and Russian policies and demonstrated its absolute inability to 
influence  the  escalation  of  hostilities  between  the  neighbouring  states.  Both  states, 
thereafter, recognised that the Allies lacked any real authority to enforce their wishes on 
the war and its outcome, and this influenced their relations with the western states for the 
duration  of  the  conflict.  Procrastination  became  the  defining  characteristic  of  western 
policy. Thus, although a  new territorial  settlement was urgently  needed in central and 
eastern  Europe,  the  Conference  ensured  that  relations  between  the  neighbouring  states 
could  only  be  decided  by  the  diplomatic  negotiation  and  military  engagement  of  the 
Polish-Soviet War. 
 
      In the resultant conflict, and in conjunction with military directives, both diplomatic 
negotiation and foreign policy were utilised to implement the respective states’ ideologies. 
The decision-making process employed by the Soviet regime was of crucial importance for 
its Polish policy. Although in theory the formulation, elaboration and implementation of 
foreign and diplomatic policy rested with state organisations, in practice it was governed 
almost exclusively by the RKP(b) and ultimately by its Politburo, presided over by Lenin. 
This  enabled  the  latter  to  centrally  elaborate  and  direct  the  implementation  of  Soviet   224 
ideology at all levels. As a result, under his direction, the conduct of Soviet foreign policy 
became an extremely well-defined process.  
 
      As  Marxist  theory  provided  no  blueprint  for  the  role  diplomacy  would  play  in  a 
socialist  society,  the  Soviet  regime  was  forced  to  develop  its  own  unique  diplomatic 
measures to regulate relations with the Poles and the outside world during the war. A two-
pronged offensive was adopted: the utilisation of open, revolutionary diplomacy directed 
towards the Polish and Entente populations, and reliance on traditional diplomatic methods 
directed  towards  their  opponents’  governments.  Although  on  paper  these  policies, 
embodied in the Comintern and the NKID respectively, were diametrically opposed, both 
organisations were united in their promulgation of Marxist ideology and, as such, were 
utilised,  as  required,  by  Lenin  and  the  Politburo.  Both  sought  to  spread  international 
revolution, protect and consolidate Soviet Russia and separate Russia’s enemies: Britain 
from France and the Entente from Poland.
1 These shared war aims united and strengthened 
the resolve of all Soviet institutions throughout the conflict. 
 
      Soviet recognition that traditional diplomatic practices had aroused public suspicion 
during the Great War led the regime to instigate revolutionary diplomatic measures. This 
was a new,  unorthodox, high-profile and widely disseminated political weapon against 
which the Poles were unable to defend themselves for much of the war. Indeed, Soviet 
diplomacy and propaganda were virtually synonymous. Both initiatives deliberately and 
consistently coincided with intensified Red Army activity against the Poles. By embroiling 
Poland  in  a  carefully  constructed  diplomatic  offensive  whilst  concurrently  pursuing 
military objectives, the Soviet authorities sought to foster international socialist revolution, 
influence Polish and Entente public opinion, reduce support for the Polish war effort and 
remove Poland as an obstacle to the sovietisation of central and eastern Europe. Yet, the 
regime was flexible in its diplomatic manoeuvres, not hesitating to rely on traditional and, 
on occasion, secret diplomacy, despite initial promises to the contrary, if this presented the 
best opportunity to achieve its aims. The theory and practice of Soviet diplomacy were, 
thus, often very different. 
 
      Likewise, the formulation of a coherent diplomatic agenda and realistic foreign policy 
were vitally important for the infant Polish state. By creating an inextricable link between 
Polish politics and the military, Piłsudski, like Lenin, was able to ensure that throughout 
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the war, the strategic moves of the armed forces directly responded to the state’s foreign 
policy  objectives.  The  latter  sought  to  safeguard  Polish  independence,  protect  her 
inhabitants from the impending Red Army advance, and facilitate her geographic, political, 
economic and social reconstruction. Here too, despite the absence of clear blueprints to 
follow,  it  quickly  became  clear  that  diplomacy  would  play  a  crucial  role  in  the 
establishment  of  relations  with  her  ideological  eastern  opponent.  Diplomacy  further 
provided a breathing space to enable the Polish leaders to reach a compromise on which of 
the  opposing  ideological  agendas  of  Piłsudski  and  Dmowski  would  be  pursued  at  the 
international  conference  in  Paris.  Although  throughout  the  war  the  former  remained 
inherently distrustful of diplomacy as a medium, like Lenin, he was tactically astute in 
recognising the temporary benefits which it could accord to his state.  
 
      In the first year of the war, both Russia and Poland regarded it as highly unlikely that 
hostilities  could  be  resolved  purely  by  military  engagements:  intermittent  diplomatic 
negotiation  was  therefore  central  to  the  foreign  policy  of  both  from  the  outset. 
Commencing as early as October 1918, before Polish independence was even established, 
communication was greatly hampered by the fact that the Poles had no wish to recognise 
the  Soviet  regime,  which  the  establishment  of  formal  diplomatic  relations  would  have 
implied. This remained the situation for the duration of the war. Militarily, 1919 saw the 
Poles initiate and maintain a clear advantage over Soviet Russia, freeing the entire area 
gained by Russia at the 3
rd partition of 1795. As the latter was enmeshed by domestic 
considerations in the Civil War, it lacked both the time and resources to direct a great deal 
of military attention on the Poles. As a result, during this year, the Soviet regime relied 
heavily upon diplomatic conduct to secure the infant state.  
 
     In  direct  contrast,  Piłsudski’s  belief  that  Russia  was  the  primary  threat  to  Poland’s 
independence in 1919 ensured that the attention of his armed forces was directed on the 
Soviet regime. Yet, even so, he refused to advance further eastwards at the end of the year, 
accurately  recognising  that  a  White  victory  in  the  Civil  War  would  favour  Poland’s 
independence even less than a Red success. Instead, it was decided to await the outcome of 
Russia’s  domestic  contest  before  attempting  to  establish  firm  relations  with  Poland’s 
opponent. 
 
      In the diplomatic field, the first Soviet attempt to send skilled revolutionaries to direct 
revolutionary  agit-prop,  encourage  socialist  revolution  and  provide  the  Polish 
revolutionary  movement  with  experienced  leadership  –  Lenin’s  acknowledged  second   226 
stage in the revolutionary process – saw the despatch of a Russian Red Cross Mission to 
Poland at the beginning of 1919. This process would culminate with the establishment of 
the Polrevkom in July 1920. It was also the initial step in Russia’s diplomatic offensive, 
providing the NKID with its first opportunity to play to an international audience, and start 
the process of isolating Poland internationally and removing Entente support for the Polish 
war effort. Tactically, it was an astute move.  
 
      In sharp contrast, Piłsudski’s continued military advance, taken in direct contravention 
of  Allied  wishes,  lost  much  international  goodwill  for  the  Poles.  During  1919,  to 
commence  implementing  his  federalist  ideology,  Piłsudski  secured  the  strategically 
important cities of Wilno, Lwów and Minsk, and presented events to the world as fait 
accompli. This action led to the temporary suspension of diplomatic contact with Russia, 
but as Soviet hands remained tied domestically, the regime was soon forced to resume 
talks at BiałowieŜa in June to stabilise relations. Invariably, as with all negotiations during 
the conflict, these were marred by mutual distrust and collapsed the following month. 
 
      With Piłsudski’s order to halt the military advance in August 1919, secret negotiation 
came to the fore at Mikaszewicze from October to December 1919. This was in accord 
with the wishes of both Poland and Russia: France was pushing for a joint Polish-White 
offensive  against  Soviet  Russia,  whilst  a  demonstration  that  Poland  was  willing  to 
negotiate would invalidate Soviet propaganda assertions the state was an Entente puppet. 
By securing a temporary armistice until the defeat of Denikin was assured, these talks 
prevented the military escalation of the war at the end of 1919. In all other areas, though, 
compromise remained out of the question.  
 
      Therefore, although militarily the Poles maintained a clear advantage over Russia in 
1919, with the latter’s focus directed towards domestic concerns, the Soviet regime clearly 
won the majority of the diplomatic battles. Led by able and experienced diplomats and 
skilled propagandists, the NKID and Comintern successfully pursued a two-pronged attack, 
enmeshing the Poles in tactically complex negotiations and creating irrevocable tensions 
between them and their western allies.  
 
      Intermittent recourse to a dual diplomatic-military offensive continued to be pursued 
by the Poles in 1920. The Soviet regime, too, intensified its three-pronged drive: traditional 
and revolutionary diplomacy; agit-prop and military engagement as the year progressed. 
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employed by both belligerents during the war, so that either Russia or Poland was in the 
diplomatic ascendancy at any one time. However, although for the first part of the year the 
Soviet regime fought from a weaker military position, its diplomats again succeeded in 
maintaining a clear advantage over their opponents. Utilising their former experience as 
underground  revolutionaries,  the  Russian  and  Polish  communists  proved  skilled  at 
composing appeals designed to raise the sympathy of the international working class. The 
tactical astuteness of Lenin and his colleagues as players in the international arena was, at 
this time, clear for all to see. 
 
      Furthermore, the Poles were constrained in their actions and at the outset of the year 
were obliged to consult the Entente governments for advice on the Soviet peace offer of 
January 1920. Once more they received divided counsel from Britain and France, as first 
witnessed  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  This  placed  them  in  an  extremely  difficult 
position. The Poles remained dependent upon the Entente for supplies and equipment and 
were greatly concerned at the propaganda onslaught which diplomatic negotiation with the 
Soviets would undoubtedly facilitate. Despite these misgivings, however, Lloyd George’s 
advice made it impossible for the Poles to resort purely to military measures, and in March 
the latter duly began talks to meet with a Soviet delegation at Borisov.  
 
      These talks failed to materialise. The Allies wished, as was the norm, to avoid any 
responsibility for facilitating peace talks, preferring to watch the drama unfold from a safe 
distance. The Soviets cleverly utilised the debate over the meeting place to prolong the 
talks, allowing them to simultaneously prepare a Red Army counter-offensive and to play 
to a large international audience. In this, the NKID and Chicherin undoubtedly came out on 
top. Neither, however, were the Poles blameless. Piłsudski knew that the Poles were in a 
strong position militarily and was secretly preparing to launch an offensive into Ukraine. 
He, too, saw no reason to sue for peace or to accede to Soviet demands. Both states now 
favoured a military dénouement. 
 
      Thus, the temporary truce secured at Mikaszewicze was observed only until Denikin 
had been removed as a threat in April 1920. One this had been achieved, Piłsudski, again 
driven  by  his  ideological  programme,  launched  an  offensive  on  Kiev,  transforming, 
through his approach towards ethnographic  Russia,  the scale  and intensity of the war. 
Although he sought to resolve the border states’ territorial issues without having to take 
into account allied wishes, by overestimating the strength of the Polish Armed forces, 
misinterpreting Ukrainian support for his federalist programme and underestimating the   228 
resources of the Red Army, his action lost further international goodwill for the Poles and 
brought the Polish state close to collapse. 
 
      In turn, the Soviet vision of Ukraine as a socialist bridge to south-western Europe set 
the two states ideologically, politically and militarily on a crash course. The Kiev offensive 
proved  a  crucial  turning  point  for  Russia’s  perception  of  the  war  and  had  important 
implications for Soviet ideology as its leaders were forced to acknowledge the potential 
support to be gained by playing the national card. For the first time, the Soviet regime 
directly and officially petitioned Russian nationalist sentiment for the war effort, to great 
effect. This temporary ideological shift demonstrated both a great flexibility in policy to 
secure the widest possible support for the war effort, and highlighted Lenin’s abilities as an 
excellent tactician. It also indicated just how much the RKP(b) was willing to bend its 
beliefs in the very short-term to achieve the vital long-term goal of securing the world’s 
first socialist state. This was fully in-keeping with Marxist-Leninist doctrine that ideology 
must be re-evaluated in response to changing circumstances.  
 
      The Red Army’s quick response resulted in a dramatic reversal in the fortunes of the 
protagonists. The Poles were swept ever westwards along the entire front, so that by late 
July,  Piłsudski  had  lost  all  territory  acquired  the  previous  year.  It  also  presented  the 
Politburo with a unique opportunity to implement its war aims. The Soviet decision, taken 
on  17  July  1920,  to  cross  the  ethnographic  border,  in  direct  contravention  of  Marxist 
doctrine, irreversibly altered the complexion of the war, culminating politically with the 
establishment of the Polrevkom and militarily with the Battle of Warsaw. This was one of 
the pivotal turning points of the conflict, as it represented a major ideological shift by 
Lenin and the Politburo. 
 
      Until this point, Soviet action was governed by the Marxist doctrine that the socialist 
revolution must be the work of each nation’s own proletariat and it was to this end that 
Russia’s  revolutionary  diplomacy,  in  combination  with  their  well-planned  agit-prop 
offensive, were directed prior to July 1920. Marx argued that it was the responsibility of 
communists to guide and direct the process of overthrowing the capitalist system through 
international socialist revolution, but that the working class must emancipate itself. It was 
thus essential in the Polish war that the regime wait to allow its agit-prop to incite the local 
population,  before  supporting  a  genuine  Polish  workers  movement,  if  and  when  it 
developed.  Socialist  revolution  must  not  be  imposed  from  outside  through  the  use  of   229 
military force. The Red Army, at most, should assist the efforts of the Polish working 
class. It should not be used as a decisive instrument in bringing about political change.  
 
      Confidence, however, was high in the Politburo that if successful, transforming the 
Polish campaign into a revolutionary war would not only secure Russia’s socialist state, 
but would spread the revolution westwards to Germany and south-westwards to Hungary, 
Romania  and  Czechoslovakia.  This  would  provide  a  viable  international  alternative  to 
capitalism  and  would  be  the  first  step  in  overthrowing  the  Paris  settlement.  Most 
importantly,  the  sovietisation  of  Poland  would  crucially  implement  the  third  stage  of 
Lenin’s ideological programme, drawing Poland into the Soviet federation of states. The 
regime was, thus, confident that the Red Army would act as a necessary catalyst for a 
Polish workers’ and peasants’ led socialist revolution.  
 
      It was this error of judgement which was ultimately responsible for the unprecedented 
defeat of the Red Army at Warsaw the following month. The Soviet regime overlooked a 
fundamental Marxist dictum and tried, in July 1920, to impose revolution on the Poles by 
force.  Lenin’s  insistence  that  the  Red  Army  be  used  to  test  Poland’s  ‘ripeness’  for 
revolution in July 1920, demonstrated a profound lack of judgement and a fatal misreading 
of the situation in Poland, for which his country ultimately paid the price of defeat.  Poland 
was demonstrably not ready for socialist revolution.  
 
      This misjudgement continued to  direct Soviet policy  for the remainder of the war. 
Indeed, so convinced were the RKP(b) leaders that the Polish workers and peasants would 
support the advancing Red Army, that it supported the establishment of the Polrevkom, 
earmarked  as  the  first  Soviet  Polish  Socialist  Government,  in  the  same  week  that  the 
ethnographic border was crossed. This proved to be one of the most significant events of 
the war. Through it, Polish communists sought to lead the socialist revolution in their 
native country, implementing in practice the second stage of the revolutionary process 
pursued by Lenin: the establishment of revolution in each state encouraged by the work of 
local communists. The importance of this organisation cannot be underestimated. It left no 
doubt about Lenin’s ultimate objective in the war with Poland. If the Polish-Soviet War 
formed part of the Soviet leaders’ earliest venture to export revolution by military force 
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Polish  government,  establishing  a  Socialist  Soviet  Republic  on  ethnographic  Polish 
territory. It was, ultimately, the political culmination of Soviet ideology in Poland.
2  
 
      The  Committee  was  not  established,  as  has  been  suggested,  in  response  to  a 
spontaneous workers’ movement. Instead, it was created in direct response to communist 
recognition of the need to establish an organisation to direct the sovietisation of Poland and 
to mobilise Polish communists to direct the revolutionary process in their country. As such, 
it was the definitive attempt by the communists of Poland and Russia to impose their 
ideological  programme,  not  simply  through  diplomatic  overtures  or  agitation  and 
propaganda, but through decisive, concrete and practical action. 
 
      Established on the initiative of Polish communists, who defined its programme, the 
Committee  received  very  little  direct  instruction  from  Moscow.  Indeed,  policy 
disagreements  arose  between  the  Polrevkom  and  Lenin.  Yet  it  was  dependent  on  the 
RKP(b)  for  funds  and  fully  shared  with  the  Soviet  regime,  the  Marxist  objective  of 
establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat in Poland. As a political instrument, capable 
of exporting socialist revolution abroad, Lenin was extremely interested in its activities, 
requesting daily reports about its work in the Polish political struggle. 
 
      More than any other event of the war, the establishment, activities and conduct of the 
Polrevkom  graphically  demonstrated  that  which  the  Soviet  regime  hope  to  achieve  in 
Poland and beyond. As such, it provided a clear indication of the measures which would 
have been implemented had the Red Army been victorious at the Battle of Warsaw later in 
the  month.  Led  by  individuals  intimately  associated  with  the  Soviet  decision-making 
process  in  Russia,  it  carried  out  a  wide  range  of  tasks  aimed  at  implementing  Soviet 
ideology in Poland and was deeply committed to the dissemination of Soviet propaganda 
and agitation to the  local population.  Mirroring Soviet policy, it  directly addressed its 
working  class  target  audience,  over  the  heads  of  the  Polish  Government.  In  fact,  the 
measures  it  introduced  broadly  replicated  those  which  the  Bolsheviks  had  themselves 
undertaken three years earlier in Russia to initiate the transition to a Marxist economy. 
 
      Crucially, however, although both its members and the Soviet leaders were keen to 
stress its independence from the Russian regime, the Polrevkom was ultimately dependent 
upon the advancing Soviet armed forces for its continued survival. Without the Red Army 
                                                
2 The Battle of Warsaw later in the month would represent the military culmination of this policy.   231 
it could not have functioned, nor controlled the local revkomy in the occupied Polish lands. 
Herein lay its fundamental weakness. It was utterly dependent upon the Soviet military to 
control the areas over which it sought to establish authority, so that its influence only ever 
extended as far as the Soviet frontline.  
 
      The reception of its ideological programme by Polish inhabitants was crucial to its fate 
and its failings were those of the entire Soviet foreign policy-diplomatic agenda pursued 
during the war. The local population in Poland ultimately held its fate in its hands. This 
also proved the vital factor in determining the eventual outcome of the war. Contrary to the 
Committee’s expectations, the local population refused to support it in sufficient numbers 
required to guarantee its survival. The peasantry remained largely  passive to its work, 
initial  working  class  support  soon  waned  as  it  failed  to  deal  with  the  ever-increasing 
problems it faced, Polish socialists, its potential allies, regarded it as part of an imperialist 
Russian invasion, and it failed to coordinate its activities closely with the one party which 
unreservedly supported it: the KPRP.  
 
     The  majority  of  Poles,  including  the  workers  the  Committee  claimed  to  represent, 
regarded national independence and security as more important than the adoption of an 
alien  Soviet  ideology.  The  Polrevkom  failed  to  establish  the  longed-for  socialist 
government  because  fatally,  it  failed  to  win  the  support  of  the  local  population,  who 
refused to  be inspired by  Marxist ideology. In  reality,  socialist revolution  had no  real 
support base in Poland and neither did the Polrevkom. This fundamental truth sealed the 
fate not only of the Committee, but also of the entire Soviet policy pursued by Lenin 
during the war. 
 
      Whilst the Polrevkom was working to foster socialist revolution in Poland, July and 
August witnessed the climax of both Soviet and Polish diplomatic offensives and agit-prop 
drives, as the military situation intensified. Although both states continued to play to an 
international audience, Entente intransigence, founded on an unwillingness to accept any 
direct  responsibility  for  the  progress  of  events,  first  witnessed  at  the  Paris  Peace 
Conference, reached its zenith. Chicherin took the opportunity, through the Baranowicze 
negotiations, to secure a temporary truce to strengthen the position of the Red Army and to 
allow the work of the Polrevkom and the widely disseminated Soviet agit-prop to bear fruit 
in  Poland.  The  Poles,  too,  sought  to  gain  time  to  facilitate  a  military  solution  to  the 
conflict. Piłsudksi was also confident of victory. 
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     The talks, therefore, served as a smokescreen behind which military preparations for the 
decisive battle of the war were made. Quite simply, it was not in the interest of either party 
to negotiate seriously until the lines on the battlefield had been drawn. Conviction that the 
Polish socialist revolution was imminent and that the Red Army would be victorious at 
Warsaw, removed any pressing need for the Soviets to negotiate before its objectives had 
been achieved. The Polrevkom resided in the wings, ready to grasp political power as soon 
as the Polish Army was defeated. There was no incentive for Lenin and his colleagues to 
negotiate with a Polish Government, soon to be replaced by an ideologically allied socialist 
government. 
 
      Instead, Baranowicze enabled the Soviet diplomats to play to an international audience. 
Once more, the diplomats of the NKID won the diplomatic contest, and began to reap 
rewards for their consistent diplomatic offensive, as the Allied states increasingly began to 
question  Polish  policy.  The  extremely  severe  Soviet  terms  proposed  to  the  Poles  also 
succeeded, once again, in splitting British and French reaction and advice. The tactical 
superiority of the Soviet statesmen and diplomats, thus, continued to reap rewards for the 
Russian regime right up until the commencement of the battle. 
 
      The Battle of Warsaw was of decisive importance for Soviet Russia, Poland and the 
wider world. If successful, Soviet Russia would undoubtedly have sought to spread its 
ideology, on the back of the Red Army, not only to Poland, but to the rest of Europe and 
beyond. For the Poles, the battle represented the final stand in the struggle to consolidate 
and secure their infant state. Until this date, they had lagged behind the Soviet regime in 
the proficiency of their agit-prop, but once the Red Army threatened their capital, the Poles 
adopted  the  Soviet  methods  of  appealing  directly  to  their  own  population  and  to  the 
western Allies, to great effect. Polish patriots, incensed at the approach of their historic 
opponent towards  their capital city, displayed steely  determination to fight to the  end. 
Piłsudski alone devised the successful military strategy and commanded the Polish Army 
to impose the first military defeat, by a foreign adversary, on the Soviet Russian Republic. 
The Allies could claim no plaudits for the victory.  
 
      Privately the Soviet regime was forced to acknowledge the catastrophic implications of 
this for the international socialist movement. As Lenin admitted, it proved a turning point 
not only for the Polish-Soviet War, but for the entire world. Following the Great War it had 
appeared that the tide was turning in the Soviets favour as revolutionary movements were 
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this international activity. Following the conclusion of the peace settlement at Versailles in 
mid-1919, the European nations increasingly began to turn their backs on international 
concerns, as amply demonstrated by Allied intransigence in dealing with both Poland and 
Russia throughout the war.  By the time the Soviet regime ordered the Red Army to cross 
the  Polish  border  and  endorsed  the  establishment  of  the  Polrevkom  in  July  1920,  the 
revolutionary upsurge had long since passed in most of Europe. Their action was a year too 
late. The Soviet regime’s inability to take this shift in international opinion into account 
had fatal consequences in August 1920. 
 
      Following these dramatic events, Soviet Russia, too, began to turn its focus inwardly, 
and  the  implementation  of  international  revolution  receded  temporarily  into  the 
background. For the Polish Republic, victory at Warsaw secured the independence of the 
state and removed the threat of the installation of a puppet Soviet regime. It also laid the 
foundations of Polish-Soviet relations for the next two decades. A Soviet victory would 
have been the first step in shattering the international system established at Paris. Europe 
was saved, by the Polish-Soviet War, from a Soviet onslaught, until the outbreak of the 
Second World War. 
 
      The final diplomatic enactments of the conflict, staged in neutral Riga, saw the Soviet 
diplomats skilfully manoeuvre, for the last time, to gain the upper hand at the negotiating 
table, despite being militarily defeated. As throughout the war, Lenin maintained a tight 
grip on Soviet proceedings, whilst Piłsudski, disillusioned by the failure of his federalist 
programme,  largely  withdrew  from  the  negotiating  process.  As  a  result,  the  National 
Democrats,  as  in  Paris,  directed  the  Polish  agenda.  This  time  though,  the  delegates 
proposed  more  conciliatory  terms  in  the  hope  of  avoiding  a  future  war  with  Russia. 
Military engagements ended at 2400 on 18 October 1920, but mutual suspicion once again 
forced the negotiations to become a protracted affair. It was only on 18 March 1921, with 
the signing of the Treaty of Riga, that the Polish-Soviet War formally ended. 
 
      This  compromise  peace,  for  the  first  time,  delimited  the  Polish-Soviet  frontier, 
successfully achieving an objective which the Treaty of Versailles had failed to secure two 
years earlier. Neither state could, however, realistically claim the Treaty as a victory. In 
practice, both failed to secure the war aims defined by the ideological programmes of their 
respective leaders at the outset of the conflict. The Poles renounced enormous areas of land 
which had belonged to the pre-partition state and neither Piłsudski’s federalist programme 
nor  Dmowski’s  annexationist  agenda  were  implemented  in  full.  Likewise,  the  Soviet   234 
leaders were forced to concede their inability to sovietise Poland and spread revolution to 
central and western Europe. Importantly, though, the Riga settlement provided a much-
needed  temporary  breathing  space  for  Russia  and  Poland,  enabling  them  to  turn  their 
attention to the pressing domestic concerns threatening their states.  
 
      Thus, in conclusion, from 1919-1921, Polish–Soviet relations alternated between an 
intermittent  pursuit  of  military  offensives  and  recourse  to  diplomatic  negotiation  as 
domestic and international conditions dictated, and was acknowledged as such by their 
respective leaders. In reality, although both sides were willing to provide their diplomats 
with opportunities to secure the states’ foreign policy objectives by peaceful means, neither 
leadership hesitated to employ military force as and when the need arose. Mutual distrust 
of  their  opponent’s  motives  was  heightened  by  the  Soviet  regime’s  adept  use  of 
revolutionary diplomacy and widespread dissemination of agit-prop materials.     
 
      With the establishment of the Polish state in November 1918, Poland and Soviet Russia 
were set on a crash course. Ideologically, western democracy and Russian Marxism battled 
it out in the Polish-Soviet War. This was the principal obstacle to the establishment of 
cordial relations between the neighbouring states in 1919-1921. The war which followed 
was inevitable. The uncompromising and diametrically opposing war aims of both ensured 
that it was impossible for either to secure their objectives through diplomacy alone. The 
very nature of the war, the ideological and traditional opposition of both states, and their 
directly  conflicting  aims  and  objectives,  ensured  that  only  the  military  defeat  of  one 
protagonist would force the signing of a peace.  
 
      All policies pursued by Lenin and the Politburo in the war with Poland stemmed from 
their  mistaken  conviction  that  Poland  was  ripe  for  the  second  Marxist  stage:  socialist 
revolution. The Soviet’s longed-for Polish revolution failed to materialise, despite the best 
efforts  of  its  diplomats,  statesmen,  agitator-propagandists,  Red  Army  men  and  the 
Polrevkom.  By  consistently  overestimating  the  revolutionary  potential  in  Poland  and, 
contrary to all Marxist teachings, by utilising the Soviet military to enforce revolution on 
Poland, Lenin inadvertently signed the death-warrant of the socialist revolution in that state 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. Communist ideology, ultimately failed to inspire 
the vast majority of the Polish population.  
 
      The entrenchment of this ideological divergence between Polish western democracy 
and Russian Marxism after the war ensured that lasting compromise proved unattainable.   235 
For the Poles, Russia continued to incite historical, geographic, political and ideological 
opposition.  Russia  too  remained  suspicious  of  Poland  for  identical  reasons.  Mutual 
antagonism, deepened by the Polish-Soviet War, developed further in the inter-war years. 
Soviet humiliation at the outcome of the conflict made it inevitable that, at a future date, 
the regime would seek to redress the balance. The terms agreed at Riga failed to provide an 
enduring solution to Polish-Soviet hostility, and were once more questioned by the armed 
forces of Soviet Russia in September 1939. The peace lasted less than twenty years.        236 
Appendix A: Biographical Notes 
 
Babel, Isaak (1894-1941) 
Born in Odessa, Ukraine, to a Jewish family, he joined the RKP(b) in 1917. During the 
Polish-Soviet War, he served as a political commissar in the Red Army. A collection of his 
stories based on his war experiences, Konarmiia, was published in 1926.  
 
Balfour, Arthur (1848-1930) 
Born  in East Lothian, Scotland and educated at Eton and Trinity  College,  Cambridge. 
Balfour entered the House of Commons in 1874 as the Conservative MP for Hertford. He 
became British Prime Minister in 1902, a post he held until 1905, and remained leader of 
the Conservative Party until 1911. In 1916, David Lloyd George, appointed him Foreign 
Secretary, a post from which he resigned in 1919 following the Paris Peace Conference.  
 
Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseevich (1853-1926)  
Born in Tiflis, the son of an aristocrat, Brusilov was educated in the Imperial Corps of 
Pages. After the Russian Revolution in 1917, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of 
the Russian Army by the Provisional Government. Brusilov offered his services to the 
Soviet regime in 1920. Involved in the Red Army march to Warsaw in 1920, he retained 
largely staff positions, initially as a military consultant and then as an inspector of cavalry. 
 
Chicherin, Georgii Vasil'evich (1872-1936) 
Born in Tambov province, into a family from the Russian lower nobility, Chicherin was 
the son of a retired diplomat. A graduate in history and philology from the University of St. 
Petersburg,  he  entered  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  1898.  In  1904,  he 
resigned  from  the  diplomatic  service  to  settle  in  Berlin,  where  in  1905  he  joined  the 
RSDRP. A Menshevik, he was expelled from Germany in 1907, moving to Paris and, from 
1914-1918, to England. He returned to Russia in January 1918 and joined the RKP(b). In 
March, he was named Commissar for Foreign Affairs, retaining the post until 1930, and as 
such  was  Soviet  Russia’s  highest  ranking  diplomat  during  the  Polish-Soviet  War. 
However,  he  was  never  invited  to  join  Soviet  Russia’s  chief  policy-making  body,  the 
Politburo. 
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Clemenceau, Georges (1841-1929)   
Born  in  Mouilleron-en-Pareds,  France,  he  trained  as  a  doctor.  In  1871,  he  became  a 
member of the National Assembly and in 1876 was a leader of the extreme left in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Clemenceau held the post of French Premier, 1906-1909, and again 
in 1917-1920 and presided over the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 
 
Curzon (of Kedleston), George Nathaniel, (Marquis) (1859-1925)   
Born at Kedleston Hall, Derbyshire, Curzon studied at Oxford, became an MP in 1886, and 
was appointed Viceroy of India, 1899-1905. He became a member of Lloyd George’s War 
Cabinet in 1916 and held the post of British Foreign Secretary 1919-1924, a post he had 
long coveted. 
 
Dąbski, Jan (1880-1931) 
Born in Kukizów, near Lwów, Dąbski was a member of the Polish Legions during the 
Great War, 1914-1918. He was Vice-President of PSL (Piast), and as Deputy Foreign 
Minister,  1919-1923,  was  the  chief  negotiator  at  the  Polish-Soviet  peace  negotiations, 
which concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Riga in March 1921.  
 
Danishevskii, K./Daniševskis, Jūlijs Kārlis  (1884-1938)   
The son of a Latvian farmer, Danishevski joined the Latvian Social Democratic Party in 
1900. Arrested and exiled to Siberia in 1914, he became a member of the Moscow Soviet 
in 1917 and was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Latvian SSR in 1919.  He was a 
political member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic in 1920, attached 
to the Western Front and in August 1920, led the Soviet peace delegation at the Minsk 
negotiations. 
 
Daszyński, Ignacy (1866-1936)   
Born at ZbaraŜ, Galicia, to an aristocratic family. In 1882, Daszyński became leader of the 
PPS in Galicia. In 1891, he co-founded the Galician Social Democratic Party and was a 
member of the Austrian Reichsrat (Parliament), 1897-1918. Elected as Premier of Poland, 
December 1918-January 1919, from 1919-1929, he was leader of the PPS in the Sejm and 
was Vice-Premier of Poland from June-December 1920.  
 
Dmowski, Roman (1864-1939)   
Born in a small town near Warsaw, Dmowski attended the University of Warsaw, studying 
biology. From 1906-1912, he was elected a deputy to the Russian Duma, was Chairman of   238 
the Polish National Committee in Paris from 1917-1919, and the leading Polish delegate at 
the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. As leader of the National Democratic Party, he was a 
principal opponent of Józef Piłsudski during the Polish-Soviet War and in July 1920 was a 
member of the Council of State Defence. 
 
DzierŜyński, Feliks (1877-1926)   
Born in DzierŜynskowo, Wilno guberniia, the son of a Polish landowner. Co-founder of the 
SDKPiL in 1899, he was elected to the CC of RSDRP(b) in 1917. A principal organiser of 
the October Revolution, he was appointed Chairman of the Cheka on 7 [20 n.s.] December 
1917, a position he held until his death. From 1917, he was elected a Presidium member of 
All-Russian CEC, a RKP(b) CC member, from 1917-1926, and an Orgburo member, from 
March 1919-April 1920. In May-July 1920, DzierŜyński was appointed Rear Commander 
of South-West Front, from May-September 1920, was a political member of the Western 
Front and was unofficial head of the Polrevkom. He was People’s Commissar for Internal 
Affairs, 1920-1922. 
 
Grabski, Stanisław (1871-1949)  
A  Polish  politician,  co-founder  of  the  PPS  and  Professor  of  Economics  at  Lwów 
University,  1910-1939.  From  1918-1919,  Grabski  was  a  representative  on  the  Polish 
National Committee in Paris and was a member of the Polish peace delegation at the Riga 
Conference with Soviet Russia.   
 
Grabski, Władysław (1874-1938)   
Born in Borowo near Łowicz, like his brother Stanisław, he was a Polish politician and 
economist.  He served as a National Democratic Deputy in the Russian Duma, and as the 
Polish Prime Minister from July-August 1920 and again from 1923-1925.  
 
Joffe, Adolf Abramovich (Krymskii, Viktor) (1883-1927) 
Born in Simferopol’, the son of a wealthy Crimean merchant, and educated as a doctor, 
Joffe joined the RSDRP(b) in June 1917. Chairman of the Soviet delegation during the 
peace negotiations with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk in 1918, he was appointed Soviet 
Ambassador to Germany the same year. Joffe headed Soviet peace delegations to Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania and was a delegate at the 2
nd Congress of the Comintern in 1920. 
From September 1920-March 1921, he was Chairman of the Soviet delegation to the Riga 
Peace Conference with Poland.   
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Kamenev, Lev Borisovich (Rosenfeld) (1883-1936)  
Born in Moscow, the son of a railway engineer, Kamenev joined the RSDRP in 1901.  
When the party split in 1903, he supported the Bolshevik faction, becoming a leading 
member. In April 1917, he was elected a CC member of RSDRP(b), and was a delegate to 
the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations. At the 2
nd Congress of the Comintern in 1920 he 
represented,  with  Lenin,  the  RKP(b)  on  the  commission  for  national  and  colonial 
questions. He was a Politburo member, 1919-1925, and an Orgburo member from March 
1919-April 1920. In 1920-1921, he headed a Soviet trade delegation to Britain. 
 
Kautsky, Karl Johann (1854-1938) 
Born in Prague, Kautsky was a leading theoretician of the German Social Democratic Party 
and 2
nd International, and a critic of Bolshevism. 
 
Kerr, Philip Henry (11
th Marquis of Lothian) (1882-1940) 
As David Lloyd George's private secretary, 1916–1921, he was active at the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919. 
 
Kon, Feliks (1864-1941)  
A  Polish  Communist  and  journalist,  Kon  joined  the  PPS  (Lewica)  in  1904,  before 
becoming an RSDRP(b) member in 1918. He was a Polrevkom member from July-August 
1920.  
 
Krestinskii, Nikolai N. (1883-1938) 
Born  in  Mogilev,  to  Ukrainian  peasants,  he  graduated  in  law  from  St.  Petersburg 
University in 1907. A member of the RSDRP in 1903, of the RKP(b) CC, 1917-1921 and 
from 1919-1921, he was a member of the central Secretariat and Politburo. Krestinskii was 
appointed Commissar for Finance, 1918-1922. 
  
Lapiński Pawel (Pawel Lewinson) (1879-1937) 
Joining the PPS in 1904, he was appointed to its CC from 1906-1918. Lapiński became a 
member of the Central Executive Committee of the PPS-Lewica in Russia, and one of the 
organisers of the Polish Commissariat in the Commissariat for Nationalities, in December 
1917. Between 1918 and 1920, he was a consultant to the NKID and in 1920-1927, headed 
the Diplomatic Information department of the NKID RSFSR in Berlin.  
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Lenin, Vladimir Il’ich (Ulianov) (1870-1924)   
Born  in Simbirsk, the son of  a school inspector,  Lenin studied law at Kazan’  and St. 
Petersburg Universities. In 1894, in St. Petersburg, he organised the illegal “Union for the 
Liberation of the Working Class”. Arrested in 1895, for the next 22 years he remained in 
exile, becoming a member of the RSDRP CC and leading the Bolshevik wing of RSDRP, 
in 1903. He was one of the principal organisers of the October Revolution in Russia in 
1917 and was elected Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars. An advocate of 
immediate peace with Germany, he pushed through the signing of the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk with Germany in March 1918 and was chief instigator in founding the Comintern 
in March 1919. During the Polish-Soviet War, he was Soviet Russia’s leading statesman 
and chief policy-maker: Chairman of Sonvarkom, 1917-1924; CC member of the RKP(b) 
and its titular head; leading figure in the Politburo; head of the Council for Workers’ and 
Peasants’  Defence,  November  1918-April  1920,  and  of  the  Council  for  Labour  and 
Defence, April 1920-January 1924.  
 
Leszczyński, Julian (Leński) (1889-1939)  
Leszczyński joined the SDKPiL in 1905. In November 1917, he became Commissar for 
Polish Affairs and in February 1919, Commissar for Education in the Lit-Bel SSR. During 
the Polish-Soviet War, he was a representative of the Polrevkom on the South-Western 
Front.  
 
Lloyd-George, David (1
st Earl of Dwyfor) (1863-1945)  
Born in Manchester, he studied law in Wales and, in 1890, became an MP for Carnarvon 
Boroughs, a seat he held for 55 years. As British Prime Minister, at the head of a coalition 
government, dominated by Conservatives, he held office from 1916 to 1922, and led the 
British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 
 
Marchlewski, Julian Juzefovich (Karski/Kujawski) (1866-1925) 
Born  in  Włocławek,  Poland,  to  a  family  from  the  petty  nobility,  Marchlewski  was  a 
diplomat, politician and writer. He became a well-known activist in the Polish and German 
social democratic movements and was elected a candidate member of the CC RSDRP in 
1907.  In June 1918, he went to Moscow and was appointed a member of the All-Russian 
Central  Executive  Committee  and  a  member  of  the  NKID.  As  leader  of  the  Polish 
communists in the USSR, 1919-1920, he signed the founding document of the Comintern, 
returning to Moscow as representative of the Polish Communist Party. During 1919-1920, 
he  was  entrusted  by  Lenin  as  a  principal  adviser  on  Polish  affairs,  chief  diplomatic   241 
negotiator  in  secret  talks  with  the  Poles  and  was  nominated  official  Chairman  of  the 
Polrevkom. 
  
Paderewski, Ignacy Jan (1860-1941) 
Born  in  Kurylowka,  Podolia,  Paderewski  was  a  world  famous  concert  pianist  and 
composer. Following the outbreak of the Great War, he lobbied internationally for the 
establishment of a free Poland, was a representative of the Polish National Committee in 
Paris and was a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, signing the initial peace treaty for 
Poland.  He became Polish Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs from January-
November 1919.   
 
Patek, Stanisław (1866-1945) 
A Polish statesman and lawyer, he was appointed Pilsudski’s representative with the Polish 
National  Committee  in  Paris,  in  1919.  Patek  was  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  from 
December 1919-June 1920.   
 
Petlura, Simon Vasil’evich (Semen) (1879-1926)   
Born  in  Poltava,  the  son  of  a  coachman,  he  was  a  Ukrainian  nationalist  leader  and 
politician. After the February Revolution in 1917, he organised the Ukrainian Military 
Committee,  becoming  Minister  of  Defence  in  the  Ukrainian  Rada,  in  1918.    He  was 
Chairman (‘Ataman’) of the Ukrainian Directory, set up in Kiev in March 1917 as an 
autonomous government, transformed in November 1917 into an independent regime, and 
was supported by the German occupiers from March-November 1918. Fighting against 
both  the  Red  Army  and  Denikin’s  White  Army,  in  alliance  with  Poland,  Petlura  was 
defeated at the end of 1919.  He reached Kiev with the Poles in the spring of 1920, but 
emigrated to Poland after the Polish retreat.   
 
Piłsudski, Józef (Klemens) (1867-1935) 
Born in Zulów, near Wilno to a minor gentry family, he was educated at Wilno University. 
In 1892, he co-founded the PPS, becoming the first editor of its newspaper Robotnik. In 
1906,  he  became  leader  of  a  right-wing  faction  of  the  PPS,  establishing  paramilitary 
organisations (Strzelcy), which in August 1914, became the Polish Legions in the Austrian 
Army. He was appointed Minister of Defence under the Regency Council in 1917, and was 
imprisoned from July  1917-November  1918 in Magdeburg Castle. In November 1918, 
upon his release, he declared Poland’s independence, becoming the country’s first Chief-
of-State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In spring 1920, he was appointed   242 
Marshal of Poland and was the principal military leader, statesman and policy-maker in 
Poland during the war with Soviet Russia.  
 
Preobrazhenskii, Evgenii Alekseevich, (1886-1937) 
Born to a priest’s family, in Bolkhoz, central Russia. An economist and party activist, he 
was elected to the regional RKP(b) committee in the Urals 
 
Próchniak, Edward (1888-1937) 
Born in the town of Pulawy, Poland, he was an SDKPiL member from 1903 to 1917, a 
member of the KPRP from 1918, and a member of the RKP(b) in 1917-1918 and 1920-
1926. In 1920, he was nominated a member of the Polrevkom.  
 
Radek, Karol Berngardovich (1885-1939) 
(Bernhardovich/Sobelsohn/Sobelson/Parabellum/Bremer/Struthahn) 
Born in Lwów, Galicia, into a lower middle class family. He was a member of the Polish 
and  German  Social  Democratic  Parties  and,  from  1917,  of  the  RSDRP(b).    After  the 
October Revolution, he became Head of the Central European Department of the NKID 
and  was  a  Soviet  delegate  at  the  Brest-Litovsk  peace  negotiations.  At  the  8
th  RKP(b) 
Congress in March  1919 he was elected, in absentia, a  member of  CC and at  the  2
nd 
Comintern Congress in July-August 1920 was elected a member of the ECCI, becoming a 
secretary  to  the  Comintern,  from  1919-1924.  He  was  valued  highly  by  the  Soviet 
leadership as an adviser on Polish and German affairs and participated in the Polish-Soviet 
negotiations at Minsk in October 1920. 
 
Rumbold, Horace (1869-1941) 
Born  in  St.  Petersburg,  the  son  of  the  Secretary  to  the  British  Embassy,  he  was  a 
professional  diplomat,  1888-1933.  Rumbold  was  appointed  British  Minister  to  Poland 
October 1919-November 1920. 
 
Sapieha, Prince Eustacy (1881-1963)  
Sapieha was a Polish statesman, appointed Chairman of the Committee for the Defence of 
the Borders, in 1919.  From July 1919-June 1920 he was Polish Minister in London and 
Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs from June 1920-June 1921.  
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Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili/Jugashvili/Soso/Stalin/Joseph/ 
I.Besoshvili/David/Kato/Koba/Ivanovich/Vasil’ev/K. Stefin) 
(1879-1953) 
Born in Gori, Tiflis Province, Georgia, to a shoemaker and washerwoman. He joined the 
RSDRP in 1898, and after the party split in 1903, supported the Bolshevik faction.   
After the October Revolution, he was appointed: a CC member of the RKP(b); an All-
Russian CEC member; a Politburo member, 1917-1952; a member of the Orgburo and 
Commissar for Nationalities, 1917-1923. From 1918-1920, he was a political commissar 
with the Military Revolutionary Council, being sent to the Southern, Western and South-
Western Fronts and was a member of the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defence. In 
March 1919, he was with the RKP(b) delegation at the founding congress of the Comintern 
and in July 1920 was elected an alternate member of the ECCI.   
 
Trotsky, Lev Davydovich (Bronstein/Trotsky, Leon) (1879-1940) 
Born  in  Ianovka,  Kherson  Province,  Ukraine,  the  son  of a  Jewish  estate  manager.  He 
joined the editorial staff of the RSDRP newspaper, Iskra, and at the 2
nd Party Congress in 
1903, sided with the Menshevik faction. He officially joined the RSDRP(b), as part of the 
mezhraiontsy faction, in August 1917. Was elected to the CC, in absentia, at the 6
th Party 
Congress and as Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee, was the principal 
organiser of the October Revolution in 1917. He became a member of the All-Russian 
CEC; the Politburo, 1917-1926, and the Orgburo from March 1919-April 1920. Trotsky 
was appointed Commissar for Foreign Affairs, October 1917-February 1918, leading the 
Soviet delegation at the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations. He became Soviet Commissar 
for War, March 1918-January 1924. In January 1919, he signed the appeal for the founding 
congress of the Comintern and was elected an alternate member of the ECCI.   
 
Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893-1937)   
Born in Smolensk guberniia, the son of a nobleman and a peasant woman. He graduated 
from  the  Aleksandrovskii  Military  Academy  in  1914,  before  joining  the  exclusive 
Semenovskii  Guards  Regiment.  Became  a  member  of  the  RKP(b)  and  joined  the  Red 
Army, in April 1918. He was appointed Commander of Caucasian Front on 31 January 
1920. On 29 April 1920, was appointed Commander of Western Front, leading the Soviet 
invasion of Poland, which was halted just before Warsaw.   
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Unszlicht, Józef (Unshlikht, Iosif Stanislavovich) (1879-1938) 
Born in Mlava, Plotsk Province, Poland.  He joined the SDKPiL in 1900 and was an active 
participant in the October Revolution in 1917, as a member of the Military Revolutionary 
Committee. Unszlicht was a Collegium member of the Cheka from December 1917 and a 
member of the CEC of SDKPiL in Russia. In March 1919, he was elected a member of the 
CC of the Communist Party of Lithuania and Belorussia and appointed Commissar of 
Military Affairs in the Lithuanian-Belorussian Soviet Republic. He was a representative of 
the Polish Communist Party to the founding congress of the Comintern, in March 1919. 
From April 1919, he was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western 
Front, Political Commissar of XVI Army and a Polrevkom member.  
 
Wasilewski, Leon (1870-1936) 
Born in St. Petersburg, a member of the PPS and close associate of Piłsudski, he was the 
architect of Polish foreign policy in the east. Appointed first Polish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, November 1918-January 1919. 
 
Weygand, Maxime (1867-1965) 
Born  in  Brussels,  he  was  Chief-of-Staff  to  Foch,  1914-1923  and  France’s  military 
representative on the Inter-allied Mission to Poland, July-August 1920.  
 
Wilson, Thomas Woodrow (1856-1924) 
Born in Staunton, VA, he studied at Princeton and John Hopkins Universities, becoming a 
lawyer and University professor. He was elected President of USA, 1913-1921. Wilson led 
the American delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, but the US Senate rejected the 
Treaty of Versailles. Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1919.   
 
Witos, Wincenty (1874-1945)   
Born in Wierzchaslawice, Galicia, he was employed as a woodcutter, carpenter, and a 
landowner. Witos became leader of the PSL (Piast) Party and was a Deputy in the Vienna 
Reichsrat, from 1911–1918. He was appointed Prime Minister of Poland in 1921, 1923 and 
1926. 
  
Zinoviev, Grigorii Evseevich (Radomysl’skii, Apfelbaum) (1883-1936)  
Born in Elizavetgrad, Kherson Province, to a lower middle class Jewish family.  Member 
of the RSDRP from 1901, he was elected Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, December 
1917-January 1926, a candidate member of the Politburo in 1919 and a full Politburo   245 
member  from  1921-1926.  He  held  the  post  of  Chairman  of  the  Comintern  Executive 
Committee, March 1919-October 1926.     246 
Appendix B: Variant Place-names 
 
Baranowicze; Baranovichi; Baranavichy 
Białystock; Belostok; Belastok; Byalistok 
BiałowieŜa; Belaveskaia Pushcha; Belovezhskaia Pushcha 
Borisov; Borisów 
Brest-Litovsk; Brześć nad Bugiem; Brześć Litewski  
Kiev; Kijów 
Kraków; Krakov; Cracow 
Lwów; Lvov; L’vov; Lviv; Lemberg 
Mikaszewicze; Mikashevichi 
Minsk; Mińsk 
Moscow; Moskva; Moskwa; Maskva  
Riga; Ryga 
Warsaw; Warszawa; Varshava 
Wilno; Vilna; Vilnius   247 
Abbreviations and Glossary 
 
CC       Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party 
(TsK:  Tsentral’nyi  komitet  rossiiskikh  kommunisticheskikh  partii 
(bolshevikov); Centralny Komitet Rosyjskiej Komunistycznej Partii 
(bolszewików))  
CEC   (All-Russian) Central Executive Committee of the Soviet (VTsIK: 
Vserossiiskii  tsentral’nyi  ispolnitel’nyi komitet; Centralny  Komitet 
Wykonawczy) 
Cheka  All-Russian  Extraordinary  Commission  for  the  Struggle  against 
Counter-Revolution  and  Sabotage/Soviet  Secret  Police 
(Vserossiiskaia  chrezvichainaia  komissiia  po  bor’be  s 
kontrrevoliutsiei,  spekuliatsiei  i  prestupleniem  po  dolzhnosti  pri 
SNK RSFSR; Nadzwyczajna Komisja do Walki z Kontrrewolucją i 
SabotaŜem)  
Comintern    Communist International (Kommunisticheskii internatsional) 
DBFP       Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1918-1945 
D & M    Dokumenty i materialy po istorii Sovetsko-Pol'skikh otnoshenii. 
Vols. 1-3 
DVP      Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR. Vols. 1-3 
Konarmiia    Soviet 1
st Cavalry Army 
KPRP      Communist Workers Party of Poland (Komunistyczna Partia  
         Robotnicza Polski) 
Kresy      Borderlands lying between Poland and Russia 
MSZ      Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw 
Zagranicznych)   
NKID      People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narodnyi 
komissariat po inostrannym delam) 
NAS      National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh 
Nat. Dems.    Polish National Democratic Party (Stronnictwo 
Narodowo-Demokratyczne (endecja)) 
Ober-Ost    Supreme Command of Eastern Front (Ober Kommando 
Ostfront, Oberbefehlsheber Ost; Naczelne Dowództwo Wschodu) 
Orgburo    Organisational Bureau of the of the Central Committee of the  
      Russian Communist Party (Organizatsionnoe biuro TsK RKP(b))   248 
Pan      Soviet term for a Polish landowner 
Piłsudski Institute  Archive  of  the  Institute  of  Józef  Piłsudski,  London  (Archiwum 
Instytutyu Józefa Piłsudskiego)  
Pol’buro    Polish Bureau of the Russian Communist Party (Pol’skoe biuro 
RKP(b)) 
Polish Institute  Polish  Institute  and  General  Sikorski  Museum,  London  (Instytut 
Polski i Muzeum im. Gen. Sikorskiego) 
Politburo  Political Bureau of the Russian Communist Party Central  
            Committee (Politicheskoe biuro TsK RKP(b)) 
Polrevkom    Polish Provisional Revolutionary Committee (Pol’skii 
vremennyi revoliutsionnyi komitet; Tymczasowy Komitet 
Rewolucyjny Polski) 
PPC      Paris Peace Conference 
PPS      Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna) 
Revkom    Revolutionary Committee (Revoliutsionnyi komitet; 
Rewolucyjny Komitet) 
RGASPI  Russian State Archive of Social and Political History, Moscow 
(Rossiiskii gosudarstvennii arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii) 
RKP(b)    Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (Rossiiskaia 
kommunisticheskaia partiia (bolshevikov)) 
RSFSR    Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Rossiiskaia 
sovetskaia federativnaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika; 
Rosyjska Socjalistyczna Federacyna Republika Rad) 
Sejm      Polish Diet, Parliament 
Sovnarkom    Council of People’s Commissars (Sovet narodnykh 
komissarov) 
TNA      The National Archives, London   249 
Selected Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Archival 
 
Archiwum Instytutyu Józefa Piłsudskiego w Londynie 
Kolekcja 1 – Marszałek Józef Piłsudski. 
Kolekcja 2 – Piłsudska, Aleksandra. 
Kolekcja 23 – Wojna Polsko-Bolszewicka, 1918-1920. 
 
The British Library: Archival collections 
A collection of posters issued by the Southern anti-Bolshevik armies, 1918-1921. 
A collection of posters issued by the Soviet Government, Moscow, 1918-1921. 
Russian posters of World War One. 
Soviet era posters, 1986-1993. 
 
Instytut Polski i Muzeum im. Gen. Sikorskiego w Londynie 
A.I.14/1-4 – Miscellaneous: Polish-Bolshevik War, 1919-1920. 
A.11 - Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. 
A.11.49/CZ/1 – Sląsk Cieszyński : zbiór tekstów informacyjnych i 
     dokumentacyjnych uloŜony na podstanie mat. archiwalnych  Ambasady R.P. w 
     Londynie. Zestawit R. Wagnerowicz Konsul Generalny R.P., 1918-1921. 
A.11.49/SOW/20 – Sprawa granic, traktat ryski, linia Curzona, 1919-1920. 
A.11.76/30 – Traktat Pokoju między Polską a Rosją i Ukrainą, podpisany w Rydze 
     dnia 18 marca 1921 roku. 
A.12 - Ambasada Rzeczypospolitej w Londynie. 
A.12.P.1/2 – Współdziałanie niemiecko-sowieckie w wojnie polsko-sowieckiej: noty 
     lipiec-wrzesień, 1920. 
A.12.P.1/3 – Współdziałanie niemiecko-sowiecki w wojnie polsko-sowieckiej 
     materiały informacyjne marzec 1919-grudzień 1920. 
A.12.P.2/1 – Wojna polsko-bolszewicka: memoranda, komunikaty wojenne, 1920. 
A.12.P.2/2 – Okres wojna polsko-bolszewicka: depesze, memoriały, komunikaty 
     prasowe, 1920. 
A.12.P.2/3 – Petraktacje pokojowe polsko-sowieckie: depesze, komunikaty, wycinki 
    prasowe.   250 
A.12.P.3/1 – Stosunki handlowe z Sowietami: pisma Polskich poselstw. 
A.12.P.3/3 – Okrucieństwa Sowieckie w stosunku do rannych i jeńców 
     Polskikh:  protokóły. 
A.12.P.3/4 – Wojna polsko-sowiecka i sprawa zawarcia pokoju, 1920-1921. 
A.12.P.3/5 – Opracowania po Angielsku na temat wojny polsko- 
     bolszewickiej, 1920. 
A.12.P.4/1 – Wykowanie Traktatu Ryskiego. 
A.42 - Konsulat Generalny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Londynie, 1919 
     -1946. 
A.42.30 – Akty Polskiej propagandy 1920 r. 
A.42.108 – Akte w Spr. Marszałka Józefu Piłsudskiego. 
A.42.112a – Akte Zasdnicze Ambasady Polskiej w Londynie: 1919-1932. 
A.42.323 – Korespondencja L. Alma Tadema a Konsultatem Gen. R.P., 1919. 
KOL 24 - Kukiel, Marian: gen. dyw. prof. dr. 
KOL 24/3 – śyciorysy, bibliografia, dokumenty prywatne-ksiąŜeczki 
      Ŝywnościowe, kwity, legitymacje. 
KOL 24/6 – Listy w sprawie Archiwów Wojskowich i do H. Liebermana w sprawie  
     ‘Sprawy Brzeskiej’. 
KOL 24/101 – Rękopisy i maszynopisy opracowań historicznych, 1914-1920. 
KOL 24/102 – Rękopisy i maszynopisy opracowań historycznych, 1921-1939. 
KOL 24/104 – Rękopisy i maszynopisy róŜne – noty, noty biograficzne, recenzje, artykuły 
      okdicznościowe, wspomnienia pośmiertne. 
KOL 24/105 – Nadbitki, kupie artykułów, broszur itp. 
KOL 24/106 – Prasa i wycinki prasowe a artykułami. 
KOL 24/111 – Zbiór wycinków prasowych o gen. Kukielu zebrane przez prof. L.Koczego. 
KOL 80/6 – Grobicki, Jerzy plk. dypl. : Wspomnienia, Sztab Gen. W.P., Dywizja 
     Podlaska/9. D.P./ BrzeŜany, Pomorze, Front Litewsko-Białoruski, z Jazdą 
     Dąbrowskiego, Kampania Wołyńska, 1-szy Pułk SzwoleŜerów, 1918-1920. 
KOL 82 – Kolekcja Amb. Jana Ciechanowskiego. 
KOL 82/1 – Dokumenty, korespondencja memoranda, notatki itp. Jana 
     Horodyskiego, 1914-1919. 
KOL 82/2 – Akta Komitetu Narodowego Polskiego we Francji, 1917-1918. 
KOL 82/3 – Jan Ciechanowski w Londynie, 1918-1920. 
KOL 82/6 – Komunikaty Swojenne Sztabu Generalnego, 1920. 
KOL 82/7 – Korespondencja Amb. Ciechanowskiego, 1920-1966. 
KOL 82/65 – Sprawa granic po I Wojnie Światowej i Traktacie Ryskim.   251 
KOL 104/3 – Adam śółtowski: ‘Poland’s Eastern Heritage’. 
KOL 104/7 – Adam śółtowski: ‘History of Poland’. 
KOL 155 – Brzezicki, Roman sgt. 
KOL 168 – Litwa. 
KOL 180 – Sokolnicki, Henryk: ‘Memoirs of a diplomatic and social life, chiefly 
     before and during World War II, in Poland, the USSR and Scandinavia’. 
KOL 187 – Trawiński, Witold. 
KOL 191/29 – Piećdziesięciolecie 24 Pułku ułanów imienia Hetmana W.K. 
     Stanisława Źołkiewskiego: wspomnienia. 
KOL 195 – Demel, Franciszek col. 
KOL 214 – Sukiennicki, Wiktor prof. 
KOL 227 – Wankowicz, Karol. 
 
National Archives of Scotland 
GD1/839/1 Reminiscences by Mrs. Flower, secretary to Philip Kerr, 11
th Marquis of 
     Lothian, during World War I and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, 1894-1919. 
GD40/17 The private papers of Philip Kerr. 
GD193/327 White papers and memoranda re: Russia, 1919-1923. 
GD193/339 Correspondence re: Russia, 1919-1925. 
GD248/3401/8 Papers of the Grant of Grant and Ogilvy of Findlater families, Earls 
     of Seafield (Seafield Papers): Miscellaneous papers, 1781-1946; “The Spectator” 
     20 September 1919. 
GD372/132 Letters from correspondents serving with the North Russian Expeditionary   
     Force: letters from Major L.H. Marriage, Machine Gun 
     Corps, near Archangel, 1919. 
GD433/2/18 Letters to A.J. Balfour with some copy replies, 1918-1929,(33- 
     65); situation in Poland 1920, (41-43); Lloyd George and 
     Clemenceau, (57 & 63); Danzig, (64). 
GD433/2/136 Diary kept by Alice Balfour, 1917-1928. 
GD433/2/224 Diary kept by A.B. Balfour, 1898-1899. 
GD433/2/363 Bound volume of Alice Balfour’s letters, 1919, (16-24): Paris 
     Peace Conference; the Russian Army and British views of Lenin and 
     Trotsky. 
 
   252 
The National Archives 
FO 93/129/1 – Poland. No. 1: Treaty of Peace, Versailles, June 28 1919. 
FO 93/129/3A – Poland. No. 1: Treaty of Peace, Versailles, June 28 1919. 
FO 93/129/4 – Poland. No. 4: Decision of the Conference of Ambassadors 
     at Paris  concerning the frontiers of Poland, Paris, March 15 1923. 
FO 373/1/1 – Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Historical 
     Section of the Foreign Office, No. 0. 
FO 373/3/7A – Poland: general sketch of history, 1569-1772. Handbook 
     No. 49. 
FO 373/3/8 – Russian Poland, Lithuania and White Russia, April 1919. 
     Handbook No. 51. 
FO 373/3/9 – Prussian Poland, March 1919. 
FO 373/3/10 – Galician Poland, March 1919. 
FO 374/7 – Conférence de la Paix 1919-1920: Recueil des actes de la 
     conférence. Part IV, Section C2, Commissions des affaires Polonaises. 
FO 374/8/2 – Recueil des actes de la conference. Part IV: Commissions de la Conférence 
     (procès-verbaux, rapports et documents), Section C, Questions  Territoriales. 
FO 374/20 – Peace Congress, Paris, 1919: miscellaneous papers. Part I – January-April 
     1919. 
FO 374/21 – Peace Congress, Paris, 1919: miscellaneous papers. Part II – April 
     -July 1919. 
FO 417/7 – Part I - Correspondence respecting the affairs of Poland, October 
     -December 1919. 
FO 417/8– Part II – Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Poland, 
     January-June 1920. 
FO 417/9 – Part III – Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Poland, July 
     -December 1920. 
FO 417/10 – Part IV – Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Poland, 
     January-June 1921. 
FO 418/53 – Part I – Correspondence respecting Russia, 1919. 
FO 418/54 – Part II - Further correspondence respecting Russia, 1920. 
FO 418/55 – Part III – Further correspondence respecting Russia, 1921. 
FO 688/1 – 1919 (files 6-755). 
FO 688/2 – 1920 (files 3-10). 
FO 688/3 – 1920 (files 19-20). 
FO 688/4 – 1920 (files 20-44).   253 
FO 688/5 – 1920 (files 49-75). 
FO 688/6 – 1920 (files 76-106). 
FO 688/7 – 1920 (files 110-147). 
FO 688/8 – 1920 (files 148-547). 
FO 688/9 – 1921 (files 9-50). 
FO 688/10 – 1921 (files 50-160). 
 
Rossiiskii gosudarstvennii arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI) 
Fond No. 19 
Opis 1, Sovet narodnykh komissarov: protokoly, 1917-1922. 
 
Fond No. 63 
Opis No. 1 - Polish Bureau of Agitation and Propaganda CC RCP(b). 
Delo 4 - Resolutions of Polish Communists in Moscow, 9-11 September 
     1919, about the creation of a Central Committee centre for party work 
     among the Polish population. 
5 - Department of Agitation and Propaganda of Polish Bureau 1919-1923, 
     Secret Department of the Bureau, 1920-1921. 
8 - Protocols of Polish Bureau, 16-19 Feb 1921, with the participation and 
     signature of J. Marchlewski. 
11 - Documents and materials of the local Polish Bureau to the CC CP of 
     Belorussia  and Ukraine. 
13 - Protocol of meeting of Polish Bureau leaving the front for Moscow – 
     DzierŜyński, Kon, Marchlewski. 
14 - Meeting of Polish Bureau for 1921 - DzierŜyński, Marchlewski, Kon, 5 
     January-29 December 1921. 
32 - Letters to the CC about Communist Party organisation on Polish 
     territory. 
36 - Białystok - mood of Polish population in the town, 1 June – 19 October 
     1920 
40 - Letters from CC CP of Lithuania and Belorussia about their 
     conference, 22 July –22 December 1920. 
43 - Note from Narkomindel about the Polish Government note concerning 
     the activities of Polish communists in Russia and speech by NKVD about 
     the internal situation of Poland. 
44 - Liquidation of the Polish Commissariat.   254 
69 - Lithuanian and Belorussian CP protocol about military organisation of 
     army and conduct of illegal work 
72 - Letters from the Lithuanian and Belorussian CC about the distribution 
     of Polish  literature by Polish organizations. 
73 – Conspiratorial letters from local underground communist organisations 
     of Polish  workers about the situation in Poland. 
86 – Lithuanian and Belorussian CC CP notes, by DzierŜyński. 
88 - Białystok Committee of KRPR – Polrevkom. 
134 - Polrevkom. 
135 - Lecture by Marchlewski on Polish history. 
172 - Polish Bureau thesis about agitation and propaganda work in Middle Lithuania. 
186 - Letter by Lenin on the work of the Polish military. 
190 - Russian-Ukrainian Peace delegation’s negotiations with Poland. 
191-193 - From the Russian-Ukrainian peace delegation’s negotiations with Poland, 
     written by DzierŜyński. 
194 - Letters about the peace negotiations between Russia and Poland at Riga. 
198 - Russian Red Cross Mission. 
210 - Statistics about the Polish population in Belorussia and the RSFSR. 
252-262 - Work of Polish Bureau in Belorussia. 
266-285 - Work of Polish Bureau in Ukraine. 
267 - Work of the Polish Bureau of Agitation and Propaganda in Ukraine, January 
     1920-1922. 
286 - Articles and press reports about the political situation in Poland and about the 
     negotiations and relations between Soviet Russia and Poland. 
287-291 - Foreign press reports about the situation in Russia, Poland, Lithuania and 
Latvia. 
295 - Protocol of the Secret Bureau of the Polish Bureau, 20 Nov 1920 – 22 March 
     1921. 
305 - Underground, illegal work of the Polish Bureau in Białystok. 
314 - Letter by Lenin to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Bureau about the 
situation in Poland. 
315 - Letter from the Polish Bureau to the Department of the Communist Party of Poland 
in Berlin. 
317 - Conclusion of peace negotiations between Poland and Russia. 
395-532 - Documents of the local Polish Bureau in Russia, Poland, Ukraine and 
     Belorussia.   255 
535 - Letters and notes of People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G.V. Chicherin, to the 
Polish Government complaining about the Polish Army occupation of Belorussian and 
Ukrainian lands. 
536 - Bobin’ski’s letter to the Polish Bureau about Poland’s internal situation and the 
need to conclude peace. 
539 - Letter from a member of the Russian-Ukrainian peace delegation, V. Pan’skii, 
     about the peace negotiations 
541 - Letter by Vera Kotsheva about the need to establish contact with Karl Radek. 
577 - Polish newspaper summary for October 1920 - March 1921. 
579 - Material on peace negotiations with Poland, Polish-Russian relations    
     and Poland, Lithuania, Belorussia and Ukraine. 
 
Fond No. 68 – Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland 
Opis No. 1 
Delo 1 - Polrevkom manifesto, signed by DzierŜyński, Marchlewski and Kon. 
3 - Organisational meeting of Polrevkom with DzierŜyński, Marchlewski and   
     Kon. 
4 - Orders of Polrevkom for July-August 1920. 
6 - Instructions of Polrevkom for the organisation of Revkomy in Poland, the 
     land question, defence and the development of industry. 
8 - Letter to Lenin from the Polrevkom about its formation, the situation in 
     Poland, and about its work - signed by DzierŜyński. 
10 - Note from Polrevkom to Revvoensovet about the organisation, activities 
     and liquidation of Revkomy in Poland. 
12 - Letters from Polrevkom to Head of Army and Staff of Western Front 
     about the situation in Poland and about the peace negotiations between 
     Poland and Russia. 
14 - Information about the Białystok population. 
24 - Letters from Polrevkom about the need to work among the young, 
     European population and in professional unions, to establish 
     revolutionary tribunals with the participation of Polrevkom members,  
     and about the situation in Galicia. 
28 - Civil, military and social institutions in Białystok and other towns. 
29 - Mandates of Polrevkom. 
32 - List of appeals of Polrevkom, 1-14 August 1920. 
34 - Minutes of Polrevkom meeting.   256 
37 - List of Białystok Committee’s work, 6 August – 3 September. 
38 - Letters from Białystok Revkom to CP of Lithuania and Belorussia. 
40 - Velinski Revkom letters to CC Litbel re: Wilno situation. 
77 - Letter from Doletsky to Polrevkom about the situation in the CP of 
     Poland. 
78 - Events in Poland and the Polrevkom written about by F. Kon. 
79 - Photographs of members of the Polrevkom- DzierŜyński, Marchlewski, Kon, and   
others. 
 
Fond No. 70 
Opis 5 - Polskaia Komissiia Istparta TsK VKP/b. Department for the collection and 
     study of materials on the history of the October Revolution and the history of the 
    RKP(b).  Includes information about the Polish-Soviet War. 
Opis 101-114 
Dela 488-554 - Copies of State Archive for Foreign Affairs, 1913-1918. 
Dela 639-640 - SDKPiL & PSS, 1914-1918. 
Delo 659 - Diplomatic documents about Polish-Soviet Relations, 1919-1920. With 
     letters by Feliks DzierŜyński and RóŜa Luksemburg. 
 
Fond No. 76 
Opis 1 - Felix DzierŜyński, 1896-1912. 
Opis 2 - Politburo, Pol’bureau, Polrevkom, Party and State Commissions, 1917-1926. 
Opis 4 - Felix DzierŜyński: biographical documents. 
 
Fond No. 135 
Felix Kon, (1883-1944). 
 
Fond No. 143 
Julian Marchlewski, (1889-1937). 
 
Fond No. 159 
Georgii Chicherin, (1872-1936). 
 
Fond No. 326 
Karol Radek, (1885-1939). 
   257 
The Victoria and Albert Museum 
Archival Collection of Russian and Polish propaganda posters: 
8409A-G. 
E.957-1916. 
E.1801-1917. 
E.3758-1919. 
E.1734-1919. 
E.181-1922. 
E.1241-1933. 
Propaganda Poster Exhibition, December 2002-31 May 2003, “The    
     Schreyer Collection”. 
 
Documentary Collections 
Affiches et imageries Russes, 1914-1921. Paris: Musée des deux guerres   
     mondiales, 1982. 
Baburina, N.I. (ed.) Russkii plakat pervoi mirovoi voiny. Moscow:  
     Tvorchesko-Proizvodstvennaia Firma “Iskusstvo i Kultura”, 1992. 
     Balcerak, Wiesław. (ed.) Polsko-Radzieckie Stosunki Kulturalne, 1918- 
     1939: dokumenty i materiały. Warsaw: Ksiąka i Wiedza, 1977. 
Bone, Ann. (ed. & trans.) The Bolsheviks and the October Revolution:   
     minutes of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic 
     Labour Party (b), August 1917-February 1918.  London: Pluto Press, 
     1974. 
Bourne, Kenneth & D. Cameron Watt. (eds.) British Documents on  
     Foreign Affairs: reports and papers from the Foreign Office  
     Confidential Print. Series A. Vol. 1-5. n.p.: University Publications of  
     America, 1984. 
________. (eds.) British Documents on Foreign Affairs: reports and papers 
     from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Series I. Vol. 1-9. n.p.:     
     University Publications of America, 1989-1991. 
Bowlt, John E. (ed. & trans.) Russian Art of the Avant-Guard: theory and 
     criticism, 1902-1934. New York: Viking Press, 1976. 
Browder, Robert P. & Alexander F. Kerensky. (eds.) The Russian  
     Provisional Government: documents, August 1917- February 1918. Vol.  
     1-3. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961. 
Bubnov, A.S., S.S. Kamenev, M.N. Tukhachevsky & R.P. Eideman.   258 
     Grazhdanskaia voina 1918-1921.  Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe 
     Izdatel’stvo Otdel Voennoi Literatury, 1930. 
Bunyan, James & H.H. Fisher. (eds.) The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918: 
     documents and materials. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1934. 
Butt, V.P., A.B. Murray, N.A. Myshov & G.R. Swain. (eds.) The Russian Civil War: 
     documents from the Soviet archives. London: Macmillan, 1996. 
Czestochowski, Joseph. (ed.) Contemporary Polish Posters in Full Colour. New 
     York: Dover Publications Inc., 1979. 
Degras, Jane. (ed.) Calendar of Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1917-1941. 
     London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948. 
________. (ed.) The Communist International, 1919-1943: documents. London: Cass, 
     1971. 
________. (ed.) Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1917-24. Vol. 1. London: 
     Oxford University Press, 1951. 
Direktivy glavnogo komandovaniia krasnoi armii, 1917-1920: sbornik dokumentov. 
     Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1969. 
Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. 1
st Series, Vol. 2. London: H. M. 
     S. O., 1946. 
Dokumenty i materialy po istorii Sovetsko-Pol'skikh otnoshenii. Vol. 1-3. Moscow: 
     Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1963-1965. 
Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR.Vol. 1-3. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo 
     Politicheskoi Literatury, 1957-1959. 
Dziennik Praw Państwa Polskiego.  Warsaw: n.p., 1918-1919. 
Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej.  Warsaw: n.p., 1919. 
Fuhrmann, Joseph. (ed.) The Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II 
     and the Empress Alexandra: April 1914-March 1917. Westport, Conn.: 
     Greenwood Press, 1999. 
Gostynska, Weronika. (ed.) Stosunki Polsko-Radzieckiej, 1918-1919.  Warsaw: 
      KsiąŜka i Wiedza, 1972. 
________. (ed.) Tajne Rokowania Polsko-Radzieckie w 1919: materiały archiwalne i 
     dokumenty. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1986. 
Hardie, M. & A. Sabin, (eds.) War Posters: issued by the belligerent and neutral nations,   
     1914-1919. London: A & C Black, 1920. 
Henderson, H.W. (ed.) Polish-Soviet Relations, 1917-1945: facts and   
     documents. Glasgow: H.W. Henderson, 1945. 
Horak, Stephen. (ed.) Poland's International Affairs, 1919-1960: a calendar   259 
     of treaties, agreements, conventions and other international acts. 
     Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964. 
Istoricheskii arkhiv. Vol. 1. Moscow: n.p., 1992. 
Jaworski K. & K. Blaszcyński, (eds.) Zmartwychstanie Polski w świetle  
    dokumentów. Poznań: n.p., 1928. 
Kakurin N.E. & V.A. Melikov, Voina s belopoliakami, 1920 goda. Moscow: 
     n. p.,1925. 
Kluchnikov, I.V. & A. Sabanin, (eds.), Mezhdunarodnaia politika 
     noveishego vremeni v  dogovorakh, notakh i deklaratsi’akh. Vol. 2. 
     Moscow: n.p., 1928. 
________. (eds.) Mezhdunarodnaia politika noveishevo vremeni v 
     dokumentov o Russko-Polskikh otnosheniiakh, 1918-1920, vol. 2. 
     Moscow: n.p., 1920. 
Kostiushko, I.I. (ed.) Pol’sko-Sovetskaia voina 1919-1920: ranee ne 
     opublikovannye dokumenty i materialy. Vol. 1-2. Moscow: Institut Slavia  
     Novedeniia i Balkanistiki RAN, 1994. 
Krasnaia kniga: sbornik diplomaticheskikh dokumentov o russko-pol’skikh 
     otnosheniiakh, 1918-1920. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo,  
     1920. 
Kumaniecki, Jerzy. (ed.) Pokój polsko-radziecki 1921: geneza, rokowania, 
      traktat, komisje mieszane. Warsaw: Biblioteka Narodowa, 1985. 
________. Stosunki Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z panstwem radzieckim, 
     1918-1943: wybór dokumentów. Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawn. Nauk., 
     1991. 
Kumaniecki, Kazimierz. (ed.) Odbudowa Państwowości Polskiej, 
     najwaŜniejsze dokumenty, 1912-styczeń 1924. Warsaw; Kraków: J. 
     Czernecki, 1924. 
League of Nations Treaty Series. Vol. 4. No. 1. London: Harrison and Sons, 
     1921. 
Lenin, Vladimir. Biograficheskaia khronika. Vol. 8-10. Moscow:  
      Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1977-1979. 
________. Izbrannye proizvedeniia. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975. 
________. Lenin o propagande i agitatsii. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe  
     Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1962. 
________. Leninskii sbornik. Vol. 35-36.  Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo 
     Politicheskoi Literatury, 1959.   260 
________. Neizvestnye dokumenty 1891-1922. Moscow:  ROSSPEN, 1999. 
________. Polnoe sobraniie sochinenii. Vol. 1- 55. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe 
     Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1956-1965. 
________. Voennaia perepiska: 1917-1922gg. Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1987. 
Links! Links! Links! Eine chronik in vers und plakat 1917-1921. Herausgegeben 
     und kommentiert von Fritz Mierau. Berlin: Rőtten & Loening, 1970. 
Litwin, Aleksander. (ed.) Tymczasowy komitet rewolucyjny polski. Warsaw: Wydział 
     Historii Partii KC PZPR, 1955. 
Meijer, Jan. (ed.) The Trotsky Papers, 1917-1922. Vol. 1-2. The Hague: Mouton, 
     1964 & 1971. 
Olszer, Krystyna. (ed.) For Your Freedom and Ours: Polish progressive spirit from 
     the fourteenth century to the present. New York: F. Ungar, 1981. 
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: the Paris 
     Peace Conference. Vol. 1-13. Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
     Printing Office, 1942-1947. 
Pavlov, G. (ed.) Sovetskii politicheskii plakat. Leningrad: Avrora, 1975. 
Piltz, George. (ed.) Russland wird rot: satirische plakate, 1918-1922.  Berlin: 
     Eulenspiegel, 1977. 
Pipes, Richard. (ed.) The Unknown Lenin: from the secret archive. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1996. 
Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943: official documents. Washington: Ministerstwo 
     Spraw Zagranicznych, 1968. 
Protokoly tsentral’nogo komiteta RSDRP(b), avg. 1917g-fevral’ 1918g. Moscow: 
     Gospolitizdat, 1958. 
Protokoly zasedanii tsentral’nogo ispol’nitelnogo komiteta sovetov. Moscow: n.p., 
     1920. 
Pukhalina, E.D. (ed.) Russkii plakat perovoi mirovoi voiny. Moscow: Tvorchesko 
     -Proizvodstvennaia Firma  “Iskusstvo i Kul’tura”, 1992. 
Richardson, Al. (ed.). In Defence of the Russian Revolution: a selection of    
     Bolshevik writings, 1917-1923. London: Porcupine Press, 1995. 
     RSDLP: resolutions and decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
     Union 1898-October 1917. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974. 
Russian Poster: from revolution to perestroika. Glasgow: University of 
     Strathclyde, 1989. 
Russkii politicheskii plakat. Moscow: Rossiskaia Gosudarstvennaia 
     Biblioteka, 2000.   261 
Ryska affischer, 1917-1922. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitetsbiblioteks 
     Utställningskataloger, 1985. 
Sbornik sekretnykh dokumentov iz arkhive byvshego ministerstva   
     innostrannykh del. Moscow: n.p., 1921. 
Slusser, Robert M. & Jan F. Triska. (eds.) A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 
     1917-1957. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. 
Sobranie zakonov i razporiazhenii praviltel’stva SSSR, 1917-1918. 
     Moscow: Iuridicheskoe Izdatel’stvo NKIU SSSR, 1933-1940. 
Soviet Posters, 1918-1978: an exhibition. London: Royal College of Art 
     Galleries, 1978. 
Soviet Union and Peace: most important documents issued by the 
     Government of the USSR concerning peace and disarmament from 1917-  
     1929. London: Martin Lawrence, 1929. 
Tarczyński, M. Bitwa Niemenska 29 VIII-18 X 1920: dokumenty 
     operacyjne. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, 1998. 
________. Bitwa Warszawska 13-28
 August 1920: dokumenty operacyjne. 
      Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, 1996. 
US Congress, Senate, Congressional Record. Washington: n.p., 1918. 
Valetskii, M.G. & N.M. Lapinskii. (eds.) Russko-Pol’skie otnosheniia v   
     period mirovoi voiny. Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1926. 
Vestnik narodnogo komissariata inostrannykh del.  Moscow: n.p., 1920. 
Vestnik vremmennaia pravitel’stva. Moscow: n.p., 1920. 
Vladych, L.V. (ed.) Ukrainskyi politychnyi plakat. Kiev: Vidavnytstvo 
     Politychnoi Literatury Ukrainy, 1981. 
Vogel, Robert. A Breviate of British Diplomatic Blue Books, 1919-1939.  
     Montreal: McGill University Press, 1963. 
Vsesoiuznaia kommunisticheskaia partiia (b) v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh  
     s'ezdov konferentsii i plenumov TsK: 1898-1925. Vol. 1. Moscow:  
     Partizdat, 1936. 
Vulliamy, C.E. (ed.) The Red Archives: Russian state papers and other documents 
     relating to the years 1915-1918. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1929. 
Ojczyzna i postęp: z dokumentow chwili.  Warsaw: n.p., 1916-1918. 
 
 
 
   262 
Newspapers 
Bednota 
Communist International 
Daily Herald 
Daily Mail 
Daily Telegraph 
Den’ 
Dziennik Polski 
Evening News 
Freiheit 
The French Socialist Party 
Gazeta Poranna 
Gazeta Warszawski 
Glasgow Herald 
Goniec Czerwony 
Iskra 
Izvestiia 
Kommunistichesky Trud 
Kurjer Polski 
Kurjer Poranny 
Kurjer Warszawski 
Le Figaro 
L’homme enchaîne 
L’Information 
London Illustrated News 
Manchester Guardian 
Monitor Polski 
Neue Lodzer Zeitung 
New Statesman 
Novoe Vremia 
Nowa Reforma 
Polska Czas 
Pravda 
Przegląd Wieczorny 
Robotnik 
Rzczespospolita   263 
Sztandar Komunizmu 
The Spectator 
The Times 
Trybuna 
 
Memoir Sources, Original Works 
Antonov-Ovseenko, Vladimir. Zapiski o grazhdanskoi voine. Vol. 4. 
     Moscow: Vysshii Voennyi Revoliutsionnyi Sovet, 1924. 
Babel, Isaak. Konarmiia. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1927. 
________.  1920 Diary. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. 
Barmine, Alexandre. (trans. Gerard Hopkins). Memoirs of a Soviet 
     Diplomat: twenty years in the service of the USSR. London: Lovat 
     Dickson Ltd, 1938. 
Buchanan, George. My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories. 
     Vol. 1–2. London: Cassell, 1923. 
Butnik-Siverskii, V.S. Sovetskii plakat epokhi grazhdanskoi voiny, 1918 
     -1921. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Vsesoiuznoi Knizhnoi Palaty, 1960. 
Carton de Wiart, Adrian. Happy Odyssey. London: Jonathan Cape, 1950. 
Chicherin, Georgii. Lenin i vneshnaia politika. Moscow: Politizdat, 1977. 
________. Stat’i i rechi po voprosam mezhdunarodno politiki. Moscow: 
     Izdatel’stvo Sotsial’no-Ekonomichesko Literatuty, 1961. 
________. Vneshnaia politika sovetsoi rossii za dva goda: ocherk, 
     sostavlennyi k dvukhletnei godovshchine rabochekrest’iansko revoliutsii.   
     Moscow: n.p., 1920. 
Churchill, Winston. The World Crisis: the aftermath.  London: Thornton 
     Butterworth, 1923. 
D’Abernon, Viscount Edgar. The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World.  
      London:  Hodder and Stoughton, 1931. 
Dąbski, Jan. Pokój Ryski: Wspomnienia. Pertraktacje. Tajne układy z Joffem. Listy. 
     Warsaw: n. p., 1931. 
Debicki, Roman. Foreign Policy of Poland, 1919-39: from the rebirth of the Polish 
     Republic to World War II. London: Pall Mall Press, 1963. 
Demosfenova, G., A. Nurok & N. Shantyko, Sovetskii politicheskii plakat. Moscow: 
     Isskustvo, 1962. 
Denikin, Anton. Tragediia beloi armii: kto spas sovetskuiu vlast’ ot gibeli. Moscow: 
     Studiia ‘Trite’ Rossisskii Arkhiv, 1991.   264 
De Robien, Louis. The Diary of a Diplomat in Russia, 1917-1918. New York: 
     Praeger, 1970. 
Dmowski, Roman. Niemcy, Rosja i Kwestija.  Lwów: n.p., 1908. 
________. Polityka Polska i odbudowanie panstwa: z dodaniem memorialu 
     “Zagadnienia srodkowo- i wschodnio-europejskie” i innych dokumentów polityki 
     polskiej z lat 1914-1919.  Hanover: n.p., 1947. 
________. Wybór Pism. Warsaw: Panstowowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1990. 
Dosch-Fleurot, Arnot. Through War to Revolution: being the experiences of a 
     newspaper correspondent in war and revolution, 1914-1920. London: J. Lane, 
     1931. 
DzierŜyńska, Zofia. Dnevnik zakliuchennogo pis’ma. Moscow: n.p., 1966. 
________. V gody velikikh boev. Moscow: Mysl’, 1975. 
DzierŜyński, Feliks. Dnevnik: pisma k rodnym. Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 1958. 
________. Izbrannye proizvedeniia. Vol. 1, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi 
     Literatury, 1977. 
________. Izbrannye stati - rechi, 1908-1926. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1947. 
Filasiewicz, Stanislas. La question polonaise pendant la guerre mondiale. Paris: n.p., 
     1920. 
Grabski, Stanisław. Pamietniki. Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1989. 
________. The Polish-Soviet Front. London: n. p., 1943. 
Hardinge, Charles. Old Diplomacy: the reminiscences of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst.   
     London: John Murray, 1947. 
Ioffe, A.A. Mirnye peregovory v Brest-Litovske. Moscow: n.p., 1920. 
Kakurin, N.E. Russko-pol’skaia kampaniia 1918-1920: politico 
    stratagicheskii ocherk. Moscow: Vysshii Voennyi Redaktsionnyi Sovet, 1922. 
Kerensky, Alexander. The Kerensky Memoirs: Russia and history’s turning 
     point. London: Cassell, 1966. 
Kon, Feliks. Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskii: biograficheskii ocherk. 
     Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1939. 
________. Vospominaniia. Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 1935. 
________. Za piatdesiat let. Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel, 1936. 
Kozicki, S. Sprawa granic Polski na konferencji pokowej w ParyŜu. 
     Warsaw: n.p., 1921. 
Kukiel, Marjan. “The Polish-Soviet Campaign of 1920”. Slavonic Review. 
     Vol. 8, No. 22, (1929): 48-65. 
Lenin, Vladimir. The Development of Capitalism in Russia: the process of   265 
     the formation of a home market for large-scale industry. Moscow: 
     Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1956. 
________. Imperialism, kak vysshaia stadiia kapitalisma. Moscow: Progress 
     Publishers, 1975. 
________. “The International Significance of the War with Poland”. Al. 
Richardson. (ed.) In Defence of the Russian Revolution: a selection of 
     Bolshevik writings, 1917-1923. London: Porcupine Press, 1995. 
________. “The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self- 
     determination”. 
Lenin: Selected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968. 
Lloyd George, David. Memoirs of the Peace Conference. Vol. 1-2. New 
     Haven: Yale University Press, 1939. 
________. War Memoirs. Vol. 1-6. London: I. Nicholson and Watson, 1933 
     -1936. 
Lunacharsky, A. & Y. Slavinsky, “Theses of the Art Section of Narkompros 
     and the Central Committee of the Union of Art Workers concerning   
     Basic Policy in the Field of Art, 1920”. John E. Bowlt (ed. & trans.)  
     Russian Art of the Avant-Guard: theory and criticism, 1902-1934. New   
     York: Viking, 1976. 
Maiskii, I. Vneshniaia politika RSFSR, 1917-1922. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
     “Krasnaia Nov” Glavpalitprosvet, 1923. 
Marchlewski, Juilan. “Mir s Polshei” in Kommunistisheskii Internatsional.   
     No. 14, (1920): 2751-2754. 
________. Pisma Wybrane. Vol. 2. Warsaw: KsiąŜka i Wiedza, 1952. 
________. Pol’sha i mirovaia revoliutsia. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 
     1920. 
________. Pol’sha pod inozemnym igom. Moscow: n.p., 1920. 
________. Rosja proletarjacka a Polska burŜuazyjna. Moscow: Wydawnictwo 
     Komunistyczne “Trybuna”, 1921. 
________. Sotsial’nye otnosheniia v Pol’she. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe 
     Izdatel’stvo, 1920. 
________. Voina i mir mezhdu burzhuaznoi Pol’shei i proletarskoi Rossiei. 
     Moscow: n.p., 1921. 
________. Wobec Kwestii Rolnej w Polsce. Moscow:  n.p., 1918. 
Marx, Karl. (transl. Ben Fowkes) Capital: a critique of political economy. London: 
     Penguin Books, 1976.   266 
Marx, Karl & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto. London: Penguin, 1985. 
________. Selected Correspondence. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
     1955. 
Nabokoff, Konstantin D. The Ordeal of a Diplomat. London: London and Norwich 
     Press, 1921. 
Nicolson, Harold. Curzon: the last phase, 1919-1925, a study in post-war diplomacy. 
     London: Constable & Co., 1934. 
________. Diplomacy. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. 
________. Peacemaking, 1919. London: Constable, 1945. 
Paléologue, Maurice. An Ambassador’s Memoirs, London: Hutchinson, 1923, Vol. 1- 
     3.  Paris: Librairie Plon-Nourrit, 1921-1922. 
Piłsudska, Alexandra. Piłsudski: a biography by his wife.  New York: Dodd, Mead 
     & Co., 1941. 
Piłsudski, Józef. (trans. D. R. Gillie) Joseph Pilsudski: the memoirs of a Polish   
     revolutionary and soldier. London: Faber, 1931. 
________. Korespondencja 1914-17. London: Instytut Józefa Pilsudskiego, 1984. 
________. Moje Pierwsze Boje. Lódz: Wydawn. Lódzkie, 1988. 
________. Pisma. Mowy. Rozkazy. Vol. 5. Warsaw: Instytut Badania Najnomszej 
     Historji Polski, Towarzystwo Wydawnicze “Polska Zjednosczona”, 1933. 
________. Pisma Wybrane. London: M. I. Kolin, 1943. 
________. Rok 1920. London: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 1987. 
________. Year 1920: and its climax battle of Warsaw during the Polish- 
     Soviet War 1919-1920.  London: Piłsudski Institute, 1971. 
________. Zadania Praktyczne Rewolucji. Warsaw: NZS, 1985. 
Polonsky, Viacheslav. Russkii revoliutsionnii plakat. Khudozhestvennaia 
     monografiia. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1925. 
Radek, Karol. “Die Polnische frage und die internationale revolution”. Die 
     Kommunistische Internationale. No. 12. (1920): 21-42. 
________. Golod v Rossii i kapitalisticheskii mir. Moscow: Otdel’nyi Ottisk 
     Izdatel’stvo No. 7 “Vestnik Narodnoi Komissariata Innostrannykh Del”,   
     1921. 
________. The International Outlook. London: Communist Party of Great 
     Britain, 1923. 
________. Piat’ let kominterna: osnovy programmy i taktiki kominterna. 
     Moscow: Izdatel’stvo “Krasnaia Nov” Glavpolitprovet, 1924. 
________. Podgotovka bor’by za novyi peredel mira.  Moscow: Partiinoe   267 
     Izdatel’stvo, 1934. 
________. Portrety i pamflety. Vol. 1-2. Moscow: Sovetskaia Literatura, 
     1933. 
________. Programma sotsialisticheskogo stroitel’stva. St. Petersburg: 
     Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1920. 
________. Put’ kommunisticheskogo internatsionala: rech; proiznesennaia  
     na III kongresie kommunisticheskogo internatsionala. Petrograd:    
     Izdannie Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionale, 1921. 
________. Vneshnaia politika Sovetsko Rossi. Moscow: n.p., 1923. 
________. Zhizn’ i delo Lenina. Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo,  
     1924. 
Ransome, Arthur. The Crisis in Russia. London: Allen & Unwin, 1921. 
Report of the Special Conference on Labour and the Russian-Polish War, 
      13 August 1920: the council of action. London: n.p., 1920. 
Riddell, George. Lord Riddell’s Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference  
     and After, 1918-1923. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1933. 
Rykov, A.I. Izbrannye proizvedeniia. Moscow: Institut Ekonomikii AN 
     SSSR, Moskva Ekonomista, 1990. 
Sarolea, Charles. Letters on Polish Affairs. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 
     1922. 
Sazonov, Serge. Fateful Years, 1909-1916: the reminiscences of Serge Sazonov. 
     London: Jonathan Cape, 1928. 
________. Vospominaniia. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1991. 
Sergeev, E.N. Ot Dviny k Visle.  Smolensk: Voennaia Redaktsiia Sovetskogo Zap- 
     Fronta, 1923. 
Sikorski, Władysław. La Campagne Polono-Russe de 1920.  Paris: n.p., 1928. 
Suslov, P.V. Politicheskoe obespechenie sovetsko-pol’skoi kampanii 1920 goda. 
     Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Otdel Voennoi Literatury, 1930. 
Temperley, H.W.V. (ed.) A History of the Peace Conference of Paris. Vol. 6. 
     London: Frowde, 1924. 
Trotsky, Leon. (trans. John G. Wright) The First Five Years of the Communist 
     International. Vol. 1. London: New Park Publications, 1973. 
________. (trans. Brian Pearce).  How the Revolution Armed: the military writings 
     and speeches of Leon Trotsky. Vol. 1-3.  London: New Park Publications, 1979- 
     1981. 
________. Moia zhizn’: opyt avtobiografii.  Vol. 1-2. Berlin:  Izdatel’stvo “Granit”,   268 
     1990. 
________. (trans. Tamara Deutscher) On Lenin: notes towards a biography.  London: 
     George G. Harrap and Co., 1971. 
________. Our Political Tasks. London: Connolly Books, 1969. 
________. Permanentnaia revoliutsiia. Berlin: Granit, 1930. 
________. (trans. Elena Zarudnaia) Trotsky’s Diary in Exile. Cambridge, Mass.: 
     Harvard University Press, 1958. 
Tukhachevsky, Mikhail. “Pokhod za Vislu”. Izbrannye proizvedeniia. Vol. 1. 
     Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1964. 
     Voina Pol’skikh bialogvardieev protiv Sovietskoi Rossii. Moscow: n.p., 1920. 
Weygand, Maxime. Mémoires. Vol. 2.  Paris: Flammarion, 1957. 
Zetkin, Klara. Vospominaniia o Lenine. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1955. 
Zinoviev, Grigorii. Kommunisticheskii Internatsional. Letchworth, Herts:   
     Prideaux Press, 1980. 
________. Sochineniia. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1923-1924. 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Reference Works 
Atlas of European History. London: Times Books, 1994. 
Banks, Arthur. (ed.) A Military Atlas of the First World War. Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 
     1998. 
Brown, Archie (ed.) The Soviet Union: a biographical dictionary. London: 
     Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1990. 
Crystal, David. (ed.) The Cambridge Biographical Encyclopedia. Cambridge; New 
     York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Deiately SSSR i revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia Rossii: entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ 
     granat. Moscow: Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1989. 
Drozdowski, Marian Marek. (ed.) Międzynarodowe Aspekty Wojny Polsko 
     -Bolszewickiej, 1919-1920: antologia tekstów historycznych. Warsaw: 
     Towarzystwo Miłośników Historii, Komisja Badan Dziejow Warszawy Institutu 
     Historii PAN, 1996. 
Fracht, Richard. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Eastern Europe: from the Congress of Vienna 
     to the fall of communism. London: Garland Publishing Inc., 2000. 
Goluba, P.A. et al (eds.) Velikaia oktiabr’skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia:   269 
     entsiklopediia.  Moscow: Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1987. 
Gorkin, A.P. et al (eds.) Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar’. Moscow: Bolskaia 
     Rossiskaia Entsiklopediia: Izdatel’stvo “Ripol Klassik”, 2002. 
Gromyko, A.A. (ed.) Diplomaticheskii slovar’. Vol. 1-3. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
     “Nauka”, 1985. 
Khromov, S.S. (ed.) Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsia v SSSR: 
     entsiklopediia.  Moscow: Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1983. 
Lazitch, Branko. (ed.) Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern: new revised and 
     expanded edition. Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 
Lerski, George L. (ed.) Historical Dictionary of Poland, 966-1945. Westport, Conn.: 
     Greenwood Press, 1996. 
Magnuson, Magnus (ed.) Chambers Biographical Dictionary. Edinburgh: Chambers, 
     1990. 
Olech, Urszula. Wojna Polsko-Sowiecka 1919-1921: materiały do bibliografii. 
     Warsaw, Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny, 1990. 
Prokhorov, A.M. (ed.) Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia. Vol. 1-30. 
     Moscow: Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1969-1978. 
________. (ed.) Bol’shoi entsiklopedicheskii slovar’. Moscow: Sovetskaia 
     Entsiklopediia, 1994. 
________. (ed.) Sovetskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar’.  Moscow: Sovetskaia 
     Entsiklopediia, 1989. 
Slusarczyk, Jacek. Polska a Panstwo Radzieckie: kalendarium, 1918-1939. 
     Warsaw: AWM, 1996. 
Sokol, Stanley S. (ed.) The Polish Biographical Dictionary: profiles of 
     nearly 900 Poles who have made lasting contributions to world 
     civilization.  Wauconda, IL.: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 1991. 
Suchcitz, Andrzej. Generałowie Wojny Polsko-Sowieckiej: mały słownik 
     biograficzny.Białystok, Ośrodek Badań Historii Wojskowej Muzeum 
     Wojska w Białystoku, 1993. 
Vronskaia, Jeanne. (ed.) A Biographical Dictionary of the Soviet Union, 
     1917-1988: a biographical encyclopedia of 5,000 leading personalities 
     in the Soviet Union. London: K.G. Saur, 1989. 
________. (ed.) Kto est’ kto v Rossii i byvshem SSSR: vydaiushchesia  
     lichnosti byvshogo Sovetskogo Soiuza, Rossii i emigratsii.  Moscow: 
     Terra, 1994. 
Wieczynski, Joseph L. (ed.) Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet   270 
     History.Vol. 10-41. Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 
     1976-1993. 
Zhukov, E.M. (ed.) Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia. Vol. 1-16. 
      Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1961-1976. 
 
Books 
Baker, Ray Stannard. Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement: written from 
     his unpublished and personal material. Vol. 2. London: William 
     Heinemann, 1923. 
Beichman, Arnold. The Long Pretense: Soviet treaty diplomacy from Lenin  
     to Gorbachev. London: Transaction Publishers, 1991. 
Bieleń, Stanisław. Polska-Rosja Czas Przewartościowań. Warsaw: Centrum  
     Badań Wschodnich Uniwersutetu Warszawskiego, 1995. 
Blobaum, Robert. Feliks DzierŜyński and the SDKPiL: A study of the origins of 
     Polish Communism. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984. 
Blociszewski, J. La restauration de la Pologne et la diplomatie Européene. Paris: 
     n.p., 1927. 
Bonnell, Victoria. Iconography of Power: Soviet political posters under Lenin and 
     Stalin. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997. 
Borzęcki, Jerzy. The Soviet-Polish peace of 1921 and the creation of interwar Europe.  
     New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. 
Bowlt, John E. (ed.) Russian Art of the Avant-Guard: theory and criticism, 1902 
     -1934. New York: Viking, 1976. 
Butler, J.R.M. Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr), 1882-1940. London: Macmillan, 1960. 
Chamberlin, William H. The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921. Vol. 1. New York: 
     Grosset & Dunlap, 1965. 
Chernykh, M.N. Iulian Markhlevskii o Sovetsko-Pol’skikh otnosheniiakh v 1918 
     -1921 gg. Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR Institut Slavianovedeniia i 
     Balkanistiki, 1990. 
Churchill, Winston. The Second World War: the gathering storm. London: Cassell, 
     1948. 
Cienciała, Anna M. & Titus Komarnicki. From Versailles to Locarno: keys to 
     Polish foreign policy, 1919-1925. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 
     1984. 
Cierlińska, Hanna. (ed.) A Panorama of Polish History. Warsaw: Interpress, 1982. 
Craig, Gordon A. & Felix Gilbert, (eds.) The Diplomats, 1919-1939. Princeton, N. J.:   271 
     Princeton University Press, 1953. 
Crampton, Richard J. Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century. London: Routledge, 
     1994. 
Dallin, A. Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe, 1914-1917. New York: King’s 
     Crown Press, 1963. 
Davies, Norman. God's Playground: a history of Poland, 1795 to the present. Vol. 2. 
     Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. 
________. Heart of Europe: a short history of Poland. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
     2001. 
________. White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20. London: 
     Pimlico, 2003. 
Dennis, Alfred. The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia. London: J. M. Dent,   
     1924. 
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921. London: Oxford 
     University Press, 1954. 
Dziewanowski, M.K. The Communist Party of Poland: an outline history. 
     Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. 
________. Joseph Piłsudski: a European federalist, 1918-1922. Stanford:    
     Hoover Institution Press, 1969. 
Epszteina, Tadeusza. (ed.) Polacy a Rosjanie. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo 
     Neriton/Institut Historii Pan, 2000. 
Erickson, John. The Soviet High Command: a military-political history, 
     1918-1941. London: Macmillan, 1962. 
Feliks Dzerzhinskii: a biography. (trans. Natalia Belskaia). Moscow: 
     Progress Publishers, 1988. 
Fiddick, Thomas C. Russia’s Retreat from Poland, 1920: from permanent 
      revolution to peaceful coexistence. London: Macmillan, 1990. 
Fischer, Louis. The Soviets in World Affairs: a history of the relations 
     between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, 1917-1929. Vol. 1.  
     Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1951. 
Fuller, J.F.C. The Battle for Warsaw, 1920. London: Gryf Printers, 1980. 
Gerson, Louis L. Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914-1920. 
     New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. 
Gieysztor, Aleksander et al. (eds.) (trans. by Krystyna Cekalska). History of   
     Poland. Warsaw: PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, 1979. 
Goldwin, Robert A. (ed.) Readings in Russian Foreign Policy. New York:   272 
      Oxford University Press, 1959. 
Gorodov, I., L. Zamiatin & I. Zemskov, G.V. Chicherin: diplomat leninskoi 
     shkoly. Moscow: Politizdat, 1973. 
Hamilton, Keith & Richard Langhorne. The Practice of Diplomacy: its  
     evolution, theory and administration. London & New York: Routledge, 
     1998. 
Henderson, H.W. An Outline of Polish-Soviet Relations. Glasgow: H.W. 
     Henderson, 1943. 
Hughes, Gwyneth & Simon Welfare. Red Empire: The forbidden history of 
     the USSR. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990. 
Humphrey, Grace. Poland Today. Warsaw: M. Arct Zaklady Wydawnicze, 
     1935. 
Iazhborovskaia, I.S. “O nekotorykh aspektakh vliianiia oktiabr’ia na soderzhanie, 
     napravlenie i formy klassovoi bor’by v Pol’she, 1918-1923”. Sovetsko- 
     Pol’skie otnosheniia, Moscow: n.p., 1974. 
Isaev, A.P. Voina s Pol’shei: Rossiia za liniei fronta. St. Petersburg: SPB Nestor, 
     1999. 
Istoriia diplomatii. Vol. 1-3. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1965. 
Jackson, Robert. At War with the Bolsheviks: allied intervention into Russia, 1917 
     -1920. London: Tom Stacey Ltd, 1972. 
Jonca, Karol. Wojna polsko-sowiecka 1920 toku w dokumentach niemieckiej dyplomacji. 
     Wrocław: Wydawn Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2002. 
Karpus, śbigniew. Wschodni Sojusznicy Polski w Wojne 1920 roku. Toruń: 
     Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika,1999. 
Karski, Jan. The Great Powers and Poland, 1919-1945. Lanham, MD.: University 
     Press of America, 1985. 
Kenez, Peter. The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet methods of mass 
     mobilization, 1917-1929. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
Khovratovich, I.M. Georgii Vasilevich Chicherin. Moscow: “Mysl”, 1980. 
Kirkien, L. Russia, Poland and the Curzon Line. Duns, Berwickshire: Caldra House 
     Ltd, 1944. 
Knei-Paz, Baruch. The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky. Oxford: 
     Clarendon Press, 1978. 
Knorowski, Mariusz, M. Piekarski & K. Spiegel. (eds.) Muzeum ulicy: plakat polski w 
     kolekcji Muzeum Plakatu w Wilanowie. Warsaw, Krupskii KsiąŜka, 1996. 
Komarnicki, Titus. Rebirth of the Polish Republic: a study in the diplomatic history of   273 
     Europe, 1914-1920. London: William Heinemann, 1957. 
Konovalov, Sergei. (ed.) Russo-Polish Relations: an historical survey. London: 
     Cresset Press, 1945. 
Korbel, Josef. Poland between East and West: Soviet and German diplomacy towards 
     Poland, 1919-1933. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963. 
Koryn, Andrzej. (ed.) Wojna Polsko-Sowiecka 1920 roku: przebieg walki tło 
     międzynarodowe. Warsaw: Wydawn Instytutu Historii PAN, 1991. 
Kozlovskii, Lev. Russkaia revoliutsiia i nezavisimost’ Pol’shi. Paris: Franko  
     –Russkaia Pechat’, 1922. 
Kukiel, Marian. The Polish-Soviet Campaign of 1920. Edinburgh: Oliver & 
     Boyd Ltd, for Scottish-Polish Society Publications, No. 1, 1942. 
Kutrzeba, Tadeusz. Wyprawa Kijowska. Warsaw: n.p., 1937. 
Latawski, Paul. (ed.) The Reconstruction of Poland, 1914-1923. London:   
     Macmillan, in Association with the School of Slavonic and East 
     European Studies, University of London, 1992. 
Lebedev, V. Russian Placards, 1917-1922. St. Petersburg: Izvestiia VCIK, 
     1923. 
La guerre polono-soviétique de 1919-1920: colloque organisé par la  
     laboratoire de Slavistique, Paris, 4 mai 1973. Paris: Institut d’Études  
     Slaves, 1975. 
MacMillan, M. Peacemakers: the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and its 
     attempt to end war. London: John Murray, 2003. 
Maksakova, L.V. Agitpoezd “Oktiabr'skaia Revolutsiia”, 1919-1920.  
     Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1956. 
Mamatey, Victor S. The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918. 
     Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957. 
Man, John. The War To End Wars, 1914-18. London: Reader’s Digest  
     Association, 1998. 
Mawdsley, Evan. The Russian Civil War. Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2000. 
Mayer, Arno J. Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918. New 
     Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. 
McCrone, David. The Sociology of Nationalism: tomorrow’s ancestors. 
     London: Routledge, 1998. 
McLellan, David. Karl Marx: his life and thought. St. Albans: Paladin,  
     1976. 
________. Karl Marx: the legacy. London: British Broadcasting    274 
     Corporation, 1983. 
McLeod, Mona. Agents of Change: Scots in Poland, 1800-1918. East 
     Linton, East Lothian: Tuckwell, 2000. 
Micewski, A. Polish Foreign Policy: historical perspectives, Gierek’s 
     Poland.  New York, London: Praeger, 1973. 
Mikhutina, Irina. Pol’sko-sovetskaia voina, 1919-1920 gg. Moscow: In’t 
     slavianovedeniia i balkanistiki RAN, 1994. 
Musiałik, Zdzisław. General Weygand and the Battle of the Vistula: 1920. 
     London: Józef Piłsudski Institute of Research, 1987. 
Northedge, F.S. & Audrey Wells. Britain and Soviet Communism: the impact of a  
     revolution. London: Macmillan, 1982. 
O’Conner, Timothy. Diplomacy and Revolution: G.V. Chicherin and Soviet foreign 
     affairs, 1918-1930. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1987. 
Palij, Michael.  The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance, 1919-1921.  An aspect of 
     the Ukrainian Revolution. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies 
     Press, 1995. 
Patterson, Eric J. Piłsudski: Marshal of Poland. Bristol: J.W. Arrowsmith, 1935. 
Peplonski, Andrzej. Wywiad w Wojnie Polsko-Bolszewickiej, 1919-1920. Warsaw: 
     Dom Wydawniczy Bellona, 1999. 
Pipes, Richard. The Formation of the Soviet Union: communism and nationalism, 
     1917-1923. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. 
________. Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, 1919-1924. London: Fontana 
     Press, 1994. 
Polonsky, Antony. Politics in Independent Poland, 1921-1939. Oxford: Clarendon 
     Press, 1972. 
Poltorak, Sergei. Pobedonosnoe porazhenie: razmysheniia o sovetsko-polskoi voine 
     1920 goda v kanun ee 75-letiia. St. Petersburg: TOO “Tertsiia”, 1994. 
Ponomaryov, B., A. Gromyko & V. Khvostov. (eds.). History of Soviet Foreign 
     Policy, 1917-1945. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969. 
Reddaway, William F. et al. (eds.) The Cambridge History of Poland. Cambridge: 
     Cambridge University Press, 1951. 
Reddaway, William F. Marshal Pilsudski. London: Routledge, 1939. 
Rose, William J. Poland. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1939. 
Rozek, Edward J. Allied Wartime Diplomacy: a pattern in Poland. New York: John 
     Wiley, 1958. 
Salisbury, Harrison E. Russia in Revolution, 1900-1930. London: Deutsch, 1978.   275 
Senn, Alfred Erich. The Emergence of Modern Lithuania. New York: Columbia 
     University Press, 1959. 
Service, Robert. Lenin: a biography. London: Papermac, 2001. 
________. Lenin: a political life. Vol. 3. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995. 
Shotwell, James T. & Max M. Laserson. Poland and Russia 1919-1945.       
     New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by King’s  
     Crown Press, 1945. 
Sieradzki, J.  BiałowieŜa i Mikaszewicze: mity i prawdy.  Do genezy wojny 
     pomiędzy Polska a RSFRR w 1920r. Warsaw: n.p., 1959. 
Smith, Jeremy. The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-1923.  
     Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999. 
Smogorzewski, Casimir. La Pologne restaurée. Paris: Gebethner & Wolff, 
     1927. 
________. About the Curzon Line and Other Lines. London: n.p., 1944. 
Stachura, Peter D. (ed.) Perspectives on Polish history.  Stirling: Centre for 
     Research in Polish History, University of Stirling, 2001. 
________. (ed.) Poland between the Wars, 1918-1939. Basingstoke: 
     Macmillan, 1998. 
________. Poland in the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999. 
________. (ed.) Themes of Modern Polish History: proceedings of a 
     symposium on 28 March 1992 in honour of the centenary of General  
     Stanislaw Maczek. Glasgow: Polish Social and Educational Society,  
     1992. 
Stieve, Friedrich. Isvolsky and the World War: based on documents recently 
      published by the German Foreign Office. (trans. E.W. Dickes). London: 
     G. Allen and Unwin, 1926. 
Strachan, Hew. The First World War. London: Historical Association, 1993. 
________. The First World War: to arms. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University 
     Press, 2001. 
Sukiennicki, Wiktor. Przyczyny Początek Wojny Polsko-Sowieckiej, 1919 
     -1921.Warsaw: Bellona, 1963. 
Sumner, Benedict H. Survey of Russian History. London: Duckworth, 1944. 
Swain, Geoffrey. Russia’s Civil War. Stroud: Tempus Publishing Ltd, 2000.   
Szczepański, Janusz. Społeczeństwo Polski w Walce z Najazdem 
     Bolszewickim 1920 roku. Warsaw: Wyzsza Skoła Humanistyczna, 2000. 
Tadeusza, E. (ed.) Polacy a Rosjanie. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Neriton,   276 
    2000. 
Teslar, Tadeusz. Polityka Rosji Sowieckiej podczas Wojny z Polską: trzy 
     momenty. Warsaw: Gebethner & Wolff, 1937. 
________. Propaganda Bolszewicka podczas Wojny Polsko-Rosyjskiej 1920 
     roku.Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Oświatowy, 1938. 
Thatcher, Ian D. Leon Trotsky and World War One: August 1914-February  
     1917. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000. 
________. Trotsky. London: Routledge, 2003. 
Timmers, Margaret. (ed.) The Power of the Poster. London: V&A   
     Publications, 1998. 
Tuck, Jim. Engine of Mischief: an analytical biography of Karl Radek. London: 
     Greenwood Press, 1988. 
Tych F. & H. Schumacher, Julian Marchlewski: szkic biograficzny.  Warsaw: n.p., 
     1966. 
Uldricks, Teddy J. Diplomacy and Ideology: the origins of Soviet foreign relations, 
     1917-1930. London: Sage Publications, 1979. 
Umiastowski, R. Russia and the Polish Republic 1918-1941. London: Aquafondata, 
     1945. 
Vakar, Nicholas P. Belorussia: the making of a nation: a case study. Cambridge, 
     Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. 
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Trotsky: the eternal revolutionary. (ed. & trans. Harold 
     Shukman). London: HarperCollins, 1996. 
Wagner, Gerhard. Deutschland und der polnisch-sowjetische kreig 1920.  Wiesbaden: 
     Steiner, 1979. 
Wandycz, Piotr. S. France and her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925: French-Czechoslovak- 
     Polish relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno. Westport, Conn.: 
     Greenwood Press, 1974. 
________. Polish Diplomacy, 1914-45: aims and achievements. London: Orbis for the 
     School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 1988. 
________. The Price of Freedom: a history of East Central Europe from the Middle 
     Ages to the present. London: Routledge, 1992. 
________. Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
     University Press, 1969. 
Wheeler-Bennett, John. Brest-Litovsk: the forgotten peace, March 1918. London: 
     Macmillan, 1963. 
White, Stephen. The Bolshevik Poster. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University   277 
     Press, 1988. 
_______. Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution: a study in the politics of  
     diplomacy, 1920-1924. London: Macmillan, 1979. 
Williams, Beryl. The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921. Oxford: Basil 
     Blackwell, 1987. 
Williams, Robert C. Artists in Revolution: portraits of the Russian avant 
      -guard, 1905-1925. London: Scolar Press, 1978. 
Wyndham, Francis & David King, Trotsky: A Documentary. 
     Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972. 
Yates, Paul. A Short History of Białystok, Poland. London: P. Yates, 1984. 
Zamoyski, Adam. The Battle for the Marchlands. New York: Columbia 
     University Press, 1981. 
________. Paderewski. London: Collins, 1982. 
________. The Polish Way: a thousand year history of the Poles and their 
     culture. London: Murray, 1987. 
Zarnitskii, S. & A. Sergeev, Chicherin. Moscow: Izdatelstvo TsK VLKSM, 
     “Molodaia Gvardiia”, 1975. 
Zawilski, Apoloniusz. Polskie Fronty, 1918-1945. Vol. 1. Warsaw: Oficyna 
     Wydawnicza Volumen, 1977. 
Zueva, F.G. (ed.) Istoriia Pol’shi. Vol. 3. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo akademii 
     nauk SSSR, 1958. 
śułowski, Mieczyslaw. Wojna z Rosją o Niepodległóść, 1918-1920.  
     Katowice: Wydawnictwo Polskie, 1987. 
 
Articles 
Beauvois, Daniel. “The Polish National Ideal”. The International History 
     Review. Vol. 7, No. 1, (1985): 146-158. 
Biegański, S. “Piłsudskii Lenin o Ruchach Rewolucyjnych Narodowych”. 
     Niepodległość. Vol. 3, (1951): 64-83. 
Biskupski, M.B. “Paderewski, Polish Politics, and the Battle of Warsaw, 
     1920”. Slavic Review. Vol. 46, No. 3, (1987): 503-512. 
Black, Eugene C. “Lucian Wolf and the Making of the Paris Peace 1919”. 
     Polin: A Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies. Vol. 2. No. 1, (1987): 5-36. 
Blank, Stephen. “Soviet Nationality Policy and Soviet Foreign Policy: the 
     Polish Case 1917-1921”. The International History Review. Vol. 7, No. 
     1, (1985): 103-128.   278 
Bowlt, John E. “Russian Art in the Nineteen Twenties”. Soviet Studies. Vol. 
     22, No. 4, (1970): 575-594. 
Bruce Lincoln, W. “Soviet Political Posters: arts and ideas for the masses”. 
     History Today. Vol. 26, No. 5, (1976): 302-309. 
Ciołkosz, Adam. “Karl Marx and the Polish Insurrection of 1863”. The 
     Polish Review. Vol. 10, No. 4, (1965): 8-51. 
Dąbrowski, Stanisław. “The Peace Treaty of Riga”. The Polish Review. Vol. 4, No. 1, 
     (1960): 3-34. 
Davies, Norman. “August 1920”. European Studies Review. Vol. 3, No. 3, (1973): 
     269-82. 
________. “The Genesis of the Polish-Soviet War”. European Studies Review. Vol. 5, 
     No. 1. (1975): 47-67. 
________. “Lloyd George and Poland, 1919-1920”. Journal of Contemporary 
     History. Vol. 6, No. 3, (1971): 132-154. 
________. “Sir Maurice Hankey and the Inter-Allied Mission to Poland, July-August 
     1920”. Historical Journal. Vol. 15, No. 3, (1972): 553-561. 
________. “The Soviet Command and the Battle of Warsaw”. Soviet Studies. Vol. 23, 
     No. 4, (1972): 573-585. 
Dziewanowski, M.K. “Joseph Piłsudski, the Bolshevik Revolution and Eastern 
     Europe”. The Polish Review. Vol. 14, No. 4, (1969): 14-31. 
________.  “Pilsudski's Federal Policy, 1919-1921”. Journal of Central European 
     Affairs. Vol. 10, No. 2, (1950): 113-128.   
________. The Soviet-Polish War of 1919-1920. Issue 36, (April 1999). 
     www.file://H/essay36_3.html 
Elcock, H.J. “Britain and the Russo-Polish Frontier 1919-1921”. Historical Journal. 
     Vol. 12, No. 1, (1969): 137-154. 
Fiddick, Thomas C. “Miracle on the Vistula: Soviet Policy versus Red Army 
     Strategy”. Journal of Modern History. Vol. 45, No. 4, (1973): 626-643. 
Gąsiorowski, Zygmunt J. “Joseph Pilsudski in light of American Reports 1919-1922”. 
     Slavonic and East European Review. Vol. 49, No. 116, (1971): 425-436. 
________. “Joseph Pilsudski in light of British Reports”. Slavonic and East  
     European Review. Vol. 50, No. 1, (1972): 558-569. 
Gott, Richard. “Art of the State”. New Statesman. 20 January 2003. 
Himmer, Robert. “Soviet Policy toward Germany during the Russo-Polish 
     War, 1920”. Slavic Review. Vol. 35, No. 4, (1976): 665-682. 
Jones, David R. “Documents on British Relations with Russia, 1917-1918”.   279 
     Canadian-American Slavic Studies. Vol. 7, No. 7, (1973): 219-237. 
Juzwenko, A. “Misja Marchlewskiego w 1919 roku na tle stosunków 
      polsko-radzieckich”. Zieliński, H. (ed.) Z badań nad wpływen i  
     znaczeniem rewolucji rosyjskich 1917 roku dla ziem polskikh.  Wrocław: 
     n.p., 1968. 
Kalenichenko, P. “O deiatel’nosti Polskogo vremennogo revoliutsionnogo  
     komiteta”. Manusevich, Aleksandr. (ed.) Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia i zarubezhnye 
      slavianskie narody. Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1957. 
Khrenov, I.A. “Kommunisticheskaia rabotaia partiia Pol’shi v bor’be za 
     normalizatsiiu Pol’sko-Sovetskikh otnoshenii, 1918-1921”. Sovetsko- 
     Pol’skie otnosheniia, 1918-1945. Moscow: n.p., 1974. 
Korczyński, Aleksander G. “From a Triple Yoke to Independence”. The   
     Polish Review.  Vol. 14, No. 4, (1969): 5-14. 
Latawski, Paul. “The Dmowski-Namier Feud, 1915-1918”. Polin: A Journal 
     of Polish-Jewish Studies. Vol. 2, No. 1, (1987): 37-49. 
Lerner, Warren. “Poland in 1920: a case study in foreign-policy decision 
     making under Lenin”. South Atlantic Quarterly. Vol. 72, (1973): 406- 
     414. 
Lerski, George L. “Dmowski, Paderewski and American Jews”. Polin: A 
     Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies. Vol. 2, No. 1, (1987): 95-116. 
Levene, Mark. “Nationalism and its alternatives in the International Arena: 
     the Jewish Question at Paris”. Journal of Contemporary History. Vol. 
     28, No. 3, (1993): 511-531. 
Lewandowski, Józef. “History and Myth: Pinsk, April 1919”. Polin: A 
     Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies. Vol. 2, No. 1, (1987): 50-72. 
Lincoln, W. Bruce. “Soviet Political Posters: arts and ideas for the masses”. 
     History Today. Vol. 26, No. 5, (1976): 302-309. 
Lundgreen-Nielsen, Kay. “The Mayer Thesis Reconsidered: the Poles and 
     the Paris Peace Conference, 1919”. The International History Review.  
     Vol. 7, No. 1, (1985): 68-102. 
MacFarlane, L.J. “Hands off Russia: British Labour and the Russo-Polish 
     War 1920”. Past and Present. Vol. 38, (1967): 126-152. 
Materski, Wojciech. “The Second Polish Republic in Soviet Foreign  
     Policy.” Polish Review. Vol. 45, No. 2, (2000): 331-345. 
McCann, James M. “Beyond the Bug: Soviet Historiography of the Soviet 
      -Polish War of 1920”. Soviet Studies. Vol. 36, No. 4, (1984): 475-493.   280 
Micewski, Andrzej. “Polish Foreign policy: historical perspectives”. Bromke, Adam 
     & John Strong. (eds.) Gierek’s Poland. New York; London: Praeger Publishers, 
     1973. 
Polonsky, Viacheslav. “Russkii revoliutsionnyi plakat”. Pechat' i Revoliutsiia. 
     Vol. 5, No. 1, (1920): 56-77. 
Russell, Bryant F. “Lord D’Abernon, the Anglo-French Mission, and the Battle of 
     Warsaw 1920”. Jahrbücher für geschichte osteuropas. Vol. 38, (1990): 526-547. 
Semenenko, V.I. “The Soviet-Polish War of 1920, the Idea of World Revolution and 
     the Position of L.D. Trotsky”. Journal of Trotsky Studies. No. 3, (1995), pp. 59-80. 
Sowrakowski, Witold. “An Error Regarding Eastern Galicia in Curzon’s Note to the 
     Soviet Government.” Journal of Central European Affairs. Vol. 4, No. 1, (1944): 
     3-27. 
Sukiennicki, Wiktor. “Przyczyny i Poczatek Wojny Polsko Wieckiej, 1919-1921”. 
     Bellona. Vol. 45, (1963): 11-42. 
Taylor, Richard, “A Medium for the Masses: agitation in the Soviet Civil War”. 
     Soviet Studies. Vol. 22, No. 4, (1970-1971): 562-574. 
Voevodin, P. “Agitpoezd ‘Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia’”. Partiinaia Zhizn’. Vol. 5. No. 
     5, (1957): 73-74. 
von Laue, Theodore H. “Soviet Diplomacy: G.V. Chicherin, Peoples Commissar for 
     Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930”. Aspaturian, Vernon V. (ed.) Process and Power in 
     Soviet Foreign Policy. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971. 
Wandycz, Piotr S. “General Weygand and the Battle of Warsaw”. Journal of Central 
     European Affairs. Vol. 20, (1960): 357-365. 
________. “Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe: Poland”. The 
     American Historical Review. Vol. 97, No. 4, (1992): 1011-1025. 
________. “Poland and Russia: the Perennial Question”. The 
     International History Review. Vol. 7, No. 1, (1985): 2-18. 
________. “Secret Soviet-Polish Talks, 1919”. Slavic Review, Vol. 24,  
     No. 3, (1965): 425-429. 
________. “The Treaty of Riga: it’s significance for interwar Polish 
     foreign policy”. The Polish Review. Vol. 14, No. 4, (1969): 31-37. 
White, James D. “National Communism and World Revolution: The 
     Political Consequences of German Military Withdrawal from the 
     Baltic Area in 1918-1919”. Europe Asia Studies. Vol. 46, No. 8, 
     (1994): 1349-1369. 
White, Stephen. “Labour’s Council of Action”. Journal of Contemporary    281 
     History. Vol. 9, No. 4, (1974): 99-122. 
Zalkin, I. “Iz pervykh mesatsev narodnogo komiteta po inostrannym 
     delam”. Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, no. 15, (1922): 55-61. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 